

POLITICAL REFLECTION



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“ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

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World News

By Ebru Birinci

The COVID-19 Update



As of December 26, 2020, 80,3 million Covid-19 cases and 1,7 million death were recorded based on given official numbers by the governments. The Covid-19 influence has expanded throughout every aspect of our lives irreversibly. The pandemic has shown the vulnerabilities and inefficiencies of the world community and state apparatus. On the other hand, despite the neo-liberal expectations of a globalized world, people, liberals included, have laid hopes on the enlarged responsibility and control of the state in overcoming the pandemic. While stretching and loosening the restrictions, in turn, governments around the world hover between the economy and public health.

While the second wave of Covid-19 grabbed many countries and a highly-infectious coronavirus has been seen in many countries, the latest vaccine developments have stimulated recent vaccine purchasing race mostly among the rich countries; by December, worldwide confirmed purchases reached 7.2 billion doses. In November, Pfizer and its partner BioNTech announced the development of a vaccine that is 95 percent effective, being the third of the officially approved vaccines after Russian and Chinese's Covid-19 vaccines. Reportedly, the effectiveness of the Covid-19 vaccines varies considerably: Pfizer/BioNTech - 95%, Moderna - 94.1%,

Oxford/AstraZeneca - 70%, Sinovac - 50%, which can be worrisome for those who live in the countries that preferred purchasing Sinovac.

The picture of vaccine purchase per country, no wonder, indicate the disturbing global inequality. For example, total vaccination coverage of some countries like Canada, Australia, the United States, Britain, and the EU exceeds their population, however, vaccine purchase of other countries with weak economies cannot even cover half of their population, such as Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia, not to mention other underdeveloped countries. The rich countries reserved most of the available doses, especially those of Pfizer-BioNtech, for the near future. Such a trend of egoism among the countries is well-understood within the concept of rising nationalism in international relations, yet it is likely to bear more tension and conflict in the future especially with regarding to national health security.

Climate Change



The five years old commitments, made within the framework of the Paris Agreement, did not prevent the world from experiencing the hottest five years recorded since then. Besides, the reduction of carbon emissions due to the Covid-19 lockdown across the planet falls short of expectations for the future. According to the latest UN Emission Gap Report, published on 9 December 2020, “CO₂ emissions could decrease by about 7 percent in 2020 (range: 2–12 percent) compared with 2019 emission levels due to COVID-19, with a smaller drop expected in GHG emissions as non-CO₂ is likely to be less affected. However, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs continue to rise”. The report also draws attention to the levels of contribution to total GHG emissions among the world countries. China, the USA, the EU, and the United Kingdom and India, the top emitters, have contributed to 55 percent of the total GHG emissions without LUC (Land-use change). The increasing number of countries committed to net-zero emission goals has

become one of the most important developments of 2020. The election of Joe Biden, whose election pledge was bringing the US to the Paris Agreement again, has built up some hope, too. Biden also had a climate plan that suggests adapting a net-zero GHG target by 2050.

2020 US Election: Joe Biden- the 46th US President



The 2020 US Presidential election has been an event, to which great importance has been attached. It could bring an end to the Trump period, which has challenged the western liberal values promoted by the US for years. Or in the case of the re-election of Donald Trump as president, his arbitrary decisions, protectionist and populist policies would continue damaging these values, attracting other world leaders. Trump took many unilateral steps, undermining the US leading role in the global governance; favored anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant policies; developed personal relations with political leaders, ignoring institutional and diplomatic traditions of the US; failed to address the Covid-19 pandemic, which assured his defeat in the 2020 elections.

Before the elections were held, some were concerned about the scenario in which Trump refuses to leave the White House if he lost the elections. Indeed, Trump has claimed electoral fraud to overturn the election results. It is unlikely, nevertheless, to witness a serious obstruction in the transition of the presidency since Trump is losing support after the Electoral College ratified Joe Biden's victory.

Joe Biden comes from the American establishment, against whom Trump waged a war and did harm its core values, which are directly linked to the

neoliberal world order. Biden has promised both “to build back together”, addressing the domestic problems such as economic inequalities, racism, corruption, etc. He also assured bringing the US back to the international arena, rejoining in the international organizations and agreements, and strengthening historical alliances. Biden and his team are well aware of decreasing US popularity across the world and committed to reassume its status as a global leader. Offering reasonable proposals and management to contain the global problems, such as global warming and the pandemic, seems to be central issues that Biden would address in his efforts to restore the US global leadership status. On the other hand, regarding China, Biden does not seem to follow an accommodationist policy; he would likely to adopt a more assertive policy vis-à-vis the main challengers of the US; China, and also Russia; the latter benefited considerably from the Trump administration’s foreign policy in its own efforts to secure its place among great powers.

Crisis in Ethiopia Deepens



In November 2020, the long-standing tension, increased since the suspension of the polls in March due to the Covid-19 pandemic, between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front turned into an armed conflict, which also triggered an international problem with the involvement of Eritrea in the conflict. Tigrayan leaders have alleged that Eritrea is involved in the conflict to support the Ethiopian government and attacked several Eritrean targets. Given the historical rivalry between the Tigray and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, such diffusion of the internal conflict of Ethiopia towards Eritrea came as no surprise. Eritrea obtained de facto independence from Ethiopia in 1991. The common history of Ethiopia and Eritrea deepens and ramifies due to the Tigray region of

Ethiopia. Ethiopian EPRDF, dominated by the Tigrayan people, and Eritrea had fought over the border-lines (Eritrea borders the Tigray region) between 1998 and 2000, yet the peace agreement could only be signed in 2018. The Tigrayan people lost their power and privileged positions after Abiy Ahmed has become the prime minister of Ethiopia in 2018. Abiy Ahmed promised democratic reforms and initiated a centralized system for Ethiopia instead of ethnic-based parties, and reached a deal with Eritrea, which brought him the Nobel peace prize. The Tigray People's Liberation Front refused to join Abiy Ahmed's non-ethnic prosperity party, claiming that the system would lead to authoritarianism. The final election conflict between the Ethiopian government and Tigray has escalated when Tigray regional authorities decided to hold their own election. Although there is not much clarity about the situation on the ground, it is known that the armed conflict already resulted in the killings of civilians and an Ethiopian refugee problem in Sudan.

Ceasefire Agreement is Reached in Nagorno-Karabakh



In September 2020, the armed conflict, one of the frozen conflicts of the post-Cold War world, escalated in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and Armenia. The Ceasefire Agreement was signed on November 10, by the Azerbaijanian President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War has many characteristics in common with those signed regarding Syria and Libya, with regards to Russian and Turkish active involvement, and the use of the drones as game-changers. Since the beginning of the armed conflict, Russia positioned itself by the international law, under which Karabakh is accepted as Azerbaijanian

territory, occupied by Armenia, and suggested that Azerbaijan was fighting within its own territories, which does not require any Russian intervention. However, Turkey has shown its direct support to Azerbaijan. The changing rules and balances of international relations have delivered Azerbaijan the chance to act to alter the status quo, and it proved to be successful, to a certain extent, making significant territorial gains. Turkey, on the other hand, secured a stronger position in the South Caucasus, proved its strong dialogue with Russia, avoiding any serious confrontation. The war, in the meantime, has become another scene of an extended Turkey-France confrontation. France, being a co-chair of the Minsk Group and having a strong Armenian diaspora, has criticized the Azerbaijanian military operation and Turkish policies towards it, although its efforts could not reverse the situation in favor of Armenia. Russia, for its part, could increase its military presence in the region and promote its role as a must-be peace-broker, which has strengthened in Syria and Libya. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, who is under strong public pressure to resign, has been the one who has lost the most from the war.

Quad Cooperation against China Strengthens



On October 6, 2020, the foreign ministers of Japan, Australia, India, and the US hold the second ministerial meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which has taken shape since the cooperation of the four countries to deal with the consequences of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004. Nevertheless, the cooperation has not been developed until late 2017, when the Trump administration embraced "a free and open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) concept of Japan. Increasing concerns of the US and its allies over the Chinese assertiveness in the region have expedited the process.

The Quad seeks to prevent Chinese domination in the region and balance against any aggression from China. The representatives of countries reaffirm the Quad's strong support for ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional

architecture. 2020 has been the most active year of the Quad with a handful of multilateral and bilateral meetings of the Quad countries. On November 3, the Quad countries navies began to conduct annual Malabar drills in the Bay of Bengal. Beyond the great power competition with the US, China has uneasy relations with the other Quad countries for different reasons, too: A military stand-off between China and India on a disputed land border for several months worsened diplomatic relations with Australia (DEAR PROF RAHMAN, check if the author means Australia or India?) which ended up with Chinese trade sanctions, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan, around which the parties are constantly increasing their military presence.

UK and the EU Reach a Trade Deal



Only a week before the deadline, the UK and the EU signed a 1240-page long trade deal, hoping to bring more certainty to the European economy and prevent economic turmoil. According to the agreement, signed after four and a half years, when the UK voted to leave the EU, the parties can continue to trade in goods without tariffs or quotas starting on January 1, 2021. Both sides, trying to secure their vital economic interests, seem to be satisfied with the terms. The agreement limits the fishing right of EU nations in British waters by 25 percent, brings visa requirements for those EU citizens who want to live or work in the UK; the UK citizens, too, lose some working rights in the EU, furthermore, export and import will be subject to customs and other regulations.

It took three years for the UK to leave the political structure of the EU. Britain wanted to take back control and consolidate its sovereignty; the EU, on the other hand, tried to ensure European standards. The trade deal was seen unlikely for the most, and many predicted a no-deal Brexit scenario that would have been chaotic and economically detrimental for Britain. The UK ports have already been suffering from transport suspensions due to the coronavirus mutation in the UK. Such pandemic-

related economic problems seem to compel it to reach a trade deal with the EU.

Macron Wants to Reform Islam



Islam and Muslims have long been a central topic of public debates in France more than any other European country. Distinct occasions, from anti-Islamic implications or rhetoric to violent attacks of terrorists or individual radical Islamists, end up with heated public debates regularly. The latest chain of events followed the murder of Samuel Paty, a 47-years-old teacher who showed the Islam Prophet Mohammed's caricature during a class about freedom of thought. In the aftermath, French President Emmanuel Macron, who called Islam a religion that is in crisis all over the world today, announced his anti-radicalism plan, offering reforms and restrictions of Islamic practices in France. In fact, Macron has been working on such a reform plan for Islam for some time. Although he has said that he seeks to counter not Islam, but political Islam in France, he could not avoid the criticism. Both his determination to use governmental apparatus for his anti-radicalization policies and his language fueled a public backlash in Muslim societies; some criticism has also been raised in non-Muslim press with regard to increasing tension among Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Muslim leaders have criticized Macron for giving ground to radical Islamic ideas and feeding Islamophobia across Europe. However, the members of the group that support Macron's policies argue that they feel the radical Islam threatens their lives and freedom. However, despite the plenitude of addresses made, so far, no political leader from no country, ideology, or religion could handle addressing the deep-rooted problem of religious polarization without provoking *the Other* or instigating more extremism within their audience.

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An Overview of Turkish Foreign Policy as 2020 Ends

Dr Emrah Atar*

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The balance of the world is changing rapidly, and the ability of medium-sized or developing countries such as Turkey to keep up with this change is becoming more critical every day. First, we should note that the orientation that we have observed in recent years is gradually strengthening. We are going through a period when the share of military tools and methods in the running of foreign policy is gradually expanding.

Additionally, in this process, where nationalism and populism are strengthened, economic struggles grow quickly, and globalization loses ground. This strengthens introverted and anti-alien tendencies.

In today's international system, which leads states to doubt each other, wars between great powers have already settled into focus, perhaps not direct wars through military means but through technology, culture, information and trade.

Admittedly, if crises and wars surround you on all sides, and you also face essential challenges in terms of your fundamental rights and interests, you cannot have the luxury of accepting and tolerating what is happening with a naive approach.

The fact that Turkey acts with increasing self-confidence and independence in its relations with the world is a situation that every citizen of the Republic of Turkey will welcome with applause. However, when we look at the overall picture, it would be to go beyond the boundaries of reality to say that everything is working within an ideal framework in Turkey's foreign policy. As in 2019, 2020 has been very challenging for Turkey. From the point of view of Turkish foreign policy, it seems that there will be many issues that will be inherited by 2021 from 2020. Along with the pandemic and natural disasters such as the earthquakes in eastern Elazığ province and western İzmir province and the avalanche disaster in eastern Van province, Turkey continued where it left off without taking a step back in its foreign policy.

** Interview Editor
of the Political
Reflection
Magazine.*

The current situation of Turkish foreign policy is one of the most challenging, serious and problematic periods not only in recent years but also probably the entire Republican period in general. At this point, we can address some of the issues that remain in our minds in 2020.

Regional Disputes

The Eastern Mediterranean tension and rivalry are the main issues. Turkey took necessary and significant steps in 2020 to address this issue, which involves global actors along with regional ones, especially Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and France.

The drilling ships such as Yavuz and Fatih that enable Turkey to conduct drilling activities on its continental shelf began to operate.

In the meantime, the agreement signed with Libya to limit maritime jurisdiction prevented our country from being squeezed into a narrow area along its coast in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has increased drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with its domestic ships in the last two years. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also announced that Turkey had made the most extensive natural gas discovery in its history in the Black Sea.

Although the amount discovered will increase further in the days ahead, there is also talk of important news in the Eastern Mediterranean on the horizon.

The tension on the morning of Sept. 27 between Azerbaijan and Armenia over occupied Nagorno-Karabakh soon turned into a conflict. After a long struggle, Armenian President Nikol Pashinian announced that they had suffered a bitter defeat.

The biggest supporter of Baku's insistence on reclaiming its occupied territories was undoubtedly the Turkish government and its citizens. The Financial Times, one of the world's leading newspapers, wrote a comprehensive analysis of the influence of Turkey by stating that drones and missiles worked for Azerbaijan against Armenia and announced to the world that Azerbaijan has a bigger advantage with the support of Turkey, both diplomatically and militarily.

The new president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was announced after two rounds of elections. Former TRNC President Mustafa Akıncı entered the election as the favourite but lost to former Prime Minister Ersin Tatar, the candidate supported by Ankara. Although the election has been widely discussed, one of the most talked-about issues has been the issue of the closed town of Maraş (Varosha). In Northern Cyprus, a part of Maraş, which had been closed for settlement since 1974, was opened for public use. This situation has especially disturbed the Greek side, or the circles close to the Greek Cypriot administration. Nevertheless, neither the TRNC nor the Turkish government retreated from this step, and Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chair Devlet Bahçeli even visited this area after the elections.

The COVID-19 Impact

The coronavirus outbreak, which first appeared in December 2019, soon became the No. 1 agenda item of global public opinion. The outbreak was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO). Due to the pandemic, many countries, including Turkey, implemented strict security measures. Economic activity slowed or even halted under the restrictions, while international borders were closed for a while around the world. Millions of people have closed their homes because of curfew restrictions and quarantine practices. In this process, Turkey, which has been one of the significant examples for many countries with its health infrastructure, also received public appreciation for its humanitarian assistance throughout the world.

