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Relations between Endurance of Ruling
Political Party and Economic
Development

By Dr. Hakan Uslu & Dr. Rahman Dag

Yemen Civil War:
A Conflict That Has Never Ended

By Dr. I. Aytac Kadioglu

NATO: The Shifting Sands of an Alliance

By Alasdair Bowie

America in Afghanistan:
Foreign Policy and Decision Making
From Bush to Obama to Trump

By Dr. Sharifulah Dorani

**The Ideological Potential
of Climate Change:
(Post) Politics in the Age
of Global Warming**

By Miguel Angel Zhan Dai



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“ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

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World News

By Furkan Sahin

Palestine's Application for Full UN Membership



Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Minister Riyad al-Malki has announced that Palestine would initiate an application to obtain a full membership at the United Nations, for the first time since 2011. Al-Malki said that he would initiate an application seeking to upgrade Palestine's status from an observer state to a full member state.

To gain a full member status, Palestine needs 15 votes from the member countries of the U.N. Security Council. But, the application will be rejected if one of the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) uses their veto power. Especially, veto power of the United States is critical for the application. The U.S. administration clearly shows its support to the Israel and moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem earlier this year. **27.12.2018**

U.S. Forces Withdrawn From Syria



The U.S. president Donald Trump has ordered withdrawal of American troops from Syria. "We have won against ISIS," Mr. Trump declared in a video posted Wednesday evening on Twitter, and added, "Our boys, our young women, our men — they're all coming back, and they're coming back now."

A timetable or other specific dates has not provided yet by the authorities for the withdrawal. This military departure has been evaluated as a big disappointment by local Kurdish groups supported by the U.S. "This sudden change in policy is worrying not only to the Syrian Kurds but also to all the U.S. allies in the region," Hoshyar Zebari, the Kurdish former foreign minister of Iraq said. He also said "Russia, Turkey and Iran will be the biggest beneficiaries from this withdrawal." The potential Turkish invasion may have played a role in Trump's move to withdraw the troops. Trump

announced his decision after a phone call with the president of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been against to American support for PKK-affiliated YPG/PYD emerging along Turkey's border. This manoeuvre cannot be confined with the ISIS. It can change the local and national dynamics as the Syrian crisis has become alike a chess board.

The Yellow Vests Protests in France



As a part of his environmental policy strategy, President Emmanuel Macron announced a green tax on fuel to go into effect in 2019. After that, tens of thousands of people, called “yellow vests”, occupy the streets across the country to protest against rising taxes.

The intensity of the protests quickly forced the government to reconsider the decision. Firstly, the taxation is suspended and then taken out of agenda. However, the protest didn't end. The protests grew into a larger movement that includes members of the working and middle classes who want to improve their living standards. Their demands also include increases of salaries, social security payments and the minimum wages. Also some of them say they will not settle for anything else the president's resignation. This is the biggest political crisis Macron has faced so far, and it will determine the rest of his presidency. **20.11.2018**

Huawei CFO arrested in Canada



Huawei founder's daughter and company CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada on December 1. Canadian authorities said that they have arrested the chief financial officer of Huawei Technologies for possible extradition to the United States.

The government of China demanded her release and warned about possible retaliation against American and Canadian executives. Huawei has ranked as one of the world's biggest equipment supplier for telecommunication systems, has raised its global sales over \$75 billion. Earlier this year, it became the second ranked smartphone producer in the world, despite restrictions imposed by many countries. The arrest of Huawei's CFO is related to an ongoing trade war between China and the US, which has seen both countries impose tariffs on their imports. **01.12.2018**

CESRAN International and OBSERVARE of UAL signed the MoU for IEPAS2019

Professor Ozgur Tufekci and Professor Luís Moita signed the MoU for IEPAS2019 (the 6th International Conference on Eurasian Politics and Society), which will be organised by CESRAN International and OBSERVARE of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa on 4-5 July 2019 in Lisbon.

Professor Jose Amado da Silva (the Rector of UAL), Professor Luís Tome, Professor Ana Isabel Xavier from UAL, Professor Rahman Dag from CESRAN International, and colleagues from IESM – Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares (Higher Institute of Military Studies), Instituto de Defesa Nacional (The Institute for National Defence) joined the ceremony, as well.



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6th International Conference on Eurasian Politics & Society
4-5 July 2019 Lisbon (Portugal)



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The Ideological Potential of Climate Change: (Post) Politics in the Age of Global Warming

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Introduction

Climate change and environmental degradation are recurring topics in today's debates about politics and public life. Because of their nature, these issues are inherently international. As it is usually said, pollution does not respect national borders. The damage caused by one country will not be restrained there, but will eventually affect other neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries. Hence, states and international organisations have engaged in the debate and tried to provide global solutions, such as the Paris Agreement (United Nations Climate Change 2018). International Relations (IR) scholars are not indifferent to this discussion. For instance, Walker (1995: 178) considers environmental dangers as part of the contemporary processes of acceleration that question state sovereignty, which is at the core of the traditional accounts on internal politics and international relations. Climate change can be understood then as a danger that threatens national and international security and requires solutions that exceed the state, hence showing the inconsistencies in our contemporary articulation of power based on the principle of state sovereignty.

In line with this debate, this paper aims to answer the following question: "Does an understanding of climate change as an ideological tool have explanatory power in IR?" By answering this question, I want to show how climate change has been built discursively as an important instrument in the preservation, reinforcement and expansion of the neoliberal system in the international sphere, which may shift to a possible "global governmentality". My hypothesis is that only by considering climate change as an ideological tool we can explain these dynamics.

