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

The Jungle Grows Back

How can We Redefine the Future World Order in the Tension of Power and Ideas?

by Marco Marsili

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"ADVANCING DIVERSITY"

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

By the end of September 2020, based on the numbers delivered by all governments, total global COVID-19 cases passed 30 million, more than a million deaths recorded due to COVID-19. The decreasing trend of new cases all over the world have reversed in many countries, some of which, like Israel, went to lock-down for the second time and most countries have tightened the measures. On the other hand, despite the rise in the global new cases, the decrease in the fatality rate is observed, likely thanks to the improved preparedness of medics and medical centres, increased awareness of patients and possible loss of virulence of the virus.

9 months after first COVID-19 case, private companies and governments are competing for the development of a COVID-19 vaccine. The vaccine development process turned out to be political leverage the governments use domestically and internationally, and present international tensions and alignments seem to be influential in the international cooperation for the development of a COVID-19 vaccine.

By the end of June, China has approved the military use of an experimental coronavirus vaccine – *Ad5-nCoV*, developed by the People's Liberation Army and a Chinese pharmaceutical company - CanSino Biologics. In July, the Chinese government approved the vaccine for limited use in military personnel. The PLA, with its active involvement in the management of the quarantine and conducting scientific work, have contributed to Chinese military power projection.

On August 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had become the first country to approve a COVID-19 vaccine – *Sputnik V*, which did not even start the third phase, yet thousands of people were vaccinated with. According to a LANCET paper, 1/2 phases results, the vaccine-induced a strong immune response in all 76 participants. The approval of Sputnik V, before completing the necessary stages has been unsettling for scientists and institutions, however. Some countries, mostly non-western, are already interested in buying Russian Sputnik V, which is entering in phase 3 trials, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the Philippines, India and Brazil. Russian minister of health Mikhail Murashko announced that phase 3 would start early in September. On the other hand, Russian pharmaceutical company *Petrovax* approved to start the third phase trial of Ad5-nCoV in Moscow while Canada's National Research Council ended its cooperation with CanSino.

China has the largest navy in the world

In its '2020 China Military Power Report' the US Department of Defense (DoD) has stated that China has the largest navy numerically in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants and with the increasing shipbuilding capacity and focus on the modernization of its capacities. The report, dedicated to a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese military power, thoroughly considers that the nascent advancement of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would undergird Chinese global power projection capacities.

The economic growth of China for the last decades has rendered the Xi Jinping government invest in the modernization and enhancement of its military forces to ensure Chinese national interests. Although there are concerns over the transparency of the provided information, the Chinese defense budget increase is evident: In May 2020, its yearly defense budget of $178.6 billion was announced, marking a 6.6 per cent increase from the 2019 budget of $172.3 billion. Given the military enhancement of China, the possibility of any Chinese military involvement overseas has become a contested subject. The point of view, endorsed in the report as well, suggests that China is likely to consider deploying military forces beyond its immediate region and engaging in offensive operations against the US. Indeed, it should not be overlooked that China, one of the largest arms exporters, has long been increasing its arms-sales to the governments unfriendly to the US across the world, although it does not publicly support any confrontation with the US. Others argue that Chinese global ambitions are primarily of economic in nature, thus, under the current circumstances, the increased military capacity of China is unlikely to bring her any serious military involvement outside of the Asia-Pacific region, unlike the US or the USSR, would conduct. The Chinese military exercises in the region are aimed at regional hegemony, not a global hegemony. In line with this assumption, countering Chinese military development seems to be a mistake that would drag the US and China into a Cold War-like rivalry.

Lukashenko inaugurates as President of Belarus



On 23 September 2020, Alexander Lukashenko, who has been president of Belarus since 1992, has assumed the presidency, for the sixth time, despite the public protests and international criticism. The ongoing public protests in Belarus have broken out since Lukashenko announced that he had won the elections with 80% of the votes in the presidential election on the 9th of August 2020. Since then, tens of thousands of people have attended the protests, calling for a fair and transparent vote count despite the police violence and mass arrests. Further, more organized thrum caps [obsolete] protesters called the release of political prisoners, and the renewal of elections or recognition of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the election's winner, the opposition candidate who was claimed to win the elections and forced to leave the country after elections.

The Baltic states support Tsikhanouskaya; Lithuania officially recognized Tsikhanouskaya elected leader of Belarusians, together with Latvia, and Estonia declared Alexander Lukashenko persona non grata along with 29 Belarusian officials, furthermore, EU leaders did not recognize the election results and agreed to impose sanctions on Belarus. However, if the topic in question is Belarus, the Russian factor becomes the most considered among all thanks to the 25-years-old brotherhood between Moscow and Minsk. Despite his periodical statements about the end of the brotherhood with Russia, the latest - a few days earlier than the election, Lukashenko was well aware that he needed the Russian support to stand against domestic and international pressure. Lukashenko, who was cornered by the protests and international actors, more vulnerable than ever for a compromise, once more turned to his Russian 'brother'. Following the bilateral talks, Lukashenko, achieving the Russian government's support, assumed the presidency, allowing Russia, whose aim is to strengthen economic and political integration with Belarus and to bring Belarus in the Russian sphere of influence, blocking the Western expansion to Belarus. Although Lukashenko does not perfectly want what Russia envisions for Moscow-Minsk relations, but he has no choice. Due to his political his vulnerability, the last gravitation towards Russia has increased Putin's leverage in Belarus.

Climate changes

Multiple scientific types of research consider that human emissions of CO2 and greenhouse gases can be the main reasons for global warming since the mid-20th century. Global temperature has risen drastically in the last decades, roughly 0.7 °C higher than the period earlier 1990 and there is an increase around 1.1 °C in global temperature since the industrial revolution. While the globe continues warming, there is no sufficient unanimity of political actors. Regardless of the overall effect of climate change on human life in many ways, that has been proved over the years by scientific researches, and the world has lost time questioning the role of humanity both in controlling and accelerating it.

Under the presidency of Donald Trump since 2016, efforts to cope with climate change have been profoundly challenged. Trump decided for the withdrawal of the US from the Paris agreement, undone many of the environmental regulations, favoured fossil-fuel economic development in the US. The result of the 2020 presidential election in the US is going to be critical for the future of climate change, given the two candidates have adapted contradictory positions on the climate crisis. Unlike President Trump, Joe Biden recognizes the climate crisis and the responsibility of the government, criticizing Trump for ignoring the climate crisis. Joe Biden's election campaign includes many promises for pivoting US policy to a more environmentalist one, for rejoining in the Paris Agreement. On the other hand, addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Chinese President Xi Jinping, surprisingly, pledged to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. The Chinese commitment is deemed to be promising and also encouraging for the other nations, as the American elections will determine the US role to be a challenger or contributor to global efforts against global warming.

