

# POLITICAL REFLECTION

April · May · June · 2019 · Issue 19

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The U-turn of Turkish Foreign Policy**  
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**The State and Society  
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*Interview with*  
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**on**  
**American Foreign Policy**  
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VOL. 5 - NO. 2

APRIL  
MAY  
JUNE  
2019

# POLITICAL REFLECTION

“ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

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# World News

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*By Furkan Sahin*

## **US troops in Syrian Debacle: Settling or Leaving**



Presence of the US military power in Syria has been a controversial issue since Russia's military and political influence embedded into the Syrian conflict. It is the fact that post-ISIS Syria will face power struggle of these powers. Therefore, this issue seems to continue. Yet, still there is no certain policy preference in terms of the US troops in Syria.

In December, Trump ordered staff to execute the "full" and "rapid" withdrawal of US military from Syria, declaring that the US had defeated ISIS. In addition, Trump tweeted "We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency."

This decision draws criticism from some lawmakers and surprises foreign allies. Some officials argued that American troop's withdrawal risks key areas in Syria and might cause the ISIS to return.

These reactions seem worked because the White House said that a small group of US troops would remain in Syria. Sanders defined the mission of such a small group as peacekeeping.

Whether or not remained troops is aiming to keep the peace, US still has its own agenda requiring military assistance.



### **“Terrorist Attack” in Christchurch, New Zealand**



During Friday Prayer on 15 March 2019, 50 people killed by the white supremacist terrorist in Christchurch, New Zealand. Two separate attacks simultaneously began at the Al Noor Mosque and at the Linwood Islamic Centre.

It is true that, including politicians and leaders, many people all around the world condemned the attacks. However, what makes this massacre different from the others is not being a horrific issue itself but how the issue is handled by New Zealandian officers from bottom to top.

Their reactions to the issue has become an exemplary for the entire world. Despite prevalent Islamophobic phenomenon in the world, Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern embraced the Muslim community and at the same time definitely considered the attack as a terrorism. Not only her but also all of the state officers showed their respects to the victims' families.





## Brexit withdrawal deal rejected 3rd time



On the day long set for Britain to leave the European Union, Parliament rejected Prime Minister Theresa May's Brexit deal for a third time, leaving the country no closer to an exit plan after more than two years. The decision to reject a stripped-down version of May's divorce deal has left it very unclear how, when or even whether Britain will leave the EU.

May had told Parliament the vote was the last opportunity to ensure Brexit would take place.

"This government will continue to press the case for the orderly Brexit that the result of the referendum demands," May added.

Opponents fear that Brexit will make Britain economically vulnerable and divide the European alliance as it struggles with both the unconventional U.S. presidency of Donald Trump and growing potential problems from Russia and China.



## Trump to recognize Israeli control of Golan Heights



Following the Israel's air attacks in Gaza on 15 March, the U.S. President Trump said the U.S. should recognize disputed Golan Heights as Israeli territory. In this regard, "After 52 years it is time for the United States to fully recognize Israel's Sovereignty over the Golan Heights," Trump tweeted.

Israel captured the area from Syria in 1967 (Six-Day War), and then annexed the territory in 1981. That was not formally recognized by the U.S. and most of the other countries. They said status of the territory should be determined by the negotiations.

The Golan Heights has been a continuous problem between Israel and Syria. Israel considers this territory as a buffer zone to keep its security against Hezbollah. On the contrary, Syria views itself as a rightful owner of the area.

This can be evaluated as a political move for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of a tough election race. But also reminds that Israel see the Syrian crisis as an opportunity, while a possible territorial division of Syria is still on the table.

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## **CESRAN International and OBSERVARE of UAL signed the MoU for IEPAS2019**

Professor Ozgur Tufekci and Professor Luís Moita signed the MoU for IEPAS2019 (the 6th International Conference on Eurasian Politics and Society), which will be organised by CESRAN International and OBSERVARE of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa on 4-5 July 2019 in Lisbon.

Professor Jose Amado da Silva (the Rector of UAL), Professor Luís Tome, Professor Ana Isabel Xavier from UAL, Professor Rahman Dag from CESRAN International, and colleagues from IESM – Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares (Higher Institute of Military Studies), Instituto de Defesa Nacional (The Institute for National Defence) joined the ceremony, as well.



# IEPAS2019

6th International Conference on Eurasian Politics & Society  
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## IEPAS2019

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Conference on  
Eurasian Politics  
&  
Society  
4-5 July 2019  
Lisbon (Portugal)



# Back to the Hardest: The U-turn of Turkish Foreign Policy

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**A**fter a decade in which Turkish foreign policy has been focused on the use of soft power tools, following the 2014 it has witnessed a gradual and rapid turnaround to hard power. A variety of intertwined factors from both the domestic sphere and the international realm have determined this shift. Specifically, Turkey's regional approach seems to be increasingly affected by domestic developments, with the transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system.

Even if leaders and domestic forces determine what the state wishes or tries to do, it is the systemic level that determines what it can actually do. Indeed, over the years, mainly systemic determinants obliged Ankara to alter its revisionist soft-power oriented policy towards the region. Specifically, Libyan and Syrian crisis have shown to Turkish FPE that “a cautious ‘wait and see’ approach was not a viable option”(Keyman 2016). The uprisings gave new impetus to the regional power struggle. Three regional powers, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, competed to shape the post-Arab Spring regional order and have affected the internal struggle for power within the countries that were experiencing uprisings. Turkey represented a third Islamic-capitalist pole. Its political system – a procedural democracy that incorporates Islamic forces – was congruent with regional peoples’ aspirations. However, as the Syrian conflict deepened into intractable civil war, Ankara government seemed to be ineffectual in controlling the turmoil within its own borders and much less bid for regional leadership (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2014). Moreover, Turkish FPE “miscalculated the Islamist movements political chances in post 2011 democratic wave, over-assessed Turkey’s power and influence, and did not predict the reactions of other regional and global actors” (Yesilyurt 2017). In other words, the Arab upheavals and Turkish inability to handle the Syrian crisis with diplomatic tools have jeopardized Turkey’s ambition to be a leading country. Ankara’s over-activism has resulted in a growing number of threats to its security along the southern border. Moreover, the different approaches pursued by Russia and the West have further convoluted the post-Arab Spring geopolitical environment.

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The developments on Turkish southern border have made Turkey’s status more unstable and they have influenced Turkish FPE orientation towards

neighbours. These latter are perceived like potential enemies - as during the pre-JDP era. Meanwhile, the perception of threat coming from the great powers has increased, as they are considered as producers of instability within Turkey. The 'order maker' role in the region asserted by Davutoğlu proved to be too optimistic as shown by the worsening of the Syrian civil war. These circumstances have also driven to another change in Turkish foreign policy role, from the idea of a 'central country' to the one of Turkey as a 'buffer state'. Similarly, to the Cold War period, Turkey perceives itself as a buffer state. This current conception is security-driven and based on the notion of containment and status quo orientation. As underlined by Keyman (2016) "the current Turkey's buffer identity has three subtexts: (1) to contain refugees in Turkey; (2) to contain the ISIL problem in the MENA region, mainly in Syria and Iraq; and (3) to balance Iran's regional hegemonic aspirations". This shift is a double backward step towards a position akin the pre-JDP era. Among its determinants are not only external constraints but also several domestic factors. Firstly, the polarization between liberal and secular fractions of Turkish public and the discontent for the JDP's authoritarian drift. Secondly, the warfare between JDP and Gülen movement within state institutions, blast in the failed coup attempt in mid-2016. Thirdly, the large number of attacks by terrorist groups such as ISIL and TAK (a PKK offshoot) in Turkish cities. Finally, the disappointing results of the June 2015 general elections in which JDP saw its majority fading away. The events depicted above, indicate how the domestic level is currently characterised by growing challenges to JDP's role and depict the rising polarization among different social and political communities in the country. Accordingly, "it became increasingly difficult for the JDP to govern with soft measures, and some autocratic tendencies prevailed" (Yesilyurt 2017). President Erdogan has monopolised the authority within the JDP. His leader dominant rule has been observed in almost all aspects of Turkish politics including foreign policy, which assumed a peculiar trait of other Middle East regimes the idiosyncratic variable. As well pointed out by Dawisha (1988), the idiosyncratic variable usually occurred in regimes where power is personalized and concentrated, especially in time of fluidity or crises. During last six years neither parliamentarians nor bureaucrats in the ministry of foreign affairs played major roles in the decision-making process. Since 2014, Erdogan has taken the primary role in Turkish foreign policy making, leaving a limited position to Davutoğlu's circle (Kuru 2015). Alongside, Turkey had to leave aside its

**Since 2014, Erdogan has taken the primary role in Turkish foreign policy making, leaving a limited position to Davutoglu's circle.**

ambition to become a regional power, in line with Davutoğlu's vision, and embraced a more pragmatic and less ideological foreign policy behaviour. Under the leadership of Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu - especially following rise to power of Binali Yildirim as a Prime minister -, Turkey's strategy has followed a greater alignment with Russian

positions, in the economic field as well as in security and geopolitics. The rise of the Eurasianist perspective, not new in Turkish foreign policy (Tufekci 2017), is related to the power struggle within FPE to fill the vacuum left by the wave of arrests of Gülenist affiliated. Among the factions that have acquired more influence is the so-called Perinçek group<sup>i</sup>. The group, which revolves around the leader of the arch-secularist and ultranationalist Patriotic Party, Doğu Perinçek, is known for its staunchly secular, isolationist, socialist, anti-US, anti-West, pro-Russian and Euroasianist characteristics<sup>ii</sup>. Therefore, behind the reconciliation with Russia, that came after Turkey downed a Russian warplane near the Syrian border in November 2015, there is also a change of FPE general outlook. The trilateral cooperation with Iran, aiming to reach a sustainable ceasefire in Syria, represented a milestone in this new path of Turkey-Russia relations.

In the last four years, Turkey has adopted a more securitized foreign policy in which the hard power regained supremacy on soft power. After the election of June 2015 and the siege of Kobani, Turkey has adopted an aggressive foreign policy that comes together with a clear doctrine of pre-emptive action, that some called ‘Erdogan doctrine’<sup>iii</sup>. The core idea of this new security approach is that facing a wide range of external problems and threats, Turkey must adopt preventive policies.<sup>iv</sup> This doctrine recalled the 2002 G.W. Bush National Security Strategy of ‘pre-emption’, defined as pre-emptive and preventive action. First and clear outcome of such new pre-emptive approach was the military intervention in northern Syria launched in August 2016 (Euphrates Shield). The military operation, ended in March 2017, had the aim to oppose the ISIL advance and to prevent the constitution of an independent Kurdish state in Syria. Yet, in January 2018, Turkey launched a military operation in Afrin region, a Syrian district near the Turkish border controlled by Kurdish forces, in order to prevent the consolidation of Kurdish militia position and to create a safe zone on the border. The Ankara government decided to conduct ‘Olive Branch’ operation although it would have potentially put itself in direct conflict with the US and other NATO allies, considering the circumstances a threat to its own national security.

The leader-dominant model in decision-making has driven Erdogan to use international relations primarily as an instrument to expand and energize his constituency and power inside the country. An example of how the current Turkish approach prioritises domestic politics over foreign policy is visible in the decision of opening military bases abroad. Indeed, the establishment of a military base in Qatar in 2015, the first ever

**In the last four years, Turkey has adopted a more securitized foreign policy in which the hard power regained supremacy on soft power.**



Turkish outpost abroad, and the one that Ankara opened in Somalia (2017), would paint a new picture of success in the domestic sphere, reinforcing the idea that Turkey's new foreign policy is alive and well (Aras and Akpınar 2017). An unusual aspect of this new deal in foreign policy is that the new concept of pre-emptive action is being discussed a lot in Turkish media. It seems that the government is working to generate support from Turkish public, by promoting the doctrine of pre-emption and cross-borders operation as the sole method to combat the threats. The strategy involves concepts such as the effective use of military force beyond borders when needed, the possible disregard of traditional alliance relations and taking unilateral action independent by the US and NATO. In order to foster public support Ankara government uses a rhetoric that beats the old Turkish fears, namely a hidden project of Western powers to establish a new regional system - an updated version of the Sèvres Treaty - and the territorial integrity threatened by Kurdish claims. Such discourse was also evident in the first few weeks after the mid-2016 failed coup attempt, when President Erdogan and other high government officials accused the US and Europe of supporting the coup plotters.<sup>v</sup>

Since 2015, Turkish gamble policy has driven to an escalation of tensions with several NATO allies (Germany, Netherlands, US), a general isolation in the region and beyond. Yet, "Turkey's ambitious policy based on supporting Sunni Islamist groups was interpreted as a sectarian approach" (Öniş 2014) by Western countries who started to see Turkey as a destabilizing force in the region. At the same time Ankara's activism and growing support for the Muslim Brotherhood not only caused a harsh vigorous reaction from Shiite actors, but also did not receive warm feedback from all Sunni actors, above all Saudi Arabia. As pointed out by Aras and Akpınar (2017) the recent Qatar crisis has further demonstrated Turkey's declining ability to bring parties to the table in the region. Alongside, Turkey's democratic credentials have witnessed a gradual process of erosion, especially following the failed coup of 2016.