Governmentality has been an upcoming topic in the discipline of IR. Governmentality are the practices by which the state exert control over its citizen in contemporary societies. Following Foucault, governmentality will always be "neoliberal governmentality" as the specific form of control that is brought by the neoliberal turn on all social spheres. This turn emphasises individual liberties, making it difficult for the state to justify its governing actions. Neoliberal governmentality solves this problem by creating an

“indirect” way of control, by producing subjects who are controlled by their sense of responsibility (towards family, the nation, etc.) (Joseph, 2010). Some authors are arguing that this process is happening in the international sphere (Neumann and Sending, 2007).

To illustrate how climate change as a discursive mechanism works I will first focus on how global warming is mobilised as an ideology by the state to reinforce the neoliberal system. The main idea will be that although climate change argues for global solutions (thus apparently debilitating the states), it could actually mean giving more power to some states, in the sense of a global neoliberal governmentality, that hegemonic states impose over the others.

Climate change, sovereignty and governmentality

The ideological potential of climate change can be put into relation with multiple concepts in IR. Here I will examine two because of space constraints: state sovereignty and global governmentality. To understand how they relate, it is fundamental to understand first the literature on the post-political turn within the debate around climate change, as it has contributed to weaken the concept of “state sovereignty” and might open the doors towards an alarming global governmentality.

The ideological potential of climate change can be put into relation with multiple concepts in IR.

In recent years, a flourishing literature has conceptualised the politics of climate change across Western liberal democracies

along the lines of the theory of the post-political. Political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière and Slavoj Žižek, argue that in recent decades, Western liberal democracies have been subjected to a condition “in which the political - understood as the space of contestation and agonistic engagement - is increasingly colonised by politics - understood as technocratic mechanisms and consensual procedures that operate within an unquestioned framework of representative democracy, free market economics and cosmopolitan liberalism” (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014: 6). These authors argue that while politics centred on consensus-making seem to indicate a sign of democratic maturity, they may often repress the expression of alternative vistas, as it is the case when a certain ideology becomes hegemonic (Mouffe, 2005).

Drawing on these insights, Eric Swyngedouw (2010) argues that the integration of environmental movements in the arena of mainstream politics has only been made possible through the elimination of their deeply political nature, that is to say, their ability to foster the confrontation of antagonistic standpoints over the socio-political arrangements which ought to form the basis of society. Political debates over the validity of structural economic arrangements which produce environmental degradation in general, and climate change in particular, are replaced by the sanitised

politics of “techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration” (Swyngedouw, 2010).

A clear manifestation of the depoliticisation of environmental politics is their claim to transcend political –that is, partisan– divisions: green parties and environmental movements since the 1980s have taken pride in not taking a position in the traditional left-right cleavage. This is a key element of the “technocratisation” and therefore, depoliticisation, of climate change. Ideological confrontations are swept as emotional, irrational and consequently, irrelevant. Transcending partisan divisions becomes a sign of rationality, which is deemed the key ingredient of consensual climate governance. But the claim of technocratic politics to transcend ideological confrontation in virtue of their rationality is deceptive: it is in fact an ideological position in itself, which supports certain relations of power and calls for the objective or value-free character of what is subjective and biased (Schmitt, 2008, cited in Kenis and Livens, 2015). Claims for non-ideological climate politics are in fact very ideological: they contribute to support a liberal, expert-driven governance of the climate, at the expense of participative democracy.

Climate change is used to consolidate the existing structures, instead of

“enhancing the democratic political content of socio-environmental construction by means of identifying the strategies through which a more equitable distribution of social power and a more egalitarian mode of producing natures can be achieved.” (Swyngedouw, 2013: 7)

By pointing at the technicity of the question, debates about structural changes are silenced by questions on how to manage or deal with climate change. By not leaving space for these debates, this dynamic favours the existing structure: not talking about alternatives is the same as maintaining the current system. This is an example of how depoliticisation contributes to empowering more the hegemonic order.

This logic has some similarities to the delimitations that Walker finds between the national and the international sphere. For the author, based on the principle state sovereignty, a spatial and temporal delimitation have been dominating our understanding of politics. Whereas in the inside (nation-state) it is possible to reach a future, progress is achievable; on the outside (the international sphere), this progress is unthinkable, there is only the present, the contingent relations between the different conflictive states (Walker, 1990). This is why we have the division between “political theory” and “international relations”, because it is possible to do *politics* within the state, but outside of it, there is only violence and contingent *relations*.

Claims for non-ideological climate politics are in fact very ideological: they contribute to support a liberal, expert-driven governance of the climate, at the expense of participative democracy.

The process of depoliticisation reinforced by climate change discourse affects both the national and the international. Not only it substitutes political debates between different states, assuming that “we should all work in the same direction” to end climate change, it also does so within the nations, where alternatives discourses that propose structural changes as the solution to the problem are deemed irresponsible and optimistic-thinking. Walker refers to the challenges of climate change as having the potential to question the division between inside and outside because states by themselves cannot face these global risks. This raises the question of if we can uphold this distinction between the two dimensions, in the face of this “processes of acceleration” (Walker, 1990).

