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POLITICAL REFLECTION

"Advancing Diversity"

Quarterly

Beyond the Crisis: Global Faultiness, Recession and Resource Depletion
By Prof. Bülent Gökay

How to Reintegrate the Taliban?
By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

US Reaction to Wikileaks: A Terrorist for Opposing American Imperial Power?
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Turkish Reforms, a Wake-Up Call for Israel
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By Dr. Zura Garakanidze

Interview with

Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev

Director of Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

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

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FRANCE

As over 1m people protested on the streets, France's government presented its pension-reform plan to the National Assembly. The government claims the overhaul, which would raise the retirement age from 60 to 62, will save 70 billion euro ($89.2 billion), but unions are threatening further demonstrations and strikes.

(11 September 2010)

USA

In one of the biggest upsets in America's primary-election season, Christine O'Donnell, a Republican running for senator in Delaware and supported by the tea-party movement, beat Mike Castle, the party establishment's choice and a popular politician in the state. Ms O'Donnell's victory in the primary could benefit the Democrats in November's election. In Washington, DC, the sitting mayor, Adrian Fentry, lost to Vincent Gray, chairman of the city council.

(18 September 2010)

CHILE

A complex rescue operation in Chile to free 33 miners trapped underground for more than two months came to a triumphant conclusion as they were winched, one by one, to the surface in a purpose-built rescue capsule. Sebastian Pinera, Chile's president, said his country would never be the same.

(16 October 2010)

TURKEY

Turkey's government won a referendum on proposed constitution amendments by an unexpectedly large margin of 58-42%. The changes, which include an overhaul of the judiciary, have been welcomed by the EU and America. Mr Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has been in government since 2002, pursuing an agenda of broadly democratic reform and market liberalization.

(12 September 2010)

NIGERIA

At least 12 people were killed by two car-bombs on October 1st near a ceremony held in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, to celebrate the country's 50th anniversary of independence. A media magnate, Raymond Dokpesi, was briefly held. He is chief of staff to Ibrahim Babangida, a former military ruler from the north who plans to run gain for the presidency next year against the incumbent, Goodwill Jonathan, a southerner.

(01 October 2010)

BURMA

Aung San Suu Kyi called for national reconciliation and unity after emerging from seven years under house arrest, stressing that she alone could not lead Burma to democracy after 50 years of military rule. Speaking at length publicly for the first time since she was detained in 2003, Burma's revered face of democracy said she would like to "speak directly and honestly" with the generals who jailed her. More than 10,000 people jammed Shwegondine Road in central Rangoon to catch their first glimpse of "The Lady", as she is known across Burma – democratic leader and daughter of the country's greatest hero, independence champion General Aung San.
(14 November 2010)

USA

Whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks has unleashed a flood of US cables detailing shocking diplomatic episodes, from a nuclear standoff with Pakistan to Arab leaders urging a strike on Iran.
(29 November 2010)

IRAQ

At least 117 Iraqi civilians were killed by insurgents during a five-day period, starting on October 29th, when a suicide bomber killed 25 people in a town north of Baghdad. Two days later at least 52 people, mostly Iraqi Christians, were killed when a church in the capital was occupied by insurgents and stormed by security forces. Two days after that, another 40 people died in a series of bomb attacks, mainly in Shia districts, also in Baghdad. Presumed to have been the work of Sunni jihadist linked to al-Qaeda, it was the highest week's death toll since American combat troops let Iraq at the end of August. ***(06 November 2010)***

VATICAN

The Vatican rushed out a "clarification" of the pope's remarks on the use of condoms, insisting the pope had "not reformed or changed the [Roman Catholic] church's teaching". But the statement made clear that Pope Benedict XVI was prepared to consider the use of condoms in certain, limited circumstances. The statement, and the pope's interview, suggested that, notwithstanding the interpretation of remarks he made last year on his visit to Africa, Benedict accepted that condoms reduced the risk of infection from Aids. ***(18 November 2010)***

KOREA

North Korea attacked a tiny island in South Korea that lies in the Yellow Sea close to the countries' maritime border. The hour-long artillery barrage killed four people and flattened neighbourhoods and described by Ban Kinmoon, the UN secretary-general, as "one of the gravest incidents since the end of the Korean war". South Korea's response was restrained. As the world expressed outrage at the North's actions, America sent an aircraft carrier to join a flotilla of warships due to take part in a military exercise with South Korea.***(27 November 2010)***

Beyond The Crisis: Global Faultiness, Recession and Resource Depletion*

By Prof. Bülent Gökay**

The current global recession has been dominating the news since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. There are lots of proximate causes put forward for the recession – the US housing bubble and the huge size of the American economy, persistent unresolved global imbalances, a lack of government regulation of the financial sector, lax regulation and insufficient regulation that lead to widespread underestimation of risk. But all these are symptoms. In order to make clear sense of this crisis, one should look at a broad picture regarding the configuration of the world economy, i.e. how the global economy has been organised and what kind of shifts it has been going through over the last three decades. Such a long-term perspective is essential because the recent crisis is a clear expression of the structural changes and deep-rooted contradictions which have occurred within the global system in the last 30 years. As a result, today's global economic system is marked by a number of profound vulnerabilities. In terms of its long-term affects, the greatest vulnerability of the world system is probably that of availability and distribution of critical resources as oil, food, and water.

The very logic of accumulation under the current economic system necessitates that the material elements (resources) of nature are transformed into commodities in an ever-expanding rate. In this long history of human excessiveness in production and consumption, the stability of the economic order, as an unrestrained structure, is dependent, more than ever, on the continued accumulation in a cycle of never-ending expansion. This means that more and more materials from the nature must be consumed in the process of production. So far, the world's most valuable energy supplies and minerals are being extracted and consumed at a bread neck pace.

In the contemporary world, hardly any issue causes more stress, either directly or indirectly, than the exploration, production and consumption of the world's energy resources, in particular oil. From the war in Iraq to rising food and fuel prices, energy consumption has been a crucial topic. A direct consequence of the consumption of oil is air-pollution in the form of sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and carbon dioxide, which are a burden on society due both to current health issues, and future costs related to global warming.

Oil is the most strategic raw material. It can hardly be overstated how crucial petroleum is to our modern industrial society. Virtually every aspect of modern industrial life requires oil, gas and electricity (largely created from these fossil fuels). The modern life depends on petroleum as the main energy source for its very existence. Every day we rely on fossil fuels in one way or

another – to transport us to work, to cook our food, to light, heat, and cool our homes, and even to grow our food. Our lives are so dependent on petroleum that it is impossible to imagine of a world without it. There is very little we consume or use in our lives that does not use petroleum in its manufacture.

Oil fuels the economy. It is the largest single traded product in the world. It provides about 95 % of all transportation fuels and 40 % of the global energy. Oil is also determinant of national security. Today's modern armies are entirely dependent on oil-powered ships, planes, helicopters and armoured vehicles. Oil also supplies feedstock for thousands of manufactured products and is vital for food manufacturing: 17 % of our energy is used for producing food. Modern agriculture makes heavy use of oil in a variety of ways. We use oil for fertilisers, pesticides, and for the packaging and distribution of food.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, global trade and a global economy have developed, and our population has grown in size from 1,000 m to 6,000 m by drawing down a massive natural gift of energy in the form of cheap crude oil. Up until early modern times, miners, scientists, natural philosophers, and other 'experts' believed that gold, silver and other minerals were vegetable-like in that, when mined, they would literally grow back like mown grass. This belief was not wrong in principle in the case of coal and its hydrocarbon cousins in gaseous and liquid form, because they are the remains of ancient organisms. As a practical maxim, however, it was completely mistaken, because the time it would take normal geological processes to transform organic matter into coal, natural gas and petroleum is of the order of millions of years. Therefore, for all practical purposes, these fuels are finite, non-renewable energy sources, i.e. in any given region there is a fixed amount of oil at the beginning of the exploration, and after every drop of oil taken out there will be that amount of less oil left under the ground.

Like any fixed non-renewable resource, oil is limited, and its consumption will rise, peak (the point beyond which oil production will irreversibly start declining), and decline. Oil production follows a bell curve, and after the production reaches its peak (meaning when half the oil is taken out), oil production will inevitably fall. On the upslope of the curve, there is the first oil, the oil closer to the surface, which is also called 'cheap oil' or 'easy oil', because it is easier and cheaper to take that oil out and also it is better quality ('light', low-sulphur oil, therefore cheaper to refine). On the upslope of the curve, oil production costs are lower than on the down slope, when extra effort (and cost) is needed to extract the remaining poorer quality oil from deeper in the reservoirs, and extra cost needed to refine this 'heavy oil' (which is high-sulphur, very viscous and does not flow easily). Thus, once oil production reaches its peak, global demand for oil is most likely to exceed the capacity to produce it, prices will rise, oil-dependent economies will face serious problems. 'An increasing body of evidence suggests that the era of "easy oil" is over and that we have entered a new period of "tough oil"'.

" Since the beginning of the 20th century, global trade and a global economy have developed, and our population has grown in size from 1,000 m to 6,000 m by drawing down a massive natural gift of energy in the form of cheap crude oil. "

Today, oil and gas experts around the world are growingly alarmed at current and future scarcity of the 'black gold'. As demand for energy explodes worldwide, there is less of it available and, it seems, less exploration for it. Crude oil prices have doubled since 2001. There may still be times when oil prices temporarily fall due to sharp decline in demand, mainly during the times of serious economic crisis like the current financial crisis in the Western economies, but the general long term trend is unquestionably upward in the price of crude oil. US refineries are working close to capacity, yet no new refinery has been constructed since 1976. And oil tankers are fully booked, but outdated ships are being decommissioned faster than new ones are being built.

According to many estimates, the world is depleting oil reserves at an annual rate of 6 %. At the same time, growth in demand is rising at an annual rate of 2.2 %. All this means that the world's oil industry would have to find the equivalent of more than 8 % a year in newly discovered oil reserves to maintain an orderly oil market. Unfortunately, discoveries are lagging behind, primarily because new large oil deposits are not being found, but also because even if they were, there is a considerable time lag between a discovery and turning the oil into a useable energy product. Many observers have drawn attention to the extraordinary technological accomplishments of the industry over the past few decades. Of course, advanced technologies will buy a bit more time before production commences to fall, but it is also important to appreciate that spending more money on oil exploration will not really change this situation. There is only so much crude oil in the world, and the industry has found about 90 % of it.

There are some indications that, in the years to come, the search for new sources of oil maybe transformed into a quest for entirely new sources of energy. The replacement of fossil fuels by alternatives such as solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, hydrogen and nuclear fission does not yet seem to be a viable alternative. So far, the available energy alternatives, mostly solar and wind power, offer only diluted energy substitutes, i.e. not as powerful a fuel source as oil. For solar and wind energy to come close to providing the same amount of energy as oil does, would require a truly massive scale up in production and deployment of such technologies and still they would come nowhere near to match the convenience and density of oil. Therefore, while conservation and renewable energy are much in the news, the reality is that neither of these factors is likely to have any significant impact on the steadily growing demand for oil products.

Many analysts, looking at the current discovery and production levels of oil fields around the world suggest that within the next decade, the supply of conventional oil will be unable to keep up with demand. We are also witnessing the impact in the increasing scarcity and cost of food and other critical resources that rely on oil. There are some reports that there has been a surge of motorists running out of fuel because they could not afford to fill their tanks. Airlines are cutting back on flights, and some even are beginning to charge extra for checked baggage. During the last couple of years,

World Oil Resources (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003)



in some parts of the world, rising fuel prices led to massive protests and strikes. Many leading economists and oil experts claim that the price of oil generally reflects the fast rising demand from China and India, and stagnant production as reserves of accessible oil become less plentiful. According to some experts, even a shortfall between demand and supply as little as 10 or 15 percent is enough to wholly shatter an oil-dependent economy. There were serious oil-related crises in the 1970s, but these 'oil shocks' were due to political effects rather than the decreasing amount of oil. Unlike the oil shocks of the 1970s, this time there seems to be a permanent decline. It is becoming clear that cheap fuel is no longer something that we can take for granted. The economy is already suffering for it. The end of cheap oil indicates a potentially spectacular reshaping of the globalized trade flows that have emerged in the last two decades.

> Without volume energy we have no sustainable water, we have no sustainable food, we now have no sustainable healthcare. And since five-sixths of the world still barely uses any energy it really is an important issue. And since five-sixths of the world is still growing fast or too fast it's even a more important issue.
>
> What peaking does mean, in energy terms, is that once you've peaked, further growth in supply, is over. Peaking is generally, also, a relatively quick transition to a relatively serious decline at least on a basin-by-basin basis. And the issue then, is the world's biggest serious question.

Recently energy (and food) prices have sharply declined but only because of the severity of the recession(1). Despite the current fall in prices, the latest report by the *International Energy Agency* (IEA), 2008 World Energy Outlook (WEO), paints a depressing picture of an oil industry having to run faster and faster, like a hamster trapped on a wheel, just to keep pace with burgeoning oil demand over the next 20 years. The first paragraph of the IEA report reads as 'the world's energy system is at a crossroads. Current global trends in energy supply and consumption are patently unsustainable - environmentally, economically, socially'. The report, released in November 2008,

Production of Oil, both conventional and unconventional



This model, based in part on multiple Hubbert curves, is prepared by Colin J. Campbell and Jean H. Laherrère, March 1998

million barrels per day (bpd) of new oil production capacity to meet the expected growth in demand by 21 million bpd by 2030 and offset 43 million bpd of expected declines from existing fields. The total cost is put at around $5 trillion at today's prices. The study, based on detailed data for the world's 580 largest oilfields and an extrapolation to the remaining 70,000 smaller fields, estimates output from existing and future fields will decline by 6.7-8.6 percent a year.

In the report "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World", the National Intelligence Council speculates that 'Countries capable of significantly expanding production will dwindle; oil and gas production will be concentrated in unstable areas. ... As a result of this and other factors, the world will be in the midst of a fundamental energy transition away from oil toward natural gas and coal and other alternatives'.

> **"In order to reduce our energy consumption, it follows that we consume less products. The only rational response to the impending end of the cheap oil age is to redesign all aspects of our lives."**

The world economy was able to enjoy impressive growth in the 20th century, largely because it benefited from cheap and abundant oil, and could afford ignoring environmental costs. The severe effects of global environmental damage have now risen to the point that the very survival of the humanity is at stake. By far the most controversial feature of environmental damage relates to potential atmospheric damage, that is, damage to the gaseous membrane that maintains all life on earth. Especially the combustion products of fossil fuels are the major source of danger to earth's atmosphere. The problems arise because some of the key gaseous components of the atmosphere are becoming excessively concentrated, and many experts believe that this situation is dangerously upsetting the delicate balance between various gaseous in earth's atmosphere. This human-induced global warming is only one among many serious environmental consequences caused by the never-ending drive of accumulation under the existing system. A quarter of all deaths in the world today have some links to environmental factors.

> ...the environmental crisis we now confront is quantitatively and qualitatively different from anything before, simply because so many people have been inflicting damage on the world's ecosystem during the present century [20th] that the system as a whole – not simply its various parts – may be in danger.

The environmental problems associated with all aspects of production, distribution and consumption trigger crucial questions about the future sustainability of economy and society in the present way of organisation. The world population is expected to grow by 1.2 billion over the next 20 years, and all of these people will want food, shelter and energy, further straining the planet's already strained resources. This is the secret ticking time bomb under the global economic system in the 21st century. The only long-term solution is to reduce significantly our energy usage. This does not just mean using energy efficient light bulbs, taking the bus to work, or to cycle. In order to reduce our energy consumption, it follows that we consume less products. The only rational response to the impending end of the cheap oil age is to redesign all aspects of our lives. PR

Notes:

* The ideas and most of the data contained in this section are drawn from B. Gokay, 'How Oil Fuels World Politics', in B. Gokay (ed), *The Politics of Oil. A Survey*, Routledge, 2006, pp. 3-10.

** **Bülent Gökay** is Professor of International Relations at Keele University.

1) Recently, in the second half of 2010, surging demand in China, India and the Middle East is making up for decline in the debt-crippled West. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7266837/Barclays-and-Bank-of-America-see-looming-oil-crunch.html, accessed in March 2010)

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Clash of Communities: Turkey's Dormant Domestic Cold War

By Dr. H. Akın Ünver*

More importantly than ever, Turks need to realize that their compatriots who vote for the rival party are also Turks and not some extraterrestrial entity that popped up suddenly to 'take over' Turkey.

Turkey's September 12, 2010 Constitutional Amendment referendum was perhaps one of the most socially polarizing episodes in its modern history. A slightly higher-profile voting than a general election, this referendum carved Turkey into two sharply divided trenches, a 'yes' or 'no' to the proposed amendment package to the Turkish Constitution.

Supporters of the Constitutional amendment package argued that the proposed changes would bring Turkish legal and political system closer to European standards through a number of rectifications regarding economic – social rights, individual and judicial reform and enabling the trial of the 1980 coup generals. The 'no' position on the other hand had focused extensively on the judicial reform part of the amendment package, arguing that the proposed reform would do nothing but render the Constitutional Court (the highest judicial organ) subservient to the demands of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), meaning the AKP's effective control over the entire judiciary.

Although the amendment package was voted in favor by the 58% of the Turkish electorate on September 12 and that the ruling AKP has declared the result 'a victory', the vote and its aftermath has exposed Turkey's long dormant 'domestic Cold War'. Turkey emerged from its deeply polarizing referendum even more entrenched – in the words of the prominent Turkish columnist Hakkı Devrim: 'like a freestone peach; which serves as an analogy of Turkish political nature in every incident'. However more interesting than the referendum were the public-political discourses and narratives adopted by both sides of the political continuum in order to increase support and snatch indecisive voters by creating an atmosphere of 'life and death'. Turkey's run-up to referendum was marked by Hitler moustaches, 'asylum-grade' conspiracy theories and well-known warnings from both sides that if people don't vote their way, then 'all will be lost for Turkey'. Such scenes are not unfamiliar in polarized electoral politics of course and unfortunately make up a considerable portion of electoral symbolism and discourse.

However, this time Turkey did not experience its usual 'partisan polarization', which identifies a strong separation in socio-politics along political party lines. This was something relatively new; a case of 'popular polarization', which defines a situation where the society is pushed towards two extremes that are independent of party politics and relate to issues and topics about which the electorate feels more strongly about. Such determinants are always policy areas and issues that elicit an existential threat within a society, so sufficiently 'real' and 'possible' that it becomes impossible even to reason with, let alone convince those immersed in such narratives. Competing narratives and 'realities' clash with each other so intensely, that the resultant effect is one of alienation and 'other-ness' within the society. These clashes intensify of course, as other forms of polarization such as wide ideological discrepancy and acute class struggle weigh in.

One such case was a Hurriyet Daily News report on September 22, about a residential area in the southern Turkish city of Antalya, which had labelled itself as a place only 'Ataturkist, secular and democratic' people can live. This political gated community is just one of many examples in Turkey, where Turkish secularists seek to establish 'glass havens'; invisible and seemingly unsegregated from the society, but serving as a way of drawing strict boundaries between those who adhere to Kemalism and those who do not. One may refer to these gated residentials as a 'secular ummah' (*ummah* (Ar.), or *ümmet* (Tur.) refers to an Islamic community) where, just as in an Islamic *ummah*, a certain code of practice is observed with corresponding social and cultural side-practices, while non-adherents are marginalized and kept outside of the community. While the Islamic ummah seeks unquestioning subservience to Mohammad's deeds, the same rigid obeyance is sought in a 'secular ummah'; similarly, in the words of a well-known political commentator 'secular ummah' goes Anıtkabir (Ataturk's mausoleum) in the same spirit that the Islamic ummah goes to Kaaba.