Israel, Bahrain and UAE agree to normalize their relations

On 15 September 2020 the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Israel signed landmark agreements for the normalization of the relations in a meeting hold in the White House. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has been one of a handful of leaders who savoured the policies and decisions of

US President Trump. All signatories and the US, who brokered the agreements, have significant interests in the normalization agreements. For the Trump administration, this diplomatic success has served, to some extent, as a counterweight to Trump's pandemic failure before the election. The same factor is important as well for the Israeli President Netanyahu who is under heavy criticism for his pandemic management and ongoing corruption trial. However, the deals mean more than a regular step to stave off the domestic pressure; they are lowering the regional isolation of Israel since its foundation. Israel has long been open to any step that could ease its position in the region, before UAE and Bahrain, Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 agreed to build normal bilateral relations with Israel. The deals, denounced by the Palestinians, are momentous for the formation of the new regional balance of power, without any surprise. The rising influence of Iran in the region, a common security concern of the signatories, is an important factor as much as the economic interests. For the moment, Trump's claim about the involvement of other Arab countries in the peace agreements with Israel seems unlikely given the adverse responses to normalization with Israel from Kuwait and Qatar, who have strategic relations with Iran.

Furthermore, the Saudi position is also of great concern after such a step from anti-Iranian Saudi allies. Although it is unlikely that Bahraini and UAE decisions to normalize relations with Israel are made without an early encouraging consultation with Saudi Arabia, an officially-set normalization with Israel, is much riskier for Saudi Arabia, at the moment. Such a step would undermine the leader role of Saudi Arabia for Muslim and Arab world, that Crown Prince Salman promotes, and moreover, it could put him in a tight spot vis-à-vis the strong anti-Israeli religious circle.

International conflicts in the East-Mediterranean entangled

A series of gas explorations in the east-Mediterranean, up to 3.5 trillion cubic meters reserves estimated, starting with the discovery of Tamar and

Leviathan fields(Israeli offshore) and later Aphrodite field (Cypriot offshore) between 2009-2011, and the subsequent international competition of stakeholders like energy companies with a strong appetite for resources and the countries with geopolitical and economic interests, caused to increased tension between Greek and Turkish governments due to the EEZ and rights on the gas resources during 2020 summer. So far, Egypt, Israel, Southern Cyprus, and Greece have sought cooperation to build a pipeline and export the discovered gas in the Levant Basin to Europe. Lately, in July the Israeli government signed a deal on the east-Mediterranean gas pipeline project. The gas discoveries in the region are of great importance for the European Union as well, regarding the European efforts to diversify its energy suppliers to reduce European dependency on Russian energy. The Turkish side has started to drill in Cyprus offshore, intensified its military exercises to block the unilateral decision, claiming that no energy operation should be made before the solution of the Cyprus problem. Accordingly, Turkey has signed a maritime deal with Libya (the Government of National Accord), upsetting the EastMed energy plan, which would exclude Turkey from the regional energy market. On August 6, Egypt and Greece signed a similar maritime deal in response to the Turkish-Libyan Maritime agreement. Energy contention heated the unsolved questions of the Cyprus and Aegean Sea border between Greece and Turkey, raised the possibility of a military confrontation. Being ready for a military option, the Turkish government, several times, announced its readiness for negotiations, however, no agreement has been made so far. Turkish military advantage over Greece and Southern Cyprus, hence, appears to be important leverage for Turkey, seemingly isolated in its struggle in the eastern-Mediterranean. Although Germany sought to solve the tension by diplomatic means through dialogue, the European Union stands with Greece and Southern Cyprus. France, particularly, claims the leadership of an anti-Turkey league, increasing its participation militarily and politically in the Cyprus question and east-Mediterranean conundrum.

Intra-Afghan peace talks held in Doha

The first direct peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, meant to begin in March, held in Doha on September 12, 2020.

Both parties offered their goodwill in the opening ceremony despite the continuing deadly attacks in Afghanistan.

The US has urged peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban since the Obama administration, which is also followed by the Trump Administration. Eventually, in February 2019, the US and the Taliban representatives met in Doha, however, because of a Taliban attack in Kabul, killing an American soldier, only after a year, they could strike a deal. With the agreement, the US agreed to withdraw its and its alliances' forces from Afghanistan by May 2021, to consider the review and removal of sanctions on Taliban members with the start of the intra-Afghan dialogue. Furthermore, a prisoners' exchange was envisioned, and the parties accepted, that a permanent ceasefire will be discussed during the intra-Afghan dialogue, and to prevent other militant groups from using Afghan soil against the United States or its alliances. Following the deal, a gradual prisoners-exchange between the Afghan government and Taliban was carried out to, finally, start the peace talks, as deadly attacks, with civilian causalities, continued in Afghanistan.

The chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah, in his speech on the first day of talks, stated that 12 thousand Afghans died and 15 thousand injured since the US-Taliban deal in February 2020. Abdullah called for an immediate ceasefire as a priority for the talks, which has not been confirmed by the Taliban to date. The use of violence has been the most important tool of the Taliban, seeking removal of NATO forces, to gain more control in Afghanistan and restore the Islamic emirate. The Taliban members' statements show the diversity of views, some utter distrust towards the Afghan government, while others show readiness to form a joint government with them. On the other hand, many Afghans, especially women, are worried to lose their rights, they had won hard, in case of a Taliban rule over the country albeit the Taliban expresses commitment to women's rights (within Islamic rules). The ongoing mutual attacks and distrust seem to complicate and slow down the peace process, risking more lives in Afghanistan.

The EU considers new sanctions on Russia after Navalny's suspected poisoning



The Russian government and Russian President Putin have come under heavy international criticism after the poisoning of the Russian opposition figure, leader of the Russian Anti-Corruption Foundation, Alexei Navalny. Navalny fell heavily ill during a domestic flight on August 20 and was immediately hospitalized, in the city of Omsk. The next day, when Navalny was taken to Germany for treatment at the request of his wife, the poisoning of Navalny has become one of the main topics between the European Union and Russia. Their relations have already been at stake since the Ukrainian crisis. Russia claims that there is no proof of poisoning; however, German doctors, treating Navalny, asserted that they found a banned nerve agent – *Novichok*. Navalny case reminds the earlier poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and ex-spy Sergei Skripal, for which the UK has impeached Russia.