However, by considering the ideological potential of climate change, I find another way in which this distinction is challenged. The depoliticisation process that it brings affects both the inside and the outside. National political movements that stand for alternatives solutions to climate change by proposing structural changes are deemed irresponsible and not helpful, given the “urgency” of the matter. This could point to a possible “global governance” that after the division between national and international is surpassed, could be in charge of managing the danger of climate change holistically, as a sort of “Climate Leviathan” (Mann and Wainwright, 2018).

This last point should bring us to a discussion about governmentality, as the type of global governance that would be created. Theorists like Neumann and Sending (2007) have claimed that the use of Foucault’s concept could be useful to explain the contemporary international order. However, this has been criticised by Joseph (2010), who through clarifying the Foucauldian term, states the problems that employing it in the international sphere has.

Briefly, he claims that the specific governmentality referred by Neumann and Sending is the neoliberal one (citizens are auto-governed by the responsibilities that are (re)produced in them, not directly by violent actions of the governing state) and; that for Foucault governmentality is inherently related to a state that uses it. Because of these two points, we cannot talk about global governmentality: since neoliberal logic is not dominant in all states, some states are not exercising neoliberal governmentality by and for themselves (Joseph, 2010). The possible neoliberal governmentality that citizens of these states are experiencing is not from their state, but comes from foreign powers. Hence it cannot be called governmentality. However, if we consider some characteristics of the concept of “imperialism”, it could be argued that this “governmentality” exercised upon citizens from non-neoliberal is imposed by other (hegemonic) states. How?

Climate change as an ideological tool can set the foundations for a global government. The reasoning is as it follows: we need to fight climate change, and because it is a global problem, we need a global solution; since it is an urgent matter, we need someone to manage the hazard efficiently. Thus, we need a global technocracy. This global government will not be created from

scratch. As Mann and Wainwright suggest, this global Leviathan will be created by hegemonic powers (Neumann and Sending, 2007: 151). Because of the hegemonic position of neoliberal states, it is not difficult to imagine that their neoliberal governmentality would be transferred to this global state/Climate Leviathan.

If we are to follow this idea, then the hints of neoliberal governmentality that Neumann and Sending see in non-neoliberal states could be the first sparks or symptoms of this global neoliberal governmentality. Furthermore, going back to the first section, markets, by imposing green economy based production on these countries are actually (re)producing this ideology of responsibility towards ecological issues. In neo-Marxist terms, they are exporting the structures that will allow for the ideological superstructure that in turn, will legitimise and consolidate the structure. The difference between imperialism and this neoliberal governmentality would be the type of control that it exercises over its citizens. Instead of direct physical control, it would be self-governing through the responsibilities that the ideological discourse of climate change creates.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have argued how the ideological potential of climate change can be a powerful explanatory concept for the contemporary international system. Looking at the global political organisation, the discourse has contributed to the depoliticization process, with two consequences: 1) it does not allow for a significant political debate that would entail a structural transformation which perpetuates the existing system and; 2) it brings closer the national and the international, blurring the difference through equalising both spheres as depoliticised spaces where management of the is the only concern. This can lead to a justification for a global neoliberal governmentality that will be imposed (directly or through indirect pressure) from hegemonic states to the others.

Through these reasonings, and without forgetting that climate change is a reality that as a society we need to face, I affirm that it can be used as an ideology to consolidate the existing system or even strengthen its neoliberal dynamics. Hence, if we want to analyse these dynamics that are happening in international relations, we need to acknowledge the ideological dimension of the discourse on global warming.

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Yemen Civil War:

A Conflict That Has Never Ended

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Yemen, a country of the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula in western Asia, has suffered by years of violence. However, the civil war which began in 2015 has been one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. The war caused twenty-two millions of people who need urgent help to survive and to trap civilians in a life of starvation, violence and disease. This paper assesses the conflict from the beginning of the protests of the Arab uprising to civil war and peace negotiations. It aims to illustrate the underlying reasons for the country to be a total war-zone.

A Brief History of the ‘Trouble’

The contemporary conflict in Yemen cannot be assessed sufficiently without understanding the history of the trouble in the country. Yemen has been at the centre of violence for two centuries. While it has not been a conflicted territory under the control of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, the British involvement caused the partition of the country in 1839. Whilst North Yemen remained part of the Ottoman Empire, South Yemen has been a dependent state of the British Empire. The violent conflict between and within the two sides maintained after South Yemen became an independent country in 1967.ⁱ Particularly, Yemen has turned to a war-zone between Soviet Russia-supported South Yemen and the US-supported North Yemen which was a miniature of the bipolar world during the Cold War Era.

North and South Yemen witnessed several coup d'état and upheaval until the agreement of re-uniting the country in 1990 which was possible only after the collapse of the Soviet Union.ⁱⁱ When the Soviet Union's influence on South Yemen ended, the US loosened its authority on North Yemen and so, both sides came together to discuss ending the long-standing partition. The clash of interests of the US and Russia is similar with the Syrian civil war for the sake of controlling the region.ⁱⁱⁱ

The election of Ali Abdullah Saleh as the first president of the Republic of Yemen did not end the unrest as he aimed to control political power under his authority. The limited political reforms, economic difficulties and human right issues caused turmoil in the country. The Arab uprisings have just pulled the trigger of angry reaction against Saleh. However, his resignation did not prevent a civil war due to political and local grievances.