Neighbourhoods that are not so rigidly separated, experience clashes (although rarely) between these communities. On September 22, a mob attacked two art galleries that were holding cocktail parties in one of those newly gentrified neighbourhoods in Istanbul, the Tophane district, with batons, knives and pepper sprays. While it is still not clear what the motivation for the attacks were (religious, class -oriented or both) targeting choice of the attackers was crystal clear: Istanbul's secular (though not necessarily Ataturkist) and liberal art community with above-average income. In another case, some Turkish newspapers highlighted an instance in which several police officers from Ankara's Çankaya district have interrogated and asked for identification from the couples who, according to policemen, where 'holding hands in an inappropriate fashion' while walking in the park. Given the symbolic nature of the Çankaya district as the 'bastion of secularism' in Ankara, such acts by the security forces create a fear or *Basij-ization* (1) and reinforce the appeal of the gated communities among secularists.

'a case of 'popular polarization', which defines a situation where the society is pushed towards two extremes that are independent of party politics and relate to issues and topics about which the electorate feels more strongly about.'

From a psychological perspective, it is of course impossible to explain to a frightened person that whatever frightens him or her has nothing to do with the object of fear, but all to do with the meta of fear itself in his or her own subconscious. Also from a psychoanalytical perspective, it is not the perceived object of fear (i.e. spiders, altitude, dying etc.) that causes the sensation of fright, but rather a person's low neurological treshold of resistance to startling stimuli causes the sensation of being afraid. A September 2008 reflex test study published in the *Science* journal had discovered a direct correlation between 46 test subjects' lower resistance to frightening stimuli, their tendency to identify themselves as 'conservative' and their hawkish responses to potentially threatening

"In the post-referendum era, Turkey is witnessing its ever-present political polarization evolving into social polarization. A great deal of this has to do with the 'fear mining' policies that have been imposed upon the public by all walks of political leadership."

policy areas such as gun control, military expansion, foreign aid and the Iraq war. One of the co-authors of the study, University of Nebraska political scientist Kevin Smith claimed: "Historically speaking, politicians have appealed to the 'be afraid' response in the electorate in an attempt to mine votes [...] people with stronger responses are more sensitive to potential threats in their environment".

Although the debate on the ethics of using fear exploitation tactics in politics is inconclusive within the political science literature, societies that have been exposed to long-term 'fear mining' practices resemble less to a society over time, and more to a country within which different ideologies and beliefs are at an undeclared domestic Cold War. Not surprisingly, such societies and states bestow an arcane and transcendental value to notions such as 'national unity' and 'one country, one nation', yet they end up deepening societal polarization through creating new trenches of 'us' versus 'them' through this rigid understanding of 'national unity'.

Turkish society, having been subject to protracted and profound fear mining state practices almost since its transition from empire to republic, is dangerously moving towards an irreconcilable societal separation. This does not only relate to the Kurdish question, which many Turks believe to be the ultimate test of national unity, but also relate to other important social stratification factors: religious versus secularist, conservative versus liberal, west versus east, rich versus poor and so on. Today, many radicalized secularist Turks believe that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) takes direct orders from Washington and Brussels, yet at the same time, they also believe that the AKP is trying to convert Turkey into an Iran-like theocratic autocracy and that this is in the interests of the United States and Europe. While many Turkish ultranationalists today believe that the United States is directly supporting the Kurdish nationalist secessionism, they are also the most vocal advocates of buying more U.S.-issued advanced weapons systems due to their fear of losing the fight. On the other hand, while many radical Islamists in Turkey fear the proliferation of alcohol consumption, prostitution and homosexuals in their neighbourhoods perhaps more than anything else, they throw in their lot with the Justice and Development Party, which spends a considerable amount of its time trying to convince people that there is 'no such thing as neighborhood pressure'.

In the post-referendum era, Turkey is witnessing its ever-present political polarization evolving into social polarization. A great deal of this has to do with the 'fear mining' policies that have been imposed upon the public by all walks of political leadership. Today, if this tension does not get diffused, Turkey will experience more and more intra-communal tension, which will sporadically translate into violence and more deeply entrenched gated communities.

Now, rather than later, all of the political parties must take active steps to reduce this tension and leave aside populist rhetoric. More importantly than ever, Turks need to realize that their compatriots who vote for the rival party are also Turks and not some extraterrestrial entity that popped up suddenly to 'take over' Turkey. Sooner, rather than later, Turks need to see that the monster they think was hiding under their bed, was in fact in their minds all along. PR

Notes:

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1) This refers to the Iranian 'Basij' volunteer militia. For more on this, please refer to: Bayat, Asef. 'Squatters and the State: Back Street Politics in the Islamic Republic' in *Middle East Report* No. 191, Iran's Revolutionary Impasse (Nov. - Dec., 1994), pp. 10-14.

How to Reintegrate the Taliban?

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem*

One of the main agenda items at the last NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010 was to find an exit strategy for the international community to leave Afghanistan by 2014. This took place in an increasingly worsening security situation in Afghanistan as well as a deepening political rift between the Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the United States. There are already serious differences between both sides in the way they perceive security challenges faced by the country and how they could be addressed. As Ahmed Rashid points out Karzai's support for the US led 'war on terrorism' has waned significantly, with continuing high levels of violence in southern Afghanistan primarily in Kandahar and Helmand provinces being perceived major destabilizing factor for the entire country. Karzai would like to see the end of war tactics such as night raids used by the US Special Forces which have been disruptive and intrusive for civilians (Financial Times, 19 November, p.9). Such a fault line in the Afghan-US relationship is compounded by the emergence of a much bigger challenge over the last couple of months over the question of how to deal with the Taliban. According to Rashid, the President sees the strengthening of Afghan relationships with the regional countries of Pakistan and Iran as a viable alternative to NATO in the quest of ending the war and finding a political settlement. This shift in turn is seen as a betrayal by the intervening powers in the country. However, the political and security context in the country are such that almost all primary stakeholders including NATO are recognising the need to deal with such a challenge urgently.

The international community has already initiated this process under the umbrella of a programme called Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP). It is still in its early days in terms of proposing concrete reintegration programmes that can be used as inducements for convincing the Taliban to hand in their weapons and stop fighting in return of socio-economic reintegration opportunities. The Taliban as a movement relied on poorly educated young men, most of whom were the children of those Afghans who took refuge in Pakistan. Although their name is derived from the Persian word 'Talib', meaning student, the Taliban typically had only limited and very partial knowledge of Islamic and Afghan history, or even the Quran. Influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, the Taliban models a strict and, in the eyes of many other Muslims around the world, distorted understanding of the practice of Islam. In their isolation in Pakistan, they had little if any contact with respected Muslim scholars and have been unbending in their refusal to tolerate discussion. The Taliban's support in Afghanistan has always been from the Pashtun community, making the southern provinces of the country fertile ground for their activities. Moreover, the Taliban leadership has been almost exclusively Pashtun, and it was because of this ethnic identity and total linkages that they enjoyed widespread support from both the government and people of Pakistan.

As part of this planning process for demobilizing the Taliban, I have been invited to undertake a preliminary study on the possible options for reintegration in the country and there are clearly a number of challenges even in the planning stage. My reflections here are as follows. First of all, as many other war-affected environments, there is a scarcity of reliable information on the very caseload that the APRP will

be targeting. Having talked to a number of key participants from the international community and national authorities, it is estimated that there would be 25,000 – 30,000 of ex-Taliban combatants may be part of this programme. In order to present an even handed approach, and to limit resentment among the population at large, a similar number of former Mujahedin and civilians might also benefit from the programme, especially if a community-based approach is adopted for the implementation of reintegration programmes. In other words, the overall plans for reintegration could be made for a caseload of approximately 50,000 participants, and among them, 2,000 - 3,000 combatants would be commanders at different ranks or leadership level. In terms of possible age groups in the caseload, it is estimated that they would primarily range from 14 to 45, in which around 50% of them are likely to be in their 20s. However, it should be noted that at this stage these are only 'guestimates' and more importantly, it is not clear how many Taliban combatants would actually want to be part of this disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. In other words, although it is highly worrying, it is often a striking reality of war-torn environments that the international community is embarking on a $ 900 million project without quite knowing how many Taliban would be there to take the reintegration offer.

Taliban Militants

Secondly, as the case in almost all DDR contexts, it is important to know the duration of involvement in fighting in the profiling of a caseload and with the Taliban it is considered that the majority of the caseload would have spent between two to eight years in fighting. However, people drift in and out of the Taliban and spend long periods in their own communities, for example during the poppy harvest, which should be factored into the planning of programmes. In Afghanistan, experience shows that most combatants usually take part in fighting on a 'part-time' basis and no more than in the five kilometre radius of their homes, or in other words, most of the caseload for Taliban DDR is likely to be already 'home-based'. Therefore, the whole concept of 'reintegration' should bear in mind this particular fact, as for example, a meaningful and sustainable employment would be much more decisive for such combatants than social reintegration.

As part of the reintegration process, the stimulation of family and community structures would be highly important for effectiveness and sustainability. Considering local traditions and cultural values of Pashtun communities, for example, most ex-combatants are likely to be married with children. Although, this would increase the urgency of economic means for reintegration, it would potentially be an opportunity for more successful reintegration outcomes. However, there are also those combatants who fought with the Mujahedin against the Soviets and then later with the Taliban. These people usually have over 20 years of fighting experience and are primarily in senior leadership positions. Some of these combatants might have carried out against their own or neighbouring communities and for them to go back 'home' can be a difficult challenge and with them, initiatives of social reintegration would be critical. For some of them, giving up their weapons would mean a direct threat to their well-being, as they are likely to face serious security threats. In other words, dealing with grievances between them and their communities needs to be part of their reintegration process.

It is also important to recognise that the majority of Taliban members come from a low educational background with poor literacy and numeracy skills, therefore the type of economic reintegration activities need to bear in mind such an important fact. They are likely to require extra support with building such basic skills while being trained on a particular vocation or assisted through an income generation project. It is necessary to have the programme capacities to provide proper outreach services to support them properly. There should also means of providing such mechanisms of micro-credit for newly created businesses to benefit, as otherwise, they are likely to disappear in the first year of their initiation, leaving those ex-combatants without much option but returning to conflict as a means of livelihood. It is important that the provision of such vocational training and income generation activities are undertaken within a community framework and in this process, it is essential not

creating a strong 'ex-Taliban' identity through solely combatant-centred programmes. This is clearly a matter of availability of resources, and here, what I am envisaging here is not a community-wide economic regeneration initiative. However, knowing what skills are needed in a specific context and what employment opportunities can be strengthened as a potential employment opportunity for former combatants can be a good starting point to make plans for reintegration.

The APRP will be taking place in a context where there have been two previous reintegration experiences as first of all, the DDR of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) with a caseload of over 60,000 combatants and secondly, the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). Both of these processes have been unsuccessful in meeting their primary objectives. With the first DDR process which was completed in 2005, the most successful aspect was probably the disarmament phase, though even that managed to collect only 36,571 small arms and 12,248 items of heavy weaponry, which was believed to be only the tip of iceberg in a country like Afghanistan. The most prominent feature of the DDR of AMF was the way it was highly politicised during its planning and implementation. From the donors' security priorities in the country to warlords' greed for power and the post-conflict government's political structures, all have played a significant role in the creation of less than satisfactory outcomes. Although the international community was acting as a third party and therefore supposed to be neutral, the reality was rather a different story. The various lead donors in the security sector reform process all had their own priorities, and unless the DDR process served their own particular interest, they did not demonstrate much constructive engagement with the process. The re-armament of various armed groups by the US for its war against terror is probably the best example of how the agendas of different lead donors conflicted with each other. On the one hand, the DDR advocated the disarmament of combatants and on the other hand, the re-armament of various factions was taking place at full speed.

The implementation process was badly affected by the involvement of 41 implementing partners with little coordination among them, and by the time programme delivery costs incurred what is left to provide for each combatant was not really meaningful such as trying to initiate a new business in the capital city, Kabul with a budget of less US $ 1,000. As well as high implementation cost, there was hardly any national ownership of the process, and the entire approach was based on the principle of one-man-one weapon in designing reintegration opportunities. Overall, it was a slow implementation because of the political obstacles faced in the process, and did not really make linkages with contextual factors such as why poppy cultivation is the main source of income for most combatants or how culture of violence is perpetuated through generations in all segments of the society.

Some of these lessons were reflected in the design of DIAG as it was a community based approach and aimed to use coercion as a means of 'convincing' armed groups to disarm. However, it was based on a major conceptual flaw and that was the arbitrary separation of armed groups in Afghanistan as legal and illegal. It was difficult to explain why most groups within the DDR of AMF were considered as 'legal' while the majority of them had carried out terrible atrocities against civilian communities. The DIAG policy did not go far in Afghanistan, and in fact some people I interviewed in November this year, considered the new APRP initiative as a resurrection of DIAG but this time, it has a much clearer focus in terms of its target caseload and more importantly a lot more to spend for its successful implementation.

Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that generous international donor commitment for the proposed DDR cannot guarantee a positive DDR process. It is important to recognise that the national ownership of the process is clearly the case with APRP under the leadership of Minister Stanekzai and the international community has been generous with its pledges of support for this programme. However, what would be remaining critical pertains to the reintegration opportunities that could be offered and how they would be implemented. I think what we need to remember is that reintegration of former combatants is not a science but an art, and the recognition of political economy of the reintegration challenge would be the best starting point. PR

Note:

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Interview with

Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev

Director of Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

In this exclusive interview with CESRAN's Hüsrev Tabak and Özgür Tüfekçi, Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev, Director of Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, discusses Azerbaijan's role in Caucasus and the contemporary international system, and the relationships with Turkey, the US and regional states.

CESRAN: *In the Post-Soviet era, the newly established Turkic states were heavily dependent on Russia, and, had Azerbaijan chosen to heavily ally with Russia, a similar position could have occurred. Bearing this in mind, how does Azerbaijan conceive itself regarding its identity? In the name of saving its independence and stability, does it bear the responsibility to cooperate with the aforementioned Turkic states in Central Asia?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkic peoples (with the exception of the Azerbaijanis) were never organized into nation-states in the classical sense. Azerbaijan has always been the most successful Turkic state in consolidating its independence. Apart from resisting the idea of deploying Russian military bases into the country, the nationwide leader of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev succeeded in extracting oil from the Caspian shelf, which enhanced the country's economic power base. In actual fact, the BTC and BTE pipelines, mainly

built to relieve the Western world's oil and gas dependency on the Middle East, emphasized Azerbaijan's geopolitical importance for the European market.

Regarding its allied relations with Russia as well as Azerbaijan's role in strengthening Central Asian stability, Moscow and Baku seek to expand their strategic partnership in the regional geopolitical context. In recent years both states have concluded a number of bilateral agreements and reached substantial progress in fostering their good neighborhood relations. The present-day interaction between two countries shows that Azerbaijan and Russia have chosen a pragmatic cooperative policy towards the Caucasus-Caspian basin. Azerbaijan has always been able to play a more independent role because of Caspian energy riches and a very experienced political leadership. Even if the threats grow from regional or big powers, Azerbaijan could easily balance it using its oil and gas leverages, its Turkish alliance, and its links with the Muslim world. Accordingly, there are public organizations that are working in the sphere of Turkic integration, and Azerbaijan strongly supports them. The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries is one of the tools to improve Azerbaijan's relations with Central Asian Turkic-speaking countries. In general, Azerbaijani leadership pursues a multidimensional, balanced interest-based policy in foreign relations with regional and non-regional actors, and due to such a balanced diplomatic stance, Azerbaijan has been able to guarantee national security and good economic prospects.

CESRAN: *Azerbaijan has already voiced its intention to support the European energy security and to supply the Nabucco pipeline with its local gas production. To what extend will Azerbaijan be a supplier, and/or is Azerbaijan planning just to serve as a transit state in feeding Turkmen gas into Nabucco pipeline?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Azerbaijan plays a significant role in the planned Nabucco pipeline, which is very important for European energy security. So far, it has been the only Caspian producer fully committed to filling the pipeline at the first stage of the project. Hence, Azerbaijan's current and projected volumes of gas will be sufficient to justify the construction of this pipeline for the first few years of its operation.

Azerbaijan's philosophy on energy strategy is simple: energy issues should unite countries on the basis of an integrated policy, strong partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Concerning Turkmenistan's participation to fill Nabucco, its engagement is needed in the short and medium term despite several doubts that have arisen concerning its resource availability and transit corridors. The main obstacle to Turkmenistan's participation in Nabucco has to do with the political unreliability of the Iranian corridor, which is unanimously considered to be the most rational way to deliver Turkmen gas westwards. Nevertheless, the improvement of Azerbaijani-Turkmen relations, as well as the present-day partnership between Turkmenistan and Russia, leaves a room for the EU and the western energy companies to maneuver. One can therefore consider Turkmenistan's subsequent involvement in the Nabucco project weak, but still on the agenda.

"Azerbaijani leadership pursues a multidimensional, balanced interest-based policy in foreign relations with regional and non-regional actors, and due to such a balanced diplomatic stance, Azerbaijan has been able to guarantee national security and good economic prospects."

CESRAN: *How should Russia's intention to deliver S-300 air defence systems to Azerbaijan be viewed? Should it be conceptualized as the Kremlin's new balanced policy in the South Caucasus, or as a "pay-off gesture" to the recently agreed Azerbaijani-Russian gas sales deal?*

Dr. Nuriyev: The issue of modernizing Azerbaijan's army has always been the focus of attention for the reason that Azerbaijani territories are still under occupation. Despite the recent reformation of the country's armed forces, Azerbaijan's army continues to build up modern air-defense systems and to purchase various types of new armament. Azerbaijan uses its potential to grow in strength. This consolidation is observed in the military sphere as well. Azerbaijan lives in conditions of war. This is natural that a greater part of our state expenditure goes on defense. This is our sovereign right to liberate our lands. The territorial integrity of Azerbaijan has never been a subject of discussion. This point should be very clear to all parties.

Obviously, there will be no need for large defense costs after the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved. But today there is a great need for it. Azerbaijan has therefore been actively cooperating with a number of partner-countries in the military sphere. The "politicization" of this issue and the attempt to orchestrate a Russian gas-sale deal are out of the issue.

CESRAN: *What are the expectations of Azerbaijani public from the EU? In your view, what kind of role should the EU play in the South Caucasus?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Quite obviously, the EU acts tactically, not strategically, in the South Caucasus. Despite the fact that EU member states such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy are engaged in South Caucasus at a high level, none of them is able independently to exert substantial influence in the region. The fact that key member states pursue their own national foreign policies towards the three Caucasian countries affects the coherence of the EU's external actions. If these European countries were to act in concert, the EU could become a major player in the South Caucasus – even the most influential one in the middle to long term. But the incapability and reluctance of the European powers to shape a common and articulated policy towards the South Caucasus has prevented them from fulfilling their potential.

Certainly, the EU should take active steps to play an effective role in the conflict resolution process in the South Caucasus. The lack of progress in finding an enduring solution to the protracted territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a worrying and destabilizing factor that continues to impact European security and demands more extensive efforts by the European security organizations. In this context, Azerbaijan is keen to see a larger EU role in resolving the conflict. Clearly, the EU offers a unique combination of economic power and possibilities for solid political dialogue, adding value to conventional multilateral diplomacy under the OSCE's aegis.

