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Governing Without an Opposition: The Aftermath of the Early Parliamentary Election in Bulgaria
by Dr Ekaterina R. Rashkova-Gerbrands

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POLITICAL REFLECTION MAGAZINE

Established in 2010

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*by Par Hans De Marie Heungoup
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ARMY AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AFRICA

By Par Hans De Marie HEUNGOUP[*] and Édouard Épiphane YOGO[**]

ON THE WAY TO MBALMAYO in the central region of Cameroon, an officer of army with whom we shared the seat said:

«*What is happening in CAR is terrible. The boss (understood as the president of republic) sent 120 men there forgetting that what is happening there could arise in any country of the sub region even in Cameroon. We share the same problems. Just that here, people do bear the situation enough and stay still. Fortunately for us, we have a civilian as head of state. Elsewhere like in CAR, militaries do not consider that having been to the same schools and having the same rank another soldier should govern or rule the country. At least when it is a civilian who managed well the military corps, it is acceptable. They are ready to leave power within the hands of civilians. Actually, things can go wrong at any time in the country, the presidential guard has already raised the alarm (on January 25, 2013 an officer of the Cameroonian presidential guard shot on air when the presidential procession was going on). Anyway, when things will burst out, we know what we will have to do».*[1]

Such talks are current in Cameroon. During a field study from March to May 2011, we noticed through our discussion with some officers of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and the presidential guard (GP) that among those soldiers there was a climate of mistrust and suspicion towards the other unities of the army on one hand, and towards the political sphere on the other hand.[2] This is not limited to Cameroon. An overview of the literature on the links between

armies and civilian authorities reveals that the latter has often been ambivalent.[3] Then what role does the army play within the construction of democracy in central Africa? The following text considers that in central Africa army and democracy share a tetralogic way relationship. While certain states are ruled by militaries (CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, Rwanda)[4], others are governed by civilians who concluded an hegemonic alliance[5] with armies to perpetuate their power (Cameroon, Angola, Gabon)[6] some entertain safe relationships with armies (Sao Tome

et Principe), and lastly some, struggle to protect their territorial integrity (DRC, CAR)[7]. In the meantime, the tendency resides that of armies in the backyards of democracy in central Africa-ECCAS. The present work leans on theories of transitology[8] and of consolidology[9]. The interest of this method of analysis is that, it puts forward two sequences of the democratization process in central Africa: the pluralistic sequence of the nineties and the democratic consolidation sequence following the nineties.

CENTRAL AFRICA ARMIES AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS OF THE YEARS 1990

GENERALLY, ARMIES have shortly supported democratic processes in central Africa. This is due to the fact that many countries of the region were ruled by dictatorships prior to 1990. Since governments granted them enough consideration, be it material or financial, armies stayed still and faithful to them. Worse, some countries have illustrated themselves in *coups d'états* against democratically elected leaders[10]. An analysis the historical background of the relation army-democracy in central Africa during the 1990 decade shows two tendencies: the maintenance of the *statut quo* and democratic *coups d'états*.

Army as a restraint to democratic transitions

AMONG THE TEN COUNTRIES making up central Africa, seven have known the takeover of power by force (Congo-Brazzaville, DRC, CAR, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, and Equatorial Guinea). Therefore, within the majority of states in ECCAS, *multisectorial mobilizations*[11] did not lead to democratic transitions but rather, to *coups d'états*. In all these cases, army stayed in the backyards of democracy. Be it in CAR or in Chad, the various *coups d'états* were committed by former officers of the regular army like Hissen HABRE and Idriss DEBY in Chad, André KOLINGBA and François BOZZIZE in CAR, and Denis SASSOU NGUESSO in Congo Brazzaville. In some countries like Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, army maintained illegitimate leaders to power[12]. Hence, during the contested presidential elections of 1992 in Cameroon, Paul BIYA still held power only after putting the opposition candidate Ni John FRU NDI under house arrest and also after declaring a state of emergency in the most protesting regions (North-west and Littoral) of the country[13].

The second element is the ethnical orientation of some armies that leant on ethnic considerations to support ethnocratic governments leading to civil wars, tribal wars or genocides in central Africa. Hence, central Africa leaders, in a bid to perpetuate in power, referred to presidential guards for ensuring their personal security. The fundamental question does not reside on the essence of such guards, but rather, deals with

their management. They are managed like an army within the army. They benefit from better formations, rationing and equipments. Also, they acquire better advantages than the regular army. The general report from the above is that of pretorianism of presidential guards, ethnicization and presidentialisation of the regular army[14]. Placed under the authority of an Israeli general, after the death of Colonel SIRVAN, it is more equipped than the regular army and appears like an army within the army. For instance, how come within an army of 30.000 soldiers, a presidential guard alone encompasses 3000 men? Taking into account such a ratio, compared with France for instance, one could imagine a presidential guard of about 30.000 men or around 150.000 men in case of the *US Secret service.* How come within an army of 30.000 men, a special force like BIR alone comprises 4.500 men? How come BIR and the presidential guard together comprising 7500 men (one quarter of the Cameroonian army)? It clearly appears that there is an overinvestment towards the security of the president of the republic[15].