From the Oppressive Regime to the Civil War

The civil war considering the Arab uprisings is dissimilar with other Arab spring countries. While initial protests aimed to end Saleh's oppressive rule, it turned to a violent conflict because of the denial of Saleh to resign until November 2011 which deteriorated the conflict.^{iv}

The first tension of the civil war began in 2014 when Shiite rebels consisting of Houthi insurgents captured Sana'a which is the capital of Yemen.^v The claims of opposition groups included a democratic election, a new government and lowering fuel prices. After Houthi insurgents to seize the presidential palace in 2015, sectarian violence between the Shia Houthi movement backed by Iran and the Sunni government forces backed by Saudi Arabia has intensified. The Saudi-led coalition's aggressive bombings caused 17,000 civilian casualties, to displace 2 million people and to prevent 22 out of 28 million to reach food and health services.^{vi}

The US administration and Saudi-led coalition (consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Bahrain and

The Saudi-led coalition's aggressive air strikes in Houthi-controlled areas are one of the major reasons for deteriorating the civil war in Yemen.

Kuwait) claimed that Houthi rebels are driven by the Iranian government.^{vii} While the Iranian support cannot be deniable, it can be said that Houthis are not dependent on external support because they fight against the government forces since 2004. The Houthi insurgents have also been able to fight against pro-government and loyalist groups simultaneously for years. I argue that Iran's limited support for Houthis cannot be a reason for justifying

Saudi-led coalition's air strikes and the US administration's military assistance to Saudi Arabia. Instead, this coalition's bombings are directly related to their strategy to reinstate the exiled government which could only be possible by destroying rebellion forces in the country. Similarly, Juneau states that major determinants of the civil war are local and political factors, not proxy warfare of Iran or sectarian violence.^{viii} Namely, Saleh and his supporters have aimed to retake power, and Houthis have the objective to have political power, or in other words, to be represented in the political arena. While Houthis constitute 45% of all population, they have been under represented in the Parliament which triggered their angry reaction.

Peace Talks

After four years of humanitarian crisis, international community's call for help resulted in peace talks to be initiated. The UN-led talks have begun in Stockholm on December 6, 2018. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, more than 60,000 people have been killed by the two sides between January 2016 and November 2018.^{ix} These talks together with the pressure of the murder of a Washington Post journalist, Jamal

Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, the US Senate had to end air missile aid for the Saudi-led coalition.^x

There is another facilitator of peace negotiation. It can be said that the announcement of Save the Children, an international aid organisation, that at least 85,000 children under the age of five may have died because of starvation between April 2015 and October 2018 have facilitated to start peace talks. This created great reaction in international society which triggered the UN's peace initiative. Considering the Saudi-led coalition's air and land blockade in Yemen for more than three years, it is fair to argue that the coalition forces play a role in difficulties of international organisations to help people in need. This coalition's blockades and aggressive attacks on civilians are even called 'genocide'.^{xi}

After several days of negotiations, the main armed protagonists; the Houthi insurgents and Aden-based government reached a deal for a ceasefire in the key port of Hodeidah on December 16, December.^{xii} The two sides have agreed on three points in Stockholm: the first two points are related to As Salif and Ras Isa regions, Taiz, Hodeidah city and port. According to the agreement, both sides will demilitarise these regions and never be militarised again. The third point is related to exchange of captives simultaneously which stipulates to establish an executive mechanism for the exchange.^{xiii} This means that it will be possible to establish a humanitarian corridor for people who need urgent help to survive from starvation and diseases. Although this is a small step towards making peace, it is a big help for civilians who need humanitarian aid most.

Peace in Yemen can be achieved only by excluding international involvement in the civil war.

Lastly, the deep-rooted conflict demonstrates that the civil war can only be ended through political changes. International involvement including the Saudi-led coalition of eight countries, the US and Iran's support only deteriorated the conflict. I believe that Saudi Arabia and the USA's involvement was not because of ending Iran's support, but have a strategic purpose, to reinstate the exiled government in charge. It will be too optimistic to expect the Stockholm meetings to bring peace in Yemen. Instead, they can be seen first steps of a series of negotiations which will close the gap between the main armed protagonists. If the international support for conflicting parties is ended, it is more likely to establish a peace agreement in Yemen. This will make it possible for civilians to survive in the short-term, and reconstruction of the country in the long-term.

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NATO:

The Shifting Sands of an Alliance

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As a military alliance the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been the cornerstone of European defence since its formation in 1949.ⁱ NATO has stood the test of time, acting as a deterrent to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, subsequently, deploying troops and leading operations from Bosnia, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia) to Libya and Afghanistan. These operations have ranged from peace-keeping and enforcement, conducting airstrikes, training and capability building to counter-insurgency operations. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has faced continuous challenges as it seeks to maintain its relevance in a world without its intended adversary, the Soviet Union. NATO was created to face a conventional or nuclear threat. New threats have developed ranging from domestic and external terrorism, to piracy and cyberwarfare.

With the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union collapsed and was replaced by the Russian Federation, while the Warsaw Pact alliance simultaneously disintegrated. Subsequently in 1999 and 2004 NATO expanded, to take in all of the former Warsaw Pact nations; along with many nations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Slovenia 2004, Albania, Croatia 2009 and Montenegro 2017).ⁱⁱ Other Eastern European nations such as FYR Macedonia aspire to NATO membership.ⁱⁱⁱ The eastward expansion of both the alliance as well as the European Union (EU) has worked in concert, as membership of one organisation has largely been predicated on membership of the other.