On the other hand, energy security is gaining prominence on the EU agenda and is likely to guide the EU's relations with Azerbaijan in the coming years. In spite

"Despite the fact that EU member states such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy are engaged in South Caucasus at a high level, none of them is able independently to exert substantial influence in the region."

of the geo-economic importance of the South Caucasus, significant numbers of European statesmen and policymakers continue to underestimate the dangers stemming from regional conflicts in the South Caucasus. As such, the EU's leverage is limited by the fact that it shares no common political view regarding regional security problems. If "sustainable peace, stability and prosperity" are the EU's strategic goals in the region, conflict management and resolution strategies need to inform the formulation and implementation of any EU policy vis-à-vis the region, and all policies need to be assessed in their impact on the territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus.

CESRAN: *Why has the Azerbaijani government not voiced any intention to be a full-fledged member of the European Union? Why is the government satisfied with only mere "Integration to the Euro-Atlantic institutions" rhetoric? Is there any clear intention to change this? If no, then why?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions is Azerbaijan's one of the main foreign policy goals. Proceeding from the recognition of necessity to deepen its integration into the European Community, Azerbaijan has established a multi-faceted relationship with the European Union. Currently, Azerbaijan and the EU are working on an *Association* Agreement, which will lay a new legal foundation for EU relations with Azerbaijan. The main objective of the Association Agreements is to achieve a closer political association and a gradual economic integration between the EU and Azerbaijan. The EU association agreement, when completed, can have very significant implications in a number of crucial fields for the Azerbaijani population. In general, Azerbaijan is giving priority to a phased approach towards the integration into the EU, although Baku is not looking for EU membership in the near future. After fulfilling Eastern Partnership's obligations, Azerbaijan will gain benefits that could open up membership in medium term.

CESRAN: *How do you assess Turkey's EU bid with regard to its effect on Turkish-Azeri relations? Do you think that any prospective deal between Turkey and the EU will bring a different perspective to Turkish-Azeri relations?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate in December 1999, and in December 2002 the European Council announced that if Turkey met its political 'Copenhagen' criteria by the end of 2004, it would open negotiations without delay. Turkey's strategic relations with Azerbaijan will boost its political benefits to join the European Community. Azerbaijan's membership to the Council of Europe has been strongly supported by Turkey.

"Turkey's strategic relations with Azerbaijan will boost its political benefits to join the European Community."

Turkey's possible candidacy to the EU would benefit Azerbaijan both politically and economically. Access to the European Community is strongly supported by Turkey and Azerbaijan, who understand the gains it could derive, and the large strategic potential it would bring. Such situation would especially benefit Turkey's increasing role as an energy hub, and Azerbaijan's role in guaranteeing EU energy security. This also gives a chance for both countries to improve their partnership relations with the EU. Ultimately, Azerbaijan awaits only positive effects from Turkey's possible EU membership.

CESRAN: *Is it fair to say that Azerbaijan is one of the closest and reliable allies of Turkey? For example, on some crucial issues such as recognition of Northern Cyprus and Kosovo, Turkey and Azerbaijan diverge. What is the main rational behind this difference?*

Dr. Nuriyev: The military and political as well as economic and cultural alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been outlined since the beginning of the fall of the Soviet Union. The strategic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are based on strong traditions and mutual interests. Over the last 20 years Turkey has been Azerbaijan's gateway to the West, and Azerbaijan has played the same role in Turkish relations with Central Asia. Notwithstanding certain pressure and foreign influence, Azerbaijan has insisted on building its major oil and gas pipelines through Turkey towards the West. Standing by Azerbaijan during difficult times, Turkey has earned the esteem and sympathy of the Azerbaijani people. Turkey and Azerbaijan share sound friendly ties, and the Turkey-Azerbaijan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which was established on September 16th 2010, would boost the closer bilateral relations. As such, Turkey and Azerbaijan bear the moral responsibility to defend each other's interests.

From a realpolitik viewpoint, the different shift of both countries' foreign policy priorities is understandable. Azerbaijan's position on Kosovo is clear: Serbia's territorial integrity cannot be under doubt. Over the years Azerbaijan supported a unified Cyprus and the normalization of two sides of Cyprus conflict. In future, these tensions will not deadlock two countries' relations. On the contrary, it could even open new prospects and opportunities to work together.

CESRAN: *How do you assess Iran's nuclear policy? Do you see any prospective threat for Azerbaijan? As for this policy, what kind of strategies should be mapped out by Azerbaijan?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Azerbaijani perspectives on Iran have been shaped by different factors: Azerbaijan and Iran are neighboring countries; Azerbaijan is concerned about Iranian activities on its southern border; Azerbaijan examines Iran's policy so as to understand a level of threat from regional geopolitical standpoint, thereby averting possible U.S. military action. Azerbaijan would be unwilling to be on the front line of any containment effort against Iran. According to Azerbaijani Military Doctrine, which was adopted on June 8th 2010, Azerbaijan supports any country's enrichment of nuclear capacity by peaceful means. Azerbaijan closely watches developments currently underway in Iran. Azerbaijani authorities hope for a peaceful resolution of the problem. Iran is not Iraq or Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic is a significant and powerful geopolitical actor in the South Caucasus particularly and in the Greater Middle East in general. What happens in Iran has a direct impact on developments in the Caspian basin and the Middle East. For the future, the West – particularly the EU and NATO – could make Iran an offer: for instance, to provide assistance in tackling the country's energy and economic problems, and to honor its security concerns. More importantly, proactive and pragmatic diplomacy should be given a chance in order to resolve the problem through sincere engagement and direct negotiations.

"Serbia's territorial integrity cannot be under doubt. Over the years Azerbaijan supported a unified Cyprus and the normalization of two sides of Cyprus conflict."

CESRAN: *With regard to the status of Karabakh, what is Azerbaijan's road map? Specifically, what is the position of Azerbaijan towards the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Azerbaijan's conflict settlement position has remained unchanged from the first days of the peace talks. We see no other way but withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, restoration of the sovereign rights of Azerbaijan in these territories, return of the forcibly displaced population to their places of origin, establishment of conditions for restoring the communications and socio-economic growth of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in the framework of the overall economic development of the country. Obviously, the legal and political constituent for the settlement of the conflict is based upon the norms and principles of international law, laid down in the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 as well as the appropriate documents and decisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Azerbaijan does not want a war, and it remains committed to a peaceful resolution. Yet if forced by deliberate actions aimed at the further consolidation of the current status quo of occupation, Azerbaijan will be ready to resort to any other available measures to legitimately restore its territorial integrity. Territorial acquisitions and the practice of ethnic cleansing are incompatible with universal and European values and contradict the principles and ideas of peace, democracy, stability and regional cooperation.

A good-case scenario creates good opportunities for continuation and completion of the first stage of negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan, Armenia and OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs in order to start working at a new comprehensive peace agreement. However, the success of the peace process depends on a similar commitment and constructive approach on the part of Armenia, as well as on the active contribution of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. International organizations and principal powers should provide a clear signal to those destructive forces who try to attempt to lead the peace process into a deadlock and accept the occupation of Azerbaijani lands as a fait accompli.

"Azerbaijan does not want a war, and it remains committed to a peaceful resolution. Yet if forced by deliberate actions aimed at the further consolidation of the current status quo of occupation, Azerbaijan will be ready to resort to any other available measures to legitimately restore its territorial integrity."

CESRAN: *What makes Azerbaijan important to the USA? What factors affect the Azerbaijan-US relations? What should be done to sustain the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and the USA?*

Dr. Nuriyev: Azerbaijan and the U.S. share a number of strategic interests, including energy, terrorism, and peace, stability and security in the South Caucasus -Caspian basin where the security dynamics are rapidly changing. In recent years the U.S. has ignored these developments to its own detriment. By contributing troops to missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan is also seen as a major player in the region, thus helping to curb terrorism and extremism. In addition, Azerbaijan's strong economic growth makes the country a burgeoning force in the South Caucasus-Caspian basin.

Nevertheless, the U.S. lacks any coherent vision on where and how Azerbaijan fits into a broader American strategy. If the U.S. really wants to have an effective

and strategically visionary policy in the region, Washington needs to take a different tack. The U.S. needs a strong ally in Azerbaijan, not least because of Azerbaijan's unique independence in the region. Continuing to constructively engage with Azerbaijan and to work together successfully on the shared interests requires that the U.S. craft a more coherent policy towards Azerbaijan.

To achieve this task, the U.S. needs to offer greater support on the issues that are of crucial importance to Azerbaijan. The most important thing the U.S. can do now is to demonstrate that Washington has a principled approach to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and give a big push for progress. America's strong partnership with Azerbaijan answers to the consolidation of the U.S. strategic presence in the Caucasus-Caspian Sea region.

CESRAN: Thank you very much for your time and the interview.

Note:

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Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev assumed the directorship of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan according to the Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated February 8, 2008, after a career in government and policy studies.
From 1992 to 1994 he held diplomatic positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. In 1996-97, Dr. Nuriyev served as a J. William Fulbright Research Fellow at The George Washington University (GWU) in Washington, DC.
He was a Senior Research Associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (California, 1998-99), a Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, DC, 1999), Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute (Bonn, 2000-2003), a Visiting Research Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Berlin, 2005-2006).
From 2001 to 2004 Dr. Nuriyev served as a Co-chairman of the Southern Caucasus Regional Stability Study Group of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany.
In addition, Dr. Nuriyev is currently Professor of Political Science at Western University in Azerbaijan. He is also the author of numerous publications on the Caucasus, Central Asia and the wider Black Sea-Caspian basin, including most recent books and monographs such as The South Caucasus at the Crossroads (LIT, Berlin, 2007), Azerbaijan and the European Union: New Landmarks of Strategic Partnership (Routledge, Francis & Taylor, London, UK, 2008), 'Conflicts, Caspian Oil and NATO: Major Pieces of the Caucasus Puzzle,' in Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (ed. G. Bertsch, Routledge, London, 2000).
His professional expertise lies in the fields of regional security in the South Caucasus, as well as the issues of pipeline politics and foreign policy strategies in the wider Black Sea-Caspian basin.
Married with two sons, he is fluent in English, German and Russian.

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US Reaction to Wikileaks:

A Terrorist For Opposing American Imperial Power?

*By Prof. Inderjeet Parmar**

Sarah Palin, a likely Republican candidate for the presidency in 2012, has called for Wikileaks' founder, Julian Assange, to be "hunted down in the way armed forces are targeting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda". Assange, according to the potential next leader of the free world, is "an anti-American with blood on his hands". Secretary of State, Clinton, suggests that Assange has attacked the entire "international community". Other US leaders have assailed Bradley Manning, the youthful US army intelligence operative who passed secret cables to Assange, and called for his prosecution and even execution. Wikileaks, having been dismissed by Amazon and other internet service providers, has found refuge in Switzerland.

For some, it is impossible to oppose US foreign policy without being an irrational, backward, evil, fanatical terrorist, who is against all things decent. It is automatically to be branded "anti-American" – against Americans per se and, therefore, almost "racist". The construction is not dissimilar to what some Israeli leaders say when anyone criticises their country's behaviour in Gaza and elsewhere: you are an anti-Semite. In the latter case, a Jew who criticises Israel is labelled "self-hating Jew". An American who criticises his country, like Bradley Manning, is smeared as "un-American". Such an approach to criticism unites a broad range of Americans – liberals to conservatives to neo-conservatives, state agencies and private philanthropic foundations: it is a core element of an informal but powerful operational code that brooks little opposition and declares any criticism of the imperial hegemon as an attack on God himself or, in Clinton's secular term, "the international community".

As God, or the world community, the US is ordinarily used to controlling outcomes – at least that's the operating myth. They are used to doing what they want and also portraying it they way they want. Al-Jazeera is bad enough but the wikileaks episodes have exposed America's vulnerability at a particularly bad time. Having one's secrets laid bare is galling but the knowledge that there's more to come is truly frightening. And coming at a time when American power is meeting stern resistance all around the world – Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ko-

rea, from a burgeoning anti-war movement inside the US itself – and the American economy is failing to produce jobs and growth, more fully exposes US vulnerability.

Imperial powers rarely see anything in isolation. They tend to believe in the interconnectedness of things. They see the world as an interdependent system; when something goes wrong in one part of the system it has knock on effects across the system as a whole. Hence, wikileaks is seen as an attack on the entire "international community", of which the US is self-appointed head. And imperial hegemons do not appease aggressors.

It is difficult for the US to carry on "business as usual" even if the wikileaks episode has been dismissed by some as of little or no consequence. Things have changed. For Americans brought up on the myth of America the 'exceptional' country, the City Upon A Hill, the beacon of light pointing the way to the rest of the world, the eschewer of wicked power politics, wikileaks is nothing less than a reminder that the United States is like any other imperial power in history. In a deeply conservative nation, the American myth remains powerful: wikileaks' revelations chip away at American self-confidence, adding to the woes of lost status – an expensive budget-busting war in Afghanistan, economic relative decline, rise of China, a faltering American dream, and so on. And all that plus being led by a black president – who is believed by disturbingly large proportions of the electorate to be Muslim and foreign-born, an outsider – who fails to deal with an ungrateful world in quite the same way as George W. Bush or a Ronald Reagan or a Sarah Palin?

"...wikileaks is nothing less than a reminder that the United States is like any other imperial power in history."

At a conference on anti-Americanism a couple of years ago, it was said by one delegate that we should "take *America* out of anti-Americanism". That is, expressions of opposition to US policies abroad revealed more about the speaker than they did about the USA. It revealed the speaker's own psychological inadequacies, political motives, irrationalities. It echoed George W. Bush's comment that anyone who attacks America does it because they "resent our values and envy our success". It's not America, it's YOU.

Yet, American administrations must take heed of "anti-Americanism": the issue occupies a myriad of Washington, DC, think tanks and public diplomacy experts, in and out of government. It vexes the American public – "why do they hate us?" – and it gives the opposition party a stick with which to beat the administration. And in some of the weighty reports produced by blue-ribbon commissions headed by state intellectuals, there is a flicker of recognition, some credibility afforded to the notion that opposition to the US in the Middle East and elsewhere might actually be rooted in American behaviour – the deployment of lethal military force over time, costing millions of lives - over large parts of the Third World, a failure to match deeds with lofty ideals. After all, the reports note, such large majorities like American films and culture and even wish to settle in the US – so they're not actually anti-American. They say that they don't like our policies, such as unequivocal support for Israel.

But the policy implications of that insight are simply too radical to pursue. Support for Israel reflects a core interest, as do so many other national security policies. Opposition to the US that results from defending and promoting core interests is considered inevitable and viewed as a *bearable cost* of American power. Great powers have been and will be hated. But they must continue to pursue their vital interests. Anyone who opposes imperial power in pursuit of core interests is, by definition, evil and, in the age of Guantanamo, a terrorist.

Note:

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He is currently serving as Vice Chair of British International Studies Association.

How Alliance Politics Affects The Resolution Of Conflicts In The South Caucasus?

By Zaur Shiriyev*

Introduction

Alliance politics is an important factor affecting threats and conflicts in South Caucasus region. Alliances in this region are a direct reaction to the security of the region. The regional developments coupled with perceived threats, make the three states very cautious in choosing their allies. Allies are chosen to meet complex military-political needs vis-à-vis each other and regional and big powers. Hence, the Caucasus states, with the Azerbaijan as an exception, are still incapable of defending their national interests and providing for their security alone. Consequently, the security concerns raised by the states in this region and the foreign policy behavior they display, may originate in their own belief that they are incapable of relying solely on their own means, and, that the solution of any 'security dilemma' must come from the outside.

However, it is hard to deny that the political situation in the Caucasus is unique or unstable [and even hazardous] in terms of the perspectives of the regional security. This fact was highlighted in August 2008 during Russia-Georgia war that resulted in Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (1). As such, the three South Caucasian countries have now developed diverging strategies to ensure their own security (2). The ongoing ethno-territorial conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia (with overall entrapment by Russia), and over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan have been the primary sources of enhancing the overall regional security dilemma and rendering unintended anarchical consequences more tangible.

Azerbaijan

Concerned with threats from Armenia, Azerbaijan anchors its national security policy to Turkey, with whom it shares strong ethno-linguistic affinities and offers a bridge to connect Azerbaijan with both West (Euro-Atlantic structures) and East (the Muslim world). Geopolitically, the problems facing the country comprise: (1). the 'frozen' conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and (2). the increasing militarization of the Caspian Sea, which brings into play, conflicts among the five littoral states regarding the development and export of energy resources from this basin to world markets. Nonetheless, besides the threats from Armenia and disputes over the NK, Azerbaijan faces strong economic challenges as well. That is why, Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, seeks to have more diversified relations with other powers to respond both to its existential and economic challenges. Considering the united security principle and South Caucasus region as a part of Euro-Atlantic space, Azerbaijan supports efforts toward establishing the security system in this space and as it was determined by the military doctrine (3). Accordingly, it will continue cooperation with NATO on the basis of mutual interests. Moreover, Azerbaijan makes significant steps towards the Euro-Atlantic structures, without, however, asking for membership in NATO or the EU. The

reaction of the EU and the US follows immediately by including Azerbaijan into the "Nabucco" project, a very ambitious strategy meant to contain Russia's gas and oil monopoly. In actual fact, the BTC and BTE pipelines, mainly built to relieve the Western world's oil and gas dependency on the Middle East, underscore Azerbaijan's geopolitical importance for the European market (4).

Azerbaijan, although seeking to maintain good relations with Russia, ties itself to Turkey to balance against threat from Armenia. In this context, the Azerbaijani-Turkish interaction is as solid, valid and reliable as the Russian-Armenian one. Turkey and Azerbaijan had sound friendly ties and Turkey-Azerbaijan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council which established on 16 September 2010 (5) would boost these close relations. Ultimately, Azerbaijan historical alliances with Turkey counter balancing rising military tensions between Armenia and Russia.

"Azerbaijan, although seeking to maintain good relations with Russia, ties itself to Turkey to balance against threat from Armenia. In this context, the Azerbaijani-Turkish interaction is as solid, valid and reliable as the Russian-Armenian one."

Armenia

Armenia, as a historical ally of Russia, perceived existential threats from Turkey (6) and Azerbaijan as hostile for it. In need of security, it sought to restructure its ties with Russia, which in turn, was strongly motivated to reestablish previous tsarist and Soviet influence. Thus Russia was gradually becoming not only Armenia's military ally but its political and economical unique partner as well. Because of Armenia's geo-political and economic vulnerability as well as its need to ally with a great power, Russia quickly offered imposed its multi-vector assistance.

However, a closer analytical eye to the Russia-Armenia relationship reveals that such a high level of dependence may create some intra-alliance threats. Hypothetically speaking, if threats were to push Armenia to become more cautious of Russia, [and if] Russian attitudes were to change under different circumstances, then, Armenia would bandwagon with Russia – so as not to be fully absorbed by it. As such, Armenia's political, military and overwhelming economical dependence on Russia creates some hidden avenues for bandwagoning with Russia. However, external threats are immense, and intra-alliance threats will always be only secondary. Only serious changes in the levels of threats for Armenia could give Armenia another alliance motive and change its behavior vis-à-vis Russia. Therefore, Armenian leaders have repeatedly stated that despite forging closer security links with the West in recent years, they will not seek NATO membership in the foreseeable future (7). Thus, the Armenia-Russia politico-military strong alliance has both a very high level of cohesion and a high level of commitment and a very low level of defection from either side. Accordingly, Russia projects itself as a strong and implacable leader and a dominant power that pushes Armenia, its only strategic ally in the region, to cater to its interests which are anchored by its overall regional dominance. [20] August 2010, according to Russian senior officials an extension of Russian military base deployment term in Armenia is signed for 49 years and nothing else (8). This cooperation seems to be prolonged and Western political interest can't be reached in such situation.