The Idlib Attack

In early February 2020, 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike by the Russian-backed Damascus regime in Idlib, Syria. After the attack, NATO convened an extraordinary meeting at Turkey's request, but no results were achieved. Turkey has increased its effectiveness in the region and has tried to respond to the attack both on the front and diplomatically. It opened its European doors to migrants, especially unsettling the European Union and Greece. As Greece resorted to measures to block the entry of migrants into the country, tense relations between Turkey and Greece were further strained. Thousands of migrants flocked to the borders, and Greek forces' inhumane responses cost some migrants their lives.

The French Position

However, if you name the biggest problem Turkey faced in its 2020 foreign policy, there will surely be only one answer. Whenever Turkey takes any responsibility in the international arena, France is the first country to try to block it. As Turkey shifted the balance in Libya, France became the most important supporter of Libya's putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar. France was again the first country that sent its support to Armenia against Azerbaijan and accepted the declaration of independence for Nagorno-Karabakh in its Senate. French President Emmanuel Macron openly criticized Turkey's gas exploration efforts and TRNC policy and openly supported Greece's standard policies with the Greek Cypriot administration.

Turkey's regional achievements in Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, the TRNC and recently Nagorno-Karabakh can be seen as a defeat for France in terms of two aspects.

First, Turkey is becoming a serious obstacle and competitor in France's policies in the Middle East, Mediterranean and Africa. Secondly, this can be considered a military, diplomatic, commercial and strategic defeat from the point of view of France.

A Diplomatic Occasion

Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, a Turkish ambassador assumed the presidency of the 75th General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) in the period of 2020-2021. The election of Volkan Bozkır, the former EU minister and the chairperson of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission in Ankara, will play a valuable role in determining the issues to be discussed at the UNGA, focused on Turkey. Turning this situation into an opportunity may be the first step that Turkey will take in the coming years. The outcome of this development will soon be apparent.

In the light of all these events, Turkey needs to repair some relations by taking more firm steps, increase its number of friends and conduct its relations with the outside world in diversity and balance by pursuing policies aimed at both the West and the East. The noble questions that need to be asked here are who pushes the issues to military methods, whether military methods are really needed, to what extent space is opened for diplomacy and to what extent a correct route is drawn that will provide diplomatic solutions to foreign policy. Turkey has had to face severe problems and has taken foreign policy steps that prioritize its own interests in the face of difficult actors such as the U.S. and Russia.

It also proved that it is an independent country and that it can stand up and move forward in the face of pressure, as in the cases of Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. After the coronavirus pandemic, new areas of opportunities have been opened up in Turkish foreign policy. In addition to its growing number of embassies, Turkey has already increased its capacity to operate abroad in recent years with institutions such as the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and the Maarif Foundation of Turkey. Now Turkey needs to recognize this crisis as an opportunity and shape these institutions in a more coordinated way according to the new global realities.

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China and Turkey: Escaping the Trap of the “Uyghur Issue”

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The recurrent topic when considering the importance of improving multi-dimensional Turkish-Chinese relations is the complex issue of the Uyghur people, the Turkic and Muslim minority in China's Xinjiang province (XUAR)¹ which is ethnically and culturally close to Turkey and maintain a special relationship with the Turkish state. Moreover, many in Turkey even regard them as “forefathers” of Turkism and East Turkestan as the ancestral home of Turks, so Uyghurs are of crucial importance in the framework of the so-called “Pan-Turkic project”². In that respect, since Turkish decision-makers have had difficulties reconciling their ideological rhetoric and the demands of contemporary realpolitik, the Uyghur conflict remains one of the key problems in Chinese-Turkish multi-faceted relations.

However, having acknowledged this clash and its political implications, President Erdoğan had decided to adopt a new, more conciliatory stance³, which he launched during his visit to China in 2015 when he unequivocally condemned terrorism and urged Uyghurs to integrate into Chinese society. This new strategy was based on two pillars: the first is “taming” the Uyghurs via the intervention of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) by using religion as medium for the integration of the Uyghurs in Chinese society. By doing so, Erdoğan was hoping to increase Turkey's influence among the Xinjiang Uyghurs and to satisfy his constituency at home by showing that the Uyghurs enjoy religious freedom. The second is to increase Turkey's influence in China by launching projects in the educational, trade, and military fields. Additionally, by taking these initiatives, Erdoğan has moved to neutralize the discord that has existed between what Turkey's national interests call for and what the “Pan-Islamic” ideological rhetoric of its foreign policy, based on “ethnic

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¹ The acronym stands for Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region which is the official denomination; however, pro-secessionist Uyghurs refer to the region always as *Serqiy Turkestan* or East Turkestan (Fatih Furtun <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/114567/Turkish-Chinese-Relations-in-the-Shadow-of-the-Uyghur-Problem.pdf>, accessed in November 2020).

² According to Calfiero and Viala, (<https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-turkey-relations-grow-despite-differences-over-Uighurs>, accessed in November 2020) historically, since the Ottoman period, Pan-Turkish voices promoting the unification with Turkic people across the Middle East, Central Asia and China, under Ottoman and later Turkish leadership were a constant reality on the Turkish political scene, not only among the conservative political establishment and nationalist spectrum.

³ In sharp contrast, previously, referring to incidents happened in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang, in 2009, President Erdoğan reacted harshly labelling the situation in strong terms as “almost genocide”.

solidarity", together with his self-assigned role as the protector of "oppressed Muslims", conjures.

Furthermore, due to actual geopolitical dynamics, in recent years the Sino-Turkish relationship appears to be increasingly troubled by the Uyghur terrorism issue which has adopted transnational features⁴. Turkey's long-standing sympathy for the cause of Uyghurs has combined with the escalation of the Syrian crisis to produce some concerning issues for Beijing. Prominently, China is critical about Turkey's pro-asylum policy, arguing that most Uyghur asylum seekers are affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and are eager to fight ISIS in Syria and in Iraq. According to the fight against the "three evils" (terrorism, separatism, extremism), Beijing regards these Chinese citizens of Uyghur origin as a threat against its national security, fearing that these fighters will return to Xinjiang to carry out terrorist attacks and pursue secessionist ideas. Chinese demand that the Turks stop the inflow of Uyghurs into their territory⁵ and recent media reports blame Ankara for the controversial practice of even assisting Beijing in extradition and repatriation of Uyghur dissidents through third countries. Beside legitimate counter-terrorism cooperation, those actions could raise concerns if the nature of the Sino-Turkish relationship is changing towards increased Turkish (political) dependence from China. Another plausible explanation could be that compliance is dictated by the almost existential need for more Chinese capital injections to keep the strained economy and national currency afloat.⁶ Erdoğan's silence about severe Chinese violation of human rights and repression of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang could be interpreted as a further indication of such worrying tendencies. On the other side, since the Chinese narrative is that their relations with Turkey depend dominantly on their attitude towards the Uyghur problem, perhaps such Turkish attitude could be explained as mere pragmatism.

On the positive note, cooperation in the framework of the comprehensive BRI is another element which could have beneficial influence both on overall Sino-Turkish relations⁷ and on easing tensions regarding the "Uyghur issue", through economic development in the Xinjiang province, the China's gateway to the Silk Road. In that sense, if such approach of "soft

⁴ Michael Clarke, "Xinjiang and the Trans-nationalization of Uyghur Terrorism: Cracks in the 'New Silk Road'?" (www.theasanforum.org) accessed in November 2020.

⁵ It is estimated that Turkey in recent years has offered a shelter to around 50.000 Uyghurs who managed to escape China.

⁶ The activation of the yuan-lira swap line, albeit the agreement was signed in 2012, occurred for the first time just before local elections in Turkey in March 2019.

⁷ Despite clear enthusiasm, Turkish-Chinese cooperation in the BRI framework is still at an early stage and for Turkey the BRI currently is more about expectations than real, on the-ground projects, however, with some positive developments in infrastructure and port cooperation. Whether these expectations can be turned into results will depend on several factors beyond the intentions of both sides, such as regional geopolitics, the state of the global economy in the post-pandemic period, and the repercussions of the new Cold War-like form of great power competition between the US and China. Also, from Turkish perspective it is crucial that BRI synergize, rather than compete, with Turkey's own "Middle Corridor Initiative".

Sinification" (as opposed to much harder methods of preserving stability in the region often used by the Chinese security *apparatus*⁸) will show some progress, Turkey's kinship with the Uyghur could be considered as an asset in the long run, rather than a liability.

Although President Erdoğan's promising "new China strategy" paved the way for solid, stable relations between Turkey and China, a few years later, both domestic and external developments are confronting Erdoğan with a completely different scenario. Since the failed coup attempt in July 2016, Turkey has embarked itself in the process of redesigning and diversifying the map of foreign policy partnerships by gradually "de-Westernizing" its alliances and trying to foster cooperation by looking more to the East, the tendency which is likely to continue in the months to come. Further estrangement from the EU and its orbit due to the prolonged row with both Brussels and important countries as Germany, Austria and Netherlands, while waiting for more clear signals from traditional allies like Washington (unlikely, giving the result of the US Presidential elections) and NATO, will favour the continuation of the "eastward shift" in Turkey's foreign policy priorities, including opportunities for more substantial cooperation with China and building genuine "strategic partnership", a process which has begun in 2010.

However, to achieve such an ambitious goal, Sino-Turkish relations should be developed along the lines of broadening the space of common interests and mutual understanding mainly by recognizing, although the Uyghur issue has long been a major weak point in Ankara-Beijing relations, that it serves both countries' strategic priorities not to confine this one issue to define and shape overall bilateral relations.

If both Turkey and China can accommodate core national interests and establish stronger political ties, expanding cooperation mostly in the economic and security domain, will not only benefit both but also have a great impact on regional stability and global governance, where China and Turkey are quickly becoming increasingly important actors.

⁸ We refer to the thorny issue of around 400 internment camps (the official Chinese term is "vocational educational and training centers") where allegedly around 1 million Uyghurs are unlawfully detained suffering significant abuses of human rights.



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US Sanctions on Turkey's Defense Industry Might Backfire, Here is Why!

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On December 14, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on NATO ally Turkey with the pretext of buying Russia's most advanced air defense system, the S-400. This measure came only three days after Congress approved defense legislation that mandated the imposition of sanctions. It rested on Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

As part of this section's requirement, at least five out of the 12 sanctions described in Section 235 of CAATSA should be imposed on whoever engaged in significant transactions with Russia's defense sector.¹ Trump's administration chose to target Turkey's Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) and a number of its key figures, including the Head of SSB, Ismail Demir.

The sanctions targeting the SSB prohibit granting specific U.S. export licenses and technology transfer, loans more than \$10 million over a period of a year by U.S. financial institutions, export-import bank assistance, in addition to opposing international loans to the Turkish entity. It also imposes full blocking sanctions and visa restrictions on Ismail Demir and others, including SSB's vice president, SSB's Head of the Department of Air Defense and Space, and Program Manager for SSB's Regional Air Defense Systems Directorate.²

The SSB emerged in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup. It inherited the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) and continued its mission under the Turkish Presidency's auspices to develop a modern indigenous defense industry and modernize the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).

From 1999 to 2018, Turkey moved from being the third-largest importer of weapons to become the 14th-largest defense exporter in the world. According to 2019 figures, the exports of the national defense sector in Turkey surged by 40.2% to reach \$3.1 billion compared to \$2.2 billion in 2018, thus increasing the total sales by 19.5% to reach around \$10.9 billion compared to \$8.8 in 2018.³

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Although officials in the U.S. claim that the current sanctions are not meant to undermine Turkey's national defense industry or jeopardize the Turkish armed forces' military capabilities or combat readiness, facts may suggest otherwise.

For years, the US has been preventing Turkey from meeting its critical defense needs even when relations between the two NATO allies were pretty good. In 2012, former Turkish President Abdullah Gul complained that Washington stalled for a long time not to deliver advanced drones to Ankara.⁴

Drones were crucial to Ankara to counter-terrorism, particularly the Kurdish PKK, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organization in the US, NATO, and the EU. Washington blocked selling drones to Ankara when Turkey's army needed it most. This decision has ultimately revolutionized Turkey's drone industry under President Erdogan. In 2016 and during his speech in the Atlantic Council, Ismail Demir touched on this issue when he said,⁵ "I do not want to be sarcastic, but I would like to thank [the U.S. government] for any of the projects that it did not approve because it forced us to develop our own systems."

This step positively impacted Turkey's defense capabilities, military activism, and foreign policy capacity. It gave Ankara the upper hand in the geopolitical standoffs in theatres in the Levant region, North Africa, and southern Caucasus when some of its NATO allies seemed to be standing on the wrong side of the history in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno Karabakh by supporting terrorist group affiliated with PKK, warlord Haftar, and the Armenian occupation.

What reinforces the impression that Washington is trying to constrain Turkey and deprive it of the necessary advancement in the defense industry to defend its national security and interests in one of the most unstable regions in the world is the fact that key members of Congress, either individually or collectively, have quietly frozen all major U.S. arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years starting from 2018.⁶

The US-backed down from a done deal with Turkey, a joint program member to produce the most advanced multi-role stealth fighter jet in the world (F-35), which required Washington to deliver Ankara 30 F-35 jets⁷ even though it had already paid around \$1.5 billion so far.⁸ Washington blocked the jets' delivery and removed Ankara from the joint production program with the pretext of the S-400 system.

The S-400 saga⁹ started when the US refused to sell the Patriot missile to its NATO ally Turkey prompting Ankara to turn to Russia to acquire the S-400. The US officials argue that no NATO member should acquire Russian-made systems. They also claimed that the S-400 constitutes a security threat and can compromise the F-35 technology. Yet, they repeatedly refused Turkey's request to form a joint committee to put this claim on the test.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Washington had demonstrated its resolve to "fully implement CAATSA" and "will not tolerate significant transactions with Russia's defense sector." Yet, the term "significant" seems vague, which makes it susceptible to political games.

The US's main argument in this issue seems more like Swiss cheese with wholes big enough to take in the S-400 system and several Russian defense products on top of it. Several NATO allies already have Russian-made systems. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and other members all employ various Russian weapon systems.

In fact, Greece, an EU member also, was the first NATO member to acquire an advanced Russian defense system in the 90s, the S-300. Athens tested the system operationally at the end of 2013.¹⁰ Along with the S-300, Greece owns several Russian-made systems. In 2015, almost two years before Turkey is forced to acquire S-400, Athens engaged with Russia in talks to buy new missiles for its S-300 and do some maintenance for the system.¹¹

Many U.S. allies outside the NATO alliance are also heavily engaged with Russia's defense sector, such as India, Egypt, UAE, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. None of these countries was sanctioned by the US, which calls into question the US's motives to sanction Turkey and raises questions about Washington's credibility and its double standards policy.

Several divergent views emerged recently to assess the possible impact of the new sanctions on Turkey's defense industry. Some characterized these sanctions as relatively light, with no serious impact on the defense industry because they only target the SSB and not the whole sector. However, others argue that these sanctions can undermine some of the advanced defense projects that are mainly dependent on licenses or tech components from the U.S.

Reuters estimates that this measure could affect contracts worth \$1.5 billion to \$2.3 billion, around 5% of U.S.-Turkish trade.¹² It might also discourage other interested parties and prevent them from dealing with the SSB. If these are among the real goals of the American sanctions, then depending on whether these sanctions will be expanded later and extended for more than one year, they could slow down the defense sector's rise and disrupt its progress.