This has seen many of the former Warsaw Pact nations turning towards the western sphere of influence. A clear example of this is the 2014 Euromaiden Revolution in Ukraine, which saw the removal of the pro-Russian Ukrainian Government led by President Viktor Yanukovich with a pro-EU government. Russia's actions in both the Crimea as well as in the Donbass shows Russia's resentment to its former satellite state, leaving what it sees as its sphere of influence. This has also been the case outside of Europe, particularly in the case of the Syrian Civil War where Russia has aggressively backed the Syrian Government supporting its armed forces.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the Soviet Unions' conventional and nuclear capabilities acted as mutual deterrents against military conflict. NATO's strategy relied on its collective security mechanism. This is set out

in Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, in which any attack on one member of the alliance is considered an attack on the whole alliance.^{iv} This acts as a deterrent to potential aggressors as the combined forces of NATO would be a formidable adversary. Collective security makes every member's security a critical imperative to the other members. NATO is best described as a sum of its parts; not all NATO members possess the same military capabilities. Many have generic capabilities, but maintain a unique or specialist capability such as anti-submarine warfare, amphibious landing capability alongside marines or paratroopers that are held at a high level of readiness.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO began to move away from permanently forward deployment of large conventional forces in Western Europe. Instead NATO looked to build up its capability to respond to any crisis. This move showed NATO's willingness to move away from its heavy armoured approach that had characterised the Cold War to a more rapidly deployable, tactically flexible expeditionary capability. The purpose of NATO's Response Force (NRF) is to provide the alliance with the ability to respond rapidly, with Land, Sea and Air components, these may be enforcing collective security or responding to crises outside the alliance's borders.^v The combined nature of the NRF allows it to operate in a wide

With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO began to move away from permanently forward deployment of large conventional forces in Western Europe.

range of situations from high intensity state on state conventional warfare through to low intensity counter-insurgency/anti-piracy operations or peacekeeping/enforcement mandates, as well as providing specialist skills in the wake of natural disasters.

During the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the alliance agreed to enhance the NRF to double its size; simultaneously it agreed to establish a new spearhead quick reaction

force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) comprising an additional 5,000 troops, held at very high readiness, capable of being deployed within 48 hours.^{vi} The VJTF provides a compact brigade formation that could act independent from the rest of the NRF. However, if required it could form the vanguard of a more substantial NRF deployment. The VJTF's ability to rapidly deploy to any incident or flashpoint area provides a deterrent that could have a decisive effect preventing or resolving a crisis.

By increasing the size of NRF, its capability to undertake large contingency operations would be increased, therefore maximizing the forces available to a deter an aggressor. This expansion in resources allows the NRF to increase the number of specialist personnel on high readiness, as well as being able to conduct existing capabilities at a higher level and greater intensity. These continued changes to NRF mean that across the alliance there are more troops capable of being deployed rapidly. This once again

strengthens NATO's ability to act as deterrent, as well as giving the alliance the ability to intervene.

The 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw saw the unveiling and implementation of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) and Poland.^{vii} Four multinational battalions were deployed on a rotational basis with the United Kingdom, Canada, United States of America and Germany taking the lead as the framework nation in each country.^{viii} With continuing allegations of Russian involvement in the Ukrainian civil war, the forward positioning of the Enhanced Forward Presence can be seen as a clear statement of the collective security ideal as well as providing an opportunity for NATO members to exercise more regularly together. Although in February 2018 the four Enhanced Forward Presence battalions totalled only 4,692 personnel,^{ix} they act to reassure NATO eastern flank members, as well as statement to a potential aggressor that NATO members take seriously their commitment to collective security.

Enhanced Forward Presence is mutually beneficial as the host nations get the opportunity to train as well as developing new capabilities. These additional specific capabilities could be the regeneration of formerly existent skills or the development of new skills through partnering with other NATO allies. For other NATO members they are firstly showing their commitment to the ideal of collective security, and also gaining the opportunity to conduct training exercises in a different terrain and climate.

Enhanced Forward Presence is mutually beneficial as the host nations get the opportunity to train as well as developing new capabilities.

NATO faces an uncertain future. Its original geo-strategic adversary Russia is once again its most pressing concern. However, to face the future NATO must seek to be able to conduct any possible type of military operation that is conceivable while maintaining the capability of dealing with the Russian threat. The threat to NATO's Eastern flank has been recognised and with the addition of Enhanced Forward Presence has begun the process of reinforcing the alliance's eastern flank. Taken together with the VJTF and the expansion and enhancement of the NRF this provides NATO's leadership with an increased capability to respond to the wide range of potential threats facing the alliance.

This reinforcement shows that the ideal of collective security is still central to the alliance's future and that these formations work to build strong bonds between NATO member states as well as providing opportunities for further training, integration and capability-building. Altogether the training, integration and capability-building results in a more capable military force allowing NATO to fulfil its core commitments. These closer bonds endorse the ideal of collective security, facilitating NATO's ability to act as a deterrent against any aggressor.

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Relations between Endurance of Ruling Political Party and Economic Development

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Within liberal political theories, it is acknowledged that liberties should be equally given to all individuals, which cover every aspect of human lives including economic, political, social and cultural rights. It is to say that the concept of developed-ness has not only been constrained with economic aspects but also extended with democratic level and freedoms as in the cases of the USA and the members of the European Union (EU). Many underdeveloped and developing countries are taking example of them and target good scores in respecting for human rights and being politically democratic system, together with economic development. To concrete, while seeking to catch up with GDP per capita of the developed countries, democratic quality of a given state should also be rising at the same time.