Georgia

Georgia is oriented to the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures, but its alignment is very limited, giving no sense of full alliance formation. Georgia was not similarly linked (as Azerbaijan and Armenia) to any great power either historically or presently. Its quest for security and stability was formed under rapidly changing ideologies, visions and policies, making Georgia vulnerable and easier for external forces to manipulate. However, the Georgian case is particular due to the fact that Georgia's alliance behavior reflects the absence of a strong military ally, as opposed to Armenia and Azerbaijan. First, this is largely explained by the lack of historical or cultural affinities with any of the big powers that could have been revived once independence was achieved. Second, both Armenia and Azerbaijan choose their allies based upon the geographic proximity factor, while Georgia looks to more remote partners in the West. Full membership in NATO, as

many argue, could prevent Russia from intervening in South Ossetia in 2008. However, others argue that a similar quest for NATO membership was the cause of the Russian attack on Georgia.

The Challenge of a Peaceful Succession

Generally, the alliance politics directly affect future of region. In the short run and the long run, the alliances reduce the possibility of renewed military activities; the status-quo provides a framework under which major conflicts are currently inconceivable. However, in the long run, [if] this "no war, no peace" situation in the region is maintained with neither bilateral/multilateral peace agreements nor a negotiated settlement, [than] the relative stability and the fragile cease-fires between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Georgia and Russia, on the other, are threatened. Thus, up to now, the described mechanism works in the South Caucasian context. However, as mentioned, in the long-term, this pattern may change, if some hypothetical conflicts arise between big powers in the region that would entrap the South Caucasian states, specifically in the confrontations of "others" or if the existing conflicts between the South Caucasian states are again escalated.

"...the main question is always agenda: if the conflicts are settled, then will the external threat disappear and the South Caucasian states need to add to their capabilities or seek military assistance from big powers?"

In any case, the main question is always agenda: if the conflicts are settled, then will the external threat disappear and the South Caucasian states need to add to their capabilities or seek military assistance from big powers? Although this question is large enough to be the topic of separate research, some insights can shed light on the situation in the region and provide some answers.

Accordingly, under this circumstance, future "worst" and "best" case scenarios can be described as:

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

An optimistic or best-case scenario of conflict resolution for Nagorno- Karabakh conflict

According to this scenario, diplomatic efforts around the NK conflict resolution could lead to the signing - as early as next year - of a Declaration of Basic Principles of Conflict Resolution, followed by a Political Settlement Agreement in the future (in 2012). For the successful implementation of this scenario it is important that a consensus be reached between the key players in global politics – US, EU and Russia, who act as principal mediators in the Karabakh resolution process (EU as represented by France), with Turkey's involvement in the process as a regional power. Under this scenario, the Armenian community of NK would be granted a high degree of autonomy with de facto absolute economic self-sufficiency and political self -government; the only exception would be that it could not conduct its own foreign policy. In addition to such investments, NK would receive substantial subsidies from Azerbaijan's national budget.

A pessimistic or worst-case scenario of conflict resolution for Karabakh conflict

According to this scenario, military efforts around the NK conflict could lead to the war. Recently intensified skirmishes around the Nagorno-Karabakh risk spiraling out of control at the heart of a key energy transit region, Azerbaijani adopted military doctrine on June, which excludes the use of war liberating territories that are still under Armenian occupation, show Azerbaijan ready to use force legally liberate his territories.

It's clear, aspects of a resumed war may represent drawbacks for Azerbaijan, however. New military operations could disrupt investment in the Azerbaijani economy and slow down successful economic development. On the other hand, a new war may create serious problems for the pipeline politics of Azerbaijan (9). Apart from dealing a blow to its energy projects, a war in the region could seriously damage the use of transit capabilities in the region supporting the continuing operations in Afghanistan, which are unlikely to conclude in the near future.

Four elements affect the settlement process that increases the risks of war:

1. the global and regional interests of the major powers and their present interrelationships;

2. the dominant trends in international relations as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international organizations

3. the conflicting sides' own present political and economic situation;

4. the conflicting sides' diplomatic approaches, convictions, and capacity to shape the peace process.

Thus, these elements will be decisional to realize the "worst possible" war scenario as well as "best possible" one. In fact, it is hard to maintain equilibrium of interests in Azerbaijan further without somehow addressing the fact of the Armenian occupation. The Azerbaijani government is facing a challenge of changing conditions, which may soon make continuous outright rejection of a military option politically unsustainable. Azerbaijan's population has consistently ranked the ongoing occupation as the #1 problem; the sixteen years of the cease-fire have not reduced the urgency of the conflict for the Azerbaijani public, but, on the contrary, decreased hopes for a peaceful outcome

> "...a war in the region could seriously damage the use of transit capabilities in the region supporting the continuing operations in Afghanistan, which are unlikely to conclude in the near future."

Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

An optimistic or best-case scenario of conflict resolution for Georgian-Abkhazian conflict

The Georgian government has only one chance to re-back its territories using the "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation, (10)" which carries full support from the West. Moscow might pressure Sukhumi not to respond to Western overtures calling for more engagement, due to the fact that such an engagement could reduce Russia's influence in the region. If Russia took this approach, it would lead to greater tension in the Russian—Abkhaz relationship as Russia would be stopping Abkhazia from pursuing a policy that would look very appealing to the Abkhaz. Georgia's "Action Plan" has the "best" possible chance for solving conflicts. Georgia's commitment is positive and sounds convincing, but, will the occupiers and the separatist regimes commit themselves to these proposals instead of trying to frustrate them? Indeed, the very designation of the two regions as "occupied territories" is likely to trigger anger and resentment insofar as it implicitly denies that the local populations to have any say whatsoever over how, and by whom, the regions are administered. For that very reason, the strategy is hardly conducive to promoting "engagement through cooperation" with "populations that have differing perceptions of the conflict" in any sphere of activity, whether it is the economy, health, education, promoting freedom of movement, or "preserving cultural heritage and identity."

A pessimistic or worst-case scenario of conflict resolution for Georgian-Abkhazian conflict

The challenge for the international community is how to engage with Abkhazia in a status neutral way and thus seek to influence both its internal security situation and its attitudes toward continuing to seek an agreed settlement with Georgia. If no such engagement takes place, it is likely that in the next decade Abkhazia will be irreversibly separated from Georgia and de facto absorbed into Russian economic, political and military sphere. In these circumstances, it could only be a matter of time before more violence erupts. Ultimately, pessimistic scenario was realized in August 2008, after unilateral *de-jure* recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia,

South Ossetia Conflict

An optimistic or best-case scenario of conflict resolution for South Ossetia conflict

The options for developing an effective security management mechanism or, a viable political dialogue between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali are limited

and should be considered as a long-term objective. "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation" can help Ossetians and Georgians to start cooperation under the scheme of civil society. The access of any international organizations to South Ossetia will be similarly difficult in the foreseeable future.

A pessimistic or worst-case scenario of conflict resolution for South Ossetia conflict

The strategy of engagement – without recognition, is not guaranteed to succeed as we described in Abkhazia case, nor is it without political risks. The international community's engagement backfired by Russia. Had the UN engagement in Abkhazia, it could have prevented Russia, a member of the UN Security Council, from unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in violation of key principles of international law which the UN is tasked to promote. Thus in this context, new war risks should always be on the agenda.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the conflicts that emerged at the end of the Soviet era in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have played an immensely destructive role in the development of the region over the last 19 years. These conflicts have hindered the progress of individual states, made regional co-operation difficult (or in some cases non-existent), and continued to create serious problems for peace and security in the region. Thus, the future of the Caucasus region will depend significantly on a global response to these conflicts. To sum up, the Southern Caucasus has come to a crossroads, regarding its cooperation and effective regional security. Either the region will begin to integrate into Europe and anchor into the Euro-Atlantic security system by developing into an effective barrier to the proliferation of terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime, or, there will be a deterioration of security, and a new gateway will open for ethnic conflict, terror and insecurity to Europe. Nonetheless, it remains a realistic aspiration that by 2011, the region could be more united, more prosperous, more democratic, and have greater security. PR

Notes:

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The Quest For Democracy In The European Union:

What Does The Treaty Of Lisbon Include For A More Democratic Union?

By Dr. Dilek Yigit*

The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. One of the aims of the Treaty of Lisbon is to enhance the European Union's democratic legitimacy, because to what extent the European Union's political structure is democratic has become a widespread concern in European politics since the 1990s.

This paper seeks to analyse academic discussions about democracy at the European Union level in brief and then examine what the Treaty of Lisbon includes for a more democratic Union.

As known, the concern about democracy at the European Union level has started to be expressed more widely, and has triggered a vibrant academic debate among scholars during the process in which the EU Treaties amending the founding Treaties have been signed and ratified. The most important questions raised in this debate are,

- Does the European Union suffer from a democratic deficit?
- If so, how can the democratic deficit in the European Union be narrowed to create a more democratic Europe?

With regard to the first question, we see that scholars take different sides in the debate, according to approaches they adopt on the question of democracy in the European Union. Thus it might be argued that there are three strands of thinking regarding the issue.

The first strand of thinking focuses on the question of why the European Union suffers from the democratic deficit. Scholars in this group often compare the Union with a nation state and equate democracy with representative democracy to assess the democratic quality in the Union. Broadly speaking, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union as the legislative bodies of the Union and the European Commission as the executive body of the Union are compared with national parliaments and national governments,

respectively. And the European Union, though not a nation state, is viewed through lens of representative democracy. Consequently, the European Union is perceived as suffering from the democratic deficit, because, as Majone points out: "*A recurrent theme in the debate about the "democratic deficit" of the EC/EU is that the powers of the European Parliament still fall short of the powers of an ordinary parliament, while the Commission –a bureaucratic body- continues to enjoy a nearly total monopoly of legislative initiative"*(1).

The argument which is that the European Union suffers from the democratic deficit has been criticised because of the analogy drawn between the institutions of the Union and of the nation state. In this context, Majone questions this analogy, and put that:

> *"The most obvious objection to the analogy with the model of parliamentary democracy-in any of its national variants-is that the institutional architecture of the EC/EU has been designed by treaties duly ratified by national parliaments. One of the characteristic features of this architecture is the impossibility of mapping functions onto specific institutions. Thus the Community has no legislature but a legislative process in which different institution – Council, EP and Commission- have different parts to play. Similarly, there is no identifiable executive, since executive powers are exercised for some purposes by the Council acting on a Commission proposal; for other purposes (e.g., competition matters) by the Commission; and overwhelmingly by the national administrations implementing European policies on the ground"(2).*

To what extent the analogy is appropriate to assess the democratic quality at the European Union level is questionable. However, it can be stated that the concern that there is a democratic deficit based on this analogy has shaped the general atmosphere leading to the Treaty of Lisbon. And, the democratic deficit has been regarded as one of the main issues that the European Union should handle in the years ahead. Indeed, the importance of increasing the quality of democracy in the Union has already been emphasised in the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union in 2001, which states that "*The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient*" (3).

The second strand of thinking tries to explain why the European Union can not suffer the democratic deficit. This approach is mostly represented by Majone and Moravcsik. Accordingly, for Majone, since the member states delegated regulatory policy competences to the European Union, it has become a regulatory state. Consequently, as a regulatory state its policy-making should not be democratic in the usual meaning of the term (4).

Moreover, Moravcsik argues that "*When judged by the practices of existing nation-states and in the context of a multi-level system, there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a fundamental democratic deficit.*"(5), and he points out:

> ***"Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens"(6).***

The third strand of thinking is different form the first and the second. The scholars in this group are interested in methodology of analysing democracy at the European Union level. Their argument primarily is concerned with how to analyse democracy at European Union level more than why the European Union suffers the democratic deficit. In this sense, the point is that the European Union is neither a nation state nor an international organisation; consequently the standards of democratic governance we can apply at national level should not be applied at the European Union level. So what should be done is to think about how to refor-

mulate the standards of democracy, which can be applied at the European Union level. In this sense, Weale points out that:

> *"In many ways, the conception of democracy associated with the nation state, though tolerable in a way that it balanced competing values, was based upon a particular conception of democracy couched in terms of majoritarian popular will-formation through party competition. Since this version of democracy can not be a model for EU democracy (given that the conditions for its realization do not obtain), we need to reformulate the notion of democratic legitimacy itself in terms drawn from other strands of democratic theory"(7).*

Moreover, Mair puts that:

> *"...if Europe doesn't fit the standard interpretation of democracy, then we should change that standard interpretation. Rather than adapting Europe to make it more democratic, it makes more sense to adapt the notion of democracy to make it more European"(8).*

While the debate in academia is going on, it has become clear that the first strand of thinking has shaped the debate on the EU's future in both the European Convention and the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference. Hence, the answer to the question of how the democratic quality of the Union can be improved or how the democratic deficit in the Union can be narrowed can be sought in Articles of the Treaty of Lisbon.

As it is known, in a representative democracy, the central political institution is the parliament as an elected legislative assembly, so what the Treaty of Lisbon includes regarding the European Parliament is the first issue we should discuss in order to assess the role of the Treaty in creating a more democratic Europe. In article 8 of the Treaty of Lisbon, in which the Union's ambition to be founded on representative democracy is clearly stated (9), it is underlined that "*Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.*" Moreover, the Treaty is also innovative in terms of bestowing the European Parliament with additional power regarding the legislation, budget and nomination issues.

"...what the Treaty of Lisbon includes regarding the European Parliament is the first issue we should discuss in order to assess the role of the Treaty in creating a more democratic Europe."

In terms of legislation, co-decision procedure is extended, and called "ordinary legislative procedure." The text of the horizontal amendments article of the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that:

> *"the words 'the Council (shall), acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251' shall be replaced by 'the European Parliament and the Council (shall), acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure', and the words 'procedure referred to in Article 251' shall be replaced by 'ordinary legislative procedure' " (10)*

The extension of co-decision procedure in the Treaty provides the European Parliament with legislative powers comparable to legislative powers of the Council of Ministers.

In terms of budget, the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures has been abolished. Previously, the European Parliament had the last word on the non-compulsory expenditure, which represents a minor part

of the European budget. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has been given the right to decision with regard to the approval of all expenditures related to the annual budget. The texts of the related articles of the Treaty of Lisbon stipulate that:

"The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions."

"The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions."

"The Union's annual budget shall be established by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with Article 272"(11)

Regarding the Parliament's nomination powers, the Treaty of Lisbon defines the role of the European Parliament in the nomination of the Commission President clearly. As known, there has been criticism that there is a lack of direct relationship between the Commission and the outcome of the European elections for the European Parliament, which has caused widespread concern about the Commission's democratic legitimacy. With the Treaty of Lisbon, The Commission President will be elected by the European Parliament on the proposal of the European Council, taking into account the results of the European elections. Hence, the Treaty of Lisbon provides the Commission with greater democratic legitimacy. Article 9 D of the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that:

"Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for the President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members..."(12).

If the Treaty of Lisbon is analysed from the perspective of democracy, the question of what the role of the national parliaments will be under the Treaty of Lisbon should be asked, since scholars have argued that European integration has led to a decline in the power of national parliaments relative to executive institutions (13).

With the aim of making the national parliaments more involved in the European Union decision-making process, the Treaty of Lisbon creates "early-warning mechanism", which allows the national parliaments to assess whether any EU legislation proposal abides by the subsidiarity principle.

"National parliaments will have eight weeks to examine draft European acts. If a third of them (a quarter in the field of Justice and Home Affairs) oppose a draft, the Commission must review it. Moreover, if over half of all national parliaments oppose an act subject to codecision, the European legislator (a majority of the European Parliament or 55 % of the votes in the Council) must decide whether or not to proceed with the legislative process. National parliaments may also take a case to the European Court of Justice if they consider that a legislative act is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity"(14).

Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon creates the citizens' initiative, which aims to bring citizens closer to the European decision-making process and consequently to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. In Article 8 B it is stated that:

"With the Treaty of Lisbon, The Commission President will be elected by the European Parliament on the proposal of the European Council, taking into account the results of the European elections."

"*Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties*"(15).

Consequently, to what extent the European Union's political structure is democratic can be assessed through adopting different approaches, and what the conclusion we reach depends mainly on which approach is adopted. If we compare the Union with a nation state and equate democracy with representative democracy to assess the democratic quality in the Union, it is possible to argue that the Union suffers from the democratic deficit. This argument is common and has also more implications for the debate on the Union's future, for this reason the Treaty of Lisbon bears the clauses to improve the quality of democracy in the Union. If there is a democratic deficit in the European Union, the view might be taken that the Treaty of Lisbon strives to narrow the deficit through strengthening the European Parliament, introducing the citizens' initiative and enhancing the involvement of national parliaments in the European Union decision-making process. PR

Notes:

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Disclaimer: This paper does not reflect the official views of Undersecretariat of Treasury, Turkey.

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Turkish Reforms, A Wake-Up Call for Israel

By Mehmet Celebi*

On September 12, 22 million Turks voted a resounding "Yes" and thus endorsed a constitutional amendment package that could open wider the door to democratization in the Middle East.

Turkey's 26-point referendum—which will enhance civil liberties and individual rights—was watched closely by hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world, and serves as yet another opportunity for the country to show leadership in the region. As a prominent Arab scholar told me recently "If Turkey fails, what alternative is there for the Muslim and Arab world?"

Of all the countries in Turkey's immediate neighborhood, Israel should take the most heed. More than three months after Israel's deadly attack on the Turkish flotilla, tension between the two countries is still unsettled. Yet one thing is clear: Turkey has the upper hand.

The nuclear deal that Turkey, much to the dismay of the West, recently signed with Iran, co-brokered by Brazil; its mediation between Russia and Georgia after the 2008 war; its ongoing role as broker for talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan; its intervention in convincing all sides to select a consensus President and subsequently Prime Minister of Lebanon; and its success in persuading Iraqi Sunnis to participate, rather than boycott, the elections-—are all clear indications of Turkey's burgeoning role as a trusted diplomatic player on the world stage. In addition, it has lifted visa restrictions and signed "free-trade zone agreements" with several countries in the Middle East, and launched strategic dialogues with a number of Arab governments.

Even the EU, where Turkey's 40 year membership bid has been vacillating, has recognized Turkey's key global role recently.

Recently, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb underlined Turkey's growing influence by calling its foreign policy reach "one of the top five countries in the world today".

"Arguably, today Turkey is more influential in the world than any of our member states together or

separately," Stubb said. "It has a great influence in the Middle East, in the African Horn in the Persian Gulf, in Iran. It's a truly global player and we need to work together with Turkey right now on foreign and security policy."

Nothing was clearer during my recent visit to Jordan and Israel with prominent Chicago-based Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders. I was especially struck by Jordan's intense support of Turkey—from remarks by government officials of the highest level, including former Prime Minister and current Deputy President of the Jordanian Senate Fayez al-Tarawneh, to the general attitudes of the public. Their tone signals how far Turkey has come in its relations with its Arab neighbors and suggests the influence it can wield to help resolve regional conflicts.

Arab leaders and intellectuals I met unmistakably welcomed Turkey's rise in the region as a counterbalance to more than 30 years of Iranian efforts at hegemony. In particular, these officials genuinely believe Turkey is not seeking to dominate the region, but rather bring peace that will help boost its rapidly growing and record breaking economy.

In comparison, during our visit to Jerusalem, the negative feelings of the majority of Israelis we met (individuals and NGOs) could not have been a bigger contrast to the positive feelings of the Arabs we met towards Turkey (private individuals, government officials and NGOs).