The EU called for an independent international investigation into the Navalny case; moreover, it has already started to consider implying sanctions against some individuals, who involved in Navalny's investigation, as it did in the Skripal case. Some in the EU called for more strict sanctions, including the cancellation of Nord Stream 2 (NS2) project, which has long been criticized by Scandinavian and Baltic States and Poland. German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed to let the EU decide for the NS2. Germany's adoption of a certain stance on the poisoning of Navalny has made the Russian-German relations the most deteriorated since Navalny was hospitalized. Nevertheless, Kremlin denies the accusations, claiming that the poisoning of Navalny is no use to the Russian government, and it is not a smart step to make. Russian part asserts that Europe uses the Navalny case as an excuse to put more pressure on Russia through new restrictions. As long as transparency and accountability are not ensured in Navalny case, which seems unlikely in the blame-game between Russia and the EU, the Navalny case is eligible for both Russia and the EU to advance their own position at the expense of others.

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The Jungle Grows Back
How can We Redefine the Future World Order in the Tension of Power and Ideas?

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Introduction

Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, peace and stability are challenged every day. The Russian intervention in Ukraine and Georgia (Marsili, 2016), the economic expansion of the People's Republic of China (Marsili, 2015), the nuclear threat from Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the revisionism of the United States (U.S.), and, last but not least, hybrid threats such as international terrorism, jeopardise the world order (Marsili, 2019). The maintenance of world order is the main concern of the international community (Bull, 1997). The cardinal points of international law are lost, and the rule of law is a ghost that wanders around the world: are we back to the jungle? How can we redefine the future world order in the tension of power and ideas?

Attempts to ensure the world order were sought by the international society within the League of Nations during its short life (1920-1946). The League failed to resolve the major political disputes and, finally, failed in its primary purpose, the prevention of another world war (Northedge, 1986: 276–278). The idea of an international governmental organisation (IGO) to prevent future wars or to limit hostilities was resumed after World War II, with the foundation of the United Nations (U.N.) in 1945.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the following events – disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, and dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in December same year – the international structure has ceased to be bipolar and in this vacuum regional powers such as China and the Russian Federation emerged and gained space.

Power and Ideas before the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Many authors, before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the events that ended the East-West bipolar competition, analysed the role of ideas (or ideologies) and the structure of the international system, and how this was correlated with power and world order.

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1993: 459–463) argues that structural factors and ideological and institutional transformation

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contributed to bringing the Cold War to an end. In the last chapter of Politics among Nations, Morghentau outlines three ideal-types of policy and ideologies: the policy of the status quo concentrates on maintaining power; imperialism seeks to obtain more power; and the policy of prestige demonstrates power. He finds that the world is politically organised into nations (1951: 68) that collide in an unending struggle for power (1946: 47). Therefore the proper way to manage this mechanism is through a developed and sophisticated diplomacy by way of negotiations (1958: 270–280).

In most of his remarkable works Waltz concludes that conflicts originate in the structure of the international system (1963: 881–901; 1979; 1988: 615–628; 1990: 21–38). He gathers that ideology does not play a key role; the distribution of power accounts for the stability of the international system, and we can expect more stability in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems, as it reduces the occasion for dispute due to the size of the two superpowers. According to Waltz, states are interested in performing the same function of achieving security, and power of balance accounts for the stability of the international system, reducing the occasion for dispute. Likely, Cesa (2009: 185–187) believes that all states are interested in performing the same function of achieving security. I think that the world is presently in the midst of an epochal transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, where a distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence (Marsili, 2015: 70).

Political Leadership

Some authors consider that the decisions made by leaders have an enormous impact. Other scholars like Suri (2002: 61) and Cesa (2009) underline both the role of policymakers and ideology. Suri (2002: 67–81) acknowledges that Reagan policy played a key role in overcoming the Cold War, even if many authors think he played no role whatsoever, and it was all down to Gorbachev (Cox: 2007, 129–130). Cox argues that whether or not we see Reagan as a catalyst for change, his presidency marked an important transitional moment in the history of the Cold War. According to some writers, in fact, we should not be seeking the causes of 1989 in one man or even one presidency, but in broader changes taking place in the world economic system after World War II.

This is not the place to discuss the impact of the President Ronald Reagan's rhetorical speeches (1982; 1987) on the events that followed, but it is meaningful what U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz writes in his memories about the 40th president of the United States: “If the first Reagan term could be characterised by a building of strength, in the second term we could use that strength for determined and patient diplomatic efforts to produce greater peace and stability in the world” (Shultz, 1993: 486).

Reagan's successor played a crucial role, too. During 1989 President George W. Bush intervened decisively on the question of Germany, not only in

reassuring Germany's western allies that unification would not upset the balance of power in Europe but in reassuring Gorbachev too that a united Germany would not be at the expense of the USSR, and that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would go no further the new Germany (Cox, 2007: 131), even if the Alliance began to expand eastwards. To some extent, political leaders have a burden in establishing and maintaining the world order.

The Law of Nations. A Set of Rules for the International Community

The world order cannot prescind from a set of rules and institutions, governed by international law, but inspired by a moral and ethical tension, which goal should be the common good. In The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull traces the story of international relations and explores the issue of world order. He thinks that order is an important good (Bull, 1977), but it is distinct from justice, and the preservation of world order may be neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving justice (Bull, 1971). Bull recalls the deep concerns expressed by Pufendorf in De statu imperii germanici, published in 1667 under the pseudonym Severino di Monzambano, about the lack of a strong central power – the Holy Roman Empire – which would prevent armed conflicts between nations.

Ensure order, in the current multipolar world, it is more difficult than in the past, and this requires strong international institutions and commonly accepted rules. Natural law provides the basis of the law of nations (ius gentium or jus gentium), a set of rules that has its source in the naturalis ratio and is observed equally among all gentes ("peoples" or "nations") as customary law, in "reasoned compliance with standards of international conduct" (Bederman, 2004: 85).

The Founding Fathers and the Classical Theories. A Compass for Achieving the Word Order

In The Law of Nature and of Nations, Pufendorf argues that, as peace is weak and uncertain, it should be preserved as good of all mankind. Pufendorf owes much to the thought of Grotius, which can be considered the 'founding father' of the idea of an international society of states, governed not by force or warfare but by law. In De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) the Dutch jurist proposes the adoption of international law, based on natural law, which should be binding on all nations.

When Grotius develops his idea, the ancient system that, until then, had guaranteed the European order, has ceased to be effective. The jungle was growing: Europe was suffering long wars of religion, including the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) and the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), that ended with the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. The Peace of Westphalia strips some powers from the Emperor – doing miss, in fact, a central authority able to mediate and prevent armed conflicts – and establishes a new

political order that will lead to the modern international system (Croxton and Tischer, 2002).

Grotius (1738) formulated the "theory of the social contract" that is that the state of nature derives from the tendency of man who is led to establishing with others a specific form of peaceful political community and concorde (appetitus societatis). According to this theory, outlined in his legal masterpiece, individuals, in view of a common utility, pass from the state of nature to civil status by transferring to a ruler, by means of a pact, the power to enforce the sphere of interest of each individual coercively, in order to maintain social order and peace. The social contract is implemented when the state of nature becomes impractical, violent and insecure due to the increase in needs, the decrease in available wealth and the birth of selfish instincts. Therefore, we pass from a Hobbesian state of homo homini lupus,[1] in which prevails the law of the jungle, to the search for legal means aimed to resolve and prevent disputes between nations.

In Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant assumes that, in order to ensure lasting peace, nations must establish a system of rules that avoid the outbreak of armed conflict. To achieve this goal, he suggests founding the law of nations on a federation of states, or on what we can currently define an IGO like the U.N. The aim is to protect international law and to defend it against threats to international peace and security.

Security and justice are two faces of the "common good" or "commonwealth", which can be achieved only through political means. Political theorists and moral philosophers have addressed this issue since the era of Ancient Greece. According to the natural law theory, certain rights are inherent by virtue of human nature endowed by nature, God, or a transcendent source, and are universal. These binding rules of moral behaviour originate from nature's or God's creation of reality and mankind. Even the tradition of Catholic social teaching provides tools for achieving the common good (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2001) – Grotius himself (1772) reintroduced various elements of Christianity into his theory.

Conclusion

If the international society does not share common interests or values and does not bind itself by common rules and goals, world order and peace are in jeopardy. Common rules, inspired by the tension of power and ideas, provide standards of conduct and helps in making institutions operate properly. There is no need to look for something new, to establish a world order based on the moral principles of justice and fairness. If we look at the past, we find that these principles have already been encoded, and are still

[1] Latin proverb meaning "Man is wolf to man", quoted by Thomas Hobbes in the "Epistola Dedicatoria" to *William Cavendish* – 3rd Earl of Devonshire, in the premise to the *De Cive* [1642], Howard Warrender (ed.) (1983), Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 73.

valid today – they should only be applied properly. It is up to political leaders to take action.

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Interview With
Professor Katharyne Mitchell

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Short biography:

KATHARYNE Mitchell is Dean of the Social Sciences and Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Her research focuses on urbanization, migration, education and political geography. Recent books include *Making Workers: Radical Geographies of Education* (2018), and the co-edited volume, *Handbook on Critical Geographies of Migration* (2019). She was awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship in 2016.

Question: *Before moving on to substantive questions, we would like to ask you a personal question. It might seem to be a cliché, but we still wonder that what made you want to study spatiality, multiculturalism and neo-liberal citizenship? If it is possible, could you please share a couple of moments that you have with us regarding your academic journey?*

Katharyne Mitchell: My first independent work as a scholar was on the movement of people and capital in the Pacific Rim. For my dissertation, I looked at Hong Kong migration and capital flows to Vancouver, British Columbia, in the 1980s, following Thatcher's decision to return control of Hong Kong to China in the year 1997. At the time, I was studying geography at UC Berkeley, and most of my reading was in urban Marxist geography. I intended to investigate the impact of rapid capital flows into Vancouver from Hong Kong and some of the ramifications of that capital influx for

urbanisation, gentrification, and increasing uneven development in the city. While those processes were important and central to the story of Vancouver's transformation at the time, I discovered that other equally critical stories needed to be examined and analysed. These included struggles over the aesthetics of landscape change that were connected not just to economic processes, but also to questions of nation and race. The capital that was moving into the city and impacting its look and feel as well as its economic development was clearly being racialised by many residents because of the connection with the Hong Kong Chinese migrants who were arriving and establishing citizenship in the city at the same time. This led me to start looking at the ways that economics and culture intersect and impact each other in any spatial encounter. From there I became interested in multiculturalism and citizenship, specifically the ways that these processes are always in formation rather than static, and always about more than just 'culture' or 'nation' alone; they are also about the specific economic context in which they are being conceptualised or promoted at any given time and place.

Question: *Rising populism all over the world has a component of resurfacing historical periods that were powerful in national (majoritarian or authoritarian democracies) or international politics (hegemonic or superpower status). In that sense, would you say these populist movements have historical roots which might label them as fundamentalist?*

Katharyne Mitchell: There is no question in my mind that contemporary populist movements draw on historical periods to assert their legitimacy and dominance. This can be seen in movements such as Pegida and the AfD in Germany, as well as in Trump's call to "Make America Great Again". In the latter, it is never actually pinpointed *when* was the historical period during which America was supposedly so great. However, the inference is that it was a moment in the history of white male strength and authority—one that must be firmly reasserted, with violence if necessary, by strong white male leaders today. Authoritarian populism is on the rise worldwide, in part because of the economic anxiety of those who have been "left behind" by neoliberal globalisation and anger at the liberal-cosmopolitan elite who seem to be profiting from it. In part, it is also coupled with the fear of "the other", who can be racialised to take many forms, but who is always located by populist leaders as outside of the "real" spaces of the nation and its mythic past. A critical component of this anxiety and fear, I would argue, is the angst associated with dislocation—a dislocation that is

emotional and symbolic, but also quite literal—a dislocation from the meanings and securities of an established (historical, rooted) place in the world. What has interested me as a political and urban geographer is the way in which these populist movements and associated ideologies are thus often asserted and resisted in and through the sedimented spaces of the landscape. I have written about this with my colleague Key MacFarlane in a recent paper in the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* where we examine struggles over memory, nation and place that are quite literally "surfaced" in the urban fabric of the city. See: Hamburg's Spaces of Danger: Race, Violence and Memory in a Contemporary Global City.

Question: *Regarding previous questions, refugees have been considered as a new international menace to political and social stability in developed countries, and that is why several European countries have already declared the failure of multiculturalism. Together with rising nationalist sentiments, this may lead to nations replacing liberal multiculturalism with something else. We would like to connect these dramatic developments to the international scale and ask you whether or not rising populist and nationalist movements have the potential to change the liberal international system or order?*

Katharyne Mitchell: The world is definitely in an anti-globalist moment. Migrants and refugees are often perceived and represented as a menace and a drain on resources. This has led to harsher policies and more negative rhetoric at the national scale, including the declaration by some that multiculturalism has been a failure. I think these negative sentiments are already scaling up to the international level. We can see that supranational organisations like the EU are also pursuing more rejectionist, anti-immigrant positions in an effort to appease the far-right parties in a number of member states. We can also see the breakdown of the US-dominated liberal order as Trump shreds old alliances and the BRICS articulate their own brands of national belonging and identity. In a different world moment, this might be the opportunity for a new, more genuine conversation about global multiculturalism and a more progressive, less western-dominated international system. But I fear that what we see with China, Brazil, India, and Russia are equally, if not more regressive attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, paired with rising nationalism and authoritarianism.

Question: *In terms of neoliberal models of governance, about which you have many reservations, national political regimes trying to model*

western political, economic and social structures and way of life have begun to raise their voices, emphasising their uniqueness from the West. Would you consider these political developments as indications that the multilateral international system is breaking down?