In the last century, the concept of democracy and especially quality of democracy has been vividly changing. In the political realm, core principles of democracy are elections to choose who or which political party would run the country, the rule of law and the division of powers (executive, legislative and Judiciary). These might have vital importance for democracy but not limited with. Duration of holding power, especially monarchs in European countries during the 19th century hold the power consistently and resulted with economically developed but with politically undemocratic (Olson, 1993). Durability of power can also be influential on the quality of democracy. Centuries long democracy experiences have currently reached the idea that human nature tends to corrupt when it gets power. As one of the liberal thinker of the 19th century, Lord Acton says “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This argument was actually against the monarchies but has extended to the ruling a country for a long time. Given that elections are fundamental component of democracies since it is a legitimate way of changing presidents or prime ministers, duration of ruling or holding power has been generally limited with two subsequent terms. Despite coming to power through elections, persistence of power in a country (more than two terms of presidency or a political party in power) is connoted with slight tendency towards authoritarianism (Gurr, 1974; Gurr, Jagers, and Moore, 1990).

Russian Federation is mostly given as self-evident example as the same political party's candidates (Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev) has won presidential elections since early years of 2000s. It means that the United Russia which is ruling political party of Russia, the same line of political and social understanding has been prevailing since then. There might be narrow differentiation between president's policies but in cumulative perspective, not exactly identical but highly similar policies are followed. Another case similar to Russia is Turkey where Justice and Development Party, founded and led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been ruling the country since the end of 2002. There have been different figures in the Prime Ministry or Presidential offices but still the Party's core policies have been in operation. The characters of these two political parties are symbolized and affiliated with certain leadership, Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey.

Vital argument emanating from these two cases is that holding power for a long time (at least three times) infers to tendency towards authoritarianism

By the end of 1990s, the United Russia led by Vladimir Putin (currently president of Russian Federation) won the elections and took over a politically and economically ruined country and then raised it up to the level which Soviet Russia once was.

which is affiliated with lack of political freedom, lack of free market economy, suppression of political and social oppositions, bureaucratic monopoly and etc. In their first two terms, Russia and Turkey were shining stars of world politics by the early years of 21st century due to the fact that economic and democratic reforms were dynamically changing appearance of these countries (White, 2000; Usul, 2010). They were hence considered as being in the way of fully developed countries in both economic and democratic aspects. As these political parties have consolidated themselves in domestic politics and endurance of their power exceeds at least a decade, harsh critics of authoritarianism increase. It is because of the process of

dominating domestic politics has been socially and politically conflictual for these two countries.

On the other hand, these countries' economic development level and involvement of international issues have gradually increased since the enduring political parties took the power. It might be because of having adequate time to complete projects and so pursuing long term economic reforms. By the end of 1990s, the United Russia led by Vladimir Putin (currently president of Russian Federation) won the elections and took over a politically and economically ruined country and then raised it up to the level which Soviet Russia once was. By the early years of 2000s, Justice and Development Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan (currently president of Turkey) won a landslide victory and also took over a country. It highly engaged with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to recover from the



2001 economic crisis of Turkey. From such an economically bottomed level, they boosted their economies despite having up and downs.

Russia and Turkey were developing in terms of democratic and economic levels. However, today there has been a common idea that they might be economically still in upwards trends and resisting against international economic manipulations and embargos but quality of democracy has been in dramatic downwards. It seems there is a complicated picture here, which leads us to our hypothesis. Whether or not endurance of political parties in power more than two terms is destined to decrease democratic level but to increase economic development of a country. The depicted Russia and Turkey cases underpin the argument but figures and data should be employed to substantiate the argument.

To do so, democratic level of these countries is going to be measured in accordance to the Freedom House scores since 2000s. Freedom House index does not only measure the democratic level through elections but also enlarges the democratic criteria ranging from the numbers of prisoned journalists and politicians to violations of freedom of speech. These are mostly used by those arguing that Russia is an authoritarian country (McFaul, 2004: 149) and Turkey is an authoritarian democracy (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). On the other hand, there is no one simple economic index whose criteria contain persuasively adequate variables to measure economic level of a country. Thus, variety of indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gini Index for income inequality, Inflation, and life expectancy is considered to measure their level of economic development.

Russia and Turkey were developing in terms of democratic and economic levels.

In order to addresses the controversies on the relationship between endurance of political parties in power more than two terms and economic development, we utilize from the world bank's datasets for a variety of economic and social indicators which explicitly allows for the possibility that political stability and economic development are all reciprocally related. Initial point of the paper is that democratic level of these countries has been decreasing and economic development increasing within the same time period when the United Russia in Russia and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey have repeatedly been holding the power. In order to grasp these argument, Table 1 and 2 indicating freedom house scores of these countries and GDP per capita are as below;

Table 1: Freedom House Scores of Russian Federation and Turkey*Table 2: GDP Per Capita of Russian Federation and Turkey*

To begin with, both countries were categorized as “partly free” (between 2.5 and 5) but their democratic status has tended to down to the category of “not free” (between 5 and 7). The only exception is that Turkey’s status had been qualified for almost a decade between early years of 2000s and the early years of 2010s. In general, it can be argued that their democracy levels are gradually worsening under the same political parties ruling the countries. As a counter argument, there might be no relations between

prolonging rule of a certain political party in a country and democratic quality. Yet, massive literature suggests opposite, which is the longer the term of a political party the more tendencies to autocracy (Brumberg, 2002; Inkeles, 1991: 131).