Consequently, Turkey's annual trade with Arab countries has reached over $30 billion dollars, 12 times its trade with Israel. It also imports almost a fifth of its natural gas from Iran. In deepening ties to Middle Eastern governments other than Israel, Turkey is in part following where its economic interests lead. They have, as a 19th century U.K. Prime Minister once said of England, "no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests."

Enjoying an 80% approval rating among Arabs, and Turkish PM Erdogan considered the "most trusted leader" by the overwhelming Arab majority, Turkey can now lay claim to being an honest broker in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, many in Israel and the West are sounding false alarms about the intentions and direction of Turkey's current government, when they should be seizing this historic opportunity to work on a comprehensive and final resolution to the complex Middle East conflict.

Turkey's rapidly soaring political and economic ties with the Arab world are inversely rapidly plummeting with Israel.

Three months after the deadly flotilla incident, and despite a high level face to face meeting between Turkish and Israeli ministers and countless behind the scenes efforts by well-intentioned individuals, groups and countries including the US, Turkish-Israeli relations do not seem to fare any better than the post flotilla train-wreck.

Enjoying an 80% approval rating among Arabs, and Turkish PM Erdogan considered the "most trusted leader" by the overwhelming Arab majority, Turkey can now lay claim to being an honest broker in the Middle East.

For the most part, Israeli officials' hard-line and impudent if not threatening remarks have been countered by Turkish officials' steadfast, well-entrenched and mostly diplomatic stance. What is remarkable is that despite numerous efforts to ease the tensions between the once-strategically close allies, Israel does not seem to recognize the severity of the situation and the seriousness of Turkish officials' repeated warnings of further grave consequences between the two countries.

As for the flotilla incident, many have asked why Turks allowed the craft to threaten the Israeli

blockade of Gaza, an ally; in the first place and where Turkish-Israeli relations are headed.

Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey, as a democracy, could not have legally stopped the ships carrying international volunteers from leaving Turkish ports, it is important to note that the country has a long-standing history as friend and ally to those who are being persecuted. For much of the Turkish people's history, those they helped most were not oppressed Muslim Palestinians in Gaza—they were Jews.

At the height of the Spanish Inquisition, both Muslims and Jews were persecuted. Most Muslims had plenty of places to run. However, the majority of Jews were unwelcome in Spain and the rest of Europe, except for the Ottomans.

" Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel on March 28, 1949, the year after its establishment. "

At midnight on August 2, 1492, for example, when Christopher Columbus set sail on what would become his legendary voyage to the New World, his fleet had to depart from the relatively obscure port of Palos because the shipping lanes of Cadiz and Seville were so congested with Ottoman "Freedom Flotillas" evacuating persecuted Jews from Spain.

More recently, when the whole world turned a blind eye to one of history's worst atrocities—the Holocaust—Turks were among the very few who showed their humanity by rescuing more than 100,000 Jews and bringing them to Turkey. Behic Erkin, Turkey's ambassador to France from 1939 to 1943, risked his life and the neutral standing of Turkey to help over 18,000 – and, today, I'm happy to call Emir Kivircik, his grandson, a good friend.

The good relations between Turkey and the Jews continued after the establishment of the State of Israel. Traditionally, Israel and Turkey have enjoyed a good, if not particularly warm, relationship. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel on March 28, 1949, the year after its establishment. The two countries have enjoyed a formal military agreement since 1996, a formal free trade agreement since 2000, and a water-transfer agreement since 2002. They have conducted military training together, and in 2007, Turkey's Parliament became the first Muslim Parliament to be addressed by an Israeli President.

Indeed, good relations with Turkey were an explicit objective for Israel from as far back as the time of Istanbul University Law School educated Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, who set out the strategic doctrine that Israel should try to seek alliances with the non-Arab states of the Middle East to counteract the opposition to Israel of bordering Arab states. By early 2006, the Israeli Foreign Ministry was even characterising its relations with Turkey as 'perfect'. But aside from the aforementioned historic ties, both countries never really developed the relationship deeper and beyond that of military and intelligence.

Undoubtedly, throughout their recent histories, both Turkey and Israel seemed to have a lot in common- from disputed borders with Arab neighbors and reliance on U.S. aid, to powerful generals pulling strings or setting agendas behind the scenes. Those commonalities ended for Turkey in the last few years due to unprecedented reforms undertaken by the current government.

The friendly relations between Israel and Turkey began to change after Israel's war in Lebanon in 2006 and worsened after Israel's war in Gaza in 2009, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan developed a personal mistrust of Israeli leaders. This stemmed from the infamous six-hour meeting he had with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert four days prior to the attack on Gaza, where they discussed extremely encouraging developments in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks mediated by Turkey and the rumors of an attack on Gaza, which Olmert vehemently denied. Ol-

By alienating Turkey, Israel is risking one of the few friends in the region that it has ever had. "Turkey's enmity is as intense as its friendship is valuable," Prime Minister Erdogan recently warned. "Even the loss of Turkey's friendship is a cost."

mert left all but promising to respond to Syria's acceptance of direct talks with Israel. Instead, Israel's response was its attack on Gaza that killed 1,400 Palestinian.

Israel's overzealous reaction to the flotilla may have cemented this divide, overshadowing the work of more than a millennium of tolerance and harmonious co-existence between Turks and Jews.

Israel's recent actions at home and abroad—largely boosted by increasingly aggressive and combative political leadership—are concerning many Israelis, friends of Israel, and surrounding nations. It is becoming paranoid, intolerant, and undemocratic, increasingly espousing a mindset of "us versus the whole world."

The gratification certain Israeli officials received from the lowly act of the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon's denigration of Turkey's then newly appointed Ambassador to Israel is but a lucid example of this mindset Israel finds itself in.

The antagonism between the two countries does not end there. While Israel recently accepted a variation of one of Turkey's preconditions for improved relations with Israel by allowing an international panel to investigate the flotilla incident, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak recently expressed "deep concern" over the appointment of Dr. Hakan Fidan as Turkey's intelligence chief for his supposed "support of Iran".

What many in Israel and their friends elsewhere do not seem to understand is that while Turkey shares the West's concerns of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region- including by Iran, its approach to dealing with this problem is drastically different from that of the West. Accusing the chief of Turkey's intelligence of being untrustworthy for his alleged "support for Iran" is as disrespectful and aloof for a "historically strategic ally" as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent declaration that "Israel is ready for peace with Palestinians".

Turkey, as it has in recent years; will seek policies that will help bring a peaceful solution to the region, while ensuring that Israel's legitimate security concerns are taken into consideration. Turkey knows that it needs to protect the right of the Palestinians in Gaza as much as it protects the rights of Israelis to live in peace and security-but not at the expense of one over the other as in the past, but rather in a balanced manner befitting a true regional super power.

For Israel, this turn of events is a strategic loss since its relations with Turkey have historically boosted Israel's claim that its fight is not with Islam but with the Arabs, as Turkey is a non-Arab Muslim country. By alienating Turkey, Israel is risking one of the few friends in the region that it has ever had. "Turkey's enmity is as intense as its friendship is valuable," Prime Minister Erdogan recently warned. "Even the loss of Turkey's friendship is a cost."

Right now, that's a cost Israel can't afford—and Turkey knows it. But, does Israel and its friends? PR

Note:

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CPRS Turkey

Türkiye Barış ve Güvenlik Çalışmaları

Turkey has a critical geopolitical location between Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus; burgeoning economy and strong private sector; rapidly strengthening democracy and vibrant civil society; and memberships to a wide range of organisations from NATO, OECD to the Islamic Conference and candidacy to the EU. Turkey is now a pivotal player not only in regional but global affairs. It is an important peace broker in regional conflicts, a leading country for peacekeeping operations and has been a generous donor for disaster response around the world. However, Turkey is also a country trying to merge its Islamic heritage into broader structures and models of western liberal democratic governance. In its bid to deal with the past legacy of its Ottoman heritage and nation-state building policies of the Republic, Turkey still needs to address a number of fundamental socio-cultural and development challenges. Furthermore, Turkey is also a country affected by a protracted armed conflict based on Kurdish separatism and hence coping with internal security challenges.

With these characteristics in mind, the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) at Coventry University is now home to an innovative research group that will seek to explore a wide range of conflict and peace related issues with a specific reference to Turkey. The CPRS Turkey aims to:

- Create an enabling environment for research on peace and conflict related issues in the context of Turkey and on the role of Turkey at regional and international levels;
- Seek funding opportunities for scholars to undertake comparative research and encourage staff/student exchange between Coventry and Turkish universities;
- Provide scholarships to students from Turkey to undertake the CPRS flagship MA in Peace and Reconciliation Studies and Postgraduate Certificate in Conflict Resolution Skills;
- Run a book series with a reputable publisher;
- Organise a seminar series in Coventry that would host leading scholars researching on Turkey;
- Organise an annual conference for PhD students working on peace and conflict issues in Turkey;
- Publish a 'Peace in Turkey' issue as part of the online Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security annually;
- Publish a biannual electronic newsletter to disseminate the activities of the research group.

To become part of this research group and receive further information about its activities,you can contact ***Professor Alp Özerdem (a.ozerdem@coventry.ac.uk)***.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY (JCTS)

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Freedom of Expression and the Failure of Reform in Turkey

By Dr. Tim Jacoby*

Turkey's incumbent Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) government was elected at a pivotal moment. The catastrophic earthquake of 1999 had energized civil society, a sharp decline in pro-Kurdish violence had resulted from the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (the now-imprisoned leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya *Karkareni Kurdistan*, PKK)) the same year, the 2001 economic crash, and a series of human rights abuse scandals had all combined to lead to what Ioannis N. Grigoriadis calls the "the corrosion of the state icon"(1). Initially dismissed by many as merely a protest vote more indicative of the secular centre-right's corruption and fragmentation than the Turkish people's discernment, the AKP's unequivocal victory was, in fact, a result of its success in capturing the reformist mood. The European Union's decision to offer Turkey official candidate for membership status at the 1999 council meeting in Helsinki had inspired the previous administration to pursue the criteria for accession laid down at Copenhagen in 1993 with three large reform packages, but the AKP promised to go much further. Its manifesto specifically referred to the need to bring Turkish society into line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

Acting on the premise that "the more Turkey was distanced from the West – and the EU in particular – the stronger would be the dominance of the army that treated the Islamic groups as an anomaly and threat,it brought forward six further harmonization packages which, according to the European Commission's annual report, further "shifted the balance of civil-military relations towards the civilians and encouraged public debate in this area"(2). Prosecutions based on ethnic or separatist incitement were made more difficult to pursue, Article 8 of the 1990 Anti-Terrorism act which had been widely deployed to silence pro-Kurdish and religious activists was abolished and the jurisprudential scope of military courts was limited. Additional legislation strengthened civil society organizations (Law 5231, July 2004) and restricted the security forces' surveillance powers (Articles 133-135 of the 2005 Penal Code), thereby improving human rights monitoring. Prime Minister Erdoğan accompanied these measures with several groundbreaking speeches in which he acknowledged the limitations of Turkey's hitherto highly monist approach to national identity and a continuing need for greater democratization. Such an apparently profound shift from the emergency rule restrictions of the 1990s has prompted some commentators characterize the reform period as creating an 'unprecedented political space to press for human rights and to draw attention to the need for political dialogue between Turkey and the Kurds', leading to a 'palpable "Kurdification" of civil society'(3). According to Murat Somer, this helped to 'facilitate the expression of

Kurdish interests and the bargaining, deliberation, and voting processes that are necessary for democratically determining Kurdish rights'(4).

However, these have not easily translated into greater liberties for Turkey's citizenship in general and its Kurds in particular. The largest Kurdish-majority political party in the country, the People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, HADEP), was, for example, shut down by the constitutional court during the height of the harmonization reform program in 2003. Its successor merged with a party recently formed by the 1995 Sakharov Prize Winner, Leyla Zana (following her release from prison in June 2004), to become the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP) (5). This survived until December 2009 when it was charged with becoming a "focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation" and replaced by the equally harassed Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP). The same catch-all allusions to national integrity have also been used to ensure that the PKK's switch from violence to civil disobedience following its ceasefire of 1999 did not result in a rise in illegal expressions of cultural identity. In May 2002, for instance, the Ministry of the Interior instructed the gendarmerie to search the birth registry for forenames that did not comply with the law – specifically the legal requirement that all children be named in accordance with "Turkish customs and traditions". Some 76 prosecutions resulted that year. The harmonization reforms removed the registration law's references to national culture in June 2003, but explicitly retained the prohibition of non-Turkish spellings.

Indeed, the letters *q*, *x* and *w* (that are used extensively in Kurdish languages) remain illegal today under Article 222 of the 2005 Penal Code, despite the obvious ease with which "non-political" commercial entities (such as the national broadcaster *Show TV*) are able to claim a derogation (6). A similar process has occurred in relation to toponymes. More than 25,000 place names were "Turkicised" during the 1960s and 70s, the great majority of which were in the south-east. While attempts to reverse these by the Şırnak MP, Hasip Kaplan, have yet to make significant progress, the municipalities of Batman and Diyarbakır did succeed in renaming some of their thoroughfares and public spaces. These were, however, carefully circumscribed by the high court and the provincial governors' offices. References to *Halabja* (a town in northern Iraq gassed by Saddam Hussein in 1988), *insan hakları* (Turkish for human rights), *Zembilfroş* (an early-eighteenth century Kurdish poem) and many others of the cities' suggestions were, for instance, rejected on the grounds that they may encourage sedition (7).

Resistance to the reforms can also be found in the area of media dissemination. Despite now being fully decriminalized, Kurdish music has been regularly confiscated when deemed to constitute separatist propaganda or when vocalizing support for proscribed organizations (8). Even greater obsta-

cles have been placed in the way of Kurdish language broadcasting. Although legalized in 2002, it was not until 2004 and the launch of the widely popular Danish-Kurdish channel *Roj TV* that the TRT state network began five hours per week of minority language broadcasting (with the stated intention of 'reinforcing the people's trust in, and respect for, the state... as indivisible with its territory and nation') (9). This was accompanied by legislation that permitted privately owned firms to begin Kurdish transmission, but licensing was impeded by the control board's requirement that a series of complex profiling studies be undertaken before approval. When permission was finally granted in 2006, programming had to include Turkish subtitles (thereby preventing live broadcasts) and was limited to four hours per week (10).

The advent of a minority languages channel, TRT 6, in 2009 was similarly disappointing. Inaugurated with Prime Minister Erdoğan's broken Kurmanci welcome (*TRT şeş bi xêr be*), its schedule has been carefully de-politicized and its staff, guests and focus have been accused of being mostly pro-AKP and almost entirely anti-BDP (11). The facts that it has been broadcasting to all areas that receive *Roj TV* and has been accompanied by a sustained campaign to persuade the Danish authorities to ban the channel, have led some analysts to conclude that the initiative is principally 'another tool for the state to assimilate Kurds by diminishing the intensity of Kurdish cultural symbols' and by countering 'the growing influence of [unregulated] Kurdish broadcasting' (12). Indeed, by continuing to prohibit local stations from extending their Kurdish languages provisions, the state is now virtually operating a nationwide monopoly.

Other forms of media have also been subject to considerable state interference, similarly preventing or distorting the implementation of the harmonization reforms. The courts banned, for example, more than 1,800 websites in 2008, including blogging exchanges such as *Wordpress* and video-sharers like *YouTube* (on which there is a considerable amount of footage of Turkish state officials perpetrating human rights abuses) (13). Newspapers and periodicals covering Kurdish issues have been similarly targeted (19 were closed between August 2006 and November 2008 alone) and, while sometimes flouted, restrictions on the use of non-Turkish languages remain (14). In many cases, these operate at *de facto* (and thus largely unreported) levels rather than through more official *de jure* channels. A Bingöl human rights NGO, for instance, was instructed to replace its English language office sign with one written in Turkish. It was apparently felt that announcing the presence of human rights monitors in the town would impair the local council's attempts to attract foreign tourists (15). Similarly, public safety instructions printed in Kurmanci and distributed by a public utility firm were seized by the gendarmerie on the legally groundless instructions of Diyarbakır's provincial governor in 2005, while a human rights office in Elazığ was given an "informal" reprimand for distributing multi-lingual pamphlets during its 2009 campaign for the repeal of Article 301 (16).

The ad hoc and ex officio character of these interventions has produced some bizarre judgments. The dismissal of Abdullah Demirbaş (mayor of the multi-lingual Sur district of Diyarbakır) in May 2007 was, for instance, based on a ruling that 'since the language of education and teaching in our country is Turkish and every literate citizen can read and write Turkish, there can be no reasonable justification for the provision of municipal services in any language other than Turkish' (17). As the Minority Rights Group observes, this extraordinary statement 'effectively disqualifies those Turkish citizens who have not received any formal education and thus cannot speak Turkish from receiving any public services' (18). Although eventually overturned, it served to maintain the dissolution of the Sur council until the local elections of March 2009 (despite a constitutional requirement to organize a by-election within 110 days) (19).

It also clearly demarcates the limits of the much-lauded language reforms of the third harmonization reform package of August 2002. The right to a mother-tongue education to which it refers is not properly defined and has been left to the Ministry of National Education to interpret. The authorities insisted that new schools be created specifically for this purpose, that staff must hold relevant degrees from linguistics faculties (of which, none was offering Kurdish languages courses) and, through further regulations, that children under the age of 14 not currently enrolled in a state school are debarred (20). Despite these restrictions, a number of Kurmanci classes were established during 2004, but within a year all were closed citing a lack of demand born of limited disposable incomes and abstruse application procedures (21). The BDP responded by announcing its support for a nationwide boycott of the state schooling system until the right to a mother-tongue education is introduced. Inspired by Demirbaş, this was accompanied by what the party's deputy parliamentary leader, Kamuran Yüksek, called the holding of 'symbolic' classes at demonstrations throughout the region (22).

Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence testifying to the debilitating effects of arriving at primary school unable to understand the medium of instruction. In contrast to the AKP's view that 'if you study and read in class, you will do well', clearly depends on the language of the home (23). A former headmaster, now a BDP volunteer in Bitlis, recounted that 'before coming to school, my family and I only spoke Kurmanci so, like many others, I learnt nothing in school until I was able to learn Turkish. In my case, it took 5 years, by which time I was at a significant disadvantage and thus ultimately unable to proceed to university' (24). This very fundamental issue contributes to the fact that the region's secondary school enrolment ratio is less than half that of the rest of the country and that the average amount of schooling for Kurds is 25 months fewer than the national average (25). As a consequence, the need for mother-tongue lessons is acute – particularly for Kurdish women, of whom almost a quarter are estimated to be illiterate (26). In all, it is apparent that, despite being a founding signatory of the OSCE, Turkey is failing to meet the demands of its widely adopted *Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities* of 1993. Article 5 of these obliges participatory states to 'create conditions enabling institutions which are representative of members of the national minorities in question to participate, in a meaningful way, in the development and implementation of policies and programmes related to minority education' (27).

To conclude, it is obvious that, despite improvements relative to the parlous human right situation of the 1990s, the institutionalization of Kurdish identity remains, contrary to those that speak of entering a period of "post-exceptionality", embryonic at best. Discourses on the pluralization of authority within the south-east, the formalization of Kurdish political engagement and rise of civil society actors in the interstices of the PKK-state confrontation that regularly appear in the literature seem to be mostly relevant to changes that occurred during, and perhaps as a result of, the ceasefire of 1999-2004. Insofar as these have a legacy, it is difficult to link them causally to the overall direction of the harmonization reforms and the ways in which these have been implemented. Instead, it is important to note that the continuation of language and media restrictions, the neutering of TRT 6 and the failure to make the education sector more inclusive reveal the limitations of the constitutional amendments themselves, rather than simply the inevitable imperfections of implementation and transition. As the European Commission noted in its most recent progress report, 'the Turkish legal framework still fails to provide sufficient guarantees for exercising freedom of expression and, as a result, is often interpreted in a restrictive way by public prosecutors and judges'. Consequently, the report continues, 'full respect for and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights, in accordance with European standards have yet to be fully achieved' (28). Addressing these issues can only result from a new constitution that explicitly includes Kurdishness (and not the usual catch-all allusions to citizenship).