In the medium term, military operations in Syria will not be sustainable by the Turkish state, because of both material resources and their political costs. Therefore, even though it may seem very unpopular, Turkey should launch a new phase of transition in its foreign policy agenda by adopting a

more cautious and low-profile behaviour. Nowadays, the priority for national security itself is to solve the Syrian crisis by ensuring a stable and preferably neutral regime. At the same time, the strengthened ties with Qatar and the growing convergence of interests with Iran on several issues – PKK, Red Sea, Qatar blockade, and Syria integrity - may allow

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Turkey to achieve better results at a lower cost. As a result, there may be a better balance between the different hard and soft power tools.

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<sup>i</sup> Murat Yetkin, "Ankara kulislerinde ürperten senaryo", *Hurriyet*, December 6, 2016. URL: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/ankara-kulislerinde-urperten-senaryo-40300264>

<sup>ii</sup> Patrick Kingsley, "Turkey in Turmoil and Chaos Since Purge Aimed at Dissenters", *The New York Times*, April 12, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-purge.html>

<sup>iii</sup> Metin Gurcan, 'Turkey's new 'Erdogan Doctrine'', *Al-Monitor*, November 04, 2016. URL: <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/turkey-wants-use-its-hard-power-solve-regional-problems.html>

<sup>iv</sup> Burhanettin Duran, Turkey's new security concept, *Daily Sabah*, October 26, 2016. URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/duran-burhanettin/2016/10/26/turkeys-new-security-concept>

<sup>v</sup> Adam Withnall and Samuel Osborne, 'Erdogan blames 'foreign powers' for coup and says West is supporting terrorism', *Independent*, August 2, 2016. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-coup-latest-news-blames-us-west-terrorism-gulen-a7168271.html>



ISSN 2632-4911

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# The State and Society in Contemporary Turkey

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The Turkish model has long been considered as a challenge to the orthodox claim that Islam and Western values, such as liberalism, capitalism, modernity, and democracy, cannot be together as they are ontologically incompatible. The electoral success of pro-Islamic AKP in 2002 was welcomed as an example. The AKP was rooted in the political Islamic mobilisation on the one hand, and yet its political discourse was articulated around liberal democracy and free market economy on the other. The AKP's pro-Islamic but still liberal, democratic, and pro-EU rule has been shown as the evidence that the orthodox claim is flawed. However, this did not last forever and something had changed after eleven years. Most of the analysts specialised in the politics of Turkey and the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) signified the Gezi Uprising in 2013 as a breakdown in Turkish politics in terms of the AKP's transition from a democratic-liberal government to a heavy-handed and authoritarian power cluster. What happened in 2013 that led to the Gezi Uprising? Even in the 2010-2012 period, the AKP was being praised as a transformative and progressive power that would consolidate democratic values and civil liberties in the country among the mainstream-liberal intelligentsia. For instance, in 2010, The Economist was claiming that Turkey is not turning its back on the West<sup>i</sup>, as John Peet, the Europe editor of the magazine said: "Turkey has made astonishing progress in the past decade"<sup>ii</sup>. On the other hand, just three years later, following the Gezi Uprising started in Taksim Square in June 2013, it is claimed that the AKP abandoned its progressiveness and turned into a regressive power that rules the country in an authoritarian way. The Economist was then questioning whether the AKP's leader, Erdogan, is a "democrat or sultan"<sup>iii</sup>. Such transformation came by complete surprise and brought the Gezi Uprising under close scrutiny. Was the upheaval really the breaking point of the political climate in Turkey? Was the Gezi uprising a secularist movement against the Islamic AKP? Does the divide between Islamism and secularism constitute the most significant social phenomenon of Turkey? What is the key element of social change in Turkey?

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Such questions require a historical focus on the state-society relations in Turkey. The centre-periphery relations approach has long been offered as a

key to understand the state-society interaction in contemporary Turkish politics. “Society has a centre”, claimed Edward Shils more than half a century ago<sup>iv</sup>. Şerif Mardin adapted the concept to the Turkish context. According to Mardin, there has been a sharp division between centre and periphery in both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey; and this split has always been the most critical phenomenon of the Turkish politics<sup>v</sup>. He considers the modernisation process of the Ottoman Empire as the Westernization of the bureaucracy<sup>vi</sup>. Basically, he argues that the centre that is represented by the state imposed Westernisation processes towards the society that represents periphery. He applies the same analogy to the Republic as well. For instance, he claims that the coup in 1960 deepened the split between centre and periphery<sup>vii</sup>. He, therefore, concludes that the resistance in Turkey is not rooted in organised labour movements, since they are not simply the only part of the periphery; but the periphery itself is the core of counter-official culture<sup>viii</sup> because of patrimonialism and the absence of civil society<sup>ix</sup>. Metin Heper seeks answers to the antagonism of the *strong state versus weak society* in Turkey<sup>x</sup>. He argues that the state is distinctly separated from society in the Ottoman-Turkish context<sup>xi</sup> and points out two interconnected reasons for why democracy faced difficulties in Turkey. First, the state elites are sensitive to the crisis of integration, and second, they are not sympathetic towards the periphery<sup>xii</sup>. Çağlar Keyder brings social classes into this antagonism and discusses that the history of the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic is a class struggle between two classes; the bureaucracy, and the bourgeoisie<sup>xiii</sup>. Finally, Hakan Yavuz incorporated this antagonism with Islamism. He argued that “the Turkish secular reforms not only hyphenated state and society but defined the Republican state against traditional society”<sup>xiv</sup>.

**It is safe to argue that the works of scholars cited above suggest a separatist understanding of the state and society which juxtaposes the ‘Kemalist state elites’ with the ‘traditional Islamic society’, and assumes that there is a conflict between the state and society.**

It is safe to argue that the works of scholars cited above suggest a separatist understanding of the state and society which juxtaposes the ‘Kemalist state elites’ with the ‘traditional Islamic society’, and assumes that there is a conflict between the state and society. For instance, the chief advisor of President Erdoğan, İbrahim Kalın, defined that the success of Islamism, what he called the “conservative democracy”, heralded a movement *from the periphery to the centre* through emphasising society over the state<sup>xv</sup>. Moreover, John L. Esposito argued that there was a transformation of small Islamic marginal organisations

into a new class of modern-educated but Islamically oriented elite, which is defined as a movement *from the periphery to the centre* through Islamic banks, schools and religious publishing/broadcasting<sup>xvi</sup>. It is safe to argue that the major meta-theoretical tool in understanding Turkish politics manifests itself in the *secularists versus Islamists* dichotomy.

This essay identifies four shortcomings of the centre-periphery relations approach that juxtaposes secularists with Islamists antagonistically. First, the state and civil society are considered ontologically autonomous and antagonistic entities. The dualist understanding of the state-society relations does not consider the split between those concepts methodologically but ontologically. Such abstraction results in a conceptualisation that those two spheres appear as two independent entities without symbiotic relationship or with very limited interconnectedness. This is problematic because it obstructs the ability of the analysis to comprehend internal dynamic between the state and civil society, as it neglects their interdependent relationship or downgrades their relationship into a limited dependence. Eventually, it leads to an ahistorical analysis of social change. Second, the dualism also appears at the economic and the political spheres (or in other words, the market and the state) and they are considered separately and antagonistically. The pitfalls of ‘ontological exteriority’<sup>xvii</sup>, such as the negligence of interdependence and interconnectedness between spheres, apply in these dualisms too. Similar to the first one, this feature causes an ahistorical reading of the relationship of those spheres and prevents us from understanding the internal relations between them.

Third, there is clear favouritism for civil society over the state in those analyses. The antagonistic reading of the state-society relations resulted in an understanding that the state is considered as a heavy-handed, repressive and reactionary entity and civil society is seen as a progressive social force against the so-called ‘evil’ state. In the literature of Turkish politics, this conceptualisation manifests itself in the rivalry between the ‘secular’ state and the ‘religious’ civil society. An understanding based on an always-progressive civil society is problematic because civil society is symbiotically connected to the state; and as the integral state, they produce hegemony together. Civil society is neither a necessarily progressive entity nor the sphere of ‘freedom’; it is rather an abstract component of

**The Gezi Uprising was a popular response to the AKP’s on-going political economy in the 2002-2013 period that has been manifested in Islamic-neoliberalism.**



the integral state<sup>1</sup> where hegemonic struggles are carried out and civil society groups could be on either side of these struggles, be reactionary or progressive<sup>2</sup>. Fourth, there is a negligence of the social relations of production in the literature. The social relations of production are used in order to describe the class structure – that is, to say the social aspect of the relations of production. However, in the centre-periphery relations approach, the class structure is either neglected and the antagonism is made between identities (such as secular versus religious) or used as a sociological term in which it is utilised to discuss class conflict disconnectedly from the relations of production (such as bureaucracy as a class). I argue that the lack of the social relations of production in an analysis is problematic because the material conditions of societal relations are the bases that determine superstructural spheres such as culture, politics etc. Ignoring the material conditions and attributing the identities as the main source of the conflict would lead us to ahistorical analyses.

At a time when the Gezi Uprising is being demonised as an intervention by foreign governments and criminalised by false and ungrounded shreds of evidences in Turkey, it is crucial to understand the upheaval critically. I argue that neither the Gezi Uprising simply remarks a rupture in the transformation of the AKP into an authoritarian party nor it was an intervention conspired by foreign governments to overthrow the AKP. The Gezi Uprising was a popular response to the AKP's on-going political economy in the 2002-2013 period that has been manifested in Islamic-neoliberalism. False attributions to the uprising are rooted in the centre-periphery relations approach's reading of the state-society relations. It is imperative to employ a holistic and critical understanding of the state and civil society.

<sup>i</sup> The Economist, 23<sup>rd</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> October 2010, p. 21.

<sup>ii</sup> The Economist, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2010, *Anchors aweigh: A special report on Turkey*, p. 21.

<sup>iii</sup> The Economist, 8<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> June 2013, cover.

<sup>iv</sup> Shils, Edward. *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 3.

<sup>v</sup> Mardin, Şerif. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102, No. 1 (1973): 169-190, p. 169.

<sup>vi</sup> Ibid, 179.

<sup>vii</sup> Ibid, 186.

<sup>viii</sup> Ibid, 187.

<sup>ix</sup> Mardin, Şerif. "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, No. 3 (1969): 258-281, p. 254-64.

<sup>1</sup> The integral state is a Gramscian term defines the integrity of state-society, state-market, economy-politics, base-superstructure, consent-coercion, and hegemony-dictatorship.

<sup>2</sup> I owe this definition of civil society to my PhD supervisor, Prof Andreas Bieler.

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- <sup>x</sup> Heper, Metin. "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared." *Comparative Political Studies* 25, No. 2 (1992): 169-194.
- <sup>xi</sup> Heper, Metin. "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18, No. 1 (1991): 38-51, p. 46.
- <sup>xii</sup> Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley: Eothen, 1985, p. 98.
- <sup>xiii</sup> Keyder, Çağlar. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso, 1987, p. 2.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Yavuz, M. Hakan. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 7.
- <sup>xv</sup> Kalın, İbrahim. "The AK Party in Turkey." In *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, edited by John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 423-439. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 427.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Esposito, John L. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 20-1.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Morton, Adam David. "The Limits of Sociological Marxism?" *Historical Materialism* 21, No. 1 (2014): 129-158.

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ISSN: 2045-1903

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Publication date: Spring issue — April  
Autumn issue — October



# Why should Democratic Governance be a Matter of International Concern?

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**T**his short article seeks to demonstrate that the promotion of democratically legitimate governance as a right of all peoples should be a matter of utmost international concern in order to protect human rights within States and promote peace between nations.

## **The promotion and protection of human rights:**

Although democracy is a contested concept, it is possible to identify the elements commonly understood as the core definitional features. In “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” Thomas Franck explains how democracy is made up of a bundle of interconnected and mutually reinforcing human rights: the right to self-determination, expressed through the right to equal political participation in free and fair elections. Free and fair elections in turn requiring rights to freedom of expression of opposing political opinions and freedom of association and assembly so that a range of political parties can organise.<sup>ii</sup> Thus, a number of human rights are automatically upheld by a democratic system, as they constitute the very definition of democracy. Indeed, democracy inherently promotes greater individual liberty.<sup>iii</sup> The fact that human beings yearn to be free and desire to have a say in the decision-making process regarding issues that affect their lives is why, as Claude Ake states, “there is no part of the world where democracy is not relevant, if only as an emancipatory project. There is no undemocratic country I know of where democratic struggles are not being waged.”<sup>iv</sup>

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A system of democratic governance is also an essential prerequisite for the promotion and protection of all other human rights.<sup>v</sup> It is only when the people

are empowered to influence the government and hold it to account that other rights can be secured.<sup>vi</sup> It is submitted that in a democratic system where there is lawful opposition to the government, a competitive struggle for the popular vote, and regular transfer of power, the government is much more accountable to the people and thus is much less likely to deprive citizens of their human rights.<sup>vii</sup>

It follows logically that if human rights are an international concern then so too must be democracy. The broader corpus of international human rights law and the more specific right to democratic governance share a common goal: government that acts as an agent of the people, representing the people's interests not just the interests of the rulers. It could be argued that a benevolent dictatorship could uphold human rights with no need for a democratic system. However, in such a situation, human rights are not really "rights" at all; in fact they are better described as "gifts". It is submitted that a right by its very nature is not merely a choice for a government to respect or to disregard. Rather a right implies obligation and a means of enforcing that obligation. In this regard, human rights are inseparable from a democratic system.