This would not be a preferable outcome for Ankara. Yet, it will forcibly push it to seek more autocracy and to continue exploring ways to be more independent in the defense industry. This has been the case since the 70s. The American arms embargo on NATO ally Turkey in 1975 against the background of the Cyprus crisis had led to a significant transformation in the critical thinking of the political and defense elites in Turkey and ultimately led to the birth of the national defense industry under the SSM, and later on the SSB.

If the current US sanctions are intended to undermine the national defense industry, jeopardize the military capabilities, or combat readiness of Turkey, there is a great chance that they might backfire as history tells us.

¹ SECTION 231 OF THE COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT OF 2017, The U.S. Department of State. www.state.gov/countering-americas-adversaries-through-sanctions-act-of-2017/sections-231-and-

235/#:~:text=IMPOSITION%20OF%20SANCTIONS%20WITH%20RESPECT,GOVERNMENT%20OF%20THE%20RUSSIAN%20FEDERATION.

² CAATSA Section 231 “Imposition of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries”, The U.S. Department of State, 14 December 2020. www.state.gov/caatsa-section-231-imposition-of-sanctions-on-turkish-presidency-of-defense-industries/

³ Ali Bakeer, Turkey’s Defense Industry in the Covid Age, Center for Global Policy, 10 July 2020. <https://cgpolicy.org/articles/turkeys-defense-industry-in-the-covid-age/>

⁴ Turkish Bid for Drones Stalls in Congress, President Gul Says, Bloomberg, 22 May 2012. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-22/turkish-bid-for-drones-stalls-in-congress-president-gul-says

⁵ Turkey no longer interested in buying US drones: Turkish official, Hurriyet Daily News, 27 May 2016. www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-no-longer-interested-in-buying-us-drones-turkish-official---99731

⁶ Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years, Defense News, 12 August 2020. www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/08/12/congress-has-secretly-blocked-us-arms-sales-to-turkey-for-nearly-two-years/

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⁸ Six F-35 Jets Meant for Turkey to be Handed over to US Air Force, Defense World, 12 June 2020. www.defenseworld.net/news/27193/Six_F_35_Jets_Meant_for_Turkey_to_be_Handed_over_to_US_Air_Force#.X-CsLekzY1I

⁹ Ali Bakeer, How will the S-400 vs F-35 saga between Turkey and the USA end?, The New Arab, 23 July 2019. <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/7/23/how-will-turkey-and-usas-missile-saga-end>

¹⁰ Greece conducts first test launch of S-300 missile system, Airforce Technology, 16 December 2013. www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsgreece-conducts-first-test-launch-of-s-300-missile-system-4147293/

¹¹ Greece in talks with Russia to buy missiles for S-300 systems: RIA, Reuters, 15 April 2015. www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nuclear-greece-missiles-idUSKBN0N62A720150415

¹² UPDATE 1-Sanctioned Turkish defence industry chief expects U.S. ties to survive, Reuters, 15 December 2020. www.reuters.com/article/usa-turkey-sanctions/update-1-sanctioned-turkish-defence-industry-chief-expects-u-s-ties-to-survive-idINL1N2IV17I

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Interview with Professor Scott Lucas

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Question: *Prof. Scott Lucas, thank you so much for accepting our interview request for the Political Reflection Magazine. It is a privilege for me to conduct this interview with you. As one of your former students at Birmingham University, it is an honour to hear your thoughts about the US election 2020. I have so many questions to pose but little time to cover all. Since you are constantly appearing on major international TV channels about American politics and streaming daily news on your own website, anyone can follow you on <https://eaworldview.com> for your further thoughts if we cannot find enough time to cover all issues.*

Well, let me begin with my first question.

As an American citizen and a scholar working on American politics, have you ever witnessed this kind of election campaign and results? What is unique about the election in 2020? Why was it so popular in the rest of the world? For instance, many news channels worldwide covered the US Election nearly all days and even many ordinary people involved in the discussion about the American election.

Scott Lucas: It is a great honour to be here. So, thank you so much. You know it is very impressive what you are doing in CESRAN International and for Political Reflection Magazine. It has been impressive what you have done in all areas of international politics, including US politics. However, your question reminds me that when I moved from being an academic to also working as a journalist back in 2008, we started what was then Enduring American (EA) (it is now eaworldview.com). Nevertheless, back in 2008, it launched on the evening of the election and that, of course, was the Obama vs McCain election, and we thought that was historic because it was the first black American candidate for president and he triumphed. In the months after that, you know his inauguration whether you have got more than a million people that are watching it was like this idea this America coming out of the Iraq War but still in the middle of the Iraq War he was like things can change for the better in the US.

This was a historic election 12 years later but in a very different way because whereas the Obama election 2008 was not just that I have hope and change without the idea of responsibility, that idea of competence, and that idea of an American Community working together. This election was very much going to be around that figure of Donald Trump which is so different, and it is not just what we might say that Donald Trump is not necessarily

competent and what he has done as president. It is not necessarily that he has not exactly shown an engagement with the issues you and I want to talk about because it does not matter to Trump; it did not matter to Trump. In the idea of this was us vs them politics that it was his quote base MAGA (Make America Great Again) versus those that he thought with the enemies and the real question was going to be we thought that would be resolved on Election night would that message went out. Because when you talk about Trump in terms of US versus them, it is not just his supporters versus his opponents. It is Trump versus the American system, and it is Donald Trump versus the courts, versus Congress, versus the fake news media, versus professors like you and me.

It is Donald Trump versus everybody and that type of politics I think is the greatest challenge to the American system in combination with issues like Trump-Russia, Trump-Ukraine, government shutdowns, destruction of the environment, probably the most important American election in America since the American Civil War of 1860 and I am not exaggerating that for a fact I mean I honestly believe that it did not stop on Election night so what makes this a doubly historic election is that for the first time we have got a candidate who happens to be still the president who is refusing to accept the outcome of the election. You know, it is like okay I won in all caps on Twitter I won and if you say I did not win you are wrong because the election was stolen from me what makes that second part of the history so now not just Trump.

If I can define the election what makes that second historical point so significant is, he told us months ago, he will do this. Donald Trump in an interview with Fox News in July when they said when Chris Wallace interview asked “will you accept the outcome of the election” and Trump said “Well no, I do not, We will see” and then when he appointed rush through the confirmation of the Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett that she had to be on the bench before election day I want 9 Justice Supreme Court in case they have to hear a case about millions of fraudulent ballots there are not real. The Fragile balance out there is going to say that take it all the way to the Supreme Court so they could overturn the election which is precisely what we are in right now so it is almost like this would be like the crime of the American Century, but it is like the criminal saying I am going to do it, I am going to do it, try and stop me.

Question: *Because some people believed that Covid-19 played a massive role in the election results, Trump would have won the election if there was no pandemic. In fact, by obtaining around 65 million votes, Trump has done a better job than any of the previous republican candidates in history. Do you think it is because of the Trump's personality or his way of conducting politics because before and after the elections there seemed to be a really huge polarization in American society and even in the world? What did the Trump era teach us about American politics; can we say that America has divided into two big camps? More importantly, when do you think that Trump concedes the election results?*

Scott Lucas: I have been saying for months I am going to write a book about America after Trump and I am still trying to figure out the line on it because of that question that you have just raised, and that is as we speak, and there are still a few more ballots to be counted, but Joe Biden has almost 80 million votes we need to note that, but Donald Trump has 73 million. This is in a context where I thought because of coronavirus; I thought it would be extremely difficult for him to win because he is mishandled the pandemic. I mean and point-blank coronavirus does not just kill republicans or democrats it kills across the political spectrum, and the death toll is now not only more than 256 thousand it is going back up. About 1200-1400 Americans are dying a day and no sign of that stopping because of the crisis's mismanagement, pandemic, therefore the economic consequences of the pandemic, and despite the almost chaotic way in which you dealt with it. Yes, all these people voted for Trump, and you have to say why?

I think there is the general answer which we start with which is America has/was polarized before Donald Trump, that it has to do with the type of media in America where you have a polarized media environment, so it moves from being discussion media to being attacked media it has to do with the basics since the 1990s that the republicans were initially rejecting bipartisan approaches in congress this starting in 1994 with Newt Gingrich who is still around and still being very damaging on media. The idea of cooperation which has, sort of, being, of course, the republicans and the democrats go after each other, but there still were ideas that both on domestic politics and foreign policy you could find bipartisan areas where they agree. That dissolved over a generation before Trump, but I think you have to go further because I think it is too easy to say it is a polarized media about Trump that exploited that polarization. Because I have got both my parents are diehard Trump supporters in the state of Georgia which was one of the critical states in this election, some of my relatives are diehard Trump supporters. Some of them are Republicans who have broken away from Trump. The best way I can explain that to you living through it almost daily in terms of discussing politics with them is that Trump is a snake oil salesman that what he did in 2016 was he came in with many people still having the effects of the great recession of 2008-2009. He said I could make it better for you. I can make it better for you because I will stand up to the Chinese, let us blame them, or I will stand up to immigrants let's blame them, or I will stand up to other people of colour let's blame them, or I will stand up to the left whatever the left is.

So it did two things: he told people all right, things will get better if we put this guy in the office, but secondly, if things do not get better, this guy will take care of the people who have made things so wrong. Four years later, I think the lesson is that even though things did not get better for many people, it has not gotten better for America. These have been arguably the most destructive four years for America outside of wartime. Once you entrench yourself with a snake oil salesman, you get deeper and deeper in believing it has got to get better; it will get better now. The snake-oil never works, and the snake oil salesman is never in it for you; he is only in it for

himself, but you still want to believe. So, I think the importance of this for me is looking beyond Trump is you have got to recognize that merely going out and saying we will simply appeal to those people who voted for Joe Biden. We will work with them to be constructive that you cannot do just that you have got to reach out to those folks who voted for Trump and figure out was it anger, fear, resentment what is it that you can establish a line of dialogue with them. Because at the end of the day Americans whomever they voted for, have got an interest in decent housing they have got an interest in decent education for their kids, they have got an interest in decent health care especially right now to a pandemic for their families, they have got an interest in having jobs, so you have got to reach out on those common interests to those folks and not use this “us versus them” type of politics with them even as you have to recognize that Donald Trump is not going to go away. His media supporters are not going to go away, and they are going to keep practising division that makes it doubly important that you reach out to folks who have supported him and say it does not have to be this way.

Question: *Okay, thank you so much that I would come to this question because you raised a really nice point here as far as I understand that Trump did not polarize it was an already polarized system before he elected. Basically, he just touched many Americans' feelings, and he actually had some really nice maybe catchy slogan saying that “Make America Great Again” and I think the Biden administration will face more difficulties at home than abroad. I will be happy if you can elaborate on these questions with a specific reference to this Trumpism concept. I think you are just underlying this Trumpism concept because some people also believe that Trump may lose the election, and you also said that Trumpism would exist.*

Scott Lucas: So, I guess let me take that in two parts. Let me start with the positive part first. There are many folks who quite rightly say the Biden administration runs into difficulties immediately. Because even if Donald Trump is dragged out of the White House on January 20th, you have got a 50-50 senate at best, which means the vice president Kamala Harris is the deciding vote, but that is at best. I mean the republicans could have a majority of up to 52-48 depending on how these two elections go in Georgia on January the 5th then you have got a democratic majority in the house, which is diminished they still have the majority. However, it has been reduced, and so the idea of significant sweeping legislation thinks about Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first 100 days during the depression. Think about the idea of John F. Kennedy's first 100 days with all those you know both at home and abroad big messages, significant legislation. It will be challenging to say have a green new deal you know that 3 trillion dollars package that Biden and his advisors are talking about to link economic recovery with environmental protection. It is going to be difficult to expand Obama Care immediately vastly. It will be difficult to make major changes

for immigration reform immediately, but that is only part of what you can do see the power of the executive lies in that a lot of what you can do does not depend upon congress. There is a very simple first step in this, the Biden administration from day one can try to get control of the pandemic and indeed that is what they have been signalling. I mean the first meetings that Biden and Kamala Harris had after the democratic national convention in August was with medical and public health experts and some of the first meetings they had after Biden was confirmed as president-elect has been with medical public health and technology experts and the executive what we have seen is the lesson of this corona's pandemic has that the executive branch under Donald Trump has not coordinated with the states has not worked with the states, has no interest in doing so and that has led to a great deal of destruction, damage, and death.

Well, Biden and Harris can begin to reverse that, Biden and Harris can begin to work with people in terms of economic measures to limit the economic consequences even if Mitch McConnell the Senate majority leader says no stimulus package. The Biden administration can work on protecting environmental regulations restoring some of the regulations that Donald Trump has gotten rid of it can protect what we call the dreamers those seven hundred thousand they were children of undocumented immigrants that were protected under by the Obama administration, some of them are now in the armed forces, some of them now have jobs some of them are at universities. Biden can issue an executive order which says they cannot be deported, which is what Trump is threatening to do, they can protect legal immigrants who have been threatened with restrictions on their public benefits. They can protect Obamacare by preventing further destruction of it, so in other words, you can take all these very practical steps within the executive without having to have new legislation. Why is that important at the end of the day?

On the one hand, you have got competence responsibility and effectiveness. On the other hand, you have referred to Trumpism, but what is Trumpism is not competence. It is not effectiveness. It is slogans; it is a type of rhetoric, a type of behaviour which is this type of divisive politics. I think that will pose problems for the Republican Party because the Republican Party and I are talking about people like senate majority leader Mitch McConnell the house minority leader Kevin McCarthy. They have enabled Trump for almost four years while he has been president, they protected him over the Trump-Russia Scandal where Trump did commit crimes and may be prosecuted for them on day one after he leaves office, they protected him over the Trump-Ukraine Scandal where Trump did commit crimes but was protected. They protected him over a government shutdown over a national emergency they protected him over I could go on and on. Do they protect Trump while he is outside of the office and trying to run for president 2024 or do they say enough is enough that's a huge question for them, but the bigger question is Trumpism versus the Biden administration? One of the reasons why at the end of the day Joe Biden is president of the US why it is his advisors who are in and why there are many state-local leaders who have been re-elected is because they said it is

about what you do it is about unity and it is about protecting all Americans. If they maintain that line against Trumpism, that is the best answer to it. Will it stop divided media? Will it stop the disinformation? No, but it provides an alternative to that type of this division and disinformation that can last throughout the Biden administration and then we see what happens in the next four years after that.

Question: *Let me take the issue from inside or home politics or domestic politics to the abroad and some foreign policies because there was kind of like a different dimension of the Trump with the international actually with some major powers such as China, Russia and EU. So, related to this, how do you think that Biden will approach these major powers? What will he do with China and Russia and transatlantic dimensions or maybe you can think about like some emerging powers like India and Brazil?*

Scott Lucas: I think the first thing in considering Biden's foreign policy as well as his domestic policy is, he is going to bring the adults back in the room and by that, I mean one of the features of the Trump administration. Because it is Trump versus, everybody has been that he has badly damaged US agencies. He fired people across departments, and he had insulted them even people like the former general James Mattis when he left his secretary of defence or H.R. McMaster when he left his national security adviser. Trump has said that the CIA were Nazis; I am not lying go back to who are trying to overthrow him. He has gone after the FBI, and he has gone after the state department, he is dismissing people in the Pentagon even as we speak including the defence secretary Mark Esper.