As TESEV point out, though, 'a constitution based on democratic, egalitarian, and rule-of-law principles is no doubt necessary but not sufficient' (29). It must be accompanied by a comprehensive legal commitment to multi-lingual provisions throughout the public sector. Courts, mosques, schools, the armed forces, council chambers, parliament and so on must not only be permitted to use Kurmanci, Zaza, Arabic and others, they must be obliged to provide them as part both of their civic service and of a more general recognition of Turkey's diversity. PR

Notes:

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1) Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009).

2) İhsan Dağı, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2004), p. 143, European Commission, *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession* (Brussels, 2004), p. 23.

3) Kerim Yıldız, *The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights* (London: Pluto, 2005), p. 30; Nicole Watts, "Turkey's Tentative Opening to Kurdishness," *Middle East Report Online*, June 14, 2004, pp. 3-4.

4) Murat Somer, "Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics and the

Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 6 (2005), p. 618.

5) Zana served 10 years imprisonment (partly) for ending her 1991 (the year that Kurdish languages were legalized – in private only) parliamentary pledge with a sentence in Kurmanci: "I take this oath for the brotherhood between the Turkish people and the Kurdish people".

6) Senem Aslan, "Incoherent State: The Controversy over Kurdish Naming in Turkey," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, No. 10 (2009), pp. 12-14. Numerous prosecutions for breaching alphabet restrictions continue. Former DTP parliamentarian, Mahmut Alıcak, was recently sentenced to six months imprisonment for using the letter w in a 2007 communiqué ("Playing Kurdish Card [sic]," Hürriyet, January 2, 2009. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10683033.asp?scr=1).

7) Joost Jongerden, "Crafting Space, Making People: The Spatial Design of Nation in Modern Turkey [sic]," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, No. 10 (2009), pp. 12-16.

8) Ioannis Grigoriades, "*Türk* or *Türkiyeli*? The Reform of Turkey's Minority Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vo. 43, No. 3 (2007), p. 427.

9) For a broader discussion of this (and a slightly different translation), see Nesrin Uçarlar, "Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey" (PH.D. dissertation, University of Lund, 2009), pp. 144-145.

10) Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence* (New York University Press: New York, 2007), pp. 293-294.

11) The correct form is, in fact, *li ser xêrê be*. Prompted by Erdoğan's words and the fact that TRT 6 had broadcast a translated speech of his a day earlier, DTP leader, Ahmet Türk, used UNESCO's International Mother Language Day (February 23, 2009), to switch to Kurmanci during a parliamentary address. Although he avoided punishment (underlining the changes that have taken place since Zana's ill-fated oration in 1991), the fact that television coverage was immediately suspended demonstrated an obvious double-standard (see Robert Olson, Olson, *Blood, Beliefs and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey 2007-2009* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2009), pp. 172-176). Indeed, the channel has, more generally, been careful to avoid areas of contention by prohibiting songs that evoke particularly Kurdish historiographies. It has also been especially keen to offer coverage of the AKP's March 2009 election campaign (to the apparent detriment of other parties) and unable to retain arguably its biggest star (the singer-presenter Rojin) who resigned, citing efforts 'to deprive [her] show of any content" (quoted in Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere, "Turkey: Regional Elections and the Kurdish Question", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2009), p. 293).

12) Emre Uslu and Önder Aytaç, "Can 'TRT Şeş li ser xêrê be' Secure Diyarbakır for Erdoğan?" *Today's Zaman*, January 1, 2009. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=162799. Efforts to pressure the Danish administration have continued for some years and included, in April 2008, the fining of 53 DTP mayors for writing to Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in support of the channel. These endeavors succeeded in August 2010 when Copenhagen announced that *Roj TV* had been indicted for 'promoting the terrorist activities' of the PKK (Michael Gunter, "Turkey, EU and International Relations," in Turkey Civic Commission, ed., *Fifth International Conference on the EU, Turkey and the Kurds* (Brussels, January 28-29, 2009), p. 70).

13) Claire Berlinksi, "Turkey's YouTube Ban is Cause for Concern," *Radio Free Europe*, July 8, 2009. http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkeys_YouTube_Ban_Is_Cause_For_Concern/1772003.html.

14) Serhiy Holovaty, *Post-Monitoring Dialogue with Turkey* (Brussels: EU Committee on the Honouring of Obligation and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe, April 7, 2009), p. 7.

15) Personal interview, Bingöl, May 2010.

16) Personal interview, Elazığ, May 2010.

17) For the original ruling, see Kerem Öktem, "The Patronising Embrace: Turkey's New Kurdish Strategy," *Stiftung Forschungsstelle Schweiz-Türkei*, February 2008, pp. 6-7. http://www.sfst.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/dateien/OP_Oktem_08-02.pdf.

18) Minority Rights Group, *A Quest for Equality: Minorities in Turkey* (London, September 2007), p. 19.

19) Demirbaş was eventually acquitted and won the elections, but was subsequently imprisoned for five months having been convicted of new charges under Article 301.

20) Nurcan Kaya, *Forgotten or Assimilated? Minorities in the Education System of Turkey* (London: Minority Rights Group, 2009), p. 18.

21) US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey* (US Department of State: Washington DC, 2006).

22) Turkish Daily News, "DTP will Push for Education in Kurdish," September 12, 2008. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=dtp-will-push-for-education-in-kurdish-2008-09-12.

23) Personal interview, Bitlis, May 2010.

24) Personal interview, Bitlis, May 2010.

25) İsmet Koç and Turgay Ünalan, "The Extent of Internal Displacement in Turkey and its Consequences on the Child Educational Attainment and Health in Turkey," paper presented at 25th IUSSP International Population Conference, Tours, July 18-23, 2005.

26) Kerim Yıldız, Rachel Bernau and Julianne Stevenson, *The Situation of Kurdish Children in Turkey* (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, January 2010), p. 96.

27) The full text of these recommendations is available here: http://www.osce.org/documents/hcnm/1996/10/2700_en.pdf.

28) Commission of the European Communities, *Turkey 2009 Progress Report* (Brussels, October 14, 2009), pp. 18, 29. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf.

29) Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler, *A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the Government* (Ankara, 2008), p. 17.

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Two Sides of the Medallion Mehmed the Conqueror: Fighter of Islam or Lover of Western Art?

*By Nilay Özlü**

Delikanlım, işaret aldığın gün atandan
Yürüyeceksin... Millet yürüyecek arkandan !
Sana selam getirdim Ulubatlı Hasandan ....

Sen ki burçlara bayrak olacak kumaştasın;
Fatih'in İstanbul'u fethettiği yaştasın!

Bırak, bozuk saatler yalan yanlış işlesin !
Çelebiler çekilip haremlerde kışlasın!
Yürü aslanım, fetih hazırlığı başlasın...

Yürü, hala ne diye kendinle savaştasın?
Fatih'in İstanbul'u fethettiği yaştasın.!

Young man, having the signal from your ancestors
You shall march... The nation will march after you!
Let the greeting of Ulubatlı Hasan be with you...

You are the flag on the tower
You are at the age of Conqueror conquering Istanbul!

Let the broken clocks run inaccurately!
Let the gentle stay with the women!
March braveman, get ready for the conquest...

March, why are you still fighting with yourself?
You are at the age of Conqueror conquering Istanbul!

-Arif Nihat Asya

Figure 1. Scenes from 'conquest day' celebrations.

This paper aims to scrutinize the use and abuse of historical figures for ideological purposes, which happens to be a very common practice in the Turkish political arena. The commodification of history and invention of national heroes with an ideological agenda, more often than not, do not reflect a realistic and complete picture of the past. The tendency that has started with the era of Democratic Party for politicizing the Ottoman past has reached its peak in the last couple years. Especially Ottoman Sultans were presented as national heroes and icons of Islamic glory. This article hopes to unveil the discrepancies between the constructed Islamic hero and the actual persona of the very same ruler in his own historical context. A more realistic and holistic picture of one of the most controversial rulers of his time will be presented from a different perspective.

For the last couple years a novel kind of "national day" started being celebrated with an increasing enthusiasm in Turkey. These ostentatious celebrations of nationalist and religious tone, supported with the state-of-the-art technology, offer an audio-visual and spiritual pleasure for the inhabitants of Istanbul. The historic spots of the city became a scene for political spectacle on the 29th of every May. Apparently the day of the "conquest of Istanbul" started being positioned as a significant day to commemorate by the local and central governments. The governing party with a neo-Ottomanist tendency, celebrated the anniversary of the conquest as a public spectacle, organizing number of attractions including Qu'ran reading ceremonies in Rumeli Hisarı, laser animated music shows on Golden Horn, stadium concerts, political speeches, and ceremonial processions of the youth with Janissary clothing together with a *mehter* band (Fig. 1). Of course, a prayer ceremony at Fatih Complex in front of the tomb of Mehmed II was an essential component of these celebrations.

Obviously, Mehmed II, namely Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror or simply Fatih, commemorated not only as a national hero, but started being positioned as a symbol of Islamic regime and as a figure representing salvation from "secular" Turkey as well. As Fatih saved Istanbul from Byzantine Empire by giving an end to the easternmost castle of Christianity; his memory is believed to save the city one more time from the Kemalist doctrine. Prophet

Figure 2. Posters from popular social networking sites.

Mohammad predicted that one day Istanbul will be conquered by the fighters of Islam and he is believed to have said that: "They will conquer Constantinople. Hail to the Prince and the army to whom this granted". By realizing Prophet Mohammad's prophecy and by converting the church of Hagia Sophia into an imperial mosque attributed Mehmed II a holy status in the Islamic historiography (Fig. 2).

Conservative media took active part in the construction of the Fatih myth which could be summarized as a military hero, defender of Islam, and merciless fighter against infidels (Figure 3). Together with rather conventional forms of media such as TV, radio, and newspapers; internet was also vividly utilized for the construction of the new vision of *Fatih*. Dozens of web pages -many having hundred-thousands of members- that were devoted to Mehmed the Conqueror could be found in social networking sites, where the nationalist and conservative ideology was explicitly promoted. Within these web sites the axiom "we are the descendants of Fatih" was among the most common. One of the groups in facebook was named "*Atam izindeyiz!... (Fatih Sultan Mehmet)*"; this well-known motto of the Kemalists ideology was transformed to refer Mehmed II as the true ancestor of the Turkish nation (Fig. 2).

Following the footsteps of Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party, Governing Justice and Development Party politicized Fatih and used his persona as a symbol for propagating their neo-Ottomanist and -needless to say- conservative vision. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan proudly highlighted his Ottoman roots, referenced Fatih quite a number of times in his public speeches, associated Mehmed II with the cultural heritage of Istanbul, named many of the recent projects or buildings after him, and did not even hesitate to use Fatih Mosque as a political arena. Last September, a poster was presented during the latest constitutional election campaigns in which Erdoğan was depicted as Fatih during his siege of Istanbul as saying 'Yes' for the constitutional changes and the Byzantines were presented as the opposing party. A very recent example would be the government's latest educational reform project being named as "FATIH". While presenting the project, Tayyip Erdoğan praised Fatih, his intelligence, and his education. He stated that "we have to raise a generation as intelligent and as well-educated as Fatih. He knew

Figure 3. Headlines from newspapers promoting the 'conquest day' celebrations.

several languages at the age of 13; that is what we are aiming for the education of the upcoming generations."

While Erdoğan was emphasizing the superb education that Mehmed II received, he -consciously or unconsciously- did not mention the actual details of the young prince's quite exceptional education. Apart from an Arab speaking philosopher reading him every day, one Greek and one Latin tutor trained the young Prince in ancient history with readings from Herodotus, Laertius, Livy, Quintus Curtius, Chronicles of the Popes, Emperors, the Kings of France and the Lombards. Mehmed II's passion for books is well known, as he was a generous patron of book production. He owned a large library of a wide selection of books from Eastern and Western world. So far, 90 precious manuscripts were identified, 20 of them on philosophy and five on logic, from his library. The court *nakkaşhane* for book production and design was founded during his reign within the walls of the Topkapı Palace, setting the foundations of a distinctive Ottoman style in book binding, painting, illustration, and illumination.

Mehmed II ordered and received many European books, most of them focusing on the issues of geography, military science, and medicine. He was particularly interested in the legacies of world emperors, such as that of Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great. The books of Alexander the Great were being read to Fatih every day, and there are several Greek copies of the book in the Topkapı Library, the most famous being the *Anabasis* of Arrianus which was known to be copied for Mehmed II. Several Turkish versions of the book, some of them illustrated, named as *Iskendername* were produced for Mehmed II, who identified himself with the persona of the Macedonian emperor. The Sultan also had his history and his accomplishments written by Tursun Beg and his Greek historian Kritovoulos with the aim of immortalizing his accomplishments. He apparently had the ambition of being the new world-emperor and the inheritor of Roman Empire. Pope Pius II and Georgios from Trabzon actually offered the Sultan to convert into Christianity to unite eastern and western Rome under his sovereignty and to become the real successor of the re-united Roman Empire. Eventhough their offer was not accepted by Mehmed II, historians believe that he had the ambition of becoming the ruler of the known world,

Figure 4. A page from Mehmed's school book. Istanbul Topkapı Palace Museum.

as he defined himself as "Caesar" and attempted to take over Rome.

Not only the educational background but the artistic tastes of the young Sultan were quite controversial for his time. Actually his interest in figurative painting had its roots in his childhood education. The school-book with pen and ink drawings belonging to the young prince includes three-quarter face portrait busts together with arabesque motifs, animals, and his imperial cypher (Fig. 3). Sultan's keen interest in European, especially Italian art and architecture could have been derived from his ambition of uniting eastern and western Rome under his rule, as well. He patronized several European artists, mostly from Italy to have his portraits done. According to Julian Raby, medals produced from his youth to later years of his life, provide the most consistent evidence for Fatih's appeal in portraiture. The Sultan used Italian contacts and diplomatic channels to demand the services of specific Italian artists. A well known Quattrocento artist Costanzo de Ferrara, sent by Ferrante II of Naples, spent many years in Istanbul and produced the finest portrait medal of Mehmed II (Fig. 4). Painter Gentile Bellini and sculptor Bartolommeo Bellano were sent for the service of the Ottoman court by Venetian authorities as demanded by the Sultan.

Figure 5. Portrait medal of Mehmed II by Costanzo de Ferrara (1481). Oxford Ashmolean Museum.

Not only the renowned portrait painting of Mehmed II, but also a cast portrait medal was created by Bellini which was later sent to Lorenzo de' Medici of Florence. A copy of the medal was produced by the Florentine court artist Giovanni Bertolto to return the favour of Mehmed II. Apparently the Sultan was utilizing figural imagery as a political tool to reinforce his sovereignty and visibility in the Western world as well.

Figure 6. Mehmed II smelling a rose (ca. 1481). Istanbul Topkapı Palace Museum.

The influence of European artists could be traced in the imperial *nakkaşhane* as well. A new genre of portrait painting combining Timurid style of miniature painting with European style of naturalistic details appeared in the second half of the 15th century. Two of the court painters, Sinan and Şiblizade Ahmed, could be identified from this era. Sinan was trained by two artists with Italian names (one from Ragusa and one from Dalmatia) and Şiblizade Ahmed was renowned for his talent in portraiture. The famous painting, depicting Mehmed smelling a rose is attributed to Şiblizade Ahmed and the painting brought Timurid and Italian painting traditions together (Fig. 5). The bust portrait of Mehmed painted by Sinan Bey, closely followed the style of Costanzo de Ferrara (Fig. 6). The impact of European naturalism which is clearly visible in this profile depiction of the Sultan came to an end after the reign of Mehmed II. After his reign, Ottoman Sultans turned their back to Western artistic traditions and continued to use Timurid and Persian arts as sources of inspiration.

Mehmed II's interest in European art was not only limited with figural arts or portraiture paintings. During his ambitious reconstruction of Constantinople as an imperial capital, the incorporation of Italian architects and inspiration from Western and also Eastern architecture are known. In 1480 the Sultan asked Venetians to send a painter named 'Maestro Bernando' to Constantinople for the construction and decoration of buildings in Italian style which includes sculptures, large-scale paintings, and frescoes. While embracing the Byzantine and antique past of the city, the building pro-

Figure 7. Bust portrait of Mehmed II (ca. 1470s). Istanbul Topkapı Palace Museum.

gramme of Mehmed II has an immediate agenda of Ottomanizing the city reinforcing the idea of imperial continuity. Even the name of the city was not changed and the term 'Kostantiniyye' continued to be used in the imperial documents and coins until the classical era. Several architectural drawings combining Western and Islamic traditions belonging to the era of Mehmed II were found in the Topkapı Palace Archives. The impact of Italian architecture on the octagonal towers and classicizing details of the New Palace (Topkapı Palace) and the star shaped citadel (Yedi Kule) built at the Byzantian Golden Gate were also apparent. According to Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, the New Mosque Complex, which is now called Fatih Külliyesi, carries many common features with Ospedale Maggiore in Milan with its strict geometry, symmetry and axial planning that were strange to Ottoman building traditions of earlier eras. It has been argued that Italian architect Filatere (Antonio Averlino) was involved in the construction of the complex. While the official texts written for the ruling elite were praising the mosque complex and admiring its architectural and spiritual qualities; chronicles by the dervish Aşıkpaşazade or by anonymous chroniclers carried a critical tone against the complex. These anonymous chroniclers highlighted the abundant expenditure for the complex and criticized Mehmed for spending tax money to secure his afterlife. They also blamed the Sultan of injustice and oppression, since the architect of the complex, Sinan, was imprisoned and beaten to death and the workers were not paid wages and forcibly deported from their homelands. Apparently, Mehmed II has not yet enjoyed the privileged and holy status that he holds now, in his own era.

The legacy of the Ottoman Sultan as the patron of Western art did not, however, last long. The idea of positioning the Ottoman Sultan as a Renaissance ruler and a generous supporter of art and architecture leave its place to a more conservative and more orthodox understanding with the era of Bayezid II. Rather than having an appeal for portraiture, the successor of Mehmed II hates figural imagery. After arriving Constantinople to claim the throne, Bayezid sold all the paintings owned by his father. Mehmed II had a large collection of Bellini paintings that also include erotic works of art. It is obviously a twist of history that, one of the symbols of Islamic ideology today was accused as a non believer of Prophet Mohammad (*Che non credeva in Macometto*) by his very own son, Bayezid II. Apparently, to better comprehend a historical figure, both sides of the medallion have to be examined. Before consuming the legacy of Mehmed the Conqueror for political purposes, one has to understand the actual position of him in his own historical context. Whether Mehmed II was a fighter of Islam and a cruel enemy of Christianity or a lover and supporter of Western art and architecture needs to be examined one more time. PR

Note:

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When Russia will Ready to Join the WTO...

By Dr. Zura Garakanidze*

Russia's persistent interest in Iranian energy projects casts a problematic light over its bid to join the World Trade Organisation

- *Moscow is already violating the WTO's rule on relations with unrecognised separatist states*
- *It also appears ready to invest in Iranian oil and gas, enough to violate Western sanctions regimes*
- *Russian companies' Armenian subsidiaries are involved in some of these projects*

In an interview with Interfax on September 8, William Burns, the US under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, noted that the US and Russian presidents had decided at their June 24 summit to set September 30 as a target for resolving several outstanding bilateral issues.