The third element concerning armies of central Africa is their tendency to violate human rights. This can be seen in Rwanda or actually in DRC. Beyond the exceptional situation in Rwanda and DRC, the everyday life of armies must be questioned. Their brutality towards populations too must be re-examined. One must think about the exactions of the Cameroonian army during the *"operational commandment"* in 2001. According to some estimation, banditry caused the death of about 1700 civilians while the relation between army and civilian remains deleterious and marked by a feeling of superiority and abuses[16].

Army as a relief for democratic transitions

IF ONE NOTICES that armies stayed at the backyards of democracy in some countries, it is also observable that some of them helped their people in moving out dictators from power and did organized free and transparent elections.

But in central Africa, none of the various armies did that. In Cameroon, the army is simply an ally of the executive power without taking part to the political scene. In Gabon, it is the same case. Corruption and enrichment of the military staff by Omar BONGO ONDIMBA helped in keeping away the army from the political scene. In Equatorial Guinea the current president took over power by force as above mentioned. In DRC, CAR and Chad, militaries or former militaries are president arrived by force or through *coups d'état* without bringing in the democracy or changing their fellow citizens way lives conditions. In Rwanda, a General arrived by a *coup d'état* holds power. Only Sao Tomé et Principe seems to be better. In that country, none

> CORRUPTION AND ENRICHMENT OF THE MILITARY STAFF BY OMAR BONGO ONDIMBA HELPED IN KEEPING AWAY THE ARMY FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE.

the three illnesses characterizing central Africa armies does exist. No president has ever took over power by coup d'état, there is no military as president of the republic and there is no hegemonic alliance between the army and the executive power for the latter's perpetuity. Contrarily, in West Africa examples of vanguard armies for democratic processes are numerous. In Nigeria, OLESSEGUN OBASSANJO evicted General Sani ABACHA from power. After this, OBASSANJO retired from power and this released the democratic transitions within that country which today, appears to be a sturdy model of consolidation process. In Mali, Ahmadou AMANI TOURE's *coup d'état* got rid the country of a military dictatorship and instituted a democratic transition. Unfortunately, at the time when those countries started a consolidation process, a new

coup d'état has come to decline the democratic process there: one can talk of a *reflux.*

CENTRAL AFRICA ARMIES AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AFTER THE YEARS 1990

THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION HERE is to know how far one can talk of consolidation in central Africa in a context where many states are still under the democratization process, where transitions are eluded or where reflux are numerous? As Patrick QUANTIN states, "through the magic of words, liberalization processes were perceived like democratizations and retrospectively, common sense interpreted them as such"[17]. Many countries of central Africa have tried to start a transition process since 1990. Today, some of them clamped the consolidation process. From this viewpoint, one can mention Cameroon, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Sao-Tomé et Principe. Within that process, armies hesitate between supporting presidential autocracies or enrichment.

The support to presidential autocracies

GOVERNMENTS OF ECCAS lean for almost all of them on the military force to fill their gap of legitimacy. In countries which have started the democratic transitions this can be explained by the mobilization of armies in bloody manifestations against civilians. As noticed in a country like Cameroon, the mobilization of army to end up with manifestations against rising prices of fuel and primary products led to fire ball cartridge by the army towards the populations on February 2008. This led to a result of about one hundred deaths. In Gabon, the army affirmed its support to the actual president Ali BONGO during the transition process in 2010. As former minister of defense and successor of his father at the presidency of the republic, the latter did not find any difficulty in getting the army's support. In Chad and CAR, it is the same. Within those countries, national armies seem privatized. They tightly linked to the president of republic. This is observed by their ethnicisation. This context therefore facilitates the emergence of rebel groups since bad governance and poverty give way to ethnicity. In Chad for instance, the *Zaghawa* constitutes the majority of the Chadian army's composition. And this is more at the level of the presidential guard. Such an ethnicisation of army is a product of a *neo-patrimonial*[18] and ethnocratic conception of the power's devolution in the tropics; a conception far from that of Max WEBER. The situation remains identical in Rwanda. The ethnicisation of army seems if not more, proportionate to than in CAR and Chad. In fact, the Rwandan armed forces are in majority made up of Tutsis, the minority ethnic group the country on the numeric basis. This is observed at the level of officers whatever the rank, and at the level of the strategic posts occupied within the army. In DRC, the situation is inextricable.

Ali BONGO

Since that country has never undergone any democratic transition, there is no need to talk of consolidation process. In central Africa, ethnicisation of armies leads to their privatization, to the proliferation militias and that of rebel groups with ethnic trends. One can inspire on DRC and CAR with M23 and SELEKA.