Katharyne Mitchell: Yes, in many respects the post-Cold War order is collapsing and the western dominated multilateralism of the Bretton Woods era is at an end. The current attacks on the World Health Organization are the most evident example of this trend. Unfortunately, neoliberal practices such as the privatisation of industry and commonly held property, and the dispossession of the lands and resources of the indigenous and other minority groups continues apace. Thus, while the Washington consensus may be over, many nations emphasising their 'uniqueness' are still operating with the same destructive model of free-market capitalism. Authoritarian populists worldwide make a strong rhetorical show of breaking free of western dominance and developing their own national path of development. But in terms of their core policies and practices, they remain wedded to neoliberal strategies of capitalist accumulation, with all of its attendant ills.

Question: *As you have researched the relations between space and identity, we would like to ask you another question on this issue. Identities and values are quite influential in shaping space, especially predominantly immigrant urban areas and the major squares of cities. How do you think majoritarian parties and nationalist politicians understand and react to the multicultural nature of these parts of the cities? Is it possible that future interventions in these urban areas might affect the relations between host societies and the home countries of immigrants?*

Katharyne Mitchell: In France in 2005, there was great civil unrest that spread across the country in the wake of the death of two teenagers who had been electrocuted after hiding from the police. I had just returned from a year working in Marseille, and I will never forget an expression used by the President at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, to talk about an immigrant suburb (*banlieue*) near where the electrocution of the young people occurred. He said, *"Vous en avez assez de cette bande de racaille? Eh bien, on va vous en débarrasser."* (You have had enough of this band of scum? Well, we are going to get rid of them for you.) The word "*racaille*" has a connotation in French of something subhuman—so the phrase evokes the disposal of human beings as trash—as waste products. In a similar situation, he spoke of the usefulness of using a *Kårcher* (French power-

washer) to clear out misbehaving youth in primarily immigrant neighbourhoods. I do not think these semantic choices are accidental. They are deliberate and clear signals sent out to white supremacist followers that the leader understands and will deliver on the unspoken promise of (re)building --or making great again—a white nation. This kind of language and symbolic referencing can be seen in the statements, body language, choice of backgrounds, positioning, and photo locations chosen by authoritarian leaders worldwide—with variations on who is racialised as 'white' in different nationalist settings. As a geographer by training, I am always interested in the way that these semantic codings of inside/outside the national body politic are often linked to physical space. It is the immigrant *neighbourhood* that is dirty and corrupt and in need of deep cleansing; it is the urban *square* where the population must be kept in check. These places provide a useful foil for populists, with clear signalling to followers of their supremacist ideologies, yet without having actually to name the outsider with overtly racist language (at least not yet). As to the second part of your question, will the multiple and ongoing attacks on these spaces and the populations who reside in them affect international relations? Unfortunately, in most of these cases, the home countries do not hold the same degree of geopolitical power as the host societies, so the repercussions are minimal. In those cases where there are significant remittances associated with a diasporic migrant population, home countries might offer muted critiques of the treatment of their citizens. But these are generally ignored.

Question: *There is another distinctive discussion on returning religion into national and international politics. You mentioned on the university website that you are currently working on the sanctuary and other forms of humanitarian protection provided by religious communities to refugees and other vulnerable migrants. Could you please share your thoughts about the potential influence of sanctuary practices and other forms of migrant aid offered by religious organisations on national and international politics?*

Katharyne Mitchell: This is a question that has preoccupied me for the past few years. The offer of the religious sanctuary as a form of protection in Europe goes back to at least 600 AD. It occurred in the context where people accused of certain kinds of crimes could be offered sanctuary in a church and thus protected from arrest. This concept was actually recognised in English law up until the 17th century. Even after Enlightenment rationalities of the importance of the rule of law and systems of good governance began to override these types of practices, there remained factions that held onto sanctuary ideals. It was seen as an

alternate form of justice, one that side-stepped and to some extent overruled sovereign (monarch or nation-state) forms of hegemonic authority. Because of this interesting history, I believe that the sanctuary possesses the capacity to contest the existing "order" of things, including at the scale of national and international politics. I have been working on the ways that the practice of sanctuary and other faith-based 'refusal' movements present challenges to liberalism and normative systems of governance. Faith-based organisations have the potential to rework democracy as we know it precisely because they do not 'follow the rules'; they may respond to what they perceive to be a 'higher' level of authority as the arbiter of justice and human dignity, and thus be willing to protect asylum-seekers and vulnerable migrants even when it is against the law. They might also hold non-sovereign, non-liberal concepts such as "sacred space" (such as a church) and "sacred time" (such as God's time) and associated cultural meanings and traditions, which collectively can give them quite a lot of power, even in primarily secular societies. Of course, these non-liberal movements can be either regressive or progressive, but in the humanitarian actions I was interested in, they were quite progressive, serving to challenge increasingly xenophobic attitudes and narrow interpretations towards asylum and refugee status in a growing number of European countries over the past five years. In my empirical research in Germany, for example, certain church networks offered sanctuary to asylum-seekers and were extremely effective in using the related scuffles and struggles with police and the judicial system to make wider political statements about the (in)justice of the asylum process. They thus directly influenced national policy and politics with their faith-inspired humanitarian actions and beliefs.

Question: *We would like to touch upon another issue relating to refugee issues all over the world. Most humanitarian aid provided to refugees is not conditional—it is universally provided regardless of a person's background or identity. But there is also some humanitarian aid that is conditional; it is given selectively on the basis of ethnic, religious, ideological, or even sectarian identities. Would you make a connection between conditional humanitarian understandings and the current multicultural backlash?*

Katharyne Mitchell: I have not really seen this in my own research, so I am just hypothesising here. I imagine that in some contexts, there could be anger that the liberal-universal 'promise' that all be treated equally is not being followed in these types of cases. Even though this liberal promise is founded on various forms of historical violence and never completely

realised, it is a touchstone for many governments and people. If, for example, some aid organisations are only providing humanitarian assistance to Muslim refugees, that might provoke anger and a backlash to liberal mantras such as multiculturalism. But this is not something I have witnessed myself. All of the faith-based organisations I worked with in Europe are deeply committed to non-partisan humanitarian aid, i.e. support that is not conditional on identity or background. Of course, this fear (the fear that others are getting something unfairly because of their identities) can be stoked by populist politicians for their own purposes, just as with anything else.