"[As] I said before, Russia is making good progress towards those goals," Burns said. "The United States is doing everything it can to be supportive, so I think it's possible to preserve and build on [the] momentum that has built up, and I think we are at a moment where Russia's accession to the World Trade Organisation [WTO] is closer than it has ever been before."

However, information published by the Russian media makes clear that Russia is violating at least one WTO rule – and may be gearing up to break another.

Separatism and sanctions

First, the WTO prohibits trade with unrecognised separatist states. However, since the 1990s, Russia has enjoyed wide-ranging economic co-operation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions that have declared independence from Georgia.

Moreover, after invading Georgian territory and occupying South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008, Russia formally recognised the independence of these two regions. It also concluded joint border defence treaties with both of them and has officially recognised customs checkpoints on their common borders.

Secondly, the WTO requires its members to avoid violating sanctions imposed by the organisation's

other member states. This casts a problematic light on Moscow's dealings with Tehran.

In a gesture of goodwill following the announcement of a "reset" in US-Russian relations, the Kremlin has joined not only with the UN, but also with the US, EU and Japan in endorsing unilateral sanctions against Iran. At the same time, however, some Russian state-owned companies (along with their Armenian proxies) are looking to co-operate with Iran on the type of investment projects targeted by the US and the EU – and therefore by the WTO.

Co-operation plans

On April 9, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report for US legislators on Iranian sanctions.

This report stated: "Major purchases of oil or natural gas from Iran would not appear to constitute violations of ISA, because ISA sanctions investment in Iran, not trade with Iran (even in energy products). Nor do sales to Iran of equipment or services for Iran to build its own energy projects appear to meet the definition of investment under the act.

"In a gesture of goodwill following the announcement of a "reset" in US-Russian relations, the Kremlin has joined not only with the UN, but also with the US, EU and Japan in endorsing unilateral sanctions against Iran.

However, Russian companies are going beyond the scope of such activities outlined above.

Moscow and Tehran have been discussing plans for the realisation of joint investment projects in the oil and gas sphere over the long term. In July 2010, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Iranian Oil Minister Masoud Mirkazemi signed a joint statement on co-operation in the oil and gas sphere.

The document states that the parties intend "to study the possibility of establishing of a joint bank to finance projects in the oil and gas and petrochemical sectors." To this end, they will consider establishing a joint venture and mull plans for selling a portion of their joint production on exchanges.

According to Shmatko, the partnership between the countries in the designated direction has no practical limits. For his part, Mirkazemi has declared repeatedly that sanctions imposed by the US and EU haven't affected Iran's economic and industrial development in any way.

The above-mentioned agreement calls for Russian companies to spend about US$2.2 billion on oil-refining projects designed to help Iran overcome its long- standing dependence on imported motor fuels, especially petrol. This is part of a wider effort by Tehran to build up the country's downstream sector and expand petrol production capacity.

Bypassing sanctions

In theory, building new refining facilities in Iran is problematic because of the sanctions regimes seeking to bar foreign investors from pumping more than US$20 million into energy projects. However, Russia found a way to extend its fruitful energy co-operation with Iran some years ago.

In 2007, media reports indicated that Russia's Gazprom Neft, the oil arm of the state-run natural gas monopoly Gazprom, was considering proposals for the construction of a refinery in Armenia with a capacity of 7 million tonnes per year (140,000 barrels per day). The oil-processing plant was to be built near the city of Meghri, on the border with Iran.

Earlier, Yerevan had offered Moscow the opportunity to build a refinery with a throughput capacity of 3-4 million tonnes per year (60,000-80,000 bpd). However, the Russian side said it would not go through with the project unless the plant's capacity could be increased.

Re-routing oil through Armenia

This seems excessive, given that such a plant's petroleum product output would far exceed the amount needed to cover Armenian demand. As such, it seems more likely that the Russian side was

> **"Russia and Iran ... have said they might sign swap deals allowing gas to be transported from Turkmenistan to Iran in exchange for Tehran's commitment to make equivalent volumes of its own gas available on Gazprom's behalf in southern Iran."**

looking at the project as a means of helping Iran process more oil.

Indeed, the proposed Meghri refinery is supposed to receive oil pumped from Tabriz, a city in northwestern Iran, via a 200-km pipeline, and would then transport the resulting petroleum products back to Iran by railway. The transport infrastructure needed to accomplish this will be constructed with help from Russian companies.

The project has not drawn much attention lately, but considering the joint statements made by Russia and Iran on the development of a new transport corridor, a revival is not out of the question. Once a legal base for the project is established, starting work would be easy. The two countries indicated recently that this process was already under way.

According to a report from the Tert.am news agency, work on the project may begin soon. The agency said on September 14 that construction of the Iran-Armenia oil pipeline was slated to begin in the autumn of 2010 and would finish about two years later. Officially, Armenia will cover 50% of the required investments, and Iran will cover the remaining 50%. It is worth noting, however, that virtually all of Armenia's energy infrastructure is owned or controlled by Russian state-owned energy companies.

Other projects

Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have discussed other high-value energy projects. They have said they might sign swap deals allowing gas to be transported from Turkmenistan to Iran in exchange for Tehran's commitment to make equivalent volumes of its own gas available on Gazprom's behalf in southern Iran.

Tehran has also shown serious interest in Russian proposals for the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in Golestan Province and has said it may enlist Russian help to build an oil pipeline from the Caspian port of Neka to Jask, a port on the Gulf of Oman.

Additionally, Iranian authorities are ready to consider offers made by Russian state-owned and state-controlled energy companies for development licences covering new oil and gas deposits in Iran. Tehran may make these licences available on a non-competitive basis.

Meanwhile, Gazprom Neft is currently continuing negotiations for development rights to two Iranian oil deposits, Azar and Changouleh. Last year, it struck a deal with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) on the formation of a joint venture to exploit these fields.

In the gas sector, Gazprom is working at a section of South Pars, Iran's largest gas field and home to about 8% of world gas reserves. South Pars is also being targeted by Sibur, a petrochemical company controlled by Gazprom. The Russian gas monopoly may also become involved in the construction of the 2,700-km Peace Pipeline, also known as the Iran-Pakistan-India gas link. Gazprom held discussions on the project with Iranian officials in 2009.

Russian involvement and interest in the above-mentioned projects can be documented through reports in the Russian press. As such, there seems little reason to doubt that Moscow stands ready to commit funds far in excess of the US$20 million threshold set by ISA.

True, the plans outlined here have yet to come to fruition. However, if Russian companies go forward with them, Moscow will be in contravention of WTO rules. And when this potential violation is viewed against the backdrop of its occupation and recognition of breakaway regions of Georgia, Russia ought to be farther from accession to the WTO than it ever was before. PR

Note:

* **Dr. Zura Garakanidze** is an author in NewsBase E-magazine.

SAO PAULO

"It can not get any worse"

*By Fatih Eren**

I am going on analysing localities under global concern. A very problematic city, 'Sao Paulo', is going to be examined in detail in this volume.

Sao Paulo is located at the southern part of Brazil. With its population over 20 million, it is the largest metropolitan city of the country as well as the largest city of the South America. Sao Paulo is the gate of Brazil opening to the world. All foreign institutional investors have to visit this city in a way before doing an investment in Brazil because this big metropol is the leading financial, industrial and commercial centre of the country.

Before starting the examination of Sao Paulo as a global city, let's have a look at the globalisation process of Brazil in general.

The year 1995 became a breaking point for Brazil in terms of globalisation. The State's protectionist and inward-looking macro-economic policy turned liberal and outward-looking in 1995. In this context, several liberal economic reforms were put into practice after this date in the country. Thanks to these reforms, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) to the value of 45 billion dollars flew into the country in 2008 whilst the value of inward FDI flows was only 5 billion dollars in 1995.

Because of three main reasons, the Brazilian government has embraced a liberal economic policy since 1995: Firstly, the government wanted to modernize its macro-economy; secondly, it wanted to decrease unemployment rates in the country; and thirdly, it wanted to pay off all its public debt (total public sector debt was standing at more than 60% of GDP in 1995). Namely, the government considered that the only way to achieve these objectives was of attracting foreign finance capital into Brazil.

I could say that Brazil was not a country which submitted herself totally to globalisation process which was experiencing significantly in today's world; but, it was a country which read this process in a true way. Brazil aimed to turn this process into its advantage so the country displayed a pragmatic attitude during its internationalization process. In other words, it tried to benefit as much as possible from opportunities which were provided by this inevitable process. For example, Brazil is going to

Coat of Arms of Brazil

Map of South America

host some international sport organizations in the near future (i.e. the World Cup in 2014, the Olympics in 2016). The country is expected to renew its insufficient infrastructure (esp. transportation and social service infrastructures) with foreign finance capital which will be obtained from these international events.

On one hand, Brazil provided her natural and cultural resources for the benefit of transnational investors and then became one of the 'passive players' of the globalisation process. On the other hand, Brazil followed a multilateral foreign trade strategy and then developed into a 'playmaker actor' which managed the globalisation process actively in the world. In the context of the multilateral foreign trade strategy, Brazil was worked for the realisation of regional integration into the continental of South America (i.e. The Common Market of the South-MERCOSUL, The Union of South American Nations-UNASUR). In addition, the country developed commercial relations with many countries (esp. US, the European Countries, Japan, China) and established diplomatic relations with varied international organizations (i.e. United Nations-UN, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD, The Organization of American States-OAS).

Brazil's pragmatic approach in its internationalization process and its multilateral strategy in foreign relations came to fruition recently. It became the world's biggest eighth economy in terms of GDP in 2009. The balance of foreign trade in Brazil was excellent for an emerging economy because the country exported more goods than it imported in the last 9 years. In addition, the ratio of total public sector debt in GDP decreased in the last years; the gross public debt has diminished to 59% of GDP in 2010.

After looking at the general globalisation process of Brazil, I would like to finish this section with looking at business sectors which foreign investors were mostly interested in Brazil. It was seen that foreign investors invested in 'capital-intensive' and 'technology-intensive' industrial production sectors in the last 15 years in Brazil. It was natural that Sao Paulo benefited from foreign direct investments at the most in the country because it was the financial and industrial centre of Brazil. The foreign capital was involved in the city via privatizations (i.e. Telebras, Banespa, etc.), company acquisitions and mergers. However, the state is trying to orient foreign direct investments to the Northeastern part of the country today (especially to real estate and tourism sectors in this region).

The impact of global concern for Sao Paulo: Analysis

At the beginning of my analysis, I might say that Sao Paulo has always been a city marked by sharp social inequalities. More than 50% of the country's revenue is gone to higher-income class which consists 10% of the total population in Brazil. The government has put many social and economic reforms into practice in order to give more share from country revenues to the low-income class recently. In line with this, the government spent almost one quarter of its GDP on these social programmes last year. However, when I looked at the

Foreign direct investment (FDI) overview, selected years
(Millions of dollars and percentages)

FDI flows	1995-2005 (Annual average)	2006	2007	2008	2009	as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation: 1995-2005 (Annual average)	2007	2008	2009
Brazil									
Inward	18 801	18 822	34 585	45 058	25 949	16.1	14.5	14.7	9.9
Outward	*1 942*	*28 202*	*7 067*	*20 457*	*- 10 084*	*1.7*	*3.0*	*6.7*	*- 3.8*
Memorandum									
Argentina									
Inward	7 161	5 537	6 473	9 726	4 895	17.6	10.2	12.7	7.6
Outward	*1 273*	*2 439*	*1 504*	*1 391*	*679*	*3.1*	*2.4*	*1.8*	*1.1*
Mexico									
Inward	17 470	19 946	27 440	23 683	12 522	16.2	11.9	9.2	6.1
Outward	*1 997*	*5 758*	*8 256*	*1 157*	*7 598*	*1.9*	*3.6*	*0.4*	*3.7*
South America									
Inward	40 942	43 837	71 562	91 670	54 754	17.1	14.8	15.1	10.1
Outward	*6 522*	*35 451*	*12 085*	*34 120*	*3 832*	*2.8*	*2.5*	*5.6*	*0.7*
Latin America and the Caribbean									
Inward	72 089	94 557	163 612	183 195	116 555	19.0	21.3	19.7	14.6
Outward	*23 497*	*67 726*	*55 975*	*82 008*	*47 402*	*6.4*	*7.4*	*9.0*	*6.0*
Developing economies									
Inward	211 470	434 366	564 930	630 013	478 349	11.9	14.0	12.5	9.3
Outward	*79 351*	*228 691*	*292 147*	*296 286*	*229 159*	*4.6*	*7.3*	*5.9*	*4.5*
World									
Inward	741 045	1 459 133	2 099 973	1 770 873	1 114 189	10.3	16.9	12.6	9.1
Outward	*717 852*	*1 410 574*	*2 267 547*	*1 928 799*	*1 100 993*	*10.0*	*18.4*	*13.8*	*9.0*

Foreign Direct Investments between 1995 and 2009 in Brazil (UNCTAD)



Balance of Foreign Trade in Brazil

case of Sao Paulo, it was clear that these governmental efforts were inefficient in decreasing social inequalities in the city. Importantly, most of the richest people of the country and again most of the poorest people of the country live in Sao Paulo, today. Here, I might ask this general but very important question: "Does globalisation process bring a social justice to Sao Paulo?"

The congestion of population is the basic problem of Sao Paulo. This problem is a candidate to develop into a bigger problem in the globalisation process. Internal migration (from the other cities of Brazil towards this city) is going on in Sao Paulo because this city is already the economic motor of the country. It is clear that the city is needed a decentralization in terms of population because the managing and planning of the urban area with its population over 20 million is being more difficult year-to-year in Sao Paulo.

The city is at the first stages of its internationalization process, now. Economic vitality has increased in the city and this vitality brought a prosperity to the residents of the city. However, this economic prosperity may be 'temporary' as well as 'permanent' for the residents. If it is permanent, it does not a matter very much but if this prosperity is temporary, this temporary boom process then must be managed cleverly by the authorities of Sao Paulo.

The local government is expected to build 2 million affordable housing units by 2014 in Sao Paulo. However, land prices are now increasing gradually in the city as a result of global concern for Sao Paulo. Unfortunately, land prices will continue to increase in the near future due to new urban developments and investments in this locality. The increase of land prices may affect the realisation of these social house developments negatively. If the prosperity of residents is temporary in Sao Paulo, these social houses then must be developed rapidly in this prosperity phase; by this way, people in low-income class can afford these houses easily in this period. Again, these social houses can be built using the surplus value of new urban developments and investments in the city (through value-capture tools, yield-sharing methods, etc.). Thus, the surplus value of this temporary process can be transferred to low-income class in a direct way.

It has been mentioned above that the government was trying to orient foreign investments to the Northeastern part of the country. However, I must say that undoubtedly foreign investors will be interested in Sao Paulo and its region much more than the northeastern part of the country in the near future because of some logical reasons. First of all, the high population of the city will unavoidably fuel new shopping centre developments in Sao Paulo. Again, Sao Paulo is the financial centre of the country so new A-class office developments will be increased in the city as well. Besides, Sao Paulo is a commercial centre and its ties with other countries is increasing every year; so new hotel developments will start in the city, too. As a result of new shopping centre and hotel developments, new storage areas will be a huge necessity for this locality; so logistical developments will follow shopping centre, office and hotel developments in the city. Namely, many new developments will begin in various property sectors of Sao Paulo. I can say that all these property development activities will decrease unemployment rates in the city to some extent; again, some local people will benefit from these developments positively and they will go up into a higher social class (especially from low-income class to middle-income, from middle-

Figure 5: Low-density neighbourhoods in Sao Paulo

income class to high-income). These are looking as the positive sides of the globalisation process. However, I must say that all kind of investments towards this city will make the decentralization of the urban population impossible in Sao Paulo. Remember the rule that if there is an accumulated value in a place, people move on to that place. As long as the urban population will not be decentralized, all problems which are connected with overpopulation will continue increasingly in Sao Paulo in its internationalization process.

The local government of Sao Paulo is trying to place urban sprawl under control in the city for a long while (i.e. Green Belt of the Biosphere Reserve of the Atlantic Forest) because uncontrolled urban growth evidently causes environmental degradations in Sao Paulo. Therefore, I can say that urban regeneration and redevelopment projects will take the place of Greenfield projects in the city in the next years. New urban regeneration and redevelopment projects will probably make a pressure on the low-density neighbourhoods of Sao Paulo (favelas). The 10% of the urban population is living in these neighbourhoods. Importantly, the rate of property ownership is about 80% in these areas. Therefore, the protection of residents' property rights in the regeneration and redevelopment process of these neighbourhoods is very important for decreasing social inequalities in Sao Paulo.

Prospective property development projects mentioned above have a potential to change social inequalities in Sao Paulo. The lack of social infrastructure (i.e. school, hospital, sewer, open and green spaces, etc.) is one of the main problems in the city. So, it is clear that an integrity between commercial projects and social infrastructure projects is needed in all regeneration and redevelopment processes. This is crucial for Sao Paulo because it has presently a very inequitable social structure; and regeneration and redevelopment projects always play a key role in increasing or decreasing social inequalities in a city. As long as the metropolitan government of Sao Paulo takes the social aspects of urban projects into consideration seriously, the urban tension will decrease in this locality.

Every investment will bring a value increase in the properties of Sao Paulo during its internationalization process. The success for reaching social peace in Sao Paulo is strongly related with the fairly sharing of these value increases among the residents. The anger and frustration of the poor residents against the rich residents is growing day-to-day in this city. The level of this anger can be measured from rap songs which were produced by poor people in the city.

"...in the party with us you don't go
We here, you there; each one in his place
Did you get it?
If life is like this, am I to blame?
The world is different on this side of the bridge..."

This rap song has been written by one of the most famous rap group in Sao Paulo (the Racionais MC's). Therefore, the question of 'Who will benefit from these value increases?' is seen very important for Sao Paulo. If the answer of this question is 'all residents of the city', in this situation, I can assert that the anger of losers (very poor people) against the privileged few may diminish in time in the city. Keeping in mind that crime rates are a positive function of 'social frustrations' in a city.

Sao Paulo stands in an environmentally-rich geography. The globalisation process may have both positive and negative impacts on the natural resources of this city. On one hand, some international organizations (i.e. UNESCO, Green Peace, etc.) are making a pressure on Sao Paulo to maintain its natural resources sensitively because these environmental resources have a value not only for Sao Paulo but also for the world. The UNESCO's Man and Biosphere Programme which was started for Sao Paulo's Atlantic Forests in 1994 can be a good example for this international environmental pressure.

Atlantic Forests in Sao Paulo

On the other hand, Sao Paulo has already been showed one of the best places to live for pensioners in some international property magazines (i.e. A Place in the Sun, etc.). Besides, international tourism agencies tried to attract more tourists into the countryside of Sao Paulo. Namely, the warm climate and the green nature of this city makes this locality (esp. its rural area) very attractive for tourists and foreign individual investors. Therefore, It is possible to see an increase of new luxury residential developments in the rural areas of Sao Paulo in the near future. Again, It is possible to see an increase of commercial activities for tourists in the natural world of Sao Paulo (i.e. Safari, golf, camping, hunting, etc.). This rising concern will increase the vulnerability of the city's countryside to soil. The city is already fighting against environmental degradation; a microclimate came into being up to the city in the last 10 years because of its high-population and the lack of green spaces in its built environment. This microclimate makes the protection of the ecosystem and the bio-diversity very difficult in Sao Paulo in any case. When the number of people spending time in the natural areas of the city increase, the environmental degradation will speed up in this locality.