The enrichment of armies in central Africa

FACING THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATIONS many heads of state in central Africa bypassed liberalization and democratization imperatives of the political life. In consequence, they bent over corruption of the political elite. Hence, the *politics of belly*[19] of Jean-François BAYART, and the paradigm of neo-patrimonialism, better explain the establishment of dubious financial mechanisms as a method of government of many states in central Africa. In a country like Cameroon, after the relative liberalization of political life marked by the October 1992 competitive elections, one notices a decline of the opposition at every consultation (presidential, communal and legislative). Actually, in that country, the political party in power controls all the arenas from the national assembly to the town halls (the Cameroon's People Democratic Movement has about 92% members of parliament and 90% of town councilors and 92% of mayors). However, income does not suffice for a regime to stay. Because if the political leaders of central Africa, as it is the case with Gabon, corrupt leaders of the opposition and of the civil society to avoid social upheavals, the large majority of the population on its part still live under poverty. Then the army was associated to the reproduction system of the political domination. For army to accept such a deal, it had to get its own part of the national cake. This led to an enrichment of army[20] notably, officers of high ranks and Generals who left the political arenas for the profit of civilians while vehemently intervening[21] in favor of civil authorities.

CONCLUSION

NONE OF THE CENTRAL AFRICA COUNTRY is yet a real democracy. When examining them on the basis of Robert DAHL's criteria, one notices that they do not fit[22]. Up to now none of the serious think-thank in the world considers central Africa countries as democracies *(Mo Ibrahim, Transparency International, Freedom House, National Democratic Institute).* However, there has been transition attempts, frozen transitions or unfinished ones since the the Baule performative speech. But the democratic fluxes were followed by autocratic reflux. In some countries, transition turned into chaos[23]. In that context, democratic consolidation seems utopian. If central Africa countries are in the backyards of democracy today it is partly due to their national armies. Hence, rethinking democracy in central Africa requires a redefinition of the role of armies and a re-articulation of the relationships between militaries and civilians[24].

NOTES:

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Governing Without an Opposition:
The Aftermath of the Early Parliamentary
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By Dr Ekaterina R. Rashkova-Gerbrands

Governing Without an Opposition: The Aftermath of the Early Parliamentary Election in Bulgaria

By Dr Ekaterina R. Rashkova-Gerbrands*

A LONG-STANDING VIEW among political scientists is that less fractionalized party systems produce more stable democracy and deliver socially better results. Putting theory and practice together, the question that remains is, 'is that always the case?'. Theoretically speaking, policy is more easily passed and policy choices can be expected to be more stable in the long run when supported by a united majority, yet, there can be situations in which the range of policy options is compromised due to the fact that the political elite governing a state is just not diverse enough. The results from the lack of a true political opposition are political instability and directional confusion both within and outside the state. Similar situation is revealing itself currently in Bulgaria, where after the parliamentary election held in May this year, the country's government and its likely political choices, have taken a 180° degree turn.

Political crisis, radical change of direction (perhaps more for the outside world than for those currently leading the country), and once again a three-legged coalition – these are the characteristics of the current political situation in the country. The reason for calling early elections, which were originally due at the end of the summer, was the resignation of the Borisov Cabinet earlier the same year. Ex-prime minister Boyko Borisov announced his cabinet resignation after nearly two weeks of spiraling social protests[1] in which thousands of people demonstrated against the level of corruption, the lack of law and order, and the persistent poverty. Claiming that 'he will not govern a state where the police beats the citizens' and with the belief that his party, GERB, has a strong potential of winning the

elections which were to follow, Borisov, surprising both national and international politicians, stepped down. In the subsequent weeks, all three parties (GERB, the left-wing socialist party, BSP, and the Turkish minority party, DPS), which were given the opportunity to form an interim government had returned it to the President, who after consultations proceeded to the formation of a care-taker government.

In the election of May 12, four political parties entered the parliament – Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS), and ATAKA (a party with nationalist ideology). Former Prime Minister Borisov's party, GERB, admittedly won the election with 30.54 per cent of the popular vote. However, the low voter turnout[2] of just 53 per cent, and GERB's slim victory over the BSP (less than 4 per cent), has prompted the question whether these results are not a symptom of a growing mistrust towards, rather than a true victory for GERB. An even more striking fact is that about a quarter of the popular vote was cast for parties that did not make the 4 per cent parliamentary threshold, thus leaving a significant portion of the citizens' voices

Boyko Borisov

unheard. Among these parties are Citizens' Bulgaria (DBG) of former EU commissioner Meglena Kuneva, Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB) of former Prime Minister Kostov, as well as the United Democratic Forces (SDS), Order, Law and Justice (RZS), Lider, and VMRO, several of whom were part of the previous parliament.