As Michael Ignatieff has highlighted, human rights are much more effectively protected in a democratic state, with a representative and accountable government, than in an authoritarian state subject to human rights monitoring.<sup>viii</sup> Democracy puts more control in the hands of the people so that they may better protect themselves. As Tesón observes, human rights have never been respected by despotic regimes and this is why the right to political participation is enshrined in the major human rights conventions.<sup>ix</sup>

History tells us that lack of accountability results in grave violations of human rights. Amartya Sen has explored the link between famines and democracy. He points out that India was plagued by famines while under British colonial rule. However, as soon as multiparty democracy was established the famines stopped. The reason is very simple: The British regime was not accountable to the people through elections and was not subject to the scrutiny of opposition parties and a free media. This allowed the regime to rule with little regard for

the wellbeing of the indigenous population. He concludes that "in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press."<sup>x</sup> The truth is inescapable, democratic accountability promotes human rights and the dignity of the individual.

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Rummell's research demonstrates that there is a sliding scale of regimes with violence increasing as democratic accountability decreases.<sup>xi</sup> Rummell estimates that "absolute—totalitarian—Power has murdered nearly 138 million people" in the 20th Century.<sup>xii</sup> He draws particular attention to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, a totalitarian regime that exterminated over 31% of its own people in less than four years.<sup>xiii</sup>

He concludes that:

The best assurances against democide are democratic openness, political competition, leaders responsible to their people, and limited government. In other words, power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely.<sup>xiv</sup>

Rummell's findings continue to be borne out by regimes such as North Korea. In 2013, the UN Human Rights Council established a Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK. The panel of experts, chaired by the Hon Michael Kirby, found that "systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations" are being committed, including crimes against humanity. The Commission specifically concluded that State actors "systematically employ violence and punishments that amount to gross human rights violations in order to create a climate of fear that pre-empts any challenge to the current system of government". It is estimated that 80,000 to 120,000 political prisoners are held in camps where inmates are subjected to "unspeakable atrocities" including "deliberate starvation, forced labour, executions, torture, rape and the denial of reproductive rights enforced through punishment, forced abortion and infanticide." The Commission lays the blame squarely at the totalitarian nature of the regime and its first recommendation is that North Korea "Undertake profound political and institutional reforms without delay to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader and the Workers' Party of Korea". These changes should include "an independent and impartial judiciary, a multiparty political system and elected people's assemblies at the local and central levels that emerge from genuinely free and fair elections".<sup>xv</sup>

The link between unaccountable power and violence does not stop at the border. Democratisation not only protects human rights at home but also abroad.

**The link between unaccountable power and violence does not stop at the border. Democratisation not only protects human rights at home but also abroad.**



### Democratic Peace:

The very first purpose of the United Nations, stated in Article 1(1) of the UN Charter, is “To maintain international peace and security”.<sup>xvi</sup> If the primary purpose of international law is to maintain peace and security then there are powerful arguments for a requirement of democratic legitimacy within states.

In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote *Perpetual Peace* in which he predicts a world of states with republican constitutions co-existing in perpetual peace. Kant argues that as the citizens of states bear most of the adverse consequences of war, they will naturally “be very cautious in commencing such a poor game”. Therefore, if the ruler relies on the consent of the governed, war will be less likely. On the other hand, in a state where the ruler is not accountable to the people, the decision to declare war can be taken much more lightly as the cost to the sovereign is minimal:

war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice...He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference.<sup>xvii</sup>

In a democratic state, there is much greater pressure on the government not to start unpopular conflicts. In a democracy, there is freedom of expression and freedom to debate the issues of the day and, ultimately, an incumbent government must bow to the wishes of the people to secure re-election. In a despotic regime, the leader is unaccountable to the citizens, his subjects, and does not have to take their concerns into account.

Furthermore, if there is no constraint on the so-called “sovereign” in his domestic dealings with his “subjects” then why should he act differently when it comes to international relations. If the internal culture of a state is one of

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absolute, unaccountable authority vested in one person, or even an elite, then is it not more likely that this domestic “feeling of invincibility” will carry over into their view of what is acceptable behaviour internationally?<sup>xviii</sup> As Tesón puts it “Dictators inevitably become persuaded that they can get away with anything.”<sup>xix</sup> Tesón suggests that there is a psychological effect of dictatorship whereby

the complete “insulation of tyrannical rulers from criticism and debate fuels in them a sense of megalomania”.<sup>xx</sup>

Non-democratic regimes are also more likely to be wary of popular uprisings from their own people, that is, the people under their control. Where a government does not govern with the consent of the governed, it might turn to other tactics to remain in power. For example, as Boutros-Ghali commented, such governments might be more inclined to “incite hostilities against other States in order to justify their suppression of internal dissent or forge a basis for national unity”.<sup>xxi</sup> A popular explanation for the conflict over the Falkland Islands is that the military junta wanted citizens to “forget about their domestic plight”.<sup>xxii</sup> It is submitted that, where a culture of democracy exists within a state - where diverse opinions are tolerated and the government of the day does not expect to be in power forever more and accepts that it is subject to the popular will—there is much less impetus to generate an extremely nationalistic cult following and consequently less incentive to wage wars of distraction.<sup>xxiii</sup>

Lack of democratic accountability can also make States more prone to internal armed conflict, which can often spill over into neighbouring States. Regardless of what tyrannical leaders may proclaim, there is no society in which all the people agree on all the issues. There will always be disagreements and competing interests. The value of a democratic process is that issues can be resolved through debate and competitive elections in which citizens can vote.<sup>xxiv</sup> If people are disenfranchised with no means of airing their grievances and no say in their political destiny then their recourse is more likely going to be some sort of violent uprising.<sup>xxv</sup> To quote Kofi Annan, “Democratization gives people a stake in society. Its importance cannot be overstated, for unless people feel that they have a true stake in society lasting peace will not be possible”.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Non-democratic States may also threaten peace through their lack of transparency. As Farer notes, neighbouring States can observe the “budgets, industrial practices, political debates, and popular sentiments” of a transparent democratic State. Thus, when a democracy claims that it has no hostile intentions, neighbouring States can verify this with a reasonable degree of confidence.<sup>xxvii</sup> A dictatorship such as North Korea where there is extreme press censorship and little worthwhile public debate,

**Non-democratic regimes are also more likely to be wary of popular uprisings from their own people, that is, the people under their control.**

raises fears in neighbouring States—the dictatorship’s intentions are unclear and it is very difficult to substantiate what actions it might take. Consequently, States, including democracies, sometimes use force out of fear of what threat a dictator may pose.<sup>xxviii</sup>

Democratic governments are also less likely to enter into armed conflict with other democracies because in that situation “each owes its legitimacy to the principle of popular self-determination. Hence, when one attempts to impose its will upon the other, the aggressor violates the very principle on which his own claim to govern rests”.<sup>xxix</sup> In other words, a government that rules with the consent of the citizens undermines its own legitimacy if it then denies the democratic right to the citizens of another country.

Indeed, the empirical evidence demonstrates that democratic states rarely go to war with each other. Extensive research by sociologist Erich Weede found that “war or military conflict is extremely rare among democracies...some researchers do not report even a single instance of war between democracies.”<sup>xxx</sup>

This article concludes with some wise words from Sir Brian Urquhart:

The spread of democracy, and respect for human rights, are indispensable elements of a more stable, less violent human society, and are, as such, a legitimate—indeed an indispensable—international concern.<sup>xxxi</sup>

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- <sup>i</sup> The views expressed are those of the author alone and not attributed to the Bingham Centre.
- <sup>ii</sup> TM Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86(1) *The American Journal of International Law* 46, 52.
- <sup>iii</sup> SM Lynn-Jones, ‘Why the United States Should Spread Democracy’ (Discussion Paper 98-07, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 1998) available at [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why\\_the\\_united\\_states\\_should\\_spread\\_democracy.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html) accessed on 2 October 2018.
- <sup>iv</sup> C Ake, ‘Devaluing Democracy’ (1992) 3(3) *Journal of Democracy* 32, 36.
- <sup>v</sup> FR Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Transnational Publishers Inc. 1997) 142.
- <sup>vi</sup> GH Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 *Yale Journal of International Law* 539, 595.
- <sup>vii</sup> Lynn-Jones (n 6).
- <sup>viii</sup> M Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis’, (New York Review of Books, 20 May 1999) available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/05/20/human-rights-the-midlife-crisis/> accessed on 2 October 2018.
- <sup>ix</sup> Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality* (n 8) 142.



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- <sup>x</sup> A Sen, 'Democracy as a Universal Value' (1999) 10 *Journal of Democracy* 3, 7-8.
- <sup>xi</sup> RJ Rummell, 'Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder' (1995) 39(1) *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3, 5.
- <sup>xii</sup> RJ Rummell, *Death by Government* (Transaction Publishers 1994) 24.
- <sup>xiii</sup> *ibid* 5.
- <sup>xiv</sup> *ibid* 25.
- <sup>xv</sup> UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea' (2014) Un Doc A/HRC/25/63.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter) Article 1(1).
- <sup>xvii</sup> I Kant, 'Perpetual Peace' in P Gay (ed), *The Enlightenment* (Simon & Schuster 1974) 790-92. The present author is well aware that in many democratic systems, such as the United Kingdom, the initial decision to engage in armed conflict can be made by the leader of the executive without the need for consultation. Nonetheless, even in such systems Kant's argument remains valid because 1) the ruler is elected and thus already has democratic legitimacy as the people's representative in a way that is far removed from a non-democratic ruler; 2) in a democratic system the ruler can ultimately be held accountable at the ballot box for an unpopular conflict or through mechanisms such as a vote of no-confidence by the legislature.
- <sup>xviii</sup> FR Tesón, 'The Kantian Theory of International Law' (1992) 92(1) *Columbia Law Review* 53, 74-75.
- <sup>xix</sup> FR Tesón, 'Review of *Crisi Falkland-Malvina e Organizzazione Internazionale*' (1987) 81 *American Journal of International Law* 556, 558.
- <sup>xx</sup> Tesón, 'The Kantian Theory of International Law' (n 26) 75.
- <sup>xxi</sup> UN Secretary-General, 'Report of the Secretary-General: Supplement to Reports on Democratization' (1996) UN Doc A/51/761. Para 19.
- <sup>xxii</sup> Tesón, 'Review of *Crisi Falkland-Malvina e Organizzazione Internazionale*' (n 27) 558.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Farer (n 29) 725.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> UN Secretary-General, 'Report of the Secretary-General: Supplement to Reports on Democratization' (1996) UN Doc A/51/761. Para 17.
- <sup>xxv</sup> UN Secretary-General, 'Report of the Secretary-General: The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa' (1998) UN Doc A/52/871 – S/1998/318. Para 77.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> *Ibid* at Para 78.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> TJ Farer, 'Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The Western Hemisphere's Prospect' (1993) 15(4) *Human Rights Quarterly* 716, 725.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality* (n 8) 142.
- <sup>xxix</sup> *Ibid* 725-726.
- <sup>xxx</sup> E Weede, 'Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement' (1992) 29(4) *Journal of Peace Research* 377, 377.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> B Urquhart, 'The UN and International Security After the Cold War' in A Roberts and B Kingsbury (eds), *United Nations, Divided World* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn, Clarendon Press 1993) 81, 97.

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## Why Turkey Crashed the 'Western-promoted' Gains of PKK-led Kurds?

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After the Cold War, Turkey faced a disciplinary criticism from international community about the Kurdish question. This mounting condemnation not only resulted in shame, and status anxiety for Turkey, it also opened a free space for nationalist Kurds to mobilize.<sup>1</sup> Although this condemnation had a pause in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, its tone continued to increase in a cumulative manner. The 'Western-promoted' gains of nationalist and separatist Kurds mobilizing around the terrorist PKK have faced the wrath of the Turkish state since the mid-2015. Although the PKK, one of the most violent terrorist organizations, gained a lot from regional developments and international support, the Turkish state took an immense risk of worsening its image in the West and unleashed its fury on the PKK. Theoretically driven by hierarchy studies in International Relations, this paper aims to explain why Turkey ignored all criticism from the West in its last war against the PKK.