The first thing that the Obama administration does, and it will be signalled tomorrow with his first appointments to the cabinet, is I will bring back responsible people. I will respect them, and I will work with them so his first secretary of state will be Anthony Blinken who has worked with Biden for decades and is extremely capable. I think you will see Michèle Flournoy possibly his defence secretary the former assistant secretary of state for Africa has become the UN ambassador or will be the UN ambassador tomorrow these are people who have decades of experience. They were all in the Obama administration. So, they have known factors I think that is the easy part though I think the difficult part is to recognize that there will be a huge series of foreign policy challenges in part because Trump has been so destructive but in part even before that this is a changing world where you are not talking about America as the leading power, and it is probably time to recognize that.

So, let us take China, for example, it is not a question of America and China carving up the world, but it is a question of the rules of the game instead of having trade wars and threatening to break each other economically instead of talking about a possible war in the South China Sea you have firm negotiations firm and clear-eyed negotiations. So, when it comes to, let's say China you are not going to see the destructive trade wars that took

place or have taken place under Trump. You are not going to see the posturing over the South China Sea with the threat of confrontation but what you have is from negotiations across a series of outstanding topics, topics like intellectual property, topics like the relationship between the currencies, topics between global economic visions between the long-standing American vision since World War II versus what we call tend to call China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is an alternative in organizing countries economically and so those negotiations you do not go in assuming it is going to be sweetness and light, but at least you play by the rules.

For example, when it tops like Russia, you will not have the unpredictability of a president who quite frankly may have been put into office in part because of Russia because his campaign cooperated Russian 2016. You are not going to have a president who at the very least has been dragging his feet on measures by his agencies to deal with the Russians, and you are not going to have a president in Donald Trump who quite frankly is a fervent admirer of Vladimir Putin because he wants to be Vladimir Putin. You will have an administration that will have to deal with Russia, which has been very ambitious in its policy in Eastern Europe; think about Ukraine, Russia has been very ambitious some would say aggressive in what it has done in the Middle East think about Syria. You have been a Russia which has been more than ambitious it is actually broken international law to the extent of carrying out assassinations or attempted assassinations think about the nerve agent attack in Salisbury, England in 2018. In other words, Russia has not played by international rules.

Without this being an anti-American or pro-Americans thing, in other words, you know America yay or America boo when it comes to the Middle East again you have to be clear-eyed. I mean there is a whole series of problems. I have to cover daily; there you have got a Saudi Arabian Monarchy that has been willing to kill its opponents abroad. Including the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, you have got Saudi Arabia which has been involved with some very deadly conflicts such as Yemen, you have got a Saudi Arabian de facto leader in the crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman who has moved aggressively against his domestic rivals whether you are talking about other princes or whether you are talking about political dissenters. However, at the same time, Saudi Arabia is an important state because of the oil. Because it has been a military ally of the US what does the Biden administration do?

There is no easy answer there. When you talk about Israel-Palestine you are not going to get this blatantly one-sided approach which is let's move the US embassy to Jerusalem, let's allow Israel to at least maintain the West Bank settlements possibly expand them. Let's cut off all US assistance to Palestine. You will probably get a Biden administration that will restore assistance involvement in international programs in the Palestinian territories, and you will get a Biden administration that will reiterate that it wants to see a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, it will not push Israel into pulling back from the West Bank settlements, and it is not bringing Israel

back to the negotiations table with Palestine. Let alone the complicating factor of bringing the different Palestinian groups Hamas and Al-Fatah together.

I guess what I am saying we go around every area of the world you talk about India in this way; we could talk about Venezuela in this way. That is those problems that are there quite often with deep-seated roots do not disappear when America comes in, but I am looking for two things one is I am looking for competence rather than Donald Trump's ego and secondly what I am looking at is a change in American policy a recognition which is we are no longer in the words of Joseph Nye. The power that leads America makes a contribution, but it makes a contribution as part of an international community now in certain places. It may have more influence than others, but it does so truly want to cooperate because of the reasons that got us into this foreign policy mess. Think about the 2003 Iraq War was the idea that America could remake the world, and the rest of the world could follow. It does not work that way anymore

Question: *So, as far as I understand like I think in this week the Biden administration will be explaining the key teams who are going to be in the White House, and you gave some name I think Anthony Blinken for you is going to be the foreign minister and no chance for Susan Rice because Turkey was wondering about Susan Rice and Bill Burns or Jake Sullivan.*

Scott Lucas: Well, there is the story that Jake Sullivan may become the national security adviser. So, I think it will raise interesting questions for countries like Turkey as they face it. Susan Rice is an interesting one I mean Susan Rice many people were lobbying for her to have a key position in the Biden administration as she did in the Obama administration as the ambassador of the UN and the national security advisor. However, there is political baggage with Susan Rice because she is an easy target for the republicans they will repeatedly say Benghazi again. You know that 2012 incident where the American ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed, and the republicans falsely will say that was because of Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice who became, like you know, the hate figures and so on. Let's talk about a couple of key cases. One is with Turkey that you have got a difficult case here again, which is, we know Joe Biden is on the record that he is not a fan of President Erdogan and he has made some comments that have been far from polite about President Erdogan. President Erdogan also made some comments that have been far from polite about Joe Biden.

However, Turkey's in a very tricky position right now both domestically and in terms of the region and that is the Erdogan government trying to deal with a lot of opposition within the country and has often been very fierce in putting down that opposition how far they can do that. You think of that secondly in the region they are gambling on being the dominant influence in the Middle East and North Africa. They are gambling on that with Syria,

they are gambling on that with Libya, but it is not just a question of facing the Assad regime or facing the dividing groups in Libya. They are facing off against the also Saudis; they are facing off against the UAE. They have to manoeuvre with the Russians who also want an increased presence in the Middle East. The Middle East is like this kaleidoscope of moving parts and what that means is that on the one hand I do not think everyone is going to give Joe Biden a big hug immediately, but on the other hand Erdogan was not going to burn his bridges with Washington. He will continue to say things such as the Gulenist I do not want another coup like in 2016, and he will expect the Americans to respect that.

However, on the other hand, he will not, for example, pull Turkey out of NATO and he will not close down the American military base. It will be a question again of establishing the rules of the game between the US and Turkey. Next door in Syria is the one that I am watching because of eaworldview, this site I run; we have covered Syria almost every day since the uprising of March 2011. Part of Biden's baggage and those who will be in this administration is, in my opinion, this, which is their big failure from the Obama administration in that they let Syrian civilians down. When the US did not stand up to the Assad regime and did not stand up to Russia in 2013 over the chemical attacks, and when they did not stand up even before that over conventional attacks by having a protected zone for civilians, they lost the initiative in Syria, and the powers that are important in Syria right now is fine. The Americans are alongside the Kurds in northeast Syria, where there is a lot of oil; we know that. However, for the rest of Syria, if it is the Assad regime areas, Russia is the key power alongside Iran and the key power in northwest Syria.

Question: *So, actually I was going to talk about Turkey and the bilateral relationship and how the bilateral relations will be evolved after the Biden administration because there were many incidents even during the Trump administrations like you mentioned some. Especially in S-400 aerial defence system, a claim for breaching to embargo on Iran by one Turkish national bank Halk Bank case and do Syrian crisis and so on. Also, like even trump was mentioning about destroying the Turkish economy because of the Pastor Branson case and on the other hand during the pre-election campaign Biden's assessment about Turkey was also considered some kind of like a hint for the future relationship of Turkey. In August, he mentioned Turkey, and he was not that favourite to the Erdogan. Nevertheless, considering all of this, what we may witness about the relationship during the Biden administration does Biden stick to what he said before the election or does his attitude change after the election?*

Scott Lucas: I think the greatest tip to what Joe Biden's advisors do is look at what they did during the Obama administration.

Question: *I think Biden administration is no better than Trump administration about Turkey. They knew Turkey very well I mean some of the two people in Biden's administration.*

Scott Lucas: Let start with this from the Turkish standpoint they are going to balance between or manoeuvre between multiple Powers. They will balance between the Americans, the EU, Russia, and between powers in the region, including the Gulf States, which is the first step for a Biden administration. I think you get beyond the rhetoric of Joe Biden. Will they recognize that? Furthermore, I think they will. I think the idea of just sending out a threat to Erdogan and say you must not take S-400s from Russia right or you must not do this. That is not the way you deal with Erdogan. You do not try to threaten Erdogan. The question is what you can offer Erdogan or what is positive on the way forward, which means he does not swing away from you further.

I mean, to be honest with you, one of the cases that was resolved was the Pastor Brunson case under the Trump administration, but it was resolved because people behind the scenes finally got smart about this and said look, we do not want the case of this pastor to completely tear apart US-Turkish relations because there were these silly threats that were going back and forth for which we will destroy your economy. For example, if you look at what a Biden administration will do, they will recognize that Turkey is a member of NATO and it makes no sense to destabilize that relationship. Now, if Turkey, for example, gets too close to Russia in terms of taking not just S-400s but other military supplies from there though the reminder will go out to Turkey which is that your defence systems are primarily built on equipment which you take from Europe do you really want to go down the route of going towards Moscow that far.

If Turkey goes too far economically in terms of saying well, we will just simply swing towards Russia. We will swing towards other alternatives there will probably be the polite reminder when Turkey's under severe economic pressure, the Russian economy is not that strong and the possibility of links with China. Well, that is going to take some time if you want to put your chips there is this really the way you want to go right, I think they will be the polite reminder of over Libya for example which is look all of us are in a tricky position in Libya because we are now nine years after the fall of Ghaddafi and we still have a very unstable situation what can be a very damaging situation. Do you really want to further that or do we want to find some way of trying to pull back from the conflict between the militias and how we do not like what the Russians are doing in Libya either and we know you do not? So, that in other words on each of these you look for a pragmatic line with Turkey recognizing what is in the interest of Erdogan well he wants to maintain power. He wants to be seen as an international actor, but he also wants to make sure the Turkish economy does not fall apart. So, take the question of Iran the reason why the Turkish you know you had a Turkish national and Halk Bank being prosecuted over Iran was they broke the rules of the game were you might not like the

sanctions on Iran you might not like that, but they are there, and you do not go around, and this was a fairly severe claim that was being made.

So, I think Biden administration goes to Turkey and says “look we want to do something about these American sanctions on Iran we think they have been too excessive they have been damaging give us time but at the same time do not break the sanctions do not mess around with this” because it just embarrasses everybody. At the end of the day, part of me says there are some very serious issues in terms of rights both within the US and Turkey that we could talk about. There are some severe issues about how the US and Turkey have conducted themselves in the past, but the starting point at a very pragmatic level will be this idea of can we get back to negotiating with each other and realize the rules of the game are on this. I think Joe Biden can sometimes be a little bit over the top with his public rhetoric, but as a private, in private negotiating he is a pragmatist, and he will not want to get into a fistfight with the Erdogan even though he might want it because he is tough.

Question: *What I understand is that the Biden administration will strengthen the institutionalized relationship between Turkey and the United States and they will use this NATO and maybe they will strengthen the Turkish-EU partnership. There is kind of like a sign in Turkey after the Biden administration was elected there were changes in the economic management and some other steps saying that we see ourselves in the West. Can these be read as a softening policy or literal relationship between Turkey and the United States?*

Scott Lucas: Let me just add your point because I think you have answered it better than I can. It is not just between the US and Turkey but between the US and a number of other countries in the UK, the EU, and Japan. It is the institutions and the agencies that are the bedrock of the relationship. Presidents come and go, maybe President Erdogan will be gone someday I do not know he might be there 30 years from now, but presidents come and go. The lasting power is, do your militaries get along together, do your intelligence services get along together, do your economic agencies get along together, do you have faith in that relationship and the more that you work on that day-to-day relationship between institutions away from the headlines the better the relationships going to be. There is actually a paradox here because we speak in the UK, whereas I actually think the US-Turkish relationship will have those institutional links that will develop. Although, you know the apparent conflict at the top the real problem here in the UK is that this is where the institutional relationships are being broken in the sense because the UK is coming out of Europe, the Brexit which is the worst thing for the UK military for the UK economic institutions for the UK intelligence services because they are isolating themselves. Institutionally neither Turkey nor the US want to isolate. They want to work in broader relationships broader if not necessarily alliances at

least groups you work with. That is probably the key feature of the US-Turkish relationship both within NATO and then with relationships between the US and Turkey and the EU.

Question: *Actually, I mean there seemed to be a consideration that the Biden administration will be dealing with Turkey in terms of its human rights and democracy. This kind of like things will be raised after the Biden administrations, and Turkey needs to work on this kind of like dimensions rather than other situations like in Syria or other foreign affairs. I mean like entirely focusing on Turkish internal policy would be highlighted by the Biden administrations.*

Scott Lucas: No, I do not see the Biden administration not just on Turkey but on a general approach going back to a human rights approach. I mean the Obama administration actually talked about human rights but did not necessarily follow up but let me give you examples beyond Turkey and then we will get back to that. The time to go, the time to really pin down Muhammad Bin Salman was after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi at the end of 2018 because you had allies such as indeed President Erdogan who are willing to put pressure on the Saudis that time has come and gone. There may be some in the US congress that want to continue to punish the Saudis do not think it will happen. You will not see the Biden administration putting a great deal of pressure on China over the Xinjiang question the Uyghur Muslims in the northwest. They may raise the issue of Hong Kong, but that is for very special reasons. For example, Hong Kong is visible, and it is also a financial hub, but generally, they will not be going in with China on human rights issues.

They probably will raise human rights issues with the Russians, but that is a way of putting pressure on them. As long as Turkey is felt like all right, we are getting back to this institutionalized relationship they want. They will not go after questions, for example, such as the detention of journalists. There is no mileage in that they will not go back to the protest of 2013 and seven years later come back and say let's have a look at this let's reopen that case. They are not going to do it with Turkey; they will not do it with Egypt with President Sisi even though we still have serious questions about human rights there because the Biden administration's priority will be that it has to repair a lot of damage to where America stood in various conflicts and various issues in the Middle East, in North Africa, in Asia. Suppose you are repairing relationships in those conflicts. In that case, you cannot go in at the same time and start wagging your finger at various states over human rights and domestic situations as much as I believe in human rights and as much as I hope you raise those questions you know as a pragmatist, it will not happen because there are more immediate issues that existed before Trump but that have been made worse because of what Trump has done.

Question: *Okay, I understand. I think it actually was my last question because I wondered whether the Biden administration would follow the Obama's path as some people saying that this is going to be like a clause it relates to Obama's administration or his style. I think as soon as I understand Biden administration will locate itself in between Obama and Trump. Is it possible to expect some kind of like a normative behaviour and some kind of like a real politics and pragmatic manner?*

Scott Lucas: I think that is a good assessment that Biden may in a sense be slightly between Obama and Trump. You will not see the grand speeches such as Obama's Cairo Speech or indeed Obama's Ankara Speech of 2009. You are going to see more the type of behaviour that occurred in the second term of the Obama administration think about the Iran nuclear deal, think about the attempt even as I think it was badly handling its Syria policy to reach an accommodation with Russia over what should be done in the Middle East, think about its so-called Asia Pivot that said the reason why you cannot just simply say it is another Obama administration. It is because circumstances have changed and they have changed in two ways the first is if you talk about the Middle East we are now nine years after the so-called Arab spring and situations have not been resolved there. I mean we have gone through the phase of the Islamic State, but they are still present in Iraq which is still in a state of mass protest serious questions about its government's legitimacy. We are still in the middle of the Yemen civil war that's taken place we still have not had a resolution of Libya as we talked about you and me earlier, we are talking about an EU.