One of the conclusions in the aftermath of Bulgaria's parliamentary election is that perhaps the results have affected most Bulgaria's political *Right*. For the first time in the democratic history of the country, parties, which were part of the initial democratic political opposition after the changes in 1989 (the United Democratic Forces and its multiple fractions) were now all left outside of the parliamentary doors. A devastating fact not only for many of the *Right* political leaders and the future direction of their parties, but also for the current political situation in Bulgaria - one resulting in a left-wing coalition which has not won the majority of the popular vote to govern, yet is doing so in full swing with the official support of the Turkish minority party (DPS) and in practice without any viable opposition. The lack of a viable opposition is a result of the perfect division within the parliament, which allocated the ruling BSP and DPS with 120 seats in a 240-seat parliament, and GERB and ATAKA with the remaining 120, divided 97 to 23, respectively. This division of the electoral choice forced GERB to return the mandate it was granted as a leading political force because the only potential partner it could have had was the nationalist political party ATAKA. As a result, the mandate for forming a government was given to BSP, who in coalition with the Turkish party (DPS) proposed cabinet. After a new cabinet headed by Plamen Oresharski, was voted in on May 29, 2013, GERB remained the only and somewhat weak opposition to the ruling coalition. For the passing of the proposed cabinet, BSP and DPS's 120 parliamentarians were supported by the leader of the nationalist party, who despite proclaiming himself against the ruling of these parties, registered for the vote on May 29 thus ensuring

the necessary quorum of minimum 121 MPs for the vote to take place. Regardless of ATAKA's relatively small size, the perfectly divided parliament and the party's ideological incompatibility with GERB, give it the strongest veto power in the current parliament. The extremist party is enjoying a privileged position in which one side does not want anything to do with it, but without it, its opposition to the ruling coalition becomes merely symbolical, and the other while stating that they will not cooperate with a party with extreme nationalist views, welcomes its backing in crucial times like the passing of the cabinet.

The situation in Bulgaria is rather critical. Policies for which center and center-right parties have worked on for years after the democratization process started are being turned around. Steps towards the decentralization of prosecuting power are being reversed. Rules which ensured that political change happens only after it has passed through the majority of parliamentarians are being changed. One of the national priorities of the Oresharski Plan is to restart the project for the Nuclear Power Plant Belene, in which Russia has exclusive interests and which were terminated by the Borisov cabinet. Another major point of contention are the changes envisioned, and passed as of June 7, within the Law on National Security and the jurisdiction of the State Agency for National Security (DANS) which is to engulf the General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOB) – the latter was the strongest pillar in former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Tzvetan Tzvetanov's work, who's fight against corruption was appraised by many, especially abroad, but was severely criticized by the BSP and DPS who were at the time in opposition. An additional change to the law about the national security is that the director of DANS will be chosen in parliament, and not appointed by the President on the recommendation of the parliament, as it has been until now. In this way, the ruling coalition ensured that no-GERB-related

figures will have any say in the running of national security. Among other important rules which are undergoing changes are the 'house rules' of the parliament. Two points of contention there are whether break-away MPs are to be allowed to form new parliamentary groups (this was forbidden by the previous cabinet, but the rules have been changed by the current majority) and what should be the necessary minimum MPs present for parliamentary committees to be able to do their work (this used to be 50 per cent plus one, and the proposed change is to lower it to a third).

With these being only the most important changes and the ones that have been proposed and voted on already in the first week after the passing of the new cabinet, one is left to wonder 'what is next?'. What else can be reversed or changed in its direction and whose interests will it serve – those of the people or those of some parties? On the threshold of the unknown, and on the verge of many voices being left unrepresented, perhaps as some have argued[3] we should not be worried about stability, but about change.

NOTES:

* Ekaterina R. Rashkova-Gerbrands is an Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics at University of Innsbruck.

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LINKAGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

By Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain*

IN THIS PAPER, the author has made an attempt to analyse the growing severity of two closely linked issues of climate change and energy security and its possible repercussions on India's national security. In recent times there has been a lot of debate and discussion over the linkage of energy security and climate change. In this debate, national security has become a key element on the possible effects and policy responses to energy security and climate change. As energy security and climate change have in recent times gained increasing attention, so its security implications became the focus of concern for our country.

As an emerging power with a lot of development needs, India faces a huge challenge to manage the vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and energy security. Climate change and energy security concerns create significant challenges for India as it has the potential to threaten national security of the country. On the one hand India does not want any constraints on its development prospects in which energy has a key role to play while on the other hand, it faces a tough challenge partly due to international pressure and partly to national security concerns over the issue of climate change. Climate change and energy security will play key roles in the future security environment of our country.

Like many other countries, India is also currently facing the dual problems of ensuring energy security and climate change. India will therefore need to save and devote even more resources for meeting economic well-being needs with greater environmental sustainability. Broad-based economic and social development is ultimately the answer. Economic pricing of energy and other resources will be a key to switching to a more

sustainable development path. Managing energy needs for a rapidly growing economy will be at the heart of the response and India's voluntary endeavors towards climate change.