Since the late Ottoman times, Turkish policy makers have embraced Western norms and plead for acceptance in Western institutions. Put differently, the Europe has constituted a significant reference category through which Turkey accepted its inferiority and accordingly left itself to the judgment of European standards. This not only created a disadvantageous structure in which Ottoman/Turkish state has been primarily judged by Western values and institutions, it also resulted in a hyper-awareness of the Western origin of norms among policy makers, leading to norm-rejection. The latter was so simply because relations between the West and non-Western states are built on a perpetual dynamic of *stigmatization*.<sup>2</sup> As far as civilized Western states serve as a reference category, norm adaptation has never made Ottoman/Turkish state equal to Western states in its relations. While the line of norm adaptation makes the Turkish state submissive to Western demand about the Kurdish issue, the line of norm-rejection has outweighed when Western demands started to dwindle the state sovereignty in Turkey.

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<sup>1</sup> Ali Balci, "The Kurdish movement's EU policy in Turkey: An analysis of a dissident ethnic bloc's foreign policy", *Ethnicities* 15.1 (2015): 72-91; Hakan Samur, and Mehmet Behzat Ekinci, "The European Union Dilemma of the Kurds: High Support for Membership despite Lack of Sufficient Trust", *Insight Turkey* 20.3 (2018): 219-240.

<sup>2</sup> Ayşe Zarakol, "What Made the Modern World Hang Together: Socialization or Stigmatisation", *International Theory*, 8(2), July 2014, 311-332, p. 312

## A Hierarchy-based Approach

An analytical focus on status, therefore, can help to understand most of recent political developments in Turkey's Kurdish question. As part of the Europeanization process in the first decade of the 2000s, Turkey introduced massive reforms about the rights of Kurdish-speaking people in Turkey. Such reform process not only improved the rights of ordinary Kurdish people, it also motivated the PKK, a terrorist organization, in changing the basic strategy of fighting against the Turkish state. The PKK started to embrace Western demands from Turkey as safe haven, leading to resurgence of the PKK. The same ruling party, which carried out EU-imposed reforms, turned blind against EU's demands regarding human rights, accordingly risked the status of Turkey in the Western club. When Turkey's wrath reigned in the second half of the 2010s, the PKK dramatically lost all its gains stemming from the Western pressure on the Turkish state. This paper aims to explain all these ups and downs by using the analytical concept of 'status' as part of recent hierarchy-turn in International Relations.

**As part of the Europeanization process in the first decade of the 2000s, Turkey introduced massive reforms about the rights of Kurdish-speaking people in Turkey.**

The present paper has some theoretical assumptions in evaluating the following puzzle: why Turkey preferred to risk its status in Western-led hierarchical order by crushing the resurgent PKK given the fact that the latter has been discursively supported by the West in the context of the Syrian crisis? First, secondary states in a hierarchical order give the top priority to their recognition by 'targeted' reference group of states.<sup>3</sup> Because of this top priority, a specific framework laid down by the leading powers of the hierarchical order

determines what proper behaviors are for secondary states.<sup>4</sup> Third, such asymmetric relation between secondary states and the leading ones within the order paradoxically generates a never-unsettled anger on the side of inferior state, feeding revenge sentiments against states superior in the order. Fourth, when secondary states are ostracized against their own will in this hierarchical order, this never-unsettled anger comes to surface,

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<sup>3</sup> Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, "Reputation and status as motives for war", *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 371-393, p. 378

<sup>4</sup> William C. Wohlforth, et. al, "Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking", *Review of International Studies* 44.3 (2018): 526-546, p. 8



increasing the likelihood of risk-taking behaviors.<sup>5</sup> Such behaviors manifest themselves in a wide range of options such as exit from the hierarchical order, and working against the wishes of the lead state in a specific policy issue.

Secondary states in a hierarchical order may prefer challenging the demands and rules of the hierarchical order. Following a hierarchical order's rules of membership does not automatically grant status subordinate members desire. For secondary states, achieving desired status requires recognition from great powers within the order.<sup>6</sup> This creates a 'status inconsistency', the difference between status that is deserved and status that was attributed by the order itself.<sup>7</sup> In this phase, secondary states give a greater care to damages the order inflicted on their sovereignty and independence. However, dissatisfaction over status does not mechanically drive subordinate states to challenge simply because they are still secondary.

Challenging behaviors, however, need some facilitating conditions. Of them, three are the most relevant and worth to mention here. First, if an alternative hierarchical order offers a better status, secondary states exploit this in order to achieve status they desire within the existing order. Second, an improvement in material attributes such as wealth, military capability, and technological development motivate secondary states to take risk against the wishes of leading powers of the order. Third, it is leaders who turn complaints about the way secondary states are treated into policy outcomes. That means the perception of leader about whether his or her country is treated unfairly in the hierarchical order does matter. Challenge, then, arises out of facilitating conditions in favor of subordinate state dissatisfied with the rules and dictates of the hierarchical order defended by the leading actors in that order.<sup>8</sup>

**Secondary states in a hierarchical order may prefer challenging the demands and rules of the hierarchical order.**

**The PKK Issue in Context**

Since 1999, the ruling parties of Turkey gave enormous compromises to the European Union in particular and the West in general in order to improve

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<sup>5</sup> Secondary states can perceive the rules of hierarchical order as unjust and see very little stake in maintaining it. See, Shogo Suzuki, "Delinquent Gangs' in the International System Hierarchy", Ayşe Zarakol (ed.), *Hierarchies in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 2019-239, p. 227

<sup>6</sup> Duque, *Recognizing International Status*, p. 581

<sup>7</sup> See, Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1.2 (1964): 95-119

<sup>8</sup> This argument is inspired from William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War", *World Politics* 61.1 (2009): 28-57, p. 31

the status of Turkey in the Western hierarchical order. In the closing years of the first decade of the 2000s, it became clear that Turkey would not get the desired status within that order. Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish prime minister between 2003-2014 and president since 2014, often declared that he would embrace EU reforms as a path to further democratization of Turkish political system, status of Turkey in the Western order continued to deteriorate especially after 2013. In such situation, it appeared that the EU-induced reforms increased mobilization opportunities for the PKK-led Kurds, epitomized not only in the Kurdish party's sweeping the votes of Kurdish-majority cities, also in PKK's resurgence both in the southern Turkey and at the south of Turkey, Syria and Iraq.<sup>9</sup> In the eyes of the ruling elite, disappointment was big. On the one hand, compromises did not generate the desired result, improvement in status. On the other, the realization of EU demands weakened security and sovereignty of the Turkish state.

**... the realization of EU demands weakened security and sovereignty of the Turkish state.**

Together with disillusionment about compromises to the West, Russia's assertive return to the region, improvement in Turkey's material capacities, and Erdoğan's personal charisma prompted the Turkish state to challenge the rules and dictates of the Western hierarchical order. As part of this challenge, Turkish Armed Forces together with police forces started an all-out

war against the PKK in 2015 and the Turkish government crushed many opportunities PKK-friendly Kurdish political organizations gained as part of the EU reform process. Such policy moves are extremely risky for a subordinate state given that leading powers of the order might punish Turkey by either putting some sanctions in place or shifting the status of Turkey from a candidate waiting at the door to a threat against the values of that order. Turkish policy makers, however, took such costly risks and significantly curbed sovereignty gains of the PKK-led Kurdish organizations in Turkey.

**Why Turkey Challenged?**

Following a hierarchical order's rules of membership does not automatically grant status subordinate members desire. For secondary states, achieving desired status requires recognition from great powers within the order.<sup>10</sup> This creates a 'status inconsistency', the difference between status that is deserved and status that was attributed by the order

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<sup>9</sup> See, Rahman Dağ, "The Spillover Effect of the Syrian Crisis on the Peace Process in Turkey", *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 53.8 (2018): 1251-1270.

<sup>10</sup> Duque, *Recognizing International Status*, p. 581

itself.<sup>11</sup> In this phase, secondary states give a greater care to damages the order inflicted on their sovereignty and independence. However, dissatisfaction over status does not mechanically drive subordinate states to challenge simply because they are still secondary. Challenging behaviors need some facilitating conditions. Of them, three are the most relevant and worth to mention here. First, if an alternative hierarchical order offers a better status, secondary states exploit this in order to achieve status they desire within the existing order. Second, an improvement in material attributes such as wealth, military capability, and technological development motivate secondary states to take risk against the wishes of leading powers of the order. Third, it is leaders who turn complaints about the way secondary states are treated into policy outcomes. That means the perception of leader about whether his or her country is treated unfairly in the hierarchical order does matter.

The West started to direct a strong criticism towards Turkey's ruling party and its leaders, resulting in the representation of the AK Party as the primary cause of Turkey's stigma. The Gezi protests during the 2013 summer dealt a serious blow against the AK Party, tarnished its democratic image and deteriorated its decade long status as an important democratic force in Turkey. After that moment, the magnitude of status inconsistency extremely increased for the AK Party. After a decade long EU reforms, now the AK Party is presented as an authoritarian party by the EU actors and within Western circles. In such situation, the AK Party, which had already lost its enthusiasm about EU reforms, saw all reform demands as threats to its own survival. This becomes very clear in the Syrian case and Ankara never listened to those who tried to legitimize the establishment of the PKK-affiliated Kurdish entity in the Northern Syria.

Turkey challenged the West with the help of a great power, namely Russia. The return of an assertive Russia into the region via Syria challenged two-decades long US military supremacy. Turkey utilized such system-level development, and approached to Russia in order to decrease the risk of challenging to the West. As part of this rapprochement, Turkey could launch its long awaited cross-border operation in northern Syria (called Euphrates Shield) in order to prevent ISIS infiltrations in, and attacks on Turkish cities, and thwart the state-like entity of PKK-friendly Kurds along the border of Turkey. After

**The return of an assertive Russia into the region via Syria challenged the two-decade long US military supremacy.**

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<sup>11</sup> See. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1.2 (1964): 95-119

this first operation, Turkey directly targeted Afrin under the control of the PKK-affiliated forces in Syria.

Both operations against the PKK in Turkey and military advancements against PKK-affiliated groups in Syria were facilitated by improvements in Turkey's domestic military industry. Turkey witnessed a dramatic increase in the share of indigenous defense industry in domestic military market. It increases from %20 in 1999 to more than %65 in 2018. Together with this improvement, the share of Turkish indigenous defense industry in international market can show the technological strength of this industry. State companies such as Aselsan, TAI, and Roketsan and private ones such as Bayraktar have dramatically increased their sales to international market after 2008. According to SIPRI Arms Industry Database, ASELSAN (since 2010) and TAI (since 2014) are among top-selling 100 companies. When looked at the 2017 data, while ASELSAN is 61<sup>st</sup> in the list of top selling companies, TAI is at the 70<sup>th</sup>. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 against the PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria proved the success of Turkey's domestic defense industry.<sup>12</sup> As a result, arms embargo threats coming from the West as in the early 1990s did not work, and Turkey had no motivation to polish its image in the West in order to satisfy arms-selling countries.

**Between 2009 and 2015,  
the AK Party organized a  
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the PKK.**

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan showed a strong resolve in the last war of Turkey against the PKK and PKK-affiliated groups in Turkey and the Middle East. Erdoğan's determined attitude stems from two dynamics unique to his personality. First, Erdoğan is one the most reform-oriented Turkish leaders and accordingly he tried to solve the PKK problem with

peaceful steps. Between 2009 and 2015, the AK Party organized a massive political campaign in order to solve the decades-long Kurdish issue and disarm the PKK.<sup>13</sup> This process failed mostly because the PKK used this peace process as an opportunity to consolidate its gains and increase its

<sup>12</sup> See, Murat Yeşiltaş and Necdet Özçelik, *When Strategy Collapses & The PKK's Urban Terrorist Campaign*, (İstanbul: SETA, 2018); Necdet Özçelik and Can Acun, *Terörle Mücadelede Yeni Safha: Zeytin Dalı Harekatı*, Seta Rapor, (İstanbul: TurkuvaZ Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2018)

<sup>13</sup> Talha Köse, "Rise and fall of the AK Party's Kurdish peace initiatives", *Insight Turkey*, 19.2, 2017: 139–166; Sener Aktürk, "Turkey's civil rights movement and the reactionary coup: Segregation, emancipation, and the western reaction", *Insight Turkey*, 18.3, (2016): 141–167



mobilization capacity.<sup>14</sup> Learning from failures made Erdoğan more resolute in the new strategy to solve the PKK problem, an all-out war aiming to dismantle the PKK and PKK-affiliated organizations. Second, Görener and Uçal, in their data-driven study, find that Erdoğan is a strong and determined leader who can “push the limits of what is possible”.<sup>15</sup> Therefore Erdoğan is able to orchestrate strident and risky decisions.

## Conclusion

Why did Turkey take a risk of worsening its image in the eyes of Western countries by starting an all-out war against the PKK and its branches in the Middle East? Given that the US allied with the PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria, the risk of drawing the wrath of the lead state was immense. In addition to many domestic reasons, Turkey's changing conditions in international system made such a war, full of risk in terms of Turkey's relations with the West, possible. This paper categorizes three most explanatory reasons into different levels. At the system level, West's negative attitude together with the rise of Russia as aggressive balancer made the policy of balancing possible for Turkey again. At the state level, self-sufficient military capacity decreased Turkey's dependency on Western arms. At the individual level, situational development, learning from failure, and dispositional character of Erdoğan made Turkey more resolute in its last war against the PKK.