I think the EU itself is in a strong footing, but I think the UK is in a seriously diminished situation because of Brexit we are talking about the issue of North Korea has not been resolved in Asia and indeed North Korea has been able to continue its nuclear program while having the photo opportunities with Trump. China is now four years down the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further and then affects Africa or China, you know we could go on and on. In other words, politics never stand still, and we are four years away from where the Obama administration stopped as well as being in a pandemic, I remind you again and again. So, what do you do in that type of situation again I think we talked about it on the domestic front, but I think it is also true here you show that you have adults in the room, and you take steps which are for the immediate repair. So, for example, you go back into the World Health Organization, you go back into it because it is a responsible thing to do in a pandemic, but you also do it politically because if you stay outside the World Health Organization who is the number one power that benefits by increasing its contribution? It is China.

You go back, and you rethink your relationship with the EU, not just NATO. However, with the EU in terms of economic cooperation, because if you do that who are you looking at well, you are looking at the Chinese alternative, you look at relations with Turkey very pragmatically because that affects your relationship both with NATO and with the Middle East and Middle Eastern Powers. However, also it affects your relationship with Europe. I mean Turkey's got that key position. So, Biden, I think from a pragmatic

viewpoint, the problem that will come in is the one that the Obama administration faced when you have a serious crisis that unsettles your day-to-day institutional planning you respond. If you have another version of what happened in 2011 like the Arab Spring what you do if you have another intifada in Palestine or if you have a situation where you have a war between Israel and Hamas and Gaza what do. You know you, and I could run all these scenarios that administrations cannot plan for them. However, you cannot map out your action before they occur right and that is where the challenge comes in I guess what I am saying to you is I have mixed feelings about where Joe Biden comes from and have a mixed feeling where the advisors come from because I think they badly mishandled certain situations in the Obama administration.

However, I know whom I was dealing with, and at least the world knew whom I was dealing with. Trump, it was not just the question of that your house might leak into the roof he was going to go in and tear the whole roof down, and that is the problem and then let me leave you with this as much as we talk about Joe Biden as much as we talk about this. Here is what I am looking at beyond it the one person who was not in the Obama administration who is significant in the Biden administration is Kamala Harris. We know Kamala Harris in terms of where she stands on a lot of domestic issues because she has been a senator for a few years from California because her track record was in domestic politics before she went into the senate coming out of California if there is a Kamala Harris administration in 2024. If Biden's one-term president does she have a different vision of America in the World or does she just simply fit into this, you know this sort of blueprint that we talked about we do not know, and that is sort of I think a very exciting prospect because I think she is an exciting person in terms of her competence her ability what she means as potentially the first Black American President the first Asian American President. So, I guess what I the present is always tricky the present is always one where we might stumble, but at least we have got a path which means that we can start to work together not just with the officials, but at all levels of society and across countries we have got a path that has not been there in the past four years. Let see if we can take it.

Question: *I understand what you mean. The timing and the circumstances will shape how this Biden administration will look like and also it is more predictable to what Biden is going to do than assuming what Trump can do. Also, actually, I was wondering the last thing. It was about Kamala Harris. There was a belief that Biden himself focused on more internal politics and left the foreign policy to the Kamala Harris. Do you agree with that? Because there is kind of rumour that preparing, she sees herself a candidate for 2024.*

Scott Lucas: I do not think that is right to be that type of division. I think again without pouring everything back into the way that it was done the

Obama Administration. I do think it is instructive the way that Obama and Biden work together. Obama's quote, which was Biden, was the last person in the room. He would take Biden's advice in the sense that he would run ideas pass Biden and review Biden's situation. I think you see the same thing with Kamala Harris. I know that politically we can remember that first democratic debate where she nearly ended his candidacy by going after him about racial matters almost embarrassed him. However, at the end of the day, they are both pragmatic politicians; there is not a modern versus the last thing, it is not a reactionary versus progressive thing. They both are pretty much politicians which is what can we get done.

So, I think you will see her brought in immediately on coronavirus she will be a key part of the response there, and she will be very much a part of what the administration does on immigration for obvious reasons. She is the child of immigrants there is that personal connection this here. I think you will see her probably involved in other domestic issues racial and social issues that involved. I am not sure where exactly she will fit in internationally. However, I think again it is probably the case when they see you are pressing issue, but they have to deal with whether it is China, whether it is Russia. That shown to be one of the voices in the room. You can say the thing you can say about the Trump Administration is that Mike Pence, the vice president, was competent. Quite often, Trump did not listen to him at least Pence could hold him back on occasion. I think here, Kamala Harris is competent, and she works with the president as competent as well. Does it mean that we are going to solve all the global problems? No, it does not, but it means that I think that the American response would be something which would be much more predictable and much more responsible than what we have seen in the past.

Question: *As far as I understand, Kamala Harris is a competent enough to conduct many things, especially in terms of internally, especially focusing on some migration issues or other domestic issues rather than foreign policy. Because she is competent, energetic, and ambitious, maybe it makes her unique. What would you say about her active involvement as a Vice President to the American Policy?*

Scott Lucas: I think so, but another thing is probably she would be the first vice president to become president if she succeeded since George H.W. Bush (the big Bush) in 1989 and I think they are the way that you saw Bush already had for the expertise he was ambassador to China he was in ambassador to the United Nations, he was CIA director. Harris does not have those credentials, so I think you will see her trying to actually try to be involved in foreign policy issues to build expertise. Thus, the difference I think between her and say someone like a big Bush in the past and it will take time, even as smart as she is, will take time to get in on these issues. So, I think we will see it not in terms of that she will have a dramatic foreign

policy mission within the first year of the presidency, but she will become part of the team discussing these issues.

Question: *Okay, thank you so much, Prof. Scott Lucas, for sharing your thoughts with us. I really appreciate what you have said to us. Actually, you covered many issues, and you answered many questions and briefly. It was enlightening us. Thank you so much again.*

Scott Lucas

Thank you.

*** This interview was transcribed by Berkay Karlıdağ (Student at Eskişehir Osmangazi University, Turkey)*

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The Supremacy of EU Law over German Law: EU Law vs National Law

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Introduction

This essay is in continuation of my previous two papers published by *Political Reflection Magazine*. The first paper dealt with how and why the notion of supremacy of European Union (EU) law has been developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) (Dorani, 2020a), and the second one focused on whether the United Kingdom has accepted the supremacy of EU law (Dorani, 2020b). Those essays (together with my article entitled 'Shall the Court Subject Counter-Terrorism Law to Judicial Review: National Security vs Human Rights') also explain why the series of essays (and the article) are relevant to both Law and International Relations Courses. This essay concentrates on whether Germany has recognised the primacy of EU law over German law. It consists of three stages, which cover the German courts' reactions to the notion of the supremacy from the beginning of the EU's creation up to now, followed by detailed concluding remarks.

The German Court Systems

Germany is a dualist country. Article 23 (ex. 24 (1))¹ of the German Constitution implies EU supremacy over German law. There are five separate court systems, dealing with ordinary matters, tax, labour, social security and administrative issues. Each of these court systems is headed by a Federal Supreme Court. These courts do not bind to each other. However, on constitutional matters, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) binds all five courts. While the lower courts' referral (preliminary reference) to the ECJ on a constitutional matter is not obligatory, it is compulsory to the FCC, which has the final say (Roth, 1991: 154). It is the function of the FCC under Article 100GG to view the constitutionality of a piece of secondary legislation, and EU secondary measures are also subject to view, as they are incorporated by the German Parliament (Kumm, 1999: 362). Therefore, throughout the essay the main focus is on the FCC as the issue of supremacy falls within the sphere of the FCC.

Stage One (1960-70): The FCC, EU Law Supremacy and No Condition

There were mixed reactions about the supremacy of EU law by the German

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CESRAN
International.

courts. In *Re Tax* (1963), the Tax Court challenged the constitutionality of the ratification of the Treaty of Rome 1957, holding the EU regulation concerned was invalid since Article 249 (ex. 189) was 'unconstitutional' (Alter, 2000: 74). Further, Article 23 was not an authority for transferring legislative power to the EU. Many German scholars claimed that the Treaty of Rome was unconstitutional because it gave unusual power to the EU (Alter, 2000: 74-6).

The Tax Court referred the issue to the FCC. Incidentally, the Federal Tax Court (FTC), in rejecting the argument in *Re Tax*, had held that Article 23 transferred sovereignty to the EU and it should not be measured in accordance with the standard applied to 'constitutional authority within the State itself.' Four years later, the FCC made its judgment on *Re Tax* by saying that the unconstitutionality of one provision did not mean that the whole Treaty was unconstitutional. It went further in another case to confirm the 'independent nature of the EC [and the] ECJ's right to issue regulations binding inside Germany'.

With regard to Article 23, it did transfer 'certain sovereign rights to the EC.' The FCC was very supportive of the 'special nature' of the EU. Thus, the FCC sent a clear message to the lower courts and to the other litigants that they should not challenge the ECJ's authority and the ratification of the Treaty. In affirming the validity of *Van Gend en Loos* (1963) (for the details of the case, see Dorani, 2020a) the FCC added since EU regulations were not acts of German authorities, 'it lacked the jurisdiction to assess the validity of them.'² This language of the FCC supported the ruling of *Costa* (1964), in which the ECJ had held that the validity of EU law due to its special and original *nature* could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions.

In *Lutticke* (1966), the Federal Tax Court (FTC) made a reference to both the ECJ and the FCC in which it asked that, inter alia, the notion of direct effect was 'in the essence of a political nature' and hence it was not legally valid (Alter, 2000: 83). On appeal, the FCC strongly criticised the remarks made by the FTC regarding the direct effect of EU law, adding Article 23 implied 'not only that the transfer of sovereignty to interstate organs [was] valid, but also that decisions of the ECJ [...were] to be recognised' (*Lutticke*, 1972; Alter, 2000: 85). Moreover, all directly effective EU law and the rulings of the ECJ, 'the autonomous sovereign authorities' (Alter, 2000: 85), were directly effective within the national sphere, and all lower courts were entitled 'not to apply national laws which [were] contrary to EU law' (Horspool, 2000: 176).

The FCC became one of the first European supreme courts to accept the superiority of EU law over a subsequent national law, as well as the ruling of the ECJ as having the power to indirectly set aside national law (Alter, 2000: 87). By doing this, the FCC set a precedent to the lower courts to disregard the incompatible national law. The FCC exactly did what the ECJ wanted national courts to do in *Van Gend* and *Costa*, and therefore, one could conclude that by the end of 1970 the FCC had accepted the supremacy of EU law over German law without any condition (Roth, 1991: 141).

However, one unclear issue was whether that supremacy was extended to the Basic Rights enshrined in the German Constitution.

Stage two (1970-90): the FCC, EU law supremacy and conditions

In 1970, Professor Hans Heinrich Rupp in his important speech – which is claimed to have triggered off the famous *Solange I* (1970) decision – called the EU ‘a government without a sovereign’, having no ‘democratic safeguards’ as well as protection for ‘basic rights’. As a result of these deficiencies, the FCC (as opposed to the ECJ) should be the final arbiter regarding conflicts between the German Basic Rights and EU law (Alter, 2000, 88).

Some weeks later, an EU regulation was argued to have violated the claimant’s Basic Rights, which resulted in the case of *Solange I*. The ECJ, in response to the preliminary ruling in *Solange I*, finding the EU regulation was not in breach of the German Basic Rights, held that EU law was even superior to the German Constitutional law. The Administrative Court, believing the ECJ’s ruling would undermine the German Basic Rights, refused to accept the ECJ’s decision as it was unconstitutional and, therefore, not binding (Alter, 2000, 89). It made a reference to the FCC. In it, *inter alia*, the Administrative Court argued that the German Basic Law should take precedence over EU law, strongly criticising those who argued that EU law was supreme to the German Basic Rights, accusing them of facilitating ‘European integration at the expense of basic rights protection’ (Alter, 2000: 89).

On appeal, the FCC repudiated its previous decision, namely that it had no authority to review EU law and held that it had now the jurisdiction to review EU acts because ‘Community regulation is implemented by’ an authority of Germany and hence ‘this is an exercise of German state power’ (Alter, 2000: 91). Therefore, all EU acts could be viewed as acts of a German authority which were subject to constitutional review. So long as the Community protection for human rights were not measured up to the federal rights of the German Constitution, EU measures would be subject to the fundamental rights provisions of the German Constitution (Hartley, 1999: 236-7). Thus, the FCC established itself as the final arbiter to decide whether the protection of the fundamental rights at the EU level was satisfactory (Kumm, 1999: 370). The FCC added Article 23 did not transfer ‘power to amend the inalienable feature of the German Constitution’ (Douglas, 2002: 33). Stephen Weatherill (1993: 322), incidentally, claimed that the FCC decided so because at the time the EU lacked a directly-elected parliament and also it did not have ‘a precise catalogue of fundamental rights’ comparable to those of the German ones.

The decision was strongly criticised by the three dissenting judges, the Commission, and some critics, including Jean Darras, a French scholar. The dissenting judges said that the fundamental rights were already adequately defended at the EU level (Roth, 1991: 143). The FCC had no jurisdiction under the German Constitution to review secondary EU law, and it was a

trespass to the ECJ's jurisdiction (Alter, 2000: 91). The decision confronted the 'smooth development of the relationship between national law and EC law' (Craig and De Burca, 2002: 291). It was a moment that the ECJ never wished to witness, as predicted then, it jeopardised (albeit in theory rather than practice) the ECJ's main aim, that is, the uniform application of EU law throughout the EU (Douglas, 2002: 269). There was a fear that if the FCC carried out its threats, it would become a precedent, and other national courts would follow it and, therefore, hold EU law inapplicable (if in breach of their fundamental rights similar to those of Germany) and the ECJ's preliminary rulings as a mere opinion (Alter, 2000: 93). The Commission called the decision a threat to the EU legal system, as it set 'the founding principle of the treaty in play' and 'through it a legal fragmenting in the Community could be introduced' (Alter, 2000: 92).

Many critics asked the decision to be reversed, and the Commission threatened to start proceeding against Germany under article 226 (ex. 169). Ensuring the Commission that the FCC would not execute its threats, the German Government (Minister of Justice) criticised the FCC to have undermined Germany's participation in the EU (Alter, 2000: 92-3).

As a result of these criticisms, the FCC softened its position in *Vielleicht* (1980) by saying that, due to the recent political and legal development in the EU, its *Solange I* decision might no longer apply to EU regulations and directives. The ruling in *Vielleicht* was called the 'perhaps' decision, as perhaps the ruling took a friendlier step towards the EU (Alter, 2000: 94). The FCC modified its stance further in *Solange II* (1987) by holding that the level of protection for human rights at the EU level now measured up to those of the German Constitution, and as long as they stayed like that, the FCC would no longer review EU law against the German standards (Craig and De Burca, 2002: 292).