To meet the increasing energy demand, there has been an enormous burning of fossil fuels which is a major cause for global warming. Dealing with the problems of climate change requires a substantial reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. India is the fifth largest GHG emitter in the world, accounting for approximately 4.7% of total global emissions, while China has become the largest emitter with 23% of total GHG emissions. In 2005, India's total GHG emissions was 1,866 MtCO2e compared with China's total emissions at 7,234 MtCO2e; India's per-capita GHG emissions was 1.7 MtCO2e compared with China's per-capita emissions at 5.5 MtCO2e. Reducing emisions would create serious problems for national energy policies and energy security and would lead to economic, social as well as political problems for different countries.

Conceptualising the Problem of Energy Security and Climate Change

Energy is essential to improving the quality of life and opportunities in developed and developing nations. The principal energy-related challenge is access to energy, which has two distinct facets: ensuring energy supply to meet the growing demand of fuelling economic growth; and providing access to lifeline levels of clean commercial energy for the poor. To date coal remains the most realistic option for power generation in the short to medium term even though an increase in the supply of coal is constrained by the ability to raise domestic production. More than 400 million people do not have access to electricity and more than 700 million depend on non-commercial biomass for cooking. Therefore, ensuring sufficient, reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices reflecting market fundamentals is a challenge for countries and for mankind as a whole. India is a major producer of Carbon dioxide.

Therefore, the significant challenge for India is to work out a compromise between, on the one hand, the implementation of its national development goals and on the other hand, a substantial contribution to the efforts to stop the global challenge of global warming.

Climate change is the result of rapid economic development - mainly because of manifold increase of industrial, population consumption of fossil fuel and amazing change in the land terrain (settlement/infrastructural change and use of land). The scientists world wide conducted a number of studies and came up with findings more or less similar regarding the implications of climate change. Since these studies are futuristic, the variation in the findings with a wide probability could be misused by politicians and parochial nationalists and mercantilist for their national objectives. That itself is a threat to global and particularly regional security.

Climate change and energy security together is projected to have severe adverse effects on India's development as it compounds the pressures on natural resources and the environment associated with rapid urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth. It can directly impact the environment for the survival of humanity, and of course it also has an unavoidable influence on military security.

Energy Security and Climate change together could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration. Besides, they can pose a threat towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and economic development, and could precipitate migration, environmental degradation or unsustainable use of natural resources, including water stress and scarcity, deforestation, desertification and land degradation.

The energy security and climate change problem is a development problem, and must be comprehensively solved in the framework of sustainable development. International cooperation on climate change must start from correctly handling the triple relationship between economic growth, social development and protection of the environment, and must place guaranteeing economic development and strengthening sustainable development to its core. It must have saving energy, improving the energy structure and strengthening ecological protection as its focus, and have scientific progress as a support, so as to continuously raise the capacity of international society to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

This section will shed some light on the possible implications of climate change and energy security on the security of India by giving examples. Climate change and energy security together is projected to have severe adverse effects on India's development as it compounds the pressures on natural resources and the environment associated with rapid urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth.

a. Water resources availability and river water disputes. For instance in the context of the Indus Waters Treaty between Pakistan and India, which regulates the water-sharing of the Indus River, whose river basin lies on Indian territory, increasing water shortages due to global warming, might raise fears in Pakistan that its share of the benefits of the Indus Waters Treaty will evaporate.

b. Food production. Food production in Western and Central India will be adversely affected not only by an increase or decrease in the overall amounts of rainfall, but also by shifts in the timing of the rainfall.

c. Reduced output of agricultural commodities such as wheat, rice and maize. Agriculture will be affected worst in the coastal regions of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where agriculturally fertile areas are vulnerable to inundation and salinization.

d. Raising sea level due to warming continental ice shelves. The rise in global sea levels - due to the melting of polar ice caps and glaciers around the world - is expected to result in the submergence of low lying areas: including river deltas, coastlines and small islands. This situation places highly populated regional cities like Mumbai, Kochi and Mangalore at risk. The effect of glaciers melting on recharge potential of aquifers in the Ganga basin and its effects on the transboundary aquifer systems, particularly in the arid and semi-arid regions is also another concern.

> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE MUST START FROM CORRECTLY HANDLING THE TRIPLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, AND MUST PLACE GUARANTEEING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TO ITS CORE.

e. Change of monsoon pattern

f. Extreme weather events such as floods and draughts. The coastal states of Maharashtra, Goa and Gujarat face a grave risk from sea level rise, which could flood the land. Goa will be the worst hit, losing a large percentage of its total land area, including many of its famous beaches and tourist infrastructure.

g. Submerge of coastal and low land areas and even displacement of population.

h. Supra-national migration. The issue related to climate change such glacial lake bursts, floods and cyclones can also result to migration inflows from Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.

i. Spread of diseases. In arid areas of western

Rajasthan and Gujarat, malaria epidemics have often followed excessive rainfall.

j. Implications on coastal infrastructure. The impact of the rise in sea level due to climate change on coastal infrastructure like ports could turn out to be a huge economic loss to the country's exchequer. The ports in high risk zones that could sustain relatively greater damage are in vulnerable locations of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal on the east and Gujarat and Mumbai on the west coast.

k. Threat to Biodiversity. One of the largest breeding colonies of the Greater Flamingo lies in the saltwater marshes and mudflats of the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat. As global warming causes a rise in sea level, these marshes and mudflats are likely to be submerged. The habitat of the endangered Lesser Florican and Indian Wild Ass, both found in the Rann of Kutch, could also be lost.

MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE SERIOUS CHALLENGE

India cannot take the issue concerning climate change and energy security lightly owing to its serious national security implications. The climate change and energy security demands India to take up certain measures that would help meet the increasing energy demand and at the same time reduce emission of Green House Gases (GHG), which remains the main cause for the severity of climate change.

Faced with the huge challenge of meeting its rapidly increasing energy demand and the reduction of the emission of GHG, India is focusing sharply on both energy efficiency improvements as well as tying up energy resources at the global level – either through purchases on the international markets or through equity investments in global assets. India would also be keenly interested in acquiring clean and efficient energy technologies. Besides, India would also be quite interested in participating in international initiatives to further develop solar and biomass technologies given its large endowments as well as

strong technical skills that it has available within. The Indian Government has already undertaken or planned for several policies and initiatives that encourage sustainable energy growth both in terms of improved efficiency of use and in terms of its environmental implications. Several policies and measures have for example focused on improving energy efficiency, enhancing renewable and clean energy forms, bringing about power sector reforms, promoting clean coal technologies, promoting cleaner and less carbon intensive fuels for transport, and addressing environmental quality.

Another alternative to reduce the use of fossil fuels would be to adopt Solar-based power technologies that have practically no form of emissions. This alternative would also lead to energy security by cutting back on coal and oil requirements to meet final demand. India has also dedicated $1 billion to expand solar power infrastructure within the Nehru National Solar Mission programme. However, the opportunities to substitute India's fossil-fuels-dependent path of development with low-carbon solutions are hardly realistic. So far, none of the developing countries have addressed the challenge of providing electricity with low-carbon solutions.

The efforts needed to address the climate change problem include mitigation of GHG emissions on one hand, and building of adaptive capacities on the other in developing countries to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change on various sectors of the society and economy enabled and supported by technology and finance.

NOTES:

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On the Brink of Revolution: An Analysis of China's Incomplete Revolution and its Impending Completion by Minority Groups

By Ashley Lynn SANDERS[*]

"The revolution is not yet completed. All my comrades must struggle on."
-Sun Yat-sen

Introduction

Although China's 1949 Revolution could be considered a completion of its 1911 Revolution, the Chinese Revolution actually remains incomplete. While these two events altered the political and economic structures of the country, the societal structure was fundamentally unchanged. Chinese society has indicated a need for change and certain factors point towards an impending movement to bring about these necessary changes. Naturally, it could be anticipated that those who require social changes more so than any other change will be the ones spearheading a movement for change, especially if this is an educated group of people. It is, therefore, evident that the recent and significant improvements in the education of minority groups in China will be the driving factor in carrying out the remaining steps of the Chinese Revolution.

Revolution

When one considers a revolution certain components, such as change, are obvious, but revolutions also entail other less blatant attributes. The word "revolution" originates from the Latin word *revolutio*, which translates to: "revolving" or "turning around." The first of these definitions supports the Marxist idea that revolutions are ongoing processes that do not simply take place within one event. The second of these translations implies an entire *volte-face*. A revolution is a combination of these two translations: an ongoing process of complete change.

In order to obtain a complete understanding of revolution, it is necessary to look as far back as Plato and Aristotle to observe the origins of defining and explaining revolutions. In *The Republic,* Plato argues that revolution is motivated by groups who are at a disadvantage in their society. He describes these disadvantaged peoples as being, "ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, are eager for revolution."[1] He believed that revolutions were economically motivated by oppressed groups of people seeking a drastic change. Similarly, in *Politics*, Aristotle makes the claim that "poverty is the parent of revolution."[2] According to Aristotle, it is "men of ruined fortunes sure to stir up revolutions."[3] It is evident that even as long ago as the 400s BCE, oppression, especially economically, has been a predominant factor in causing revolutions.