I want to complete my analysis with future transportation problems of Sao Paulo associated with its internationalization process. Today, the average daily transportation time is 2 hours by public transport in the city. Importantly, most of crimes is committed in public transport vehicles. Tourists and foreign businessmen are oriented to private cars, cabs, for-hire vehicles and tourist couches because of security reasons. In addition, the level of income is rising thanks to new foreign investments in the city so the private-car ownership may increase to a certain extent in the future. In relation to new shopping centre and hotel developments, cargo and service vehicles will be seen in traffic much more than before in Sao Paulo.

In the light of evaluations mentioned above, it can be said that the city will face with a severe traffic congestion in may be 5 years. The present state of transportation infrastructure is accepted very insufficient by public authorities in Sao Paulo. Huge investments are definitely required for the transportation infrastructure of Sao Paulo. However, the government is putting a pressure on Sao Paulo's metropolitan government to cut substantial spendings in the city in order to meet the deficit in public budget. Here is the question: How will Sao Paulo solve its increasing transportation problems without any huge investment in its transport infrastructure? PR

Note:

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The Confucian Academy, Soft Power and Patriotism

By Antony Ou*

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Confucianism has been fundamentally challenged. The crucial concepts like filial piety, imperial loyalty and social harmony were viewed as conservative and authoritarian by westernized scholars. According to these scholars, Chinese people should abandon it and welcome new sets of imported value systems such as Liberalism and Marxism. However, certain Confucian apologists argued that Confucianism should be maintained and revitalized. For instance, *Kang Youwei* (1858-1927) reinvented Confucianism by incorporating western values such as Democracy and Communism. In his work *Datongshu* (The Book of Great Unity), the future Utopia will be realized by a single central democratic government under a communist system. He insisted that all these values could be found in Confucian texts. From the above description, one can equate him to any Universalist or Socialist of today. However, one of the interesting things about him was that he proposed that Confucianism was a religion, (again, an imported value to China) and we should treat Confucius as the Grand Master. We should worship him and abide by the codes and norms of Confucianism undoubtedly. This set off the beginning of the establishment of the Confucian Academy (孔教學院).

The Confucian Academy is a misleading term and is lost in English translation. The second Chinese character actually means religion, and the English term does not reflect such an orientation. *Chen Huanzhang* (陳煥章) (1881–1933) founded the Confucian Society (孔教會) with his teacher *Kang Youwei* in Shanghai. Subsequently, the Hong Kong Confucian Academy was established in 1930. That same year, the Confucian Secondary School was built. From 1942, *Zhu Yuzhen, Lu Xiangfu and Huang Yuntian* were the chairmen of the Academy. *Tang Enjia* then has become the Dean of the Academy since 1992. Nowadays, the Academy aimed at following Confucius's teaching and promoting the essence of rites and benevolence. Its objectives are:

- Promoting Confucianism as the nation's major religion in order to enhance the cohesion of the Chinese nation,

- Advocating Confucius's birthday as a public holiday in Hong Kong,
- Establishing Confucian temples in various cities and towns around the world,
- Including Confucian teachings in primary schools, secondary colleges and universities,
- Constructing the Confucius Memorial Hall in Hong Kong and make it as the world's centre of the Confucianism.

On the one hand, the Confucian Academy thinks that it bears the responsibility to export Confucius's teaching to the world. The Dean, *Tang Enjia* is a preacher of Confucianism. He insists that Confucianism is the essence of Chinese culture, and is desirable to export it all over the world. To him, the key teachings of Confucius include Confucian "business ethics", filial piety, Confucian "environmentalism" and so on. Firstly, businessmen should always keep their promises and should prioritize "rightness" over what they can gain. In other words, businessmen are moral agents who do business with moral conscious and ethical means. Secondly, everyone should love and take care of their parents, and by doing so societies can be peaceful and harmonious. Thirdly, according to *Tang*, Confucius is an "environmentalist", who studied the relationship between human beings and nature. He proposed that we should not be in conflict with nature, instead, we should respect it and cherish it. Eventually we could possibly realize that human beings and nature are inseparable and even compatible with each other. Hence, for *Tang* and his Academy, in facing the challenges of moral decay and environmental degradation, Confucian teachings are essential prescriptions to the modern world. Confucianists do have the duty to uphold these principles and warn the others. In this sense, The Confucian Academy is a centre for breeding "soft power".

By definition, soft power refers to the state capacities of culture, values and ideologies. In the international arena, these capacities can make states gain through "co-option and attraction", according to Joseph Nye. In recent years, "soft power" is a trendy term in China. *Hu Jintao*, the Head of State of China, argues that it is time for China to develop its "soft power". Chinese international relation theorists second it. Daniel A. Bell, the first-ever foreign full-time professor in Chinese modern history, elaborates it in the vocabularies of Confucianism. He argues that Confucianism has plenty of cultural resources, such as meritocracy and family values that can be useful for western countries. Moreover, these cultural resources can particularly be suitable in East Asia.

Kang Youwei

On the other hand, Confucianism is increasingly becoming a cultural reference point for Chinese patriotism. In other words, the inclusiveness of the *Han* ethnicity (which consists of 92% of Chinese population) relies on the future development of Modern Confucianism. This notion is strongly maintained by the Confucian Academy. *Tang Enjia* advocates,

> *Throughout history, Confucianism (as a religion) has never been in conflict with China. Hong Kong has six recognized religions and Confucianism is one of them. The Confucian School has participated in the establishment of the Basic Law (the mini-constitution of Hong Kong)... Confucianism is widely regarded as the thirteen religions of the world. Confucianism also recognizes them all. However, China is the only country that has yet to recognize the status of Confucianism as a religion, which is an ironic issue. The Confucian Academy of Hong Kong has established two secondary schools and two primary schools. This is the clear evidence that the Confucian Academy loves its country and Hong Kong. This position has never been shaken. Please check the history of the Academy and you will find out that the Academy never creates troubles to the Chinese Communist Party and never seek benefit from the motherland. (Translation from "On the Religiousness of Confucianism")*

Needless to say, *Tang Enjia* is a militant patriot who thinks Confucianism should be the core value and cultural heritage of modern China. More importantly, the Confucian Academy, is a patriotic organization that help shape China's prosperous future. The Confucian Academy never creates trouble to the Communist Party and never asks for money from its beloved state. To me, this is a very peculiar understanding of the Confucian tradition, which I am sure Confucius himself would turn in his grave.

In the Analects 4:18, Confucius says,

> *In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur.*
>
> *(Translation: Chinese Text Project)*

In *Xiao Jing*, Master Zang says,

> *Anciently, if the Son of Heaven had seven ministers who would remonstrate with him, although he had no right methods of government, he would not lose his possession of the kingdom. If the prince of a state had five such ministers, though his measures might be equally wrong, he would not lose his state. If a great officer had three, he would not, in a similar case, lose (the headship of) his clan. If an inferior officer had a friend who would remonstrate with him, a good name would not cease to be connected with his character.*
>
> *(Translation: Chinese Text Project)*

The Emblem of Confucian Academy: The symbol represents the element of fire in I-Ching, one of the Five Confucian Classics. According to the Confucian Academy, this ancient occult symbol implies brightness, rightness and solidarity.



Dr. Tang Enjia, the chairman of the Confucian Academy. Is he a Confucianist or a Chinese Communist?

One could find many other Confucian quotes on the imperial concept of "remonstrance" and anyone who claimed to be a Confucianist in the past upheld this moral principle. Confucianists of remonstrance are the brave ones who pointed out the mistakes of their authorities and for most of the cases; they were jailed, tortured and executed. According to Edward Said, these people were "court intellectuals", the only alternative voice in imperial court. The notion is problematic itself in face of liberal and democratic values. The latter two concepts are actually better alternatives. But for now, remonstrance seems to be a "losing tradition" in Modern China. Patriot organizations and intellectuals, such as the Confucian Academy and *Tang*, become the philosophical hack for the dominant power— the essential part of the establishment. One should be noted that *Tang Enjia* is a brave person too, since he needs to defend the Communist Party's positions on the June Fourth Incident and the Charter 08. PR

Note:

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His monograph, Just War and the Confucian Classics: A Gongyangzhuan Analysis, has been published and is available at amazon.com.

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Inception: Ideas and Politics

By Kadri Kaan Renda *

Inception, a science-fiction film written and directed by Christopher Nolan, is based on the long existing curiosity about human mind and dreams. Understanding how human mind works, seeking the ways of controlling and manipulating human mind have been an inextricable interest for scientists, sci-fi novelists, and film producers. In *Inception*, Nolan, similar to what he did in his well-acclaimed movie *Memento*, significantly draws on burgeoning scientific, literary and cinematic work about the mysteries of human mind and the interplay between dreams and reality.

Dominic Cobb, the main character of the movie, and his colleagues are specialized in extracting or stealing what is inside a man's mind through penetrating into his dreams. This time Cobb makes a deal with a business tycoon, Saito to implant an idea into the mind of a rival businessman, Fischer. In order to achieve that Cobb contrives a long con to be performed in Fischer's dreams. I don't want to give away all the details about how Cobb and his team do that and whether they accomplish their mission. On a personal note, Nolan's brilliant idea makes the movie one of my favourites. I, personally, think that without Nolan's idea about corporate espionage through dreams, *Inception* is merely another ordinary action movie, not even better than the last couple of James Bond movies. I reckon that action-lovers will mostly be disappointed, sci-fi nerds and thriller-seekers will not exactly find what they want to see. There is a little bit of all in the movie, which is why perhaps it has been drawing wide range of audiences into the theatres, and makes it one of the highest grossing films of 2010.

In this review, I will not question the cinematic features of the movie or artistic performances. Nor do I compare and contrast *The Matrix trilogy* and *Inception* by making references to the well-known philosophical debates on post-structuralism, anti-foundationalism and psychoanalytical theories on the interplay between the reality and dreams. I have neither enough space nor thorough knowledge of these philosophical thoughts to give a comprehensive account of them. My purpose is, thus, more modest and sober. In fact, from *Inception* I want to jump into the role of ideas in day-to-day politics and political science. Whilst I was watching the movie a question popped up in

my mind. Who implants ideas about contemporary economic, political and social structures into our individual and collective mind? And how can one do that in the domain of politics? It seems to me that politicians, opinion leaders, writers, people in the show businesses and advertorials strive for implanting ideas into people's mind at a larger scale than Cobb and his team aims at in the movie. What is striking is that they can implant an idea even without entering into the dreams of each individual and going all the way down to the 'limbo'. Starting from such mind-boggling questions, I will write a brief review on ideas and their role in day-to-day politics and their influence in the field of political science.

Sigmund Freud, founding father of psychoanalytical method in psychiatry, written a great deal on dreams, subconscious and mind. Freud, to his dismay, conceded that he failed to come up with an answer to the aged-old question as to what a woman wants – which, I suppose, will remain a mystery quite a long time. Like most of the men who want to figure out what is in women's mind, politicians always wonder what the public wants. They want to learn more about the demands and desires of the public in order to find new ways to either satisfy them or more likely to manipulate them. Throughout history political movements which succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the public were the ones that grasped the public desire well enough to manipulate them to their own advantage.

Every political movement starts with an idea, revolves around that fundamental idea and its off-shoots, competes and clashes with other ideas and eventually permeates into the hearts and minds of people. By and large politics is about selling ideas to the public and winning the public opinion. In other words, politicians do what Cobb and his colleagues do in the movie: implanting an idea into people's mind. Politicians, opinion leaders, writers, people in the show businesses, advertorials bombard us with so many ideas in every moment of our life. I am not saying we are living in a dream, on the contrary, we live in an absolute reality but we are frequently exposed to a myriad of ideas even if we are awake. Some of those ideas take root in our mind, turn into knowledge or memories, and manifest itself in behaviour whereas the rest lurks around the maze of subconscious or simply vanishes in the air.

What are ideas, then? Broadly speaking, ideas include images, symbols, complexes, emotions, norms, beliefs, and values that carry meanings about the world and attributes meanings to material realities. Building blocks of reality are ideational as well as material. Material things are out there and it is easy to identify them when we see one. Whereas ideas are not tangible and not easily identified, hence it is hard to predict their effect on behaviour. Yet, ideas are non-negligible and their impact can be more vital than material elements. An idea is a living creature or a virus as Cobb calls in the movie. It is contagious, it can be planted, diffused, imitated; it can be creative as well as destructive; besides, it can be good or bad regardless of its truth claims. When an

individual believes in an idea, s/he automatically renders it true. When enough number of individuals believes in an idea, it becomes a social truth and a reality. By this way, sociologist Robert Merton argues, even a false description of an idea can cause a chain of errors which results in the actual reification of the initially wrong truth claims of the idea.

From a methodological individualist viewpoint in political science, ideas exist because an individual want them so, hence their existence depends on the will of the individual. In this individualistic reductionist paradigm, ideas are treated as either a complementary or an intervening variable which cannot explain human behaviour on their own. The role they play in human action is merely instrumental so as to see the situation from a slightly different angle. The role of ideas remains important as long as ideas help to solve the problems that decision-makers encounter. Nonetheless, this reductionist account is incomplete since it overlooks the socio-cultural environment in which an idea emerges.

On the other hand, looking through a holistic and sociological prism, some scholars argue that ideas enjoy their own life and their ultimate influence on human behaviour is more than being an intervening variable. As long as an idea is shared by many and institutionalized within the social structures it gains its own life and wields a unique impact on individual action even it is against the will of an individual or even if an individual is not aware of. In this holistic paradigm, ideas are regarded as intersubjective, normative and constitutive rather than objective, instrumental and regulative. Ideas are not solely new information that needs to be counted in the rational calculations. Rather than focusing on the agent and cognitive processes ideas are treated in its social and historical context. Indeed, ideas pertain to social structures, and thus ideas cannot be comprehended apart from their social origins. Alexander Wendt defines ideas as 'socially shared knowledge', which are more than a total of shared ideas of individuals. Ideas criss-cross cognitive and social aspects of human mind. According to this school of thought ideas do not work mechanically in a deterministic way. Ideas not only prescribe but also proscribe certain actions and policies. Thus, the causal mechanism of ideational factors is relative in the sense that their impact varies across time and space since the impact depends on social and historical context.

How does an idea come into existence? How does an idea spread? How do people espouse an idea? What makes an idea more powerful than its rivals? To my knowledge, we know little as to how an idea pops up in the mind. The formation of an idea necessitates a bunch of factors that shapes, and nurtures the idea, and links its existence to time and space. The substance of an idea is of great importance for its life-span and resiliency. Ideas that affect our subconscious states of mind such as danger, fear, food, and sex have different influences than the ideas that affect socially-oriented high level cognitive

states of mind such as shame, pride, social acceptance, and justice. However, when it comes to politics, power of an idea lies not so much in the substance of that idea but in its ability to problematize existing ideas and mobilize social structures so as to garner more support. It would be erroneous to try to comprehend an idea out of its context in which it is born. Once Victor Hugo claimed that 'all the forces in the world are not so powerful as an idea whose time has come.' Put differently, a political idea can tip when the circumstances are ripe. An idea might exist for a long time but it reaches its zenith if and only if it is acclaimed by a significant majority of the public.

Any political idea should be articulated one way or other either through speech or writing. Unuttered, unarticulated idea is nothing more than a chemical reaction in our brain. Sharing the idea reifies it by making it social. While language is the instrument that provides signs and symbols to express ideas, individuals such as politicians, academics, opinion leaders are the ones who utter political ideas and draw attention to that specific idea. Articulation of an idea is much more complex than language itself. I, therefore, attribute more power to an individual than the language as individuals per se are the idea entrepreneurs, who not only utter ideas but also sell it to the others and act on that idea. Idea entrepreneurs (read: politicians and political elites) not only utter their ideas with the help of the language but they also use metaphors, analogies and frames to persuade recipients (read: public) into the idea. Idea entrepreneurs are vigorous promoters of ideas. To put it frankly, idea entrepreneurs sell the idea by wrapping it with the cultural and historical foil of the time and society. So, an idea entrepreneur is an idea-hunter, idea-producer and idea-seller. Besides, s/he must embody the idea but not necessarily adhere to it wholeheartedly and s/he has to have an ability to act on that idea.

Alongside the relationship between idea entrepreneurs and the recipients, societal factors facilitate or constrain the pace of spread of ideas. Acclamation of an idea entails a social network. Exploring such social networks would help to understand the phenomenon of social contagion. Ideas can trickle down from the society to agent as well as they can trickle up from agent to the society. Ideas diffuse into every member of the society at exponential rate that is spreading geometrically rather than arithmetically in proportion with the number of its bearers. Hence, social proximity between idea entrepreneurs and the public and the social proximity between different social networks within a society determine the pace and scope of the social contagion.

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In the opening scene of the movie Cobb tries to convince a businessman Saito to get training in order to protect himself, or rather his mind from the dream extractors. Then the question is in information age how can we protect ourselves from the chunks of ideas served to us every moment? Should we just listen to the voice of our conscience? Notwithstanding intuitive judgment, the best solution seems, at least to me, to be self-reflexive so that we can assess the validity of those ideas by reflecting on ourselves as well as on every idea we are exposed to. In other words, having an idea about the idea might protect us from being infected by absurd and delusive ideas of the past and present, such as racism, ethnic and religious fundamentalism. Otherwise, it is highly likely that as Cobb's deceased wife Mal did to herself in the movie we will pursue an absurd idea to the point it destroys us and others. PR

Note:

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POLITICS

Social Accounting and Public Management Accountability for the Public Good

Editors: Stephen P. Osborne, Amanda Ball

ISBN: 978-0-415-80649-7

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Authors: Mary Lee Rhodes, Joanne Murphy, Jenny Muir, John A. Murray

ISBN: 978-0-415-45753-8

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Author: Julia Beckett

ISBN: 0765623218 **ISBN-13:** 9780765623218 978-0765623218

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Case Research in Public Management

Author: David E. Mcnabb

ISBN: 0765623374 **ISBN-13:** 9780765623379, 978-0765623379

Highly readable and non-technical, this handbook is designed to help students and non-profit managers gain a working knowledge of the principles and practices of conducting qualitative case study research in public organizations. This book is a motherload of practical and comprehensive guidance to planning, conducting, analyzing, and reporting case research project findings.

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U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post–Cold War World

Author: Micah Zenko

ISBN: 9780804771917

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ECONOMICS

Paradise Beneath Her Feet
How Women Are Transforming the Middle East

Author: Isobel Coleman

ISBN: 978-1-4000-6695-7

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Globalisation and Migration
New Issues, New Politics

Author: Ronaldo Munck

ISBN: 978-0-415-59087-7

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International Trade Theory: A Critical Review

Author: Murray Kemp

ISBN: 978-0-415-62037-6

Murray C. Kemp is one of Australia's foremost economists. He has held positions across the world including London School of Economics, U.C. Berkeley, Columbia University, McGill University, MIT, and latterly Macquarie University. Kemp was a Member of Council for the Econometric Society and was a Distinguished Fellow of the Economics Society of Australia. He has served as President of the International Economics and Finance Society. In 1987 he was awarded the Humboldt Foundation Prize. This book brings together several essays on the current state of the theory of international trade. As the book's title suggests, the essays are critical of several major components of the existing theory; thus, the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage, the ancient and widely accepted belief that international free trade is potentially beneficial for all countries, and the more recently developed normative analysis of international transfers (foreign aid, war indemnities) are shown to be seriously defective.