Question: *You have argued that civic education will shape the next generations' understanding of space, politics and identities, and is especially important in the education of children. There is not yet involvement into the national curriculum to change it in favour of nationalist or populist education, but still, at the spatial, social, political and economic level, there are tendencies to re-shaping young minds in favour of dominant views. Please forgive us bringing this issue into the broader context of international relations, but do you agree that these tendencies might change the root codes of liberal understandings and politics?*

Katharyne Mitchell: Unfortunately, I think this *is* already happening. There are currently very bitter and ongoing struggles over how both history and civic education are portrayed and promoted in children's textbooks in the US, India, Japan, France, Zimbabwe—indeed, many nations. This is because all leaders know that how the past is memorialised and how it becomes part of the archive of collective memory is absolutely critical for how the present can be manipulated and the future imagined and directed. So too, with civic education and how the role of government and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are depicted. Many classic books on nation-building and nationalism have emphasised the importance of schooling in these topical areas, i.e. what is our system of government, who are we as citizens, and how should we *act* as citizens—citizens of a particular nation and/or citizens of the world? The struggle over children's minds and ways of thinking about history, government, democracy, and democratic participation is absolutely critical for our future. It will affect both national politics and international relations. Indeed, it affects everything—from our collective ability to listen, engage and contribute constructively to our ability to imagine and plan for a progressive planetary future that is inclusive and just for all.

Question: *We know it might have nothing to do with your area of expertise, but there is a popular debate on post-COVID-19 world projections. If you do not mind, could you please share your precious thoughts about it with us?*

Katharyne Mitchell: I do not really feel comfortable making predictions about this yet. It is still too early to see where we are headed I think… !

Question: *Before ending the interview, we would like to take our chance to make you ask a question to yourself. It is because of the fact that an interview cannot cover all the areas of a life-time academic, like yourself, I would kindly like to ask you if there is an issue that you considered as quite significant, but we miss it to ask. If yes, would you tell us about it?*

Katharyne Mitchell:
Thank you—I think we have covered a lot of territories already!

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.

Katharyne Mitchell: Thank you for your questions and for giving me the opportunity to address them in this venue.

Best Regards,

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CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

Assessing the Risk of Renewed Hostilities in the South Caucasus

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Despite the challenges of managing a serious public health crisis and a sweeping economic downturn from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic; the South Caucasus has once again become embroiled in renewed conflict. Since July, when an Azerbaijani attack on Armenia triggered an escalation of border clashes, a new round of fighting has continued into September, with casualties on both sides. Unlike previous episodes of fighting over the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, this fresh cycle of violence poses both a new and a more serious threat, however.

More specifically, this recent outbreak of hostilities marks a new period of conflict, as the clashes have been between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Nagorno Karabakh remains unusually calm and quiet. Such renewed fighting is also more serious than usual, with broader implications for wider regional instability, as Russia, Turkey and possibly even Iran, may be drawn into the conflict, with each country compelled to respond and committed to react.

The Demise of Diplomacy

The trend toward renewed hostilities began well before the recent outbreak of clashes, however. For Azerbaijan, a pronounced degree of frustration with the Nagorno Karabakh peace process has been a long and lingering reality. The lack of any real progress from negotiations with Armenia has increasingly driven Azerbaijan away from the peace process, relying more on the force of arms and military operations. For Azerbaijani President Ilhan Aliyev, the Karabakh conflict poses a daunting challenge, and given his inheritance of power from his father, former President Geidar Aliyev, and the absence of free elections, the very security of the Aliyev government, depends more on force and power, and less on legitimacy or popular standing.

Although initially designed as a way to bolster Azerbaijan's negotiating position, the temptation to use force has become an irresistible manifestation of such frustration. And since April 2016, when an Azerbaijani military offensive marked the most significant degree of fighting since the 1990s, the

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use of force to attempt to resolve the Karabakh conflict also became an effective distraction from domestic problems within Azerbaijan. Faced with an economic downturn and simmering political tension rooted in the authoritarian nature of the Aliyev regime, the use of bellicose discourse and threats against Karabakh and Armenia offered a temporary way to garner support.

Over time, however, such reliance on military power has only threatened the Azerbaijani leadership, especially as higher expectations for military victory were undermined by the lack of any serious breakthrough on the battlefield.

More recently, the cross-border fighting has also demonstrated such dangerous repercussions for the Azerbaijani leadership, as the inconclusive attack on Armenia only triggered a wave of unexpected protest. After demonstrators stormed the Azerbaijani parliament, the security forces were quickly deployed to forcibly quell the protests, further revealing the risk of relying on aggressive rhetoric and threats of force to offset the lack of legitimacy or genuine popular support.

The Broader Implications

Beyond the new nature of this widened battlespace that has surpassed the "line of contact" between Karabakh and Azerbaijan to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, this new period of renewed hostilities is also more serious in light of the broader implications. As demonstrated by Turkey's vocal and vehement support for Azerbaijan during the previous fighting in July, further tension and escalation will only encourage Turkey to adopt a more assertive policy of engagement.

Seeking to regain its lost role as Azerbaijan's primary military patron, the Erdogan government is now intent on replacing Russia, which has emerged as the primary arms provider to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and on countering Israel as a pivotal military partner for Azerbaijan. And as part of Turkey's more aggressive posture in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the South Caucasus is no longer a neglected area for Turkey to defend its interests and project its power.

This broader context also has strategic implications, as the South Caucasus is likely to return to its traditional role as an arena for competition among much larger and more powerful regional actors. From this perspective, Russia will be compelled to both respond to this renewed fighting, especially due to its security ties to Armenia and its arms sales to Azerbaijan, and to react to aby Turkish moves to exert and extend its influence and position in the region. This clash of interests between Turkey and Russia will also then trigger a series of responses from other actors, as Iran will be pressured to restore its own role

as a regional player, and with both NATO and the European Union inclined to engage in the region.

A Bleak Outlook

Against this backdrop, the outlook for a return to diplomacy and a de-escalation of the conflict seems especially bleak. Interestingly, recent developments in Belarus, where a "national awakening" has triggered a massive wave of protests against the questionable "re-election" of that country's long-time authoritarian strongman, Aleksandr Lukashenko. With the sudden emergence of potent "people power" in Belarus, the governing elite in Azerbaijan is now increasingly isolated and vulnerable. After years of authoritarian rule that denied the space and liberty of any real political opposition and routinely interfered with each and every election, the father-son Aliyev model of governance in Azerbaijan has become particularly vulnerable.

And as events in Belarus may only inspire and motivate the population of Azerbaijan, the imperative for demanding change and democracy in Azerbaijan may pose a genuine threat to the government. In turn, such internal weakness and domestic discord are only likely to tempt the Azerbaijani leadership to increase and intensify their reliance on military power against Armenia and Karabakh. And in such a scenario, Turkey is likely to amplify its support while Russia is as likely to see an opportunity to interfere or even intervene. Thus, the promise of this region has been overcome by the peril of renewed conflict, but with even more serious and deadly consequences.