For thousands of years, scholars have continued to expound these theories of revolution. Theories have evolved based on necessity in society. Hanna Arendt, for example stated, "The social question began to play a revolutionary role only when, in the modern age and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent in the human condition."[4] Plato and Aristotle focused mainly on the causes of revolutions, while subsequent ideologists also considered their effects. In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that "the effect of all revolution is, more or less, to surrender men to their own guidance, and to open to the mind of every man a void and almost unlimited range of speculation."[5] This description of revolution explains it as a phenomenon that is not merely structural, but intellectual as well. The effects of revolution reach far beyond the confines of a political system and directly impact every citizen of a country.

Any discussion of revolution would be incomplete without considering the works of Karl Marx. In *The Communist Manifesto*, which he wrote in collaboration with Friedrich Engels, he declared that Communists "openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions."[6] In this explanation of revolution, it is necessary for absolutely every aspect of society to be entirely altered in order for a revolution to have been carried out. This explanation also expresses a need for force to be used in order for the revolution to be a successful one.

These differing explanations of revolution exemplify the notion that a revolution is indeed a more vague concept than it may seem. Revolutions have been discussed for thousands of years, yet no specific set of parameters have been allocated in regards to what a revolution actually is. Modern scholars, however, do agree that complete revolutions involve three types of changes: political, economic, and social. These three changes are what differentiate revolts and uprisings from true revolutions.

THE CHINA CASE

There have been so few legitimate revolutions in which change has occurred in a country's political, economic, and social sectors simultaneously that the term "revolution" has frequently been attributed to events where only one or two of these alterations occur. The Chinese Revolution is no exception to this incorrect generalization. In China's case, there have been two "revolutions," which is a unique occurrence. The 1911 Revolution, also known as the Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命) focused entirely on changing the political spectrum. The 1949 Revolution is not actually referred to as a revolution by the Chinese people. They call it 解放战争, which means the War of Liberation. They acknowledge that although the events that occurred were a movement for change, change did not occur in all facets necessary for it to be considered a revolution.

The Xinhai Revolution fundamentally altered the course of China's future in many regards. It resulted in the collapse of China's dynastic system, which had existed for over 2,000 years, and forced China to restructure its political system. As the unsuccessful Qing Dynasty was brought to an end, China established the Provisional Government of the Republic of China (中華民國臨時政府). The Provisional Government of the Republic of China was instituted in 1912 as a direct consequence of the Xinhai Revolution. Under this new system of government, a president was to be elected by representatives from the different provinces of China. This electoral system was a considerable change from the previous dynastic system. However, Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), who won the election, famously informed the Chinese people, "The revolution is not yet completed. All my comrades must struggle on." Sun Yat-sen was aware that there were many more aspects of Chinese society that needed to be altered in order for a full, successful revolution to have taken place.

In 1949, another marked political change took place in China as a result of the latter half of the Chinese Civil War. In April of 1949, the People's Liberation Army (中国人民解放军) successfully occupied the Presidential Palace in Nanjing. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) declared China as the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国). The People's Republic of China replaced the Provincial Government of the Republic of China with a one-party, communist state. Once again, China saw a significant alteration of its political and governmental structure. By 1950, China had transformed from a dynastic society, to a semi-democracy, to a communist nation. Although not as sudden as its political transformation, this so-called War of Liberation also brought about significant economic changes. The War of Liberation paved the way for Deng Xiaoping 's (邓小平) economic reforms. Deng Xiaoping was a Communist reformer who was a highly influential leader in the reconstruction of China's economy in the 1960s following the Great Leap Forward and again in the 1980s with the opening of China's markets. Since Deng Xiaoping's reforms, "there has been a legalization of some private commerce and trade, and some private ownership, particularly in the service industries."[7] It is apparent that China saw a tremendous amount of political as well as economic transformations after 1911, but it is equally apparent that it did not see such transformations in its social structure. It is clear that China is, and has been, in need of social restructuring.

DESIRE AND HOPE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Change tends to come about when the need for it becomes so glaring that it cannot be avoided. Social alterations were not instituted as results of the changes that took place in 1911 and 1949, which is why these events cannot be considered revolutions. A social restructuring is the missing piece of the Chinese Revolution, which may be a part of China's near future. Diverse nations

require a sense of cohesion, which does not exist in China. China is a nation with a population of 1.3 billion people, which are comprised of 56 recognized ethnic groups, who speak 292 living languages (中语).[8] When certain groups receive societal privileges that others do not, it naturally results in tension. Tensions tend to have a breaking point and China's may come sooner than its government could predict.

In order to predict what may cause a third and final Chinese Revolution, it is essential to look at what have historically been the causes of revolutions. "It has been argued that revolutions occur because of (1) demand for change, which is itself the result of (a) widespread provocation and (b) solidified public opinion; and (2) a hopefulness of change, which is itself the result of (a) a popular program and (b) trusted leadership."[9] These criteria need to be met, but other factors are also necessary. These other factors cannot be defined and are entirely situational. "The decisive factor may be conflict within one of the conservative classes or disagreement among them. (In the French Revolution, for example, not only were the clergy and the nobility divided within themselves, but the nobility also were in conflict with the king)."[10] Other factors could also include a fractured or weak military, drastic foreign policy shifts, or unsuccessful reform. Any of these determinants in combination with the other two broad causes of revolution would spark a powerful movement for change.