The above analysis is motivated by two puzzling questions: how did rulers of Turkey develop a belief that Turkey deserves a better status, and why did they take a risk of losing the present status of Turkey in the search of a better one. Turkey's recent war against the PKK provides an ample case to answer these two questions. On the one hand Turkey realized its “status inconsistency” in the case of the Kurdish issue (despite reforms no improvement in status). On the other, Turkish rulers targeted the most sensitive issue through which the West generates its judgment about Turkey. However, such a risky act was not based on a simple frustration. Since facilitating conditions, the rise of Russia as balancer, Turkey's improvement in defense industry, and learning from the past, were at play, status-altering behavior of Turkey was motivated by a strategic calculation.

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<sup>14</sup> Güneş Murat Tezcür, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey”, *Journal of Peace Research* 47.6 (2010): 775-789.

<sup>15</sup> Aylin Ş. Görener, and Meltem Ş. Ucal, “The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Turkish Studies* 12 (3), 2011: 357-381, p. 369

*“Quarterly news-Magazine”*

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# Interview with Dr Sharifullah Dorani on American Foreign Policy under the Trump Presidency

Dr Rahman Dag  
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**S**ince Mr. Trump has been elected as president, the foreign policy of the US has been shaken, at least it seems that way. Starting economic war with major economic powers, China and Europe, discussing of withdrawing US forces from Syria and Afghanistan and pressing over immigration issues (Mexican wall) do not only reshape domestic but inevitably influence foreign policy. Major of the interview, therefore, will be on US foreign policy under the Trump Administration. Based on your latest book, titled as “America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making From Bush to Obama to Trump” which is published by I.B.TAURIS, I believe you will present an explanatory insights on possible changes in US foreign policy under Trump Presidency.

Please let me start with most popular concept of twitter diplomacy of President Trump.

**Rahman Dag: Daily statements of Trump in twitter and dramatic official statements occupy the world agenda in each time. Some thought that he has been changing the embedded position of the US in the world's politics. Do you agree with that? Is there a real dramatic change in foreign policy of the US?**

Before I answer your questions, let me thank you for the interview; it really is an honour! Also, I'd like to add that my answers, in parts, are derived from my book, *America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump*, which has just been published by I.B. Tauris and Bloomsbury.

The Donald Trump Administration's foreign policy will make more sense in the light of having oneself familiarised with one of the most controversial

and dividing presidents in the US history, Trump, his particularities, including his belief system, and the context in which he operated in. I would, therefore, like to analyse Trump's characteristics at some length, as the analysis will, hopefully, make it easier for your readers to make more sense of my answers to the remaining questions. Trump's viewpoints were said to be based on a number of schools of thoughts, including 'mercantilism' or 'economic nationalism', populism or Jacksonianism, authoritarianism and pragmatism, as well as certain 'character deficiencies'.

As the name suggests, the realist theory of mercantilism argues that economic activity should be based within a nation's borders and should be employed to primarily build a strong state. For mercantilists, according to Max Fisher, foreign (trade) policy is 'a series of deals, each divided between a winner and a loser'. The US was meant to win every single deal because it was the strongest party, but, in actuality, both adversaries and allies 'ripped off' the US. As will be seen below, traces of these views are found in Trump's approach, leading to changes in US foreign policy. I discuss them below.

Others claimed that Trump was influenced by nationalistic populist ideals. They supported Israel; parted with political correctness; argued for an aggressive response towards terrorism (though wary of so-called 'Forever Wars'); opposed talks with Iran and North Korea; felt sceptical about the UN; argued for the restoration of torture and the opening of Guantánamo; doubted the existence of climate change science; felt suspicious of Wall Street; distrusted the political establishment and the business elites and wanted to have their destiny in their own hands; disliked the left-wing; backed up middle-class entitlement programmes; felt mistrustful of the

outside world; opposed voting rights, same-sex marriage, gender equality, 'soulless globalism', especially free trade, 'international alliance' and 'the immigration of non-whites' – they saw immigration as an existential threat to the US.

**For them, 'Radical Islamic Terrorism' was at 'global existential' war 'with the Judaeo-Christian world' led by the US.**

They viewed Islam in 'deeply xenophobic terms'. For them, 'Radical Islamic Terrorism' was at 'global existential' war 'with the Judaeo-Christian world' led

by the US. Generally speaking, they thought in 'apocalyptic' terms and believed things were extremely 'bad' in America and needed fixing. They shared a '1940s view of fortress America', that is, America should be insular and focus on American needs, rather than police or build the outside world.

Trump's standpoints during the 2016 election and his presidency were *consistent* with most, if not all, of these populist ideals. Hillary Clinton



called these ideals (and half of Trump's supporters) 'racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic – you name it'. For Obama and the cultural left, these Jacksonian views were as close as 'hate crime'. These views have shaken US foreign policy, as I discuss their impact in the answers to the questions below.

There were others who argued that authoritarianism (some even went as far as fascism) was found in Trump's approach because he was fond of strong and nationalist leaders (such as Russian President Vladimir Putin who has 'very strong control over' Russia), required not only loyalty but also 'subservience', and insulted those who disagreed with him or belittled him. The ex-FBI director James Comey compared the president in his book, *A Higher Loyalty: Truth Lies and Leadership*, to a 'Mafia' don, who 'never stops talking' until he 'pulls all those present into a silent circle of assent'. Like a mafia boss, for Trump 'it's all about how do you serve the boss, what's in the boss's interests'. Again, as I discuss below, this aspect of Trump's characteristics has had foreign policy ramifications.

While Rebecca Seales claimed that Trump was conservative on several issues, James Kitfield argued that 'Trump is neither conservative nor neoconservative.' He was not conservative because he ran for the presidency in 2000 through the Reform Party that stood for moderate views but lost the nomination to Pat Buchanan. He was not neoconservative because avoiding 'a new Cold War' with Russia and disapproving of spreading democracy were two policy suggestions that would disappoint the neoconservatives.

For James Kitfield and many others, including former President Barack Obama, however, *pragmatism* (or what worked) seemed to guide his vision. This likewise has been evident in Trump's foreign policy, especially during the time when the so-called 'grown-ups'/ the 'adults in the room' (Trump's experienced advisors) were present in the administration. His remarks to work with Russia and Assad to defeat the common enemy, ISIL, his admittance that the US would not be able to overthrow Assad due to Russian and Iranian support, or his meetings with North Korean leader to defuse tension over North Korea's nuclear programmes could justify this view.

**Trump's lack of experience in politics could be another factor that Trump's foreign policy is in chaos.**

Trump's lack of experience in politics could be another factor that Trump's foreign policy is in chaos. Candidate Trump never called himself a politician, as he hated the profession. For Trump, US politicians such as Clinton and Obama were 'all talk, and no action'. Politicians, including career diplomats and naive academics, were 'stupid and incompetent' and

were ‘terrible negotiators’ and, consequently, turned the world into ‘a total mess’. All they worried about was how to learn about nuances and how then to carefully consider them before making a decision. The world was tough and what the US lacked was great negotiators/dealmakers to work out the best deals for the US. Foreign policy was not about experience or academic knowledge, or else Ronald Reagan would have never made a great president. Clinton, however, disagreed, accusing Trump of being delusional and living in his own reality. Comey equally believed that Trump was ‘untethered to the truth’. Being ignorant of foreign policy (and staffing his administration with inexperienced staff), and being devoid of the nuances that he eagerly dismissed, has led him to make foreign policy suggestions (as discussed below) that have truly ‘shaken’ US foreign policy and, as your question states, occupied ‘the world agenda’.

One anonymous US official revealed: ‘Meetings with him veer off topic and off the rails, he engages in repetitive rants, and his impulsiveness results in half-baked, ill-informed and occasionally reckless decisions that have to be walked back’. Bob Woodward in his book, *Fear: Trump in the White House*, and John Bew in his article in *New Statement America*, claim that many within the administration are worried that his ‘erratic behaviour’/lack of foreign policy experience could put the US ‘on the path to World War Three’. When Trump was told that Assad again launched a chemical attack on civilian, Trump acted wildly, saying: ‘Let’s fucking kill him! Let’s go in. Let’s kill the fucking lot of them’. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, one of the adults in the room, advised against such a decision.

**While the Taliban believed that Trump was ‘non-serious’ and said ‘anything that [came] to his tongue’, many in the Middle East, however, believed that Trump ‘must be smoking bad hashish to say such crazy things’.**

Michael Wolff in his explosive book on Trump, *Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House*, disputed the notion that Trump had a stable mind, but the White House doctor disagreed with Wolff. While the Taliban believed that Trump was ‘non-serious’ and said ‘anything that [came] to his tongue’, many in the Middle East, however, believed that Trump ‘must be smoking bad hashish to say such crazy things’. Trump won the election against the expectation of almost every political pundit, and many could not believe that the

American voters elected a candidate who made misogynistic, racist and anti-Muslim comments; someone who apparently did not pay federal tax for most of the past ‘20 years’ and then proudly defended his actions by saying he ‘took advantages of the laws of the nation’.

Citizen/candidate/ Trump was not well read. He got his information from the cable channels, especially Fox News. These channels at times could be inaccurate. To make matters worse, President Trump apparently does not listen to his immediate advisors (even to his military and intelligence officials) but himself because he was very 'clever'. He single-handedly turned 'the \$1 million' loan from his father into a company now worth, in his words, more than '\$10' billion. Trump believes he is 'superior in every way', and possesses boundless confidence in his ability to cut deals that put 'America First'. According to Trump, a man who could make 'high-end real estate deals' could find a solution to all American problems. In the 1980s, he even offered himself as someone who was able to broker a nuclear deal between the US and the Soviet Union.

So, was Trump, who chides US allies and praises its foes, an ideologue or a pragmatist? Many claim that Trump proved to be contradictory, inconsistent, unpredictable, vague, controversial, wrong on facts, and even dishonest, making it hard to pinpoint what school of thought, if any, Trump's beliefs were based on. I, however, found Trump to have been consistent in pursuit of his foreign policy agenda – an agenda that has been, in most parts, influenced by populist ideas and some mercantilist views (as well as his character deficiencies). He has managed to destroy, if not fully but at least partly, the Obama legacies: described as a commitment to climate change, opening to Cuba, the Iran agreement, a pledge to multilateralism, and the Obama Health Care. As you see, Trump, to borrow your words, is beginning to change 'the embedded position of the US in the world's politics'. Actually, he has scared the entire world. More shocking is the fact that US foreign policy decisions are tweeted. Yes, you guessed it right, by no one but the President of the United States of America!

Trump's populist agenda has created strong domestic opposition. More than 120 Republican experts did not support Trump's radical views and declared Trump unfit for presidency. The mainstream media press, including the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and CNN, were critical to the extent that made Trump believe there was a 'witch-hunt' against him. The cultural left (and Congress, especially the House in which Democrats have now gained the majority) apparently vowed to oppose any Trump policy derived from his Alt-Right perspective. Low-rank US officials equally appeared to oppose his views and leaked confidential information to hurt Trump and his senior advisors, including Michael Flynn and Jeff Sessions. The American people (and many outside the US) staged numerous protests to show their opposition to Trump's radical viewpoints/policies. Trump got 'the lowest approval rating of any incoming president in modern history'. In short, Washington, DC, itself has turned into a war zone for Trump.

**Trump's populist agenda has created strong domestic opposition.**

To be fair, as Stephen M. Walt claims in his article in *Foreign Affairs*, Trump has some 'valid and important insights into America's current problems': such as the rise of immigration, the loss of jobs, corruption in the political system, globalisation's failure to deliver as was expected, NATO states' failure to pay their fair share, China taking advantage of the US, to name but a few. However, his populist approach to deal with these problems was not the right one. As will be seen below, more than two years into his presidency, he has done a lot of damage to US interests and standing in the world; he has hardly made 'America Great Again' on the global stage.

***RD: President Trump has been asking for compensation from European countries as the US paid a tremendous amount of money to sustain NATO against the then Soviets and now Russia, and also asking for new tax regulations with Canada, Japan, and Europe. Do you think that he is seeking to reduce the cost of global security that the US has been paying in order to re-establishing the US national interests?***

After WWII, America played an important part in establishing and policing global security by creating organisations, such as the UN and NATO, as well as signing numerous security pacts with countries (like Japan and South Korea) to support them should they engage in conflict with common adversaries (for example, North Korea). Using 'anti-Washington populist sentiment', Trump on numerous occasions made it clear, however, that the US cannot be 'the piggy bank that everybody is robbing' and therefore can no longer afford to police the world for free, as his country already owes nearly \$20 trillion in national debt. For him, the 28 countries of NATO have not been paying their fair share of defence (that is, what they originally agreed to pay), and NATO was 'obsolete' because it did not focus on terrorism. In a speech in Europe, Trump removed a reference to Article 5 at the last minute without the knowledge of his team. As far as security alliances in Asia and elsewhere are concerned, Trump said they should pay

**Trump has hardly made 'America Great Again' on the global stage.**

the US for the costs his country incurred for protecting them. If not, the US 'must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves,' even if they had to develop nuclear weapons.