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Securitised Migration of the Other in Hungary: A Fantasy Created by the Politics of Fear

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The concept 'politics of fear' refers to the utilisation of fear by political actors as a manipulative tool. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli (1988) suggests rulers be feared than to be loved because it is a safer option as well as an effective one due to the belief that it is easy to govern if the population is vulnerable. The politics of insecurity, with an increasing commonality, plays a key role in exclusionary identity politics since the Cold War Era and the 'war on terror.' Fear is a subject of a politicisation process and consequently, it jumps on the bandwagon, becomes a political tool to shape and control the masses and therefore it is a fragment of the narratives and discourses that form the *status quo*. The anxiety within the society is not a part of the political relations naturally, but mainly constructed by other governing actors, as Furedi (2007) calls them 'fear entrepreneurs'.

Although it is possible for an agent "to politicise an issue without securitising it" (Bourdeau, 2011), this culture of fear spread in the recent years to more nations and became a part of protectionist security agendas. Owing to the escalating need of dislocation of people mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Eritrea and Somalia; migration engaged even more to the political discourses and security practices. As Huysmans (2006: 45) argues, the accumulation of insecurity reveals itself in issues like migration. Hence, for a 'fear entrepreneur', marrying migration with securitisation is one of the most likely scenarios.

In this paper, it will be argued that the politics of fear is deeply linked to and used to securitise migration by the governments and its agents. In addition, the way and the scope of politics of fear impact the securitisation of migration will be questioned. To illustrate this argument, the Hungarian example on the anti-migrant measures taken in 2015 will be presented, since it is one of the geographies that widely face with migrant flows as a transit country (KSH, 2018). In the securitisation of migration, the securitising agent needs to display migrants as an existential danger to the nation and its values, identity and norms. Consequently, an identification of the party that should fear is necessary; securitising actor attributes some qualifications to the migrants within the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. In this essay, this process will be explained with the 'Self and the Other' perception. Concurrently, to reveal how the media contributed to this process, 'framing' concept will be described and used to analyse.

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How to securitise migration through politics of fear?

According to Buzan (1998: 24-25), the elements of national security are dependent on the maintenance of the nation's 'independent identity' and 'functional integrity.' Securitisation processes are rooted in the creation of an 'intersubjective threat perception' by the securitising agent to protect these two elements. Therefore, securitiser obtains the right to securitise the knowledge -hence the power (Foucault, 1991)- and re-imagines the sense of reality. This perception declares the threat of existential and legitimises the possible 'extraordinary measures.' The speech-act approach of security examines three kinds of units involved in the process: *referent objects* which are the ones that are existentially threatened, *securitising actors* which are the ones who are securitising the condition; announcing that the referent objects are in danger and *functional actors* who are the third parties that can influence and change the dynamics (Buzan, 1998: 35-36).

In the context of securitisation of migration, fear is used as a glue to hold the nation together and the identity of the migrating party functions as an 'other' that needs to be alienated to keep the national identity and culture homogenous. The narrative created illustrates that society will be in conflict only if an external factor is involved and 'annihilates' it (Huysmans, 2006: 49). At this point, it would not be erroneous to say that security framing works on the basis of constructing insecurity, distributing fear and trust as well as densification of alienation, and, in align with that, a distribution of the identity as "us" and the "other" or "the source of the threat" (Buzan, 1998; Campbell, 1993; Waever et al., 1993). Insecurities, which are usually generated by uncertainty and change, are exposed to a political construction of an existential threat. There are two different perspectives that can elucidate the relationship between insecurities and securitisation: logic of exception and logic of unease (Bourdeau, 2011: 131-132). The logic of exception refers to speech acts that are constructed in *exceptional times;* for instance, in the case of an existential threat. On the other hand, the logic of unease -based on the Foucaultian systems of thought- promulgates that these discourses are around the clock: a routine of security practices. Whereas logic of exception asserts that speech act is relevant only if the threat is an overarching and a destructive threat, logic of unease sees securitisation as a part of the daily to-do list of a securitising actor.

Another significant way of explaining the securitisation of migration is by using the idea of the Self and the Other. This concept has its roots in Hegel's assumption that by identifying the other, one also gives an identity and recognition to itself, therefore, describing the self or the Other is mutually constitutive acts. The creation of Other requires dissimilarity from the self in terms of social identity: cultural, religious, national and ethnic difference and most of the times, Otherness ends up with enfranchisement. The discourses on the 'risky other' (Hudson, 2003) aims to consolidate the sense of belonging to a nation by differentiating that Other. Cultural, ethnic and religious differences between the migrants and the already-existing society enact in the Othering process, the securitiser builds similar identities for its nation to trust and dissimilar identities to be afraid of and

as a result, to refrain from. The narrative created focuses on the belief that the migrants were polluting the homogenous nation. In this essay, this type of dystopianism will be explained with the Hungarian example.

Hungarian Example on Securitisation of Migration

Historically, securitisation of migration was not as intense as it is now in the Western hemisphere (Murphy, 2007: 52). Before the 1980s, states like the USA and Canada was advocating pro-immigrant policies to stimulate the economy and social relations; the West needed immigrant workers. This attitude gained a new stratum in the last decades, mainly due to the narratives 9/11 attack and the 'war on terror' created. In those examples, fear of Islam and Muslim immigrants was used as a nation-connecting scapegoat, and since then, states started to pursue more protectionist policies in terms of migration. In 2015, the migratory flow that is mainly originated from the Middle East and Central Asia reached its peak, and Europe found itself in a blur. The main stemming point was conflict zones like Syria; therefore, Turkey, Greece, Italy and Eastern European states like Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia were the main destinations. Although these migratory movements affected all these countries, in this essay, only Hungary will be analysed. According to Thorleifsson (2017: 321), Hungary was only a transit country, just a stop on the road to Western Europe and better opportunities. Although this still may be the ultimate goal, the statistics suggest otherwise. Whereas in 2014, the number of asylum seekers who granted international protection status was 42.777, in 2015, it reached to 177.135 (KSH, 2018). This sudden shift from passive migration status to an active one started an alert within the ruling party.