On the other hand, per capita GDP level in Russia and Turkey has dramatically increased since the current political parties took the power. In Russia, per capita GDP increased from approximately \$1700 in the year 2000 to \$16000 in the year 2013. At the same time period, GDP per capita has also increased in Turkey from approximately \$4000 to \$12000. Since 2013, there has been a downward trend but it is not limited with these two countries but a global scale due to the global commodity price realignments of 2014–2016 (World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2018). Overall, it can be concluded that subsequent ruling terms of a political party (more than two terms) suggests fluctuated but generally consistent economic development.

Considering only GDP would not be adequate to come to this conclusion. Gini Index, screening income inequality is commonly used for measuring economic condition of a country, suggests that Russia and Turkey have accomplished to keep the rates for a long time in spite of often fluctuations. These rates were 37.3 per cent in Russia and 41.3 per cent Turkey in 2002. In accordance to the most recent data, their percentages were 30.7 in 2015 in Russia and 41.9 in 2016 in Turkey (a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality). Poverty rate, showing the percentage of population under poverty line, has also dramatically decreased within the same time period. In 2002, 24.6 per cent of population was living under poverty line in Russia and this ratio was 30.3 percent in Turkey. These ratios significantly decreased to 13.3 and 1.6, respectively in 2015. Another alternative indicator for measuring development is life expectancy (at birth) which has considerably risen from 65 to 71 in Russia between 2002 and 2016. Over the same time period, life expectancy has also increased from 71 to 75 in Turkey. Lastly, inflation rates would suggest a paramount level of development because both countries were economically bottomed, especially Turkey. In 2002, Russia's inflation rate was 15.78 and Turkey's was 44.96 but in 2017 Russia succeed to reduce it to 5.2 and Turkey did it to 10.8.

To conclude, this short piece of paper shows that, in cases of Russia and Turkey, a long term of ruling by one party is in favour of economic development but not of democratic development. This reality leads to our main question, for developing countries, whether or not democratic and economic development is possible at the same time. To have a robust answer to this question, history of developed countries should be examined but this would be subject of another paper.

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America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making From Bush to Obama to Trump¹

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Most Afghans, following the American intervention in 2001, were profoundly hopeful. Western leaders, especially President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, repeatedly told the Afghans that the international community would never again leave Afghanistan alone, that the Taliban was history, and that instead the international community would assist the Afghans to form a government with strong institutions to establish peace, prosperity, stability and democracy. However, more than 17 years later, Afghanistan seems to have gone from bad to worse.

The Afghans, including former President Hamid Karzai (as well as many Westerners), have numerous unanswered questions about American involvement in Afghanistan, which boil down to the following six. (1) What were U.S. motives in Afghanistan? (2) If they were to establish a secure and peaceful Afghanistan, why did it fail? (3) If ineffective governance was to blame for the failure, as most U.S. politicians told the Afghans, why did the U.S. support policies that visibly bolstered bad governance and pushed Afghanistan towards instability? (4) If the Pakistani Army's support for the insurgency was to blame for the failure, as most U.S. politicians gave it as an excuse, why did the U.S. with all its extraordinary capabilities not decisively deal with Pakistan's state-sponsored terrorism? (5) If Afghanistan's 'inherent characteristics' were to blame, as many U.S. policymakers implied, why was there peace and security during the 40-year era of King Zahir Shah? (6) Why did 'bewildering' changes take place in American Afghan policy over the course of 17 years?

My book, *America in Afghanistan*, attempts to provide an answer.

During the research for *America in Afghanistan*, I noticed that Western perspectives had formed most opinions and interpretations of events in

¹ This article is a summary of the author's book – Dorani, Sharifullah, *America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co and Bloomsbury, 2019) – that has recently been published.

Afghanistan. These opinions and perspectives – in many cases ignorant of the social, political, cultural and religious realities of Afghanistan – in turn influenced decision making in Washington, D.C. My book, however, is written from an Afghan perspective; it explains Presidents Karzai and Ashraf Ghani as well as the ordinary Afghans' responses to U.S. policies. The book analyses key six decisions made by the Bush, Barack Obama and Donald G. Trump Administrations. It spells out what factors influenced these decisions at Washington, D.C., and why they failed (or succeeded) once they met reality in Afghanistan.

The Bush, Obama, and now Trump Administrations' chief goal in Afghanistan has been twofold: to ensure Afghanistan did not turn into a terrorist base from which terrorists plotted another 9/11, and to weaken, and eventually defeat, al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Afghanistan and Pakistan to an extent that both were incapable of posing a threat to the U.S. and its allies. Despite the rhetoric, bringing stability, nurturing Western-style democracy, rebuilding Afghan infrastructure, and establishing an efficient centralized government, though desirable, have *not* been U.S. goals. The execution of these objectives – which required a large number of U.S. troops to conduct peacekeeping operations and plenty of U.S. dollars to rebuild the war-shattered Afghanistan – was beyond U.S. *interests* and *means*.

The Bush Administration's invasion of Iraq siphoned off most of the administration's policy attention, awareness and military/non-military aids at the expense of the Afghanistan War.