Equally, Trump is not happy with America's contribution to the UN. His populist advisors, as well as NSA John Bolton, deeply dislike the

organisation. Following its 2017 cuts, it is likely that the Trump Administration makes further cuts to its UN budget.

So, yes, Trump is worried about the costs of keeping international security, as it is not in US national security. Unlike his predecessors, Trump does not



seem to think that global security and prosperity is linked to US security and prosperity.

I'd think that Trump, in the short run, will continue to pressurise allies to increase their defence spending, and, in the long run, renegotiate military and other deals/agreements to get the wealthiest allies in which US has military bases – such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia – to reimburse the costs the US incurs from protecting them in one way or another. The pressure has already paid to some extent, especially with regards to countries that lack a democratic system; Saudi Arabia, for example, in 2018 made deals with the US worth more than \$400 billion. Despite the rhetoric/predictions, many foreign policy experts do not believe that Trump would dismantle NATO or undermine commitments to come to the defence of NATO states and Asian allies (such as Japan and South Korea). He referred to those charges 'just another lie'. Sometimes his rhetoric could be part of his 'FUD Doctrine', that is, 'create fear, uncertainty and doubt' in order to make a better deal. As will be explained in response to question 10, he certainly has created all these emotions in the European capitals.

***RD: If so, then, does it mean that the US has been losing its superpower position in the world? And actually, accepting a multi-polar world system in terms of economy and politics?***

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineties, the US remained the only undisputed superpower. But ever since America has been losing its dominant role in world affairs, and the power of other countries have grown to an extent they influence international affairs independently of US desires. Their rise has certainly questioned the US's status of being the 'indispensable' nation that Madeleine Albright referred to at the end of last century.

It is true that the US is still the leading power when it comes to international organisations – such as the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank – but powerful countries, China and Russia in particular, seem to be distancing themselves from those bodies and instead have created their own multilateral institutions that provide both security and loans.

**Many foreign policy experts do not believe that Trump would dismantle NATO or undermine commitments to come to the defence of NATO states and Asian allies.**

In the Middle East, the US has failed to isolate and eventually remove the Iran regime, because other countries, such as Russia and China, do not allow it. Iran's influence in the region since the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has dramatically increased.

The Bush, Obama and now Trump Administrations have failed to pressurize Pakistan to abandon terrorism as a strategy to achieve its geopolitical goals in the region, especially in Afghanistan, due partly to the support Pakistan receives from China. Despite US genuine efforts in Afghanistan, it has not succeeded in defeating the Taliban and other terrorist groups. As I analyse in my book, Pakistan's interference in Afghan affairs was the single biggest cause (the mother of all the problems) that the US and the allies could not stabilise Afghanistan. But all the above three US administrations have been unable to persuade or compel Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

Likewise, Turkey, when it comes to regional affairs, acts independently of US wishes, as we have seen in the case of Kurdish groups that have been fighting ISIL. These groups are supported by the US, but Turkey sees them as terrorists and made it clear that the country was extremely unhappy with US support for them. US support for those groups has been one major factor that caused Turkey to get closer to Russia.

In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the US could not contain China's economic growth and political influence. China continues to step up militarization in the South China Sea.

India equally is more influential in the India Ocean and Southeast Asia. It (like China and Russia) keeps economic relations with Iran despite Trump's sanctions on the country.

**The Bush, Obama and  
now Trump  
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failed to pressurize  
Pakistan to abandon  
terrorism as a strategy  
to achieve its  
geopolitical goals  
in the region.**

And then there is Russia! It annexes territories, apparently interferes in (US) elections, builds more weapons and sells them to US foes (for example, Iran), holds peace talks on her soil on the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, and works against the interests of the US in the Greater Middle East.

All these countries mentioned, especially Russia and China, do not view the US as the only power, and they have established orders governed by their own rules. Democracies are being reduced and instead autocracies (supported by countries like China and

Russia, and even the US itself) are on the rise, as we witnessed the lasting results of the Arab Spring.

It is true that the US has got the world's 'only global military capability', but that ability cannot be used to influence foreign affairs, especially the results of those 'Forever Wars'. Or else we would have seen a successful end to the Afghanistan War and the war in Syria – the Assad regime would have long gone.

The US in conjunction with the allies could have had more sway in international affairs. But Trump doubts American internationalism. He is suspicious of security and economic agreements/organisations, which jointly ensure that a rules-based international liberal order is preserved. Military might without respect to these international institutions, and without respect for the interests of others, would not turn the US into a liberal leader of the alliances, but a 'reckless' and a 'rogue superpower'. New surveys by Pew Research Centre reveal that Europeans are now more likely to 'trust' Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping than Trump. According to Susan B Glasser from the *New Yorker*, the European Union in many ways acts as if it is now the 'stewards of a vision of America leadership in the world' that the Trump-led US seems to have given up.

The US National Intelligence Council's Global Trends' prediction in 2008 was that by 2025 'the international system will be a global multipower one'. Mathew Burrows and Roger George argue that it was time we changed our mind-sets with the events. However, many would disagree with the above statement because the US still possesses tremendous soft power that none of the other powers mentioned above do. It will be decades before China or others really challenge US soft power. They do admit though that Trump's nationalism would speed up the process of reducing US soft power.

**RD: How do you associate this issue with the discourse of "Make America Great Again"?**

Borrowing the slogan of his idol, Ronald Reagan, the 70-year-old Trump, the oldest president elected in US history, promised to 'Make America Great Again': that is, more *secure*, *wealthier* and more *influential* on the global stage. How he intends to do this?

First, America should adopt an intense realist approach and has to stop being the policeman of the world and instead focus on its needs at home.

**Trump is suspicious of security and economic agreements/organisations, which jointly ensure that a rules-based international liberal order is preserved.**

Second, the US has made some bad deals over the years. Trump would withdraw from them and cut new deals that will allow millions of jobs to *come back* to America; Trump held many of these deals responsible (explained below) for stealing jobs from America and creating them elsewhere, especially in China. Third, he would stop immigrants coming to the US. He saw them responsible for both terrorism and organised crimes. Consequently, he signed the immigration executive that banned the citizens of seven (then six after dropping Iraq) predominantly Muslim countries and planned to build a 'wall' on the US southern border with Mexico. Fourth, he wants to increase military spending to rebuild the military and enhance intelligence and cyber capabilities. In addition, the US left in early-2019 the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in 1987 with the Soviet Union; Trump plans to enhance US nuclear capabilities.

As seen, his populist/mercantilist agenda is solely focused within America. The agenda has failed to translate the 'America Great' doctrine into a coherent foreign policy doctrine that can make American great on the global stage. Conversely, America is argued to be in retreat, as other powers are filling the gaps. His radical ideals are therefore said to be based on false assumptions, and they might make America *less* safe, *less* wealthy and *less* influential. By invoking American interests 'so nakedly', he might force many European, Asian and the Middle Eastern allies to make their own deals with a resurgent Russia and a rising China. As David Ignatius puts it, '[u]ndoing globalization isn't possible. But undermining America's leadership in that system would be all too easy.' This leads us to the next question.

***RD: As some argue, do you think that he did start an economic war in the world and that will change liberal world order?***

**His radical ideals might make America less safe, less wealthy and less influential.**

As far as Trump's intense realist approach is concerned, the US was meant to win every single deal because it was the strongest party, but it was deceived by both friends and foes in every single one of them. For example, in the early 1990s when America was financially weak due to the burden of winning the Cold War, yet

Japan's economy was booming, because during the Cold War period Japan had employed a more mercantilist trade policy while simultaneously benefiting from US security protection. For people like Trump, the Cold War ended and Japan had won because it had eaten US 'economic lunch'. That 'searing geopolitical event...shaped Trump's thinking'. Indeed, as Journalist Thomas Wright stated, Trump has long been against US alliances and trade agreements.



The President would, therefore, liberate America from ‘the infection’ of foreign regulations and influences, including many ‘broken and embarrassing’ multinational trade agreements, which stole millions of US jobs and cost billions of US dollars in trade deficit. Instead, as I explained above, Trump promised to make bilateral agreements with states from a position of strength that focused on American interests first.

One of the agreements he opposed was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which for Trump was ‘the single worse trade deal’ ever signed in America. Another was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement that the US, Japan and ten other countries had signed, because it indirectly made possible for China to benefit. Trump sees China as ‘a national security and economic threat’ because it steals from the US money, technology and jobs, thus ruining the US’s future. He made it clear from the start that he would rewrite trade agreements, and if China did not accept them and refused to revalue its currency/stop intellectual property theft, he would label China a currency manipulator, alter the longstanding One China policy and impose punitive economic measures, such as heavy tariffs on Chinese goods coming into the US. China, incidentally, is ‘the third-largest U.S. trading partner and largest creditor’.

To distinguish himself from previous politicians, he did fulfil his ‘combative’, ‘protectionist’ and anti-free trade pledge by applying \$250 billion worth of trade tariffs on Chinese goods, and China retaliated by applying \$110 billion of trade tariffs onto US goods. Furthermore, he took America out of numerous trade deals, including NAFTA and TPP. For many, these foreign policy moves amounted to trade wars and they warned of the consequences: ‘a global economic downturn’. His administration, however, has been involved in renegotiating some of these deals with the aim to make them serve American interests. Evidently, Trump’s new NAFTA deal is ‘pretty much the same as the old one’.

Trump’s policy preferences were feared to turn the rules-based liberal order constructed/led by the United States since the end of WWII into ‘a possibility a Hobbesian one where might makes right’, where we could see a similar situation (rising nationalism, militarism, intense realist competition/power politics/ arms races) to that of the first half of the twentieth century in which two world wars happened. Indeed, as was the case then, we now witness that nationalist views are on the rise in Britain (Brexit), France (the French political party led by Maria

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Le Pin), Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Poland and Hungary, which is extremely worrying because they can constitute a destabilising force to the unity of the European Union. Trump's election has certainly energised these parties/movements in Europe and beyond. Moreover, there are arms races between many countries, Russia and the US in particular. These weapons will not be turned into flowers and gifted to one another. The geopolitical/military competitions and power politics between nations – especially between China/Russia on the one hand and the US and allies on the other, Pakistan and India, Saudi Arabia and Iran, to name but a few – could at any time trigger these weapons and launch the world into WWII.

Critics, however, claim that the rules-based liberal order was a 'myth'. It was a cover for the US' hegemonic ambitions and for 'imperialism'. Where were the rules, as some experts ask in Robert Kagan's article, when the US used 'coercion' 'violence', 'instability' and 'hypocrisy' to achieve its imperialistic goals? It is a liberal order that the US often broke, e.g. the Trump Administration supports democracy and human rights in Venezuela but props up dictators in the Middle East, or the Bush Administration invaded Iraq without a UN authorisation. If the liberal order really existed, they claim, the US (and, to some extent, the European allies) have played a role in undoing it.

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The defenders, on the other hand, claim that the US only has broken rules in exceptional circumstances to prevent the rise of radicalism: communism yesterday and radical Islam today. Kagan claims that we should not forget that the rules-based liberal order has produced a 'revolutionary transformation of human existence' after five thousand years. He gives as an example the economic and human rights enjoyed by billions of human

beings; or how racialism and tribalism have given way to cosmopolitanism and globalism.

Trump's intense mercantilist/populist approach can indeed be a threat to the economic liberal order, however flawed it has been. Jacksonians, mercantilists and conservatives always wanted a reduced role for the US in international institutions. They believe that preserving the order was costly. They do not seem to think that the US 'would prosper if a united, free world prospered.' For them, US involvement in the past 70 years has not benefited the US. Trump seems to be following their vision and it will affect, if not gradually 'change', the rules-based economic order.

***RD: How has the US foreign policy of Afghanistan and Syria changed since Mr. Trump got into power?***

In relation to the Afghanistan War, Citizen Trump belonged to, what I call in my book, 'the pessimistic camp' or the 'populist camp'. Between 2012 and 2014, in a series of widely quoted tweets and comments, Trump claimed that the US spent billions of dollars, lost thousands of lives, and thousands of US servicemen and women came home with serious problems, and yet the 'ungrateful' Afghans, who hated America, complained. US forces trained Afghan security forces, and yet they killed their trainers. Americans would construct a school today, and the insurgent groups would explode it tomorrow. The US would start all over again. The Afghanistan War was a 'waste' of American money and lives and consequently was not in US national interests. Not ending the foreign policy 'disaster' known as the Afghanistan War meant that Obama was lost in Afghanistan; the US needed strong leaders (like Trump himself) who knew what they were doing.

As early as October 2015, Candidate Trump in an interview with CNN characterised US intervention in Afghanistan as a 'terrible mistake', but a short while later, he claimed that it was Iraq that he referred to as a mistake. Afghanistan was not a mistake because more than 20 terrorist groups operated in the country and it was next to nuclear Pakistan. Furthermore, the National Unity Government would collapse in 'two seconds' after US forces left and hence the US had to stay engaged, even though he hated 'so much' remaining involved.

Trump's contrasting views and his comparison of the situation in US inner cities to the status quo in Afghanistan demonstrated that Trump, like Obama, was profoundly ambivalent about Afghanistan: he understood the strategic importance of the country and concurrently saw it as a burden to the US because things in Afghanistan were extremely chaotic and perhaps unresolvable.