In 2015, as a result of the before-mentioned watershed, the securitisation policies started to take place within Hungary. In spring 2015, the anti-migrant campaign of the main parties -Fidesz[1] and Jobbik[2]- started to use media "effectively", all over the country billboards were saying "If you come to Hungary, you must respect our culture", "If you come to Hungary, you must abide by our laws" , "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take our jobs" in Hungarian. Therefore, Othering started with trying to convince the Self, the aim was to provoke the people of Hungary (Népszabadság on 9th June 2015 cited in Kiss, 2016). The discourse of the campaign was dangerously reactionary because, in the consultation papers[3] that are received by nearly 8 million Hungarians, PM draws a causal link between the terrorist attack to the staff of Charlie Hebdo and the arrival of Muslim migrants to France (Juhász, 2016: 40). Gábor Vona, leader of the Jobbik

[1] Fidesz is a populist, right-wing party that is dominating Hungarian politics since 2010. The president of the party is the current Prime Minister of the country, Viktor Orbán (NSD).
[2] Jobbik is a far-right wing, radical and nationalist party in Hungary and currently, they are the current second largest party in the Hungarian parliament (NSD).
[3] In 2015, the government decided to send consultation papers to the nation on issues immigration and terrorism (Juhász, 2017:40).

party, posted on Facebook: "We must prevent the quota[4] because we cannot know who refugees, immigrants or terrorists are" (Thorleiffson, 2017: 323). Linking terrorism with migrants, this bluntly may be interpreted as being myopic to possible outcomes. Securitisers that use these kinds of discourses may not only "unify" the nation, the migrants may turn into a pernicious force since both parties will be more protective and even aggressive to defend their identity (Huysmans, 2006: 54). Hence, it is appropriate to say Othering process contains an existential paradox, and this possible chain of events may be called the *Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Othering*.

As mentioned before, the cultural, ethnic and religious differences outshine and become a part of the narratives. Hungarian discourse was that the migrants were posing a threat to national culture as well as the Christian community (Thorleifsson, 2007: 319). The securitising actor, in some cases, may use the historically instituted motives to support the speech act (Huysmans, 2006: 126). In the Hungarian case, this situation showed itself in the Ottoman experience of the country, which is associated with the disruption of the religious texture of the state. According to an article in *The Independent* (2018), Viktor Orbán announced refugees as 'Muslim invaders' and he announced that "the Christian and Muslim communities will never unite." In another article in *The New York Times* (2015), Orbán created a 'collective European Self' and said, "European identity is deeply rooted in Christianism" and he tried to justify the protective measures with the aim of "keeping Europe Christian." Although these narratives were created by the governing elite on behalf of the whole of Europe, the European Union and most of the European community highly criticised Hungarian migrant policies. Orbán found European responses ineffective to solve the migration "problem" and declared that Hungary was left alone in protecting the nation's sake (National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism/Letter of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán cited in Juhász, 2017: 40). This argument is highly deniable since the European Union was not as friendly as it promoted: it brought the issue to its security agenda and took protectionist measures like Dublin Regulations[5] and Refugee Deal with Turkey[6] to block the migratory flow. However, these measures were not as aggressive, and discourses were more refugee-friendly.

Actions spoke louder than words in Hungarian example as well: walls were reified starting from 2015, when the government decided to close its border with Serbia and moreover, to the border with Serbia and Croatia, they erected steel and barbed wire fences whereas, with Romania, it is still under consideration.

[4] In 2015, France and Germany suggested EU to have obligatory quotas to enforce member states to accept a certain number of refugees. Hungary was one of the main opponents of this idea (Guardian, 2015).
[5] This regulation basically identifies which member state is responsible from the asylum-seekers and according to this regulation, the first entering country is responsible for the examination of the asylum-seeker (EU Commission)
[6] In 2016, European Union and Turkey agreed on returning irregular refugees and asylum-seekers back to Turkey in the case if their application was inadmissible (European Parliament).

Politics of fear played a crucial role in the Hungarian electoral campaigns. In addition to the claims of existential threat, the government used economic insecurities of society. Orbán declared that, instead of immigrants, the funding should be received by the poor Hungarian families (Juhász, 2017: 40), and he promised that the resources of Hungary will belong to Hungarians. The government also claimed that the migrants will come and take "the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians" (Thorleifsson, 2017: 312). Orbán's re-election in 2018 meant the justification of the anti-immigrant policies and demagogues; therefore, this outcome declared, the European Union and the international community should respect the nation's will. At the end of the day, even in the securitisation of migration, policymaking is a two-level nested game[7] (Putnam, 1988).

Another aspect of this securitisation was the labelling of the migrants by the media. In align with the Orbán's discourses, media channels 'framed[8]' the issue (Entman, 1993). Orbán declared that "the overwhelming majority of people are not refugees because they are not coming from a war-stricken area" (*The New York Times*, 2015) and through vague generalisations, reflected them as if they are opportunistic job-seekers. Hungarian media used the words "refugee", "asylum-seeker", "migrant" etc. interchangeably regardless of the social and legal differences between them (Kiss, 2016: 59). These media outlets showed no effort and intention to be politically correct. Over and above, channels like Magyar Nemzet, TV2 and M1 occasionally called them as "economic immigrants" or "for-profit immigrants" (ibid). Although international media tried to contest the existing frame directed by the governing elite, re-election may be interpreted as the sign that international conscience failed to cascade[9] the frame.

Conclusion

In the essay, the link between the politics of fear and the securitisation of migration was questioned, and through the Hungarian model of securitisation, this link tried to be illustrated. First, the politics of fear was discussed. As Furedi (2007) claims, fear is a part of this century's sentience, coherently, it is a window of opportunity in security policies and encounters with securitisation. Since this essay focused on the securitisation of migration, the existential threat that is necessary for the birth of securitisation act was deeply linked to the representation of migrants as communities to be afraid of. For that cause, the Self and the Other concept was explained and connected to the declaration of migrants as *persona non grata* due to the Othering process. Othering works on the basis of underlying cultural, religious, societal and identity-related differences. In

[7] This is a political model that is used to explain how domestic politics may affect international politics and negotiations.
[8] Framing refers to the relationship between the governing elites and the media outlets. When a policy arises, government has the opportunity to control how it is reflected to the people and this is called framing.
[9] In some cases of framing, a compotent party arises and tries to deconstruct the framed issue. When the existing frame is reinforced for a change, it cascades.

the Hungarian example, Othering was a crucial part of the announcement of Muslim refugees as an existential threat to the "brethren". To illustrate this process, discourse analysis of Orbán's rhetoric took place. In addition, the role of the media in the securitisation of migration was discussed and concluded that the governing elite's framing enacted in this process.

The Orbán government, beyond being insouciant to the refugee problems, first, demonised them in discourse and then revitalised the speech-act with physically wired fences to the borders. This policy was consistent with his dystopic 'promises', because, after 2015, the number of asylum seekers in Hungary attenuated, it decreased from 177.135 to 29.432 in 2016 and eventually to 3.397 in 2017 (KSH, 2018). Furthermore, the Hungarian government legally securitised the issue, by presenting a new type of state-emergency: a Decree on "Crisis situation due to massive influx of migrants" which allowed the government to manage the "emergency" militarily without compromising (EMN, 2017: 10). It can be concluded that securitisation practices on migration were successful in Hungary, the securitising actor was able to convince the audience on the existence of an existential threat, eliminate the interference of the functional actors and frame the media. However, this consistency in the stigmatisation of refugees is far from being legitimate for the sake of the international community's responsibilities and its people.

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