However, the Bush, Obama and the Trump Administrations *desired* a relatively peaceful, secure, stable, prosperous, and even democratic Afghanistan, because such an Afghanistan was necessary for the achievement of U.S. main goal, and America was willing to help the Afghans to secure such an Afghanistan by providing a

light political, military, diplomatic and financial assistance. But the commission (and omission) of certain policies by the three administrations concerned laid the seeds of insecurity, instability, ineffective governance, corruption, criminality and an eventual war instead of peace.

Some of these strategies include the following. The Bush Administration's invasion of Iraq siphoned off most of the administration's policy attention, awareness and military/non-military aids at the expense of the Afghanistan War. Handing over responsibility of establishing security and rebuilding the key Afghan institutions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization states resulted in the collapse of law and order since these states would not engage in conflicts and failed to train an effective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), establish an efficient legal system, disarm 'the powerful syndicate', and curb opium production. The powerful syndicate consists of warlords, strongmen, drug lords, land-grabbers, smugglers, criminals, thieves and some wealthy individuals.

Backing the powerful syndicate, notably the warlords, in the name of supporting the indigenous people as part of the counterterrorism strategy led to the syndicate playing an important part in weakening the Afghan Government. Rejecting arrogantly talks with the Taliban in 2002 to bring them to the government alienated the group. Refusing to engage U.S. forces in peacekeeping and nation-building operations and declining to deploy them outside of Kabul in the first few years of the intervention deteriorated the security situation in rural Afghanistan. The neglect to offer a coherent and unified economic and developmental strategy to spend effectively the resources (on infrastructure investments) meant that the spending boosted corruption and accomplished little as far as Afghanistan's infrastructure was concerned. Creating security firms meant there was a parallel, yet not unaccountable, force to the Afghan National Police.

The Obama Administration's policy of backing decentralized governance meant that the powerful syndicate became even more influential. Encouraging militias (local police) resulted in the powerful syndicate, bolstering groups of irregular fighters accused of human rights abuses. Not treating the Taliban as an enemy sent a message that Afghanistan's enemy was not necessarily America's enemy. Obama's caveat to surge and drawdown and his haste in Afghanising the mission proved detrimental, sending a signal to the Afghans that the U.S. would again abandon Afghanistan. Obama's constant reminder to the Afghans that Afghanistan would never see a good day and the U.S. would never be able to end the 'civil war' due to Afghanistan's 'complexities' (ineffective governance, insufficient ANSF, poverty, extremism, drug mafia, regional interference and 'Afghan inborn differences') disheartened ordinary Afghans.

Refusing to engage U.S. forces in peacekeeping and nation-building operations and declining to deploy them outside of Kabul in the first few years of the intervention deteriorated the security situation in rural Afghanistan.

Changing the goal to leave a 'good enough' Afghan state defined by a stalemate was another damaging policy by the Obama Administration that widened the distance between ordinary Afghans and America. And most importantly, America's refusal to take measures to deal with Pakistan's aggression on Afghanistan and to shut the terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan angered the Afghans.

Keeping quiet about (most of) the above shortcomings/miscalculations in U.S. policies, the Trump Administration has equally made it clear to the Afghans that it is not interested in putting things right.

Seeing those policies, the Afghans could not ascertain whether the U.S. wanted peace and security or war and insecurity. Most Afghans, including Karzai, who disagreed with most of the above policies, however, concluded

that the U.S. had other ulterior motives and thus employed policies capable of keeping the war on to justify its presence.

The analysis of the decision making of key six decisions by the three administrations nevertheless indicated that America neither was dishonest nor had evil intentions towards Afghanistan or the region. The three administrations supported the above controversial policies because they *falsely* assumed they were the right policies, and, most importantly, they were *cheap*. As for Pakistan, both Bush and Obama remained hopelessly (and frustrated) unable for a variety of reasons to stop Pakistan supporting a host of terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as an instrument of its foreign policy. (The Trump Administration, however, has begun to rethink its policy towards Pakistan and is now reportedly considering the harsh measures against Pakistan if it continues to support terrorist groups and create obstacles for the peace talks conducted by the administration's envoy Zalmay Khalilzad.)

Against what has been (incorrectly) said about the U.S. long-term goal to turn Afghanistan into a military base, both the Bush and Obama Administrations tried (unsuccessfully) to establish a good enough Afghan

Given Trump's tweets and remarks as well as his 'America First' principle, it seems that Trump is frustrated with the Afghanistan War and may end it prematurely.

Government capable of defending itself against terrorist groups and *leave* the country at the earliest opportunity to, like Vietnam, avoid dependency. Given Trump's tweets and remarks as well as his 'America First' principle, it seems that Trump is frustrated with the Afghanistan War and may end it prematurely.

However, the book warns that the Trump Administration must be careful in conducting its peace talks and does not

repeat the history: Many Afghans feared that eventually the U.S. might 'sell' Afghanistan to Pakistan: that is (like the Soviet Union 'sold' the President Mohammad Najibullah Government to Mujahedeen/Pakistan a few decades earlier) America would use Afghanistan as a bargaining tool to achieve safety for America, that is, in return for the Taliban/Pakistan's guarantee that Afghanistan would not become a terrorist base from which another 9/11 might take place.

While the book commends the peace talks, it also warns that true peace will only be established where all achievements, including all rights enshrined in the Afghan Constitution, made in the past 17 years are protected. Only leaving behind a fairly strong Afghan state with a sufficient military force can provide such protection.

“Quarterly news-Magazine”

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