**The Afghanistan War was a 'waste' of American money and lives and consequently was not in US national interests.**

In relation to Pakistan, a country linked closely to the Afghanistan War, President Trump in his first 2018 tweet stated that 'the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!'

In relation to Syria, candidate Trump wanted to ascertain who US allies were. The US supported groups he did not know who they were. He feared

that the US might end up having worse people in power in Syria than Assad. US support for such people would make a mess in Syria, too.

These were some of his beliefs regarding the US's role in the Greater Middle East, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular. On 21 August 2017 Trump announced his administration's South Asia strategy that covered the Afghanistan strategy. President Trump seemed to have heeded the advice of the pro-engagement area experts, which I explain in detail in my book. His policy had subtle differences compared to that of Obama's Afghan policy. Trump approved the deployment of more US troops; did away with both Obama's micromanagement (as the Pentagon from then, *not* the White House, was to decide how many troops to be deployed and what authority to be given to them) and his setting of public deadlines for troops withdrawals (as only conditions on the ground were decisive factors); unlike Obama and Bush, publicly warned Pakistan to shut the sanctuaries and abandon its support for the Taliban and the Haqqani network; and called on India – a country Trump saw as a close friend in the region – to assist the US in bringing stability in Afghanistan by expanding its ties with the NUG, especially its economic assistance.

The objective of the military surge was to compel the Taliban (and indirectly Pakistan) to make a negotiated settlement with the NUG. Trump's Afghan policy seems to have paid off, as Trump's intensified pressure on Pakistan led to peace talks in Qatar between US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban representatives. Many hope that these talks would bring an end to Afghanistan's 40-year long conflict. But as I cover it in my book, there are a number of obstacles before an eternal peace is secured.

**The objective of the military surge was to compel the Taliban (and indirectly Pakistan) to make a negotiated settlement with the NUG.**

As for Syria, however, he continued with Obama's policy of 2015 by mainly supporting the Kurdish groups with the goal to 'wipe out' ISIL. As explained below, the policy has met considerable success.

Incidentally, as the grown-ups are gone, however, his instincts and his populist/pessimistic viewpoints (explained above) are beginning to impact even his Afghan and Syrian strategies. His instincts tell him

that '[w]hen you're digging yourself deeper and deeper into a hole, stop digging.' His populist base keeps questioning him about why he is still engaged in long and endless wars. Trump seems to be getting impatient about the lack of tangible results in Afghanistan, so he wants to stop 'digging'. A few months ago he announced to withdraw half of US troops from Afghanistan; the announcement was tweeted at a time the peace talks



were being conducted in Qatar! There is a fear that Trump, in order to feed his populist base, might use the peace talks as an excuse and end US engagement prematurely in Afghanistan, especially when domestic pressure is mounting and the 2020 US presidential election is fast approaching.

The same is the case in relation to Syria as he believes ISIL is defeated and what is the point to leave the 2000 or so US troops in there. The number is too small to curtail the influence of Russia or Iran in the region.

However, his experienced advisors believe both unilateral decisions (regarding Afghanistan and Syria) would prove disastrous and the decisions, therefore, have met stern opposition, especially from Congress, because pulling out US troops from those two countries, without establishing stability in the region, would have severe consequences, which I spell out in response to question 9. Mattis resigned over the decisions and Senior Republican Senator Lindsay Graham was incensed. Trump's decision to withdraw from Syria was seen as a betrayal of Washington's Kurdish allies, making the Kurd leaders believe that the US saw them more as 'mistress than bride'. Equally, the decision relating to Syria would leave US European allies high and dry. Moscow and Tehran were said to be the beneficiaries and their influence would dramatically increase. Many, including a number of Republicans, claimed that Trump was repeating Obama's mistake of hastily withdrawing from Iraq? They added that US presence would ensure that US allies are protected (not just against Russia and Iran, but also against Turkey that view Kurdish troops as terrorists) and one-third of Syria, which Assad and his allies do not control, is not plunged into chaos. Due to domestic pressure (and persuasion), Trump decided to leave around two hundred troops in Syria after the April withdrawal. Troops pull out from Afghanistan has not yet been executed.

Trump lacks a coherent Greater Middle Eastern strategy. Joining hands with Israel and Saudi Arabia to contain Iran is not good enough to deal with the factors that cause the numerous conflicts and wars in the region.

**Trump lacks a coherent Greater Middle Eastern strategy.**

***RD: How do you place the North Korea issue into the US-China relations?***

Trump's views/policy regarding China has already been discussed. As for your particular question, Candidate Trump made it clear that China has control over North Korea and the US has control over China, so he would get China to make North Korean leader Kim Jong Un 'disappear in one form or another very quickly'. While he did not elaborate on how China was capable of wiping out North Korea, he, however, pressurised China to use its influence to compel Kim Jong Un to talk to the US. Bilateral negotiations

between the North Korean leader and Trump took place twice and it seems China played a positive part in facilitating them.

The idea of the two leaders sitting together and talking was unimaginable in the first few months of the administration and was in itself an accomplishment and good for world peace. While Trump in the Singapore Summit provided security guarantees and a prosperous future for North Korea, and North Korean leader stated that his country would stay committed to complete denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, the summit (and the one in Vietnam early this year), produced nothing of substance. The different perspectives the US and China had regarding North Korea have remained unchanged.

China does not see a nuclear-armed North Korea as a threat to its stability, but the US and its regional allies do. China, North Korea's largest trading partner and chief political supporter, wants a peaceful end to US-North Korean relations, as it fears that a war between the US and North Korea could destabilise the region, as it can result in millions of refugees and negative economic impacts. War between the two countries seemed plausible at the beginning of the Trump Administration when the two leaders personally attacked each other and Trump warned to reduce North Korea to rubble by pressing his 'much bigger & more powerful' nuclear button.

China believes that US sanctions on North Korea, which have also caught Chinese companies, have been counterproductive and did not compel North Korea to give up its nuclear and ballistic-missiles programmes. Furthermore, China was not happy with warnings of regime change from Washington, DC, and with the joint military exercises by US and South Korean forces in the region.

**China does not see a nuclear-armed North Korea as a threat to its stability, but the US and its regional allies do.**

China wants its 'freeze-for-freeze' proposal to be implemented whereby the US and South Korea are required to put a stop to their joint military exercises and North Korea is meant to halt its missile and nuclear programmes. Trump has put a halt to those exercises, but North Korea has not denuclearised. US military and intelligence officials, therefore, distrust North Korea and believe that the country plays Trump; North Korea is accused of having

broken the terms of earlier agreements. China, on the other hand, believes that North Korea is still a trustworthy partner, adding that the US was equally to blame for the breach of the past agreements. Until China and the US are not on the same page regarding North Korea, not much would be changed.

Incidentally, while the US blames China for not doing enough to compel North Korea to denuclearise, China accuses the US of using North Korea's drive for nuclear weapons as a pretext to maximise its presence in the region. China, therefore, opposes America's deployment of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea. While previous presidents saw the presence of 30,000 US troops in the region as a strategic necessity, Trump seems to be displeased with it due to, as explained above, costs. The possibility of withdrawing them has made both Japan and South Korea nervous. Japan did not develop nuclear weapons because it looked (and trusted) to the US for security. That trust appears to be eroding.

***RD: There is a huge debate on similarities and differences in Iraq and Venezuelan cases. While former Bush administrations tried to solve Iraqi and Middle Eastern issues with direct military intervention, President Trump employs diplomatic and humanitarian methods to get a result in Venezuela. It is right that the Iraqi case was based on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and Venezuelan case bases on humanitarian issues and democracy. However, does it still imply a methodological distinction between previous presidents and Mr. Trump?***

As I cover them in my book, four major factors influenced the invasion of Iraq.

Firstly, the 9/11 terrorist acts killed nearly 3,000 Americans and George W. Bush and his advisors believed that Saddam somehow had aided al-Qaeda in engineering the terrorist attacks. They feared that Saddam had WMD and could give them to terrorists. Consequently, the next attack would be catastrophic for the US. Secondly, there was a lot of domestic support for the invasion of Iraq due to the 9/11 terrorist acts. Thirdly, there were plenty of pro-invasion advocates in the administration, especially the neoconservatives, and they influenced Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld to take action. Finally, they hold false assumptions about the missions/US capabilities: having previously defeated Saddam's forces in Kuwait in 1991 and the Taliban in late-2001, they believed that Iraq would quickly be liberated and the administration would move to the next country on the 'Axis of Evil List': Iran. We know what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the Bush Administration could not make it to Iran.

**China opposes America's deployment of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea.**

***RD: Are these factors present today?***

As far as Trump's belief system is concerned, candidate Trump denounced costly US engagements such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian

programmes and 'the nation-building business' and promised to reduce America's contribution to them considerably and instead spend the money on building infrastructure in America, which the previous administrations had allowed to fall into 'disrepair' and 'decay'. Indeed, as Trump took office, the US owed nearly \$20 trillion in national debt. Also, candidate Trump did not see the US responsible for promoting democracy and defending the oppressed. He apparently saw the world as 'threatening' and 'inhospitable' to those values. Unlike Bush, candidate Trump did not believe the US had 'a right to lecture' the world: interfere in foreign affairs of other nations. When American officials did give that right to themselves in the past, they acted 'arrogantly'.

Candidate Trump firmly believed that for the past 15 years if US presidents did not do 'anything' in the Middle East and instead went to 'the beach', the US would have saved '\$6 trillion' and thousands of US lives, and the Middle East would have been stable. It was a 'beauty' (the biggest mistake) to remove Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Hosni Mubarak from power because their removals destabilised the Middle East. The strong men in the Middle East would have ensured that ISIL was never constituted and that the region never fell into the current chaotic situation.

However, those isolationist/nationalistic outlooks, to my surprise, do not seem to be the case in relation to the Trump Administration's policy on Venezuela; a country that is on Trump's list of 'Axis of Evil'. The other two were Iran and North Korea. Trump remarked that the US 'to help [the

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Venezuelans] regain their freedom, recover their democracy and...we are prepared to take further action if the Venezuelan government continues on its goal of imposing authoritarian rule.' The administration recognised Juan Guaido as the country's interim president and does not accept the legitimacy of the Venezuelan regime of Nicolas Maduro. Trump asked the Latin American leaders (like Bush asked European heads of states before the Iraq invasion) to deal with 'this very real crisis'. Trump apparently pressed them to consider a military action because

the Maduro regime has become a national security threat to the US and the world. It seems that Maduro's internal policies are another WMD threat that is getting exaggerated. As it was the case before the Iraq invasion with France, Germany, Russia, China and the UK, the Latin American countries are split on how to respond and reportedly most oppose using a military option to remove Maduro, who enjoys the wholehearted support of China, Russia, Turkey and Iran.



As far as public opinion within the US is concerned, there is little domestic support for a military intervention in Venezuela as it was for the Iraq invasion. As stated above, ordinary Americans are fed up with the 'Forever Wars'; they certainly want to avoid another one. However, many argue that Trump is defeated at home due to a hostile Congress; the embarrassment of the government shutdown; constant talks of impeachment; the presence of several (possibly very damaging) investigations into possible links between the Trump campaign team and Russia by numerous bodies, including the Special Counsel Investigation led by Robert Mueller (though his report found no link); sex scandals; and being engaged in an unwise battle with the mainstream media press. So Trump might want to accomplish achievements overseas (or at least ease off domestic pressure) and thus intervene in Venezuela might be the answer.

The so-called adults have departed from the administration and now we see some regime-change advocates, including NSA John Bolton and (neoconservative) Special Envoy for Venezuela Elliott Abrams. Furthermore, Secretary of State Pompeo is subservient to Trump's nationalism and follow his boss's orders dutifully. Patrick Shanahan, who, unlike Mattis, has no military or decision-making experience, might equally not oppose Trump's decision to go for Maduro. The absence of the adults in the room and the presence of a 'team of morons' might prove to be a decisive factor that could lead the Trump Administration to invade Venezuela. The likelihood would increase if Maduro uses violence to suppress his opponents or harm/arrest US diplomats in the country; a country, like Iraq, has plenty of oil!

**As far as public opinion within the US is concerned, there is little domestic support for a military intervention in Venezuela as it was for the Iraq invasion.**

***RD: Answers of previous questions might have already replied to this one, but still it should be asked. Does Mr. Trump's statement that ISIS has been totally eliminated suggest the era of the global war on terror has come close to end?***

Statements like ISIL is 'wiped out', 'obliterated', or 'defeated', do not represent the reality on the ground. I do not think ISIL is 'totally eliminated' for several reasons.

First, as the Bush Administration in 2003 was preparing for the Iraq invasion, it believed that the Afghanistan War was successfully ended because the Taliban and al-Qaeda were 'history'. Equally, a few months after the Iraq invasion, the administration implied that the mission was

accomplished. More than 17 years later, more than 20 terrorist groups, *including* ISIL and al-Qaeda, operate in Afghanistan; and we have also witnessed what happened in Iraq (Zarqawi-led al-Qaeda and later ISIL) during these years.