Three months after *Solange II*, the FCC further softened its *Solange I* stance in two cases. The FTC in *Re Vat Directives* (1982) and *Re Kloppenburg* (1988) had refused the direct effect of the directives concerned because Article 249 (ex. 189) left the Member States to choose the form to give effect to directives. The FTC had followed, incidentally, the French case of *Minister of Interior v Cohn- Bendit* (1980) which held that the ruling of the ECJ was not binding on the FRC, accusing the ECJ of transgressing the limit of Article 226 (ex. 169) by giving direct effect to directives (Roth, 1991:140). The FCC reversed the decision of the FTC, calling it unconstitutional because neither had the FTC followed the ruling of ECJ nor had made a second reference to it since the ECJ was the final arbiter regarding secondary EU law (Steiner, 2003: 103). The FCC created constitutional sanctions for lower courts if they disobeyed the ECJ's rulings (Alter, 2000: 98). The FCC clearly affirmed the supremacy of EU law 'in the strongest terms' (Steiner, 2003:103) by the end of the eighties.

The ruling established a precedent for the lower courts that they should follow the decision of the ECJ, and they should choose an 'interpretation of national law (purposive approach) which corresponded to the purpose of the relevant directive' (Roth, 1991: 140). The FCC likewise accepted the

indirect effect of directives, as later held by the ECJ in *Von Colson* and *Marleasing* (1990) (for the details of the cases, see Dorani, 2020a and Dorani, 2020b). The fact that the FCC confirmed that the EU protection for human rights had been developed at the EU level strengthened the supremacy of EU law, and hence the *Solange I* story ended up happily in favour of the ECJ (Hartley, 1999: 238).

However, Karen Alter (2000: 96) argued to the contrary. He reasoned that the FCC did not say that the power it had claimed in *Solange I* would be reduced. It also did not pretend any longer that the EU was a special legal order or EU law was 'autonomous sovereign authority'. The latter argument was rightly predicted, as five years later, the FCC moved back to its *solange I* decision in *Brunner* (1994).

Stage three (1990-2020): the FCC, EU supremacy, more conditions added

In *Brunner*, the claimants asked the FCC to rule against the constitutionality of Germany's ratification of the Maastricht Agreement as, according to the claimants, the Maastricht Treaty had transferred further powers and competences of the German Parliament to the EU, which undermined the German Basic Rights and consequently was unconstitutional. The FCC stated the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1992 demonstrated that the EU was a federation of states rather than, as suggested, a European state (Horspool, 2002: 178). The EU consisted of Member States, and these Member States conferred specific powers and competences on the EU, and hence the Member States remained the masters of the treaties (Hartley, 1999: 240). If the EU institutions did not act within the powers conferred, the FCC would hold the resulting measure invalid. Secondly, the FCC would continue to protect the Basic Rights of the German nationals, 'albeit in cooperation with the ECJ' (Douglas, 2002: 269). The FCC's judgment indicated that the EU was not an 'autonomous legal order' but consisted of a number of legal practices based on treaties concluded between sovereign states (Kumm, 1999: 355). Therefore, it was the will of those Member States that was supreme. It was those Member States that could expand or reduce the scope of a treaty.

The judgment in *Brunner* was argued to have repealed the *Solange II* decision (Douglas, 2000: 268). The FCC was very critical of the German Government, too, because most politicians 'hardly understood the Maastricht Treaty and they did not appreciate how much of their own authority they were giving away' (Alter, 2000: 107). The German Parliament was representative of the will of the German people and by giving away more sovereignty than allowed by the Act of Accession to the EU would undermine the Germans' ability to 'articulate their political will through the legislative process' (Alter, 2000: 107). Such a transfer would be held invalid. At the European level, went on the FCC, there was no real democracy since, for example, unlike the German Parliament, there was no exchange of ideas (Alter, 2000: 107).

The FCC cooperation with the ECJ was claimed to have meant that the ECJ should confine itself to the powers given to it and the FCC would make sure that it did so by reviewing EU measures 'on a case-by-case basis' (Hartley, 1999: 240). The power to review amounted to a 'quite flat denial of the supremacy of EC law [and] its supreme judicial organ' (Herdegen, 1994: 239). This was against the wishes of the ECJ, as it had made clear that 'national courts had no jurisdiction to rule an EU act invalid' (Peers, 1998: 151). To the contrary, the 'Community legal order [was now] subject to the approval of the [FCC]', which was a 'major blow' to the supremacy of EU law (Alter, 2000: 106; Douglas-Scott, 2002: 270). If the FCC reviewed EU law, the courts of Member States would follow suit, and they might strike down EU law as frequently as they do national law. This might override the ECJ as the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality. It would take the EU into a state of 'inter-statal anarchy, ending the 50 years experiment of establishing a coherent legal order on the European level', and the EU 'would lose its credibility' and consequently 'degenerate into an inter-governmental forum' (Kumm, 1999: 353, 360).

Around the time of the decision (and even now), the ECJ was indirectly criticised by some constitutional experts for expanding too far the EU treaties (Alter, 2000: 105). Germany, argued many, was one of the masters of the Treaty of Rome, but if need be it could withdraw from the Treaty by a contrary act (Steiner, 2003: 81). However, many others, including Professor Mathias Herdegen (1994: 244), reasoned that 'unlike the United Kingdom, Germany, as one of the driving forces behind the transfer of monetary sovereignty in favour of the EU, had not reserved the possibility to opt-out of the [EU]'. Yet many more were of the opinion that, yes, Germany was (and is) unlikely to exit the EU, but the perception that Germany's acceptance of EU supremacy was both unconditional and unquestioning was (and is, below) no longer the case.

The FCC would only accept those EU measures that fall within the limit allowed by the German Act of Accession (Elber and Urban, 2001: 27). The scope of this limitation was unknown, and the FCC did not offer what 'the required general guarantee of fundamental rights [was]' (Craig and De Burca, 2002: 297). The ECJ could not rely on Article 10 (ex. 5) of the Treaty as an authority for EU law supremacy, as, according to the FCC, the said article only established 'inter-governmental cooperation' rather than the supremacy of EU law, which could not encroach on the German constitutional rights, and it must be 'distinguished from supranational acts having immediate effect' (Herdegen, 1994: 240).

However, it was only the FCC that could hold EU measures *ultra vires*, not the lower courts. If the lower courts were to do so, they would have to make a reference under Article 234 (ex. 177) to the ECJ. If unpersuaded by the ECJ's ruling, then they had to make a reference to the FCC under Article 100GG. Therefore, it was suggested that the FCC still regarded the ECJ as the ultimate arbiter (Kumm, 1999: 364-5). Furthermore, Frank Hoffmeister refused to accept that the FCC would review EU measures on a case-by-case basis because the fact that FCC required a general decrease in the European

human rights level demonstrated that it was reluctant to review EU measures. This was also implied by the then president of the FCC (Hoffmeister, 2001: 798).

The *Brunner* decision persuaded many litigants to challenge the EU regulation governing the banana regime. They argued that it, inter alia, breached their property rights protected by the German Constitution. Among them were the cases of *Alcan* (2000) and *Banana* (2000), in which the FCC reaffirmed its position of *Solange I* and *Brunner* (Hoffmeister, 2001: 791): if the EU institutions acted *ultra vires* their power, or if the human rights protections in the EU fell below the necessary level, the FCC would declare the EU act inapplicable in Germany (Hoffmeister, 2001: 794). The lower courts went on the FCC, could no longer refer a case to the FCC unless it showed that the human rights protections guaranteed by the ECJ fell below the German level of protection. Therefore, the claimants' claims were unsuccessful, as the lower courts did not show in their references any fall in the EU's human rights protection.

The 'Bananas rulings' were welcomed as a diffusion' of a threat to the EU supremacy even though they were not an 'unconditional recognition' of the EU supremacy (Elber and Urban, 2001: 31). It was suggested that, due to its friendly nature in those cases, the FCC established a 'new cooperation' between the FCC and the ECJ, and *Brunner* was 'partially repealed' (Steiner, 2003: 83). The new cooperation meant that as long as the ECJ sufficiently protected (German) fundamental rights and took those rights seriously (as it did, below), the FCC would not carry out its threats. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (2002: 272) pointed out the *T Port Judgement* of the ECJ in which ECJ had stated that provisions of banana regulation could be adopted to protect the fundamental rights of the traders was an indication that the ECJ took the German Basic Rights seriously. The FCC itself pointed out that the ECJ did take note of fundamental rights in a case four years before the banana litigation decision as 'it affirmed the plaintiff's right to property and the Commission's responsibility to consider the hardship the plaintiff was facing' (Alter, 2000: 115). Indeed, the ECJ was well aware that it must as seriously protect human rights as it did the notion of supremacy in order to remain supreme (Peers, 1998: 155).

The *Brunner* decision was argued to be a 'revolt' against the ECJ's ruling in *Germany v Council* (1994) (Peers, 1998: 155). The ECJ must have realised this and eventually annulled those provisions of the banana regime (Peers, 1998: 155; Alter, 2000: 115). Incidentally, in *Germany v Council* (1994), the ECJ refused to annul the EU provisions contradicting Germany's other international obligations (i.e. GATT). This case gave rise to severe criticism in Germany. The German jurist and a judge at the ECJ Ulrich Everling felt that the ECJ's judgement to hold the regulations valid was a dangerous development, which violated not only the German importers' rights to engage in their profession but also their property rights (Peers, 1998: 155; Everling, 1996: 401). The decades-long criticism and warnings eventually led to the FCC carrying out its threats.

In a case described as ‘a nuclear device’, the FCC on 5 May 2020 ruled that bond-buying by the European Central Bank violated German law and hence the ECJ acted *ultra vires*, that is, beyond the competence that Germany had given to the EU. The case triggered strong criticism by the Commission, affirming that EU law was superior to national law and it was only the ECJ which had the competence to declare the legality of an EU act (not national courts). The German Chancellor Angela Merkel privately stated that the FCC’s decision had ‘institutional’ bearing. The ruling has been argued to be a threat to the notion of the supremacy of EU law (Burke and Walsh, 2020; Kenny, 2020; Maduro, 2020; Vela, 2020).

Conclusion

The question is whether the German courts, the FCC, in particular, have accepted the primacy of EU law. The answer to this question would be in the affirmative, as the FCC, with the exception of one case, has never expressly rejected an EU provision thus far. However, the acceptance is conditional (Herdegen, 1994: 239).

As far as the FCC’s conditions (or rather threats) are concerned, it, nevertheless, ‘has erected such a high hurdle that it has become very improbable that the [FCC] will exercise its reserve control or its subsidiary emergency jurisdiction’ (Craig and De Burca, 2002: 297). For example, the banana regulation caused a fall of 40 per cent in some German importers’ business, which was a severe attack on the Germans’ fundamental right from the German importers’ point of view, but the FCC did not carry out its threats (Elber and Urban, 2001: 21). Even though Germany had strong arguments in *Germany v Council* (1994), the FCC did not make use of its new jurisdiction to hold the EU regulation concerned invalid (Steiner, 2003: 82). The FCC has clearly avoided the possibility to hold EU law inapplicable, and hence one can conclude that the FCC has accepted the supremacy of EU law (Hoffmeister, 2001: 802-3).

The test for the claimant to show that the EU protection for fundamental rights has deteriorated has become very difficult to meet, as there are ‘no significant differences in the European and German level of protection’ (Hoffmeister, 2001: 798) – especially when the ‘Fundamental Rights Charter proclaimed at the Nice Summit will (and has to some extent) end(ed) all this discussion about comparability’ (Hoffmeister, 2001: 802). Furthermore, the FCC in *Brunner* persuaded the EU that it should develop more and become a fully democratic organ so that Germany transfers more powers and competences without breaching the fundamental German rights and the ‘the principle of democracy’ (Craig and De Burca, 2002: 294-5). The FCC’s willingness for transferring more power is an indication that the FCC still regards the EU as a sovereign authority. The transferring of more competences will eventually demolish the doctrine of *ultra vires*.

However, for the time being, the *ultra vires* doctrine might become of practical significance if the EU institutions overstep its competence (Hoffmeister, 2001: 803). And, as stated, the FCC did rule that the ECJ had

acted beyond the powers conferred to it by Germany in the 2020 case relating to the bond-buying by the European Central Bank. Although the case has received much attention, it is not a demonstration of the FCC's refusal to accept the doctrine of EU law supremacy. First, the case is a special one and can be confined to its own facts. Second, the ECJ has been careful not to disregard Member States' fundamental rights such as those of the Germans. Therefore, the possibility of the FCC (or other national constitutional courts) setting aside the ECJ's rulings in the future is slim. However, the ECJ's role to strengthen the EU legal order has been reduced by the FCC's rebellious position (Everling, 1996: 436), as, in addition to the supremacy of EU law, it also has to take into consideration Member States' constitutional rights (or rather the FCC's threats).

Like the FCC, other (German) lower courts also accepted the supremacy of EU law. For example, the Federal Supreme Court, although refused to interpret the German law concerned to comply with a directive (*Re a Rehabilitation Center*, 1992), accepted the principle of state liability, which never existed before under the German Constitution (*Brasserie du Pecheur*, 1997).

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¹ It was Article 24 (1) but the German Constitution was amended for Maastricht Treaty 1992 to authorise further transfer of power to the EU, so now it is Article 23 that provides for this transfer of power (Horspool, 2000: 176).

² All the above quotes are from Alter, 2000: 74, 77, 78.

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The Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Collapse of the USSR and the End of Cold War A Chain of Surprises 'Too Big' to Be Predicted

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The fall of the Berlin Wall, on the night of 9 November 1989, marked the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Distinguished scholars of the realist school have developed different theories on the root causes and predictability of the end of the Cold War and have sought to find whether the end of the conflict between the Western and the Eastern bloc was predictable under which terms it could be settled.

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Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz made a great contribution to identifying the root causes of the Cold War, and the factors led to the end of the conflict. They all agree that it was impossible to broker a peace agreement among the 'Enemy Brothers': Cold War system was also unlikely to end in a general war but would last forever. These thinkers never took the possibility of a Soviet collapse into serious consideration.

Morgenthau (1978) describes diplomacy as the key drive for solving power conflicts, including the Cold War. Aron (1966), like Morgenthau, focuses on diplomatic-strategic behaviour. He believes that the cause of ideological conflict lies in the differences between domestic political systems. Aron (1990: 47–50) criticizes Morgenthau's view, due to the fact that it is referred to as a homogeneous system, while the US and the USSR had heterogeneous systems. He considers that the Cold War is the logical manifestation of a bipolar and heterogeneous system, namely the difference among domestic systems (Aron, 1990: 47–50). Therefore, if all states have analogous regimes, statesmen obey time-tested rules or customs; rivals or allies know on the whole what they can expect or fear, and one can distinguish between state enemy and political adversary as a result of internal rivalries, and party struggles objectively become episodes of conflict among states. None of the 'duopolists' wanted to lose face, as it would be accused of 'treason' by its citizens. Aron does not make any predictions about the end of the Soviet empire and argues that the Cold War would last forever, although in different ways and forms. Obviously, he was wrong.