Second, yes, ISIL has lost some 95 per cent of its territory in Syria and Iraq (though not in Afghanistan) it controlled in 2014. But there are contrasting reports about the number of ISIL fighters who are still around. Some claim them to be 2500; others, such as a UN report of August 2018, believe that there are some '31,100' ISIL fighters active. How can one justify the claim that ISIL is wiped out when there are thousands of them about?

Third, regardless of the number, ISIL could quickly (as al-Qaeda and the Taliban did) reconstitute, especially when the group's more capable foe (the US) intends to leave the theatre of war.

Fourth, S.V. Date is right to claim that 'ISIS will remain a regional and global threat even after their military defeat.' It is because, as Seth Jones adds, ISIL's terrorist activity is political, and it would take decades to defeat the group's terrorist activity. Trump saw it shortly after he tweeted that he was withdrawing US troops from Syria: ISIL-engineered suicide attack took the lives of four Americans in Syria. The group is likely to increase those terrorist attacks abroad, especially in Europe, as it has lost its territory in Syria and Iraq. Trump's own intelligence and military officials do not agree

with the President and they are unhappy about the pull-out, especially when US forces are not directly engaged in fighting as they only arm and advise. Reportedly, in the past four years, only four Americans died, but 968 Kurdish fighters lost their lives. (Similarly, since 2014 in the war against terrorism/Taliban, 45,000 Afghan security forces have been killed compared to less than 72 international forces.)

**ISIL is more a dangerous group than al-Qaeda, as it tries to fuel sectarian violence by blasting Shia mosques and gatherings in both Iraq and Afghanistan.**

ISIL is more a dangerous group than al-Qaeda, as it tries to fuel sectarian violence by blasting Shia mosques and gatherings in both

Iraq and Afghanistan. This has caused a great deal of worries/anxiety/fear among the ordinary Afghans and Iraqis.

Again, we see that Trump allows populist ideas to drive his Middle Eastern policy even at risk of showing himself weak on terrorism; an accusation he levelled against Obama. For the US, its Syria policy 'come with toxic side effects': worsening ties with Turkey as US reliance on the Kurdish groups that Turkey (and Syria's Arab majority) view as a threat to its own national

security. Therefore, when Erdogan promised to eliminate any remaining ISIL fighters in the region, and there was no need for US troops to be present, Trump apparently told him: 'Syria is yours.' (It is feared that Trump might get fed up with the Afghanistan War and tell Pakistan: 'Afghanistan is yours.')

But gifting counties to regional powers to facilitate US exit from the Greater Middle East before dealing with the root causes of the region's wars/conflicts, would have severe consequences: there would be a momentous rise in global terrorism, drug production, illegal immigration, and most frightened, nuclear proliferation – escalation in nuclear rivalry in the region was capable of triggering war (perhaps WWIII) in which Pakistan and India might not hesitate to launch nuclear weapons against each other; at the very least, significant damage to the US, the UN and NATO future power and standing. The US would have no choice but to enter Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq once again, this time, though, a less hospitable environment. The US has already seen during WWI and WWII that staying out of world affairs can be extremely costly. The Global War on Terror would only end when the root causes of terrorism (such as endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment and regional interference) in the region are identified and dealt with.

**When Erdogan promised to eliminate any remaining ISIL fighters in the region, and there was no need for US troops to be present, Trump apparently told him: 'Syria is yours.'**

***RD: It seems that there has been a crack between EU and US foreign policy commonality. These actors have different approaches to Iran's nuclear deal, tax and immigration issues, and NATO's economic burden. How can it be interpreted in terms of the western alliance?***

The European Union and the US now have different approaches to foreign, and even domestic, policies. These differences have indeed affected the transatlantic relationship.

As explained above, Trump is not happy with US spending on NATO. The US pays about 67 per cent (not 90 per cent, which Trump claims) of NATO, about \$31 billion, but NATO states, Germany in particular, pay 'too little'. He further implied that he would not accept the European states 'using' the US against Russian – they should lead. Germany and other surrounding countries should come to Ukraine's defence. He might not kill US forces to defend the Baltic States should Russia invade them, he once said.

Trump described the European Union as a 'foe' when it came to trade. Trump is displeased with '\$151 billion trade surplus' the European Union runs, Germany and Ireland being the chief offenders. Therefore, he imposed steel and aluminium tariffs on European exports in 2018, and there is still the possibility he imposes a 25 per cent tariff on car imports from Europe.

As for immigration, Trump believed that the Europeans extended an invitation to ISIL by accepting Syrian refugees. He saw no solidarity in Europe to stop refugees, who posed 'a national security threat' to the continent. He was quick to claim credits for predicting terrorist attacks by refugees in Europe. Candidate Trump vowed to avoid what 'stupid' European politicians could not: 'a Trojan Horse' scenario. He told Americans that refugees were like an ill 'snake', which would bite the host, once recovered. The prime example was the terrorist in Orlando whose parents came from Afghanistan. Europe sees refugees as a problem, but does not view them as a national security threat or a snake.

Trump sees Iran as 'the single gravest threat, national security threat' and the 'world's largest state sponsor of terrorism.' For him, the Iran deal was one of the worst deals the US ever made, which strengthened US foes in the region and weakened US friends, Israel in particular. To the dismay of Brussels, he unilaterally withdrew from the deal and imposed sanctions on Iran. To compensate for Obama's 'lack of support for Israel', he moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to the contested city of Jerusalem, a move that was against US (and the European Union) long-term policy that claimed the future of Jerusalem to be decided through negotiations between Israel and

Palestinians. To make matters worse, he threatened his European allies with secondary sanctions if they carried on with the Iran deal; a move seen in Europe as America's bullying.

**Trump believed that the Europeans extended an invitation to ISIL by accepting Syrian refugees.**

The Trump Administration seems serious about taking on Iran. For Trump, 'Iran's chief exports are bloodshed and chaos... We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities... It's also time for the world to take on another rogue regime,' whose

leaders keep calling 'Death to America' and promise the destruction of Israel. Europe is as opposed to military action against Iran as it was against the Iraq invasion in 2003.

European leaders have been divided on how to approach Trump. According to Tomas Valasek, the director of Carnegie Europe, they have tried various strategies with Trump, from the 'buddy-buddy approach' of President Emmanuel Macron of France and Ms. May, to 'the cooler attitude' of



Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany. But they discovered that none of the approaches worked; Trump treated each one of them like ‘a competitor’.

Many Europeans now believe that Trump uses the strategy of ‘divide and rule’. Trump supports illiberal leaders, such as Andrzej Duda of Poland and Viktor Orban of Hungary, but chides other liberal ones. He does so in order to divide Europe and make deals with individual countries (to secure better outcomes for the US) as opposed to a united Europe.

After Trump withdrew from the 2015 Climate Change deal and the Iran agreement and after his support for Brexit and nationalistic groups in Europe (highlighted above), European leaders tend to stay away from him. Support for nationalistic groups has heightened social tensions and nationalism in Europe, which can constitute a serious threat to the continent’s long-term future; liberal European leaders take any threat to the unity of the continent very seriously. Furthermore, much of the European Union’s prosperity relies on liberal trade for both goods and services and cancellations of trade deals (or the liberal order) could affect the European Union’s economy. Valasek is not incorrect to say that ‘Trump is becoming politically toxic in Western Europe...No one wants to be seen smiling with him after being berated on Twitter. Even more, Mr Trump’s insults and his unpopularity among European voters make him harder for European leaders to do what he wants them to do, like increase military spending, even when they think they should do it.’ Actually, associating with Trump for a European leader has become like ‘it’s the kiss of death.’

**Many Europeans now believe that Trump uses the strategy of ‘divide and rule’.**

More and more Europeans argue that Europe must invest in its own security and defence and should no longer rely on US leadership. Furthermore, EC should build *coherence*. Things that are important to Europe – such as liberal values, climate change and open market economy – should be eagerly pursued. Trump should face a united Europe with a strong approach. But issues like terrorism, Brexit and the migrant problem have forced the bloc to focus more at home. It has not taken any tangible step to minimize its dependence on the US. Europeans think that relations went sour with the US in the past (like the disagreement over the Iraq invasion in 2003), but things soon improved. Hopefully, as they assume, this will be the case once Trump’s presidency is over, especially when the majority of Americans have positive views of Europe and most in Congress value the transatlantic relationship.

However, for the relationship to sustain, it is important that the European Union pays close attention to the US’s genuine concerns. We have now seen some signs of this. For example, when Trump stated that troops should also

come from NATO allies, NATO responded in November 2017 by announcing that it would send some 3,000 more troops to Afghanistan. NATO's contribution was an attempt to address the US's concern that the former was not serious about its contribution to the Afghanistan War.

***RD: The turning points of the US administration have sharpened after Trump has been elected the new president. While the Trump administration has begun to focus more on nationalism, the US-Russia relationship has witnessed another conflict of interest in the Middle East. What is your opinion about the future of Trump-Putin conflict in the Middle East? Do you think that Trump will maintain to pay less attention to the issues of the Middle East and so, Russia will soon replace the US as hegemonic power of the region?***

Russia has certainly been trying to increase its influence in the Greater Middle East. It has earned the trust of many countries. There are a number of factors that have helped Russia rise as a new power in the region.

First, Obama was not interested in the Middle East and Trump has not developed a coherent strategy for the region so Russia stepped into the vacuum left by the US. Second, Putin's 'strongman image' is liked by many authoritarian heads of state but they are unsure of Trump (previously Obama) and his commitment. Putin's intervention in Syria in 2015, which saved the Assad regime, won the trust and admiration of the rulers in the Middle East. They assume that once Russia promised, it would fulfil no matter what.

Third, Syria enabled the Putin-led Russia to find for herself a great platform to influence the numerous Middle Eastern conflicts – those between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran and Syria and Turkey – as all these countries have a stake in the outcome of the war in Syria. As a result, as Liz Sly reports in the *Washington Post*, regional leaders have been more on the phone with Putin than they have been with

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Trump; they have visited Moscow more than they have visited Washington, DC. Unlike what Obama feared, Putin has not embroiled Russia in those lasting conflicts and has been skilful in avoiding choosing sides. He has kept Russia's relations good with both Iran and Saudi Arabia; Turkey and Syria; Israel and Iran.

In 2017, Putin managed to persuade King Salman of Saudi Arabia to cut oil production, showing Putin's influence within the Kingdom. Russia has sold more than \$2 billion worth of arms, including advanced S-400 missile system to Turkey, invested in oil pipelines in Iraq, made many business

deals (in gas and oil) in the region, and opened military bases/intelligence-sharing centres, including in Iraq and Syria.

Fourth, Russia cares less about the human rights record of a country, and this makes it easier for the authoritarian leaders of the region to deal with her. Fifth, Russia exploits the conspiracy theories, especially those centre on terrorist groups working for the US to destabilise the region but Russia is there to defeat them. Evidently, more and more ordinary Middle Easterners buy into them due to US failures to defeat those terrorist groups. That is certainly the case in relation to Afghanistan. As I explain in my book, Russia (and Iran) exaggerated the ISIL threat (and US 'failure' to defeat terrorism and curb opium production), and used the Taliban as a 'Trojan Horse' for numerous purposes, including to hurt/pressurise the National Unity Government and its NATO/US backers, to have bargaining advantage over America (regarding broader international matters such as Crimea or the Iran agreement), to gain more influence in Afghan affairs, and to 'outdo one another in a regional competition'. Or else if Russia (and Iran) really sought to defeat ISIL, then the obvious choice would have been to support the Afghan National Security Forces. If Russia (and Iran) truly wanted the Taliban to reconcile with the NUG, then bolstering the Taliban's military capabilities was the worse obvious option. If Russia (and Iran) really wanted to defeat terrorism in the region, then spreading rumours that ISIL, in reality, worked for the US with the aim to destabilise Russia, China and Iran were really unhelpful in the 'New Great Game' in Afghanistan.

Sixth, Russia has established a close relationship with groups that fight governments supported by the US. Examples could include the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Libyan warlord Khalifa Hifter. This policy positions Moscow to play an important part in the future of the country. Most importantly, these opportunistic moves are designed to find leverage over the US in international affairs.

However, I do not think we will see a return of the Cold War where the US and the Soviet Union competed for loyalty. Russia's financial, political, military and diplomatic abilities are limited compared to the US and that is why Putin plays it carefully. For example, there are 45000 US troops in the region, but Russian forces in

Syria are nowhere closer; over the past five years Russia made \$24 billion worth of arms deals but the US made more than \$81 billion. The only difference is that Russia uses its power and influence much more effectively than the US does.

I also think that Trump will face significant opposition at home if he removes all US troops from Syria, and it would be a bad move for his re-

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election. Mattis last year rejected the idea that the US was walking away from the region. He added 'I make clear Russia's presence in the region cannot replace the long-standing, enduring and transparent U.S. commitment to the Middle East.' I would agree with Mattis that Russia would not 'replace' the US in the Middle East for the reasons explained above. However, I would also add that Russia is much more *relevant* today than it was a decade ago.



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