Both Aron and Morgenthau agree on the 'impossible peace, unlikely war', reinforced by the nuclear deterrence. Morgenthau (1970: 102) wonders

whether it is possible to predict the end of Cold War, as it originates in the impossibility of peace and the improbability of war, hence the conclusion of the conflict was predicated upon the disappearance of one or the other of these factors. Waltz, like Morgenthau and Aron, believes that the Cold War system is unlikely to end in a general war, because in a conventional world states it is believed that both they may win and that, should they lose, the price of defeat would be bearable, but nuclear weapons reverse or negate many of the conventional causes of war, and a country risks its own destruction due to the fact that success is not assured (Morgenthau, 1970: 102).

Waltz (1964; 1979; 1988; 1990) finds that wars, hot and cold, originate in the structure of the international system, even if structural factors alone are not enough to explain the stability of the post-war period. He gathers that ideology does not play a key role; the distribution of power accounts for the stability of the international system, and we can expect more stability in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems, as it reduces the occasion for dispute due to the size of the two superpowers.

According to Waltz, a settlement should be found between the US and the USSR, in their respective domestic spheres (Cesa, 2009: 185). He argues that the Cold War and its end depend on bipolarity and that the conflict would be over as bipolarity ceased; the bipolar system seemed likely to last because no third state had been able to develop capabilities comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, even if the former was stronger than the latter (Cesa, 2009: 188). Waltz detected the root cause of the conflict in the international bipolarity structure, influenced by the Soviet internal factors, but eventually, he was not able to predict the end of the Cold War.

In 1951, Morgenthau figured that to reach a settlement as the only feasible way of putting an end to the Cold War; the Russian national interest should be compatible with the US national interest (Cesa, 2009: 180). He gathers that the world is politically organized into nations (Morgenthau, 1951: 68) that collide in an unending struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1946: 47) and therefore the proper way to manage this mechanism is through a developed and sophisticated diplomacy by way of negotiations (Morgenthau, 1958: 270–280). Morgenthau finds that the value of negotiations was widely recognized, but that the US is expecting to be in a position of unassailable strength, waiting for Moscow taking ‘the first step’ (Suri, 2002: 63–64). This position of ‘unassailable strength’ comes into force by the 1980s, with the space-based missile shield (Suri, 2002: 63–64), when the speed, complexity and high field costs of technological development left Soviet central planners far behind their overseas competitors (Goldman, 1987: 86–117). ‘[T]he first step’ theory, anyway, never entered into force, as Gorbachev called for deeper cuts in the arsenals of both superpowers after President Bush initiated in 1991 a series of remarkable unilateral disarmament measures of his own (Garthoff, 1994: 491).

Structural factors and ideological and institutional transformation in both societies contributed to bringing the Cold War to an end; the Communist

ideology was no longer a threat to American liberal capitalism (Thatcher, 1993: 459–463). Halliday (1995) suggests a ‘global’ theory, according to which it may not have been Communism, as such that failed in 1989, but capitalism that triumphed. Suri (2002: 62–63) concludes that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were not inevitable, but a conjunction of internal difficulties and external pressures made some kind of major alteration of great-power politics almost unavoidable. For many observers, Communism was bad, inefficient, and worst of all, utopian, and its end was predetermined (Cox, 2007: 125–126).

The Role of Political Leadership

Some writers consider that the decisions made by leaders had an enormous impact on the end of the conflict — Waltz does not ascribe any key role to political leadership. Other authors like Aron, Suri (2002: 61) and Cesa (2009) underline the role of policymakers and ideology. While most of the scholars ascribe to Mikhail Gorbachev the main responsibility about the collapse of the USSR, one (Cox, 2007: 125–6) argues that he wanted just to reform the system, and not to undermine it. The influence of Gorbachev’s leadership is widely recognized (Suri, 2002: 82), even if his views were by no means fixed and clear, and his reform ideas have been influenced and shaped into the social democratic mode, along the way, by most important contacts abroad with members of a reform-minded European left (Cox, 2007: 135).

An authoritative current of thought believes that without ‘new thinking’ and Gorbachev’s determination would not have been possible to see an improvement in East-West relations during the second half of the 1980s. The general secretary of Communist Party of the Soviet Union drew on an international community of opinion committed to overcoming Cold War divisions (Brown, 1996: 220–225; Evangelista, 1999: 269–285, 305–317; Legvold, 1991: 694–720). Suri (2002: 78–79) highlights that Gorbachev mobilized intellectuals and reformers in the USSR to support, as a radical redefinition of socialism, a Soviet ‘new thinking’ towards a Western European model of ‘social democracy’, thus making the ‘new thinkers’ relevant for the Soviet politics. More in general, Aron (Cesa, 2009: 183) and Suri (2002: 77–81, 91) emphasize the role of the Soviet leaders — Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yeltsin, Yakovlev, Shakhnazarov — as potential drivers of change.

Western leaders also played a prominent role. Suri (2002: 67–81) acknowledges that Reagan’s policy played a key role in overcoming the Cold War, even if many authors think he played no role whatsoever, and it was all down to Gorbachev (Cox, 2007: 129–130). Cox (2007: 129–130) argues that whether or not we see Reagan as a catalyst for change, his presidency marked an important transitional moment in the history of the Cold War, and according to some writers, in fact, we should not be seeking the causes of 1989 in one man, or even one presidency, but in broader changes taking place in the world economic system after World War II. Nevertheless,

Schweizer (1994) and Winik (1996: 293–295, 597–598, 614–620) believe that President Reagan did not have a plan of any sort to end the Cold War.

The ‘trust and goodwill’ relationship between the leaders of the two superpowers, Gorbachev and Reagan, brought a balance of interests among states (Welch Larson, 1997: 212–234) and led to a mutual trust which allowed the Soviet Union to sidestep the technical limits and bureaucratic obstacles inherent in arms control negotiations (Welch Larson, 1997: 83). Eventually, the race to disarm dominated the end of the Cold War (Garthoff, 1994: 406). The then US Secretary of State, George Shultz, writes in his memoir (1993: 486): “If the first Reagan term could be characterized by a building of strength, in the second term we could use that strength for determined and patient diplomatic efforts to produce greater peace and stability in the world”.

Some authors stress the role played by other western leaders. Chernyaev (2000: 222) and Greenwood (2000) underline the role of the Great Britain Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the European-Soviet dialogue. Mrs Thatcher (1993: 459–463) persuaded Reagan that Gorbachev was a man with whom it was possible to do business; the US President consequently pushed negotiations forward (Suri, 2002: 80–81).

Regan's successor also played a crucial role. In 1989, President George H. W. Bush played an important part regarding Germany: he reassured Germany's Western allies that the unification would not upset the balance of power in Europe, and also reassured Gorbachev that a united Germany would not be at the expense of the USSR, and that NATO would go no further than the new Germany (Cox, 2007: 131), even if the Alliance began to expand eastwards. According to Morgenthau, in the second half of the 1980s, US diplomacy played a fundamental role in German unification (Hertle, 2004: 282). Cox (2007: 127) overcomes the American point of view, which considers diplomacy having effectively changed the world by actively ‘winning’ the Cold War in Europe.

Most modern commentators accept the wrong common-sense view that the Cold War presupposed the division of Europe and a Russian presence in Germany and that until both came to an end, the Cold War would go on (Cox, 2007: 127). The German diplomat and chancellor Kohl, who pushed for German reunification and for its NATO membership, played a fundamental role, due to a series of important economic incentives in the form of economic transfers to the USSR (Cox, 2007: 137; Suri, 2002: 82). To build a genuinely international history about the events that led to the end of the Cold War, we should develop a truly multi-dimensional perspective (Cox, 2007: 137–8).

The so-called ‘Soviet Empire’ became an economic burden on Moscow by the 1970s and 1980s, together with the huge foreign debt (Lundestad, 2000). Economic reorganization and the reduction of imperial burdens became an externally imposed necessity that in turn, required internal reforms (Cesa, 2009: 188). Suri (2002: 78) states that the Cold War competition with the West drained resources from the USSR's domestic

need. Brown (1996: 242–243) argues that Gorbachev understood that his hopes for improving the Soviet economy and the quality of domestic life, in general, required a peaceful international context. Ongoing Cold War competition would have perpetuated the social stagnation, which the Soviet leader wanted to eliminate. Only extensive and unprecedented East-West cooperation could permit the allocation of resources necessary for domestic restructuring, historically known as *perestroika* (Suri, 2002: 78).

In 1990, President Bush worked with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to cajole Gorbachev and buy him off with extensive loans and trade concessions (including a DM 15 billion (IS IT DOLLAR OR GERMAN CURRENCY?) assistance package from Bonn) (Beschloss and Talbott, 1993: 183, 219–221). Bialer (1986: 1–2, 40, 55–56) and Gaddis (1997: 283–287) conclude that domestic weaknesses destabilized Moscow's empire (Gaddis, 1997: 283–287; Bialer, 1986: 1–2, 40, 55–56). The economic landscape is among the causes of the Soviet crisis, but it is not the only cause of the fall of Communism.

Too Big to Be Predicted

It was not possible to predict the end of the Cold War, nor the manner in which it finished. Historians accepted that precise prediction of the end of the Cold War was almost impossible; they simply “failed to anticipate what happened” (Quester, 2002). There is no consensus about the reasons for, or the meaning of, the end of the Cold War (Cox, 2007: 128). Likewise, there is no consensus, among the scholars, on the date of the end of the Cold War: in the 1950s, in the 1960s, in the early 1970s, or in the second half of the 1980s (Cox, 2007: 127–128). Maybe the Cold War was already over when the USSR ceased to exist as a superpower, and later as a state (Cesa, 2009: 188), even if this was not synonymous of the end of the conflict (Suri, 2002: 90).

Events after 1986 reflected particular choices not about *whether* to end the Cold War, but about *how* to end it (Suri, 2002: 81); only from there onward the end of the Cold War was clearly predictable. Our understanding of how, why, and when the Cold War ended surely remains incomplete (Suri, 2002: 91), even if it was not inevitable, as traditional analyses of realpolitik do not provide a detailed explanation (Gaddis, 1992; Lebow, 1995).

Conclusions

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were a 'big surprise' in history and politics; maybe too big to be predicted. The realist scholars — Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz — have not foreseen how the Cold War could eventually come to an end. They never took the possibility of a Soviet breakdown into serious consideration. The role played by political leaders, a new vision that would overcome the past ideological divisions, diplomacy for the reduction of armaments, the economic crisis of the USSR and, finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union

can be ascribed as contributory causes of the end of the conflict. Much remains to be investigated about the impact of individual factors that have been clearly identified. However, the inability to predict these events is widely acknowledged.

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Civil Society: An Alternative Model

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Introduction

The disillusionment with the state in the twentieth century led to the reverse on civil society in democratic theory. Since most states failed to restore individual freedom, rights and citizenship, civil society is expected to fulfil this. However, various state critics assume different roles and structures of civil society to achieve this goal. This paper critically examines the various perspectives on role and structure of civil societies towards this achievement and holds that autonomous civil society organization within the framework of democracy is a vehicle of individual rights, freedom and citizenship.

In the second half of the twentieth-century democratic states failed to secure individual rights, freedom and secure citizenship. Instead of securing and providing individual rights and freedom, they turned into undemocratic policies restraining them. This led to the frustration and disenchantment with the state machinery and apparatus and invoked civil society organization to secure individual freedom, citizenship by themselves and so to democratize society. Although civil society and state are not antagonists within a democratic framework (though in totalitarian regime), civil societies are functioning as a device to secure above-mentioned rights of the individual through democratic state and within the democratic framework.

Disillusionment with State

This disappointment with the state is very clear in three very diverse contexts. Firstly, it occurred in the Marxian understanding of the relationship between economic interests and political institution. In the critique of Hegel philosophy of rights, focusing on the right to property sanctioned by civil society, he maintained that the state lacked the ability to expressed universal interest common to society as a whole. Gramsci furthers this idea by associating the state with an instrument of direct coercion and civil society with the creation of hegemony. Secondly, this disillusionment with state emerges in socialist societies faced with a totalitarian regime. Here the state does not appear as the embodiment of the freedom; rather, it represents a force restricting and curbing civil and political liberty of the individual citizens. Under these circumstances, the state seems to be against civil society. Therefore, civil society organization fights against totalitarian state understanding and policies to store democracy. Thirdly, it is seen in terms of lack of participation and

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development in both developed western and developing countries like India. In the west, though within a framework of strong civil society and weak state, the state not actively involved in the affairs of the society and acted as a locus of the representation of a range of different interests, the centralized and highly bureaucratized state does not allow the citizen to participate and govern themselves. Therefore, they disappoint the state and seek to limit the state by giving powers of decision making to the community of place and interest.

This sentiment is also in the third world country like India. This is expressed very similar to Marxists and non-Marxists. For Marxists, a post-colonial state in India cannot accommodate the interest of the weaker section of the society. So, the democratic struggles are placed in civil society. For non-Marxists, most notably Rajni Kothari, the path of development that Indian state has adopted is deeply flawed. The focus on market efficiency, profitability, development and national security has made the Indian state unresponsive, if not hostile to the basic rights of the common man. So, for him, civil society is the arena where marginalized groups of society protest and struggle for their essential human and democratic rights.

Return to the Tradition

This disenchantment with the state has, however, taken different manifestations. In some cases, it has resulted in a recall of sentiments and structures of the past. In others, there is a demand for the strengthening of intermediate organizations independently (lack of interference of the state) that would realize the promise of constitutional democracies.

Those who critics state and recall the past are called cultural critics. In India, Rajni Kothari (Indian political scientist) is one of them, as he is disappointed with the state, he legitimizes civil society institution more (due to its self-managing and direct participation nature) to deliver constitutional rights which are independent of the state (Kothari, 1995). For him, the state is divisive in its orientation; it seeks to marginalize community and estrange them from each other. Instead of unity, the state brings homogenization of culture, politics, and economics where the poor, minority, marginalized do not fall in line and oppressed by elite section of the society and state. Therefore, they need to be tied off with their community belonging sentiments and traditions without the interference of the state. Within this framework, civil society organizations do not appear as a correlate of democracy. Indeed, this perspective suggests that civil society was strong in pre-modern India as it was governed through traditional community institutions that allowed people to manage their affairs with little interference with a state like the western ones.

But in western democracies, community identities and institutional structure have either disappeared or been compelled to function in accordance with the minimum framework of democratic equality prescribed by the state.

Consequently, social institution and a religious institution like the church have been transformed into a voluntary organization. However, in India, where the task ensuring inter-group and intra-group inequality remains unfulfilled, empowering all type of religious and social institutions to tend to hinder the realization of democratic equality. What matter in a democracy is not autonomy, rather the principle on which they function? Kothari neglects this (Mahajan, 1999). One of those who adheres the principle of strengthening the intermediate institution is Andrew Beteille. He sees the institution based on kinship, caste and religious and even state as the enemy of civil society organizations and argues that the emergence of open and secular institutions based on rational-legal principle is conducive to the growth of civil society. In contemporary India, Beteille sees banks, universities, hospitals as such an institution.

From Andrew Beteille treatment of intermediate institution, it appears that as long as these institutions work efficiently, they are worthy of protection. As he sets high efficiency of inter-mediate organizations, he thinks that they do not adequately take citizens into account. Though they stand for the efficiency of citizens, they exclude citizens at the initial stage. Further, the efficiency of the intermediate institution has little to do with citizenship which has a tendency towards equality. If one followed the path shaped by Beteille position, this modern institution could well function along lines inimical to the interest of citizens in general (Gupta, 2003). Beteille sees both state and religious institution is an enemy of civil society. Therefore, he ignores Hegel. To Hegel, civil society was distinct from either the household or the state.

Rights-based Conception of Civil Society

In contrary to both traditional and rational-legal inter-mediate exponents, Hegel invokes state and democratic framework based on the ethic of freedom to secure civility within civil society. So, for G.W.F Hegel, the state, corporation and the family are prerequisites for the ethic of freedom. In the Hegelian understanding of the civil society, the intermediate organization possesses autonomy because they are aspects of the democratic state and not because these institutions are opposed to it. Therefore, the autonomy of the institution of civil society emerges because the ethic of freedom permeated through them by the state.

This ethic of freedom, for Hegel, can be experienced in the family, in the corporation and in its highest form in the state. The family is no longer simply an institution of sexual gratification and patriarchal oppression, but one where the altruistic tie of blood and marriage are in consonance with the rights of citizens. And the corporation is not just market-oriented and self-seeking in its disposition, but contracts and relates according to policies which do not undermine the well-being of citizens. The corporation is thus under the

surveillance of the public authority. Thus, no longer is state autocratic, but bureaucratic. The state in which civil society manifests is a constitutional democratic institution. Hence, it secures individual rights, freedom and citizenship within the democratic framework of the state.

Conclusion

In conclude, since states are a disappointment in the modern world, civil society has moved in to fill the lost, which is providing individual, citizenry and human rights. Therefore, we can say, civil society is a vehicle taking people to individual freedom, rights and citizenship if it is democratically organized.

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


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Public Diplomacy in Post Pandemic World Challenges and Perspectives

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I ntroduction

If necessity is the mother of invention, certainly the present crisis mandates to re-conceptualise and re-envision the practice of Public Diplomacy (PD). Though not precisely defined, the prevailing mandate of PD is to convey and leverage explanation of policies, showcase their interests and ascertain their priorities to both domestic and International communities through various means of communication. The practice of PD is essentially a set of communication-centric activities and initiatives that drive the objectives of a policy, enhance its outcomes and foster its understanding through outreach. A much-advanced mandate of PD is to put the pursuit of Foreign policy in the landscape of people. In the age of the 21st century, diplomacy is no more just a government-to-government engagement. The idea of PD advocates engagement of people into a participatory Foreign Policy and reform process. This involves the advocacy of various stakeholders like NGOs, institutions, think-tanks, civil societies, academicians and the general public.

Challenges and Perspectives for PD

The basic contours of the pandemic are now familiar enough but, if one could look at the present international political and economic dynamics, co-operation to defeat the virus is sporadic, and the consensus is elusive. Every nation wages its own battle while the dynamics of an uncertain and changing world demands a multilateral approach. An ability to respond to various aspects of changing dynamics is part of any nation's policy, but most agents of change confront the accumulated wisdom of the entrenched or the fiery argumentation of the polarised. A broad spectrum of the public seems to surrender to the siren calls of resurgent nationalism. The questions of free trade vs fair trade, stringent vs flexible borders, naturalisation and citizenship etc., have demarcated the demographics and have set challenges to policy priorities. Many of these tensions are not new, but the current crisis will certainly exacerbate them. Since PD advocates wider transparency and building trust, it becomes decidedly more critical in times of crisis or post-crisis than in ordinary times, to deliver it (Wang, 2020b). Trust is often calculated as a function of risk, and risk perception is intensified in the face of uncertainties. As a result, PD as a policy priority

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has become more and not less significant in every nation's International Relations as PD is a critical linkage between policy and people., domestic and international (Simon (2020)). As the world is watching, the stature and credibility of every nation through its deeds are put into test. We see several reformative and interwoven tendencies along every aspect of the changing policy priorities getting influenced by the public.

With the rise of advanced technology and new ways of digital communication, the wider public have tangibly simplified their ways of conversation and reaching an agreement. Nevertheless, if one could scrutinise the wider picture, reaching a consensus for any progress in the world diplomacy and conflict resolution in the last few years was an enduring task. Mandarins and masses, Streets and the emissaries, notably moved diplomacy to the digital platforms aiming to impress the audience and not emphasising to have direct negotiations with the other parties. Twitter accounts of Foreign offices now compete with wit and sharp words. The problem is such practice attracts the presence of third parties who immediately express their support or resistance. This alters foreign policy priorities by creating dependency on likes and dislikes of non-professional audience. The normal logic of the informational society is that to attract attention; you need to be provocative and assertive. Often, this creates viral international scandals and disruptions to policy implementation. Further, it is very unfortunate that the digital audience is often more interested in negative or shocking developments in International Relations and generally, the audience are indifferent to neutral news of diplomatic negotiations, meetings and summits conducted by the officials.

The audience for PD are changing, and these changes are evidenced in the tides of global demographics. Population ageing in developed countries and the youth bulge in the developing ones are pertinent. Many nations are undergoing ethnic remapping due to migration patterns, and the diaspora of developing nations abroad are increasing. Further, many people are living transnational lives facilitated by wider access to transportation and communication. In general, the audience is now more urban who turn to digital platforms for information, news and social interactions. The dynamics of the urban world concurrently succumb to impassioned and polarised public opinion. We face a polarised world both at home and abroad as nations tend to experience an identity crisis in increasingly cultural and ethnically diverse societies. This rising populist fervour now is a demonstration of new challenges between two fundamental human forces of interest and identity in the social decision and human action.

The pandemic and the subsequent social distancing measures led to the situation where diplomats had to agree to hold their meetings online. Online conferences diminish the usual chemistry that arises between the parties in personal interactions. Lack of body language and gestures develop a dilemma where it would be inconvenient to ascertain the intentions and objectives of the parties. As a result, many negotiations and meetings are postponed to uncertain post-COVID-19 times (Ivanchenko, 2020). Technical glitches, digital illiteracy of few countries and lack of

capacity building add more difficulty to the issue in hand. Governments are also thinking about the credibility of online negotiations. Personal Data protection, privacy, the chances of negotiations being transmitted to other parties and situations where Zoom accounts were put on sale by hackers (Harwell, 2020) or leaked private conversations, demonstrate the vulnerability of technology and the limitations of digital diplomacy. Though the practice of digital diplomacy aids PD by enhancing transparency, such democratic practices may spawn dead ends in case of tense issues because of existing compulsion of the networked society. Further, online meetings do not grant space and opportunity for the conventional 'backstage diplomacy'. This reduces the chances of availing new information, an opportunity to express your position, opportunities for new projects and networking, insights and understanding of the ongoing International dynamics etc.

One of the key realisations we have confronted in the light of pandemic is the inability to transcend the politics of negativity and expand co-operation (Wang, 2020b). These dynamics point to the underlying reality of increasing diplomatic fluidity and a constantly changing communication landscape for PD, which gives us a chance to re-conceptualise and reinvent the pursuit of Public Diplomacy. Though it may be hard for the diplomats to digest, the general public has developed the capability of ascertaining risks and opportunities abroad. Their geopolitical understanding may not be formal, but, they know where to travel and with whom to trade. This is not to suggest that the calculated measures of the diplomats and deliberations of statecraft are less important, but, the era of information technology will drive the contemporary nationalism. Hence, the anatomy of policy, the accumulated experience of the statesmen will struggle to meet the demands of the public. The challenge shall hence remain striking a balance between public opinion and statesmanship. An inability to reconcile both can only come at a great cost of political credibility.

In a multipolar world, introducing one's own diplomatic terms into the discourse of international relations becomes an integral part of statecraft (Jaishankar, 2020). In a polarised world where societies are built with different principles and values, it is laborious to reconcile contestation with collaboration. Hence, every nation makes the virtue of aligning its national interest with the global good. PD acts as an effective tool to develop collective linkages with one's own national interests and common global good. It's the consistent pursuit of engaging the world through cross-cultural exchanges of people; information and communication remain to be one of the modest avenues for developing understanding and fostering co-operative behaviour. It is a reflection of a nation's enlightened self-interest over 'entrenched predatory self-interest' (Wang, 2020a).

Possible Solutions

In the wake of all these challenges, it is not only important to bring initiatives to orient public opinion with the accumulated experience of the

statesmen, but also, these initiatives must create wider engagement between the public and foreign offices. For example, the NATO's narrative of #StrongerTogether and #WeareNATO emphasising on NATO's military capabilities and its capacity to act as a deterrent to other international communities offers a great example of communication strategies to reflect policy transitions (Bjola and Manor, 2020). The European example of applauding workers and doctors from the windows who endeavoured for public health (Hinnant, 2020), the Indian example of lighting a 'Diya' or candle as a solidarity to the deceased and 'COVID-19 warriors' (Nandkeolyar, 2020), are also some of the examples of creating engagement, developing narratives and making the public informed. The state can develop narratives and involve the public for enhancing its policy objectives. Further, the policy pipeline must include suggestions and recommendations of various stakeholders. It is important that the public at large decide how their nation must engage and develop connections with the rest of the world. Communicating a policy would be easier if the practice of policy is put in the landscape of people and at the same time, it is mandatory to overlook that any such policy is practised and implemented from the lens of wise of the emissaries. Additionally, integrating digital with physical and building a distinct digital voice and digital identity will be the key factors for bringing new developments in PD. It is also the time for international communities to start negotiations and conventions on Digital and Public Diplomacy, which can curb misinformation, tackle hacking and fight data leaks. Nations must also emphasise on PD upskilling and reskilling through capacity building initiatives that involve communication strategies, audience analysis, integrating communication management, visual and storytelling and Weekly briefs by the foreign office.

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Setback for India: The China-Pak Economic Corridor

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India is a major regional player in South Asia and playing a double role as a close United States ally to counter Chinese influence in the region. China and India have great monetary relations as the exchange between the two nations is assessed at \$70 billion. The approach of Indian think tank towards the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is not monolithic. Talking during Raisina Dialogue 2020 in January, Indian Naval Chief Admiral Karambir Singh asserted that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor encroaches on India's sovereignty. This was a redundancy of India's remain against CPEC, which is the flagship project of Chinese President Xi Jinping's goal-oriented Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Indian government additionally opposes CPEC because it considers Sino-Pakistani collaboration a threat. Be that as it may, the Indian opposition to CPEC on these two focuses do not hold ground.

There are two significant reasons that drive the Indian resistance to the US\$50 billion CPEC project. The main explanation is that the economic corridor goes through the Gilgit-Baltistan district in Pakistan, which was influenced by the province of Kashmir at the hour of Partition. Since Kashmir is a universally perceived contest among India and Pakistan, India makes a case for Gilgit-Baltistan. In view of this rationale, India contends that an economic corridor among Pakistan and China is going through an Indian-claimed territory and subsequently disregards India's sovereignty.

The case of Gilgit-Baltistan

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In July 2018, S Jaishankar, then foreign secretary of India, told Chinese officials in Beijing that "CPEC violates Indian sovereignty because it runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." India fears that when the CPEC corridor successfully begins working through Gilgit-Baltistan, at that point, it will internationalize the Kashmir debate. New Delhi has verifiably restricted this chance, demanding that the question is a respective issue among India and Pakistan. This position depends on the contention that the whole Kashmir area, including Gilgit-Baltistan, is Indian territory. Subsequently, the way that the CPEC corridor goes through Gilgit-Baltistan naturally disregards the regional sway of India

Historically, after Partition, Kashmir state sent its senator to Gilgit to take control of the region, yet the Gilgit Scouts, a paramilitary power, did not acknowledge the authority of the Kashmiri Maharaja. Only a few days after

Kashmir's by forced accession to India, the Gilgit Scouts rebelled against the senator and solicited Pakistan to take control of the region.

So, in historical terms, the nature of the dispute over Gilgit-Baltistan is totally not the same as that with respect to the Jammu and Kashmir regions. Subsequently, India can't claim Gilgit-Baltistan as they claim Pakistani-administered Kashmir. India's case on Gilgit-Baltistan can be defended if Kashmir's accession to India is confirmed as legitimate by the United Nations.

In addition, regardless of the historical context regarding Gilgit-Baltistan, this region has been firmly controlled and managed by Pakistan throughout the previous 73 years. Pakistan has made it a semi-autonomous governmentally controlled area, which for all practical purposes/reasons is part of Pakistan. Truth be told, the previously existing Karakoram Highway, which interfaces Pakistan with China, goes through the similar region. Pakistan has refrained from including Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan as legitimate pieces of Pakistan to maintain UN resolutions on the dispute. Besides, last August, India altered the geographic game plan in Indian occupied Kashmir despite it being a contested region. By this rationale, how might it question any progression taken by Pakistan-administered Kashmir? Consequently, there is no just cause for the Indian case that CPEC disregards its "sway" in Gilgit-Baltistan.

CPEC as Counterbalance?

The second reason for India's opposition to CPEC is the fear that it is being used by China to counterbalance the economic growth of India. Pakistan's economy was battling in mid-2015 when Beijing consented to the CPEC arrangement with Islamabad. CPEC has so far helped the Pakistani economy by increasing energy production and paving the path for the additional outside venture. Therefore, it bodes well that India may see CPEC as an attempt by China to prop up Pakistan against India. This hypothesis is additionally bolstered by the way that India is responsive to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor under BRI yet opposes CPEC. Accordingly, India's opposition to CPEC can be seen in a Pakistan-centric angle and not an overall resistance to the more extensive Belt and Road Initiative. Neither Pakistan nor China has indicated any express aims to counter India using CPEC. Besides, Pakistan likewise has a sovereign option to settle on bargains and enter concurrences with different nations for its monetary advantages regardless of whether they are contradicted by India. Be that as it may, CPEC in no way, shape or form speaks to any demonstration of antagonism toward India.

Moreover, the Gwadar Port in southwestern Pakistan is the backbone of CPEC. Pakistan intends to make Gwadar a territorial business hub with the assistance of China. To counter the achievement of Gwadar Port, India put resources into Chabahar Port in Iran this is only 175 kilometres from Gwadar. India put \$100 million in Chabahar, and as per Chinese media, the main clear explanation was to counter the accomplishment of Gwadar Port.

The planning of the Indian arrangement with Iran further backs the case made by Chinese media. India began putting resources into Chabahar in 2016, only a year after the CPEC understandings were agreed upon. It would be too big a coincidence if India began putting resources into a port only 175 kilometres from Gwadar if it had no intention to counter CPEC.

Chabahar could have been an opposite contender of Gwadar; however, then the appointment of Donald Trump as President of the United States changed the circumstances. The Trump organization reimposed sanctions on Iran, and it turned out to be progressively hard for India to continue putting resources into Chabahar. Therefore, Gwadar Port's importance increased, and it even began serving Afghan transit trade, which would have been a customer of Chabahar Port if the US government had not forced sanctions.

The Chabahar scene uncovers that it was India that caused a key move to counter CPEC, yet it did not work. Similarly, as India has the option to settle on autonomous venture choices like that, including Chabahar, Pakistan can do likewise with CPEC. Be that as it may, the Chabahar speculation is where India made an endeavour regarded antagonistic by Pakistan and China against CPEC, yet so far it has not worked out.

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