As previously stated, revolutions are inspired by a demand and hope for change. Chinese minority groups (少数民族) have been moving towards this demand and hope for many years. Of China's 56 ethnic groups, there is one majority group, the Han, and 55 other minority groups. Throughout history these minority groups have been regarded as inferior to the Han majority. Until recently, however, many of these groups were largely uneducated, which hindered their ability to come to class-consciousness. Today, on the other hand, the Chinese government has been working to educate these people, which may be working to the government's detriment.

CHINESE ETHNIC MINORITIES

Although Confucian ideology is one that has a significant influence in China, "contemporary Confucian scholars have said very little about the ethnic minority question and minority rights."[11] It is interesting how a way of thinking that permeates Chinese culture has no direct influence on policymaking in regards to ethnic minorities. Confucianism, or the "School of the Scholars (儒家)," seeks social harmony. If modern Confucian scholars were to address minority rights, it would be necessary for the government to significantly alter its treatment of these groups, which is appears unready to do.

The Hui and Uyghur groups are two of the largest minority ethnic groups in China and their cases represent the treatment of minority groups on a broad scale. Aside from being one of the largest minority groups, the Hui is also the largest of the ten Muslim ethnic groups in China. They are comprised of descendants of Central Asian, Persian, and Arab Muslim immigrants who intermarried with the Han. "The Hui are concentrated primarily in the northwest provinces of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu and Qinghai, with considerable numbers dispersed in the provinces of Henan, Hebei, Shandong, Yunnan, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous region."[12] The Uyghur people (维吾尔) are a Turkic Muslim group, who live predominantly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (新疆维吾尔自治区). Confucian ideology and Islam are so fundamentally different, that it would be expected for challenges to arise when the two attempt coexistence.

Between 1911 and 1949, the Chinese government attempted to resolve Muslim alienation. Sun Yat-sen made efforts to integrate the Muslim minority groups into Chinese society. "Sun's Doctrine of Nationalism included all of China's Muslims under the designation of Hui, and declared that all were

Han Chinese who had adopted the Islamic faith and were different only in customs from the greater Han majority."[13] Despite this declaration, the Hui people did not experience peace throughout this time period. They fought with the Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang as well as the Han Chinese. Matters only worsened for the Hui after 1949. Muslim institutions and organizations throughout China were shut down in the 1950s and in the 1960s the government banned the *hajj*. Mao Zedong's Red Guards (红卫兵) lashed out violently against Muslims. "They formed the Revolutionary Study Group for the Abolition of Islam, which called for forcing Muslims to marry Han, the closing of all mosques, sending the Ahaongs to work in the field, prohibiting Muslims from reading the Qur'an, abolishing circumcision, cancelling Muslim holidays, dispersing all Islamic organizations and replacing traditional Muslim burial practices with cremation."[14]

Though many of the larger minority groups are comprised of Muslims, there are many non-Muslim minority groups in China as well. A group that further exemplifies the inferior treatment of minorities is Mongolians. After the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, Inner Mongolia was ruled by warlords and the Chinese Nationalist Party (中國國民黨) government. "By 1928, the very name, Inner Mongolia disappeared from the Chinese map."[15] The government in the mid twentieth century was split in its attitude toward Inner Mongolia. "The Chinese Nationalist Party (中国共产党) (GMD), committed to Chinese nationalism and the unification of China, rejected all Mongolian demands for autonomy. The Chinese Communists, locked in civil war with the GMD, viewed the Mongolian strive for autonomy sympathetically."[16] In 1947 the Mongolians overthrew the warlords and the Chinese Nationalist Party with assistance of the Chinese Communist Party. However, even after the changes that began in 1949 tensions remained. "Class struggle again became the main approach

to national integration; state unity and nationality solidarity were the criteria to judge a minority's loyalty to the Chinese State."[17]

These are merely three examples of the 55 ethnic minority groups in China who have been oppressed throughout history and are still being oppressed today. Ethnic laws have been instituted, but unsuccessfully. The aims of these laws are to "(1) reverse the traditional Chinese patter of marginalization and subordination of non-Ha peoples and (2) construct a minority elite whose loyalty is essential to political stability."[18] However, "PRC commentators acknowledge ethnic law has not eliminated interethnic and minority-state contradictions."[19] Although the PRC has outwardly recognized that there is a problem, aside from putting it on paper, nothing has actually been done to rectify the issue.

DISTRIBUTION OF BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES

Over sixty years after the political and economic changes began taking place in 1949, there has still been limited reform in the social sector. This is especially true in the case of the minority groups. It is natural that *some* social changes have taken place over this long span of time, but it is clear that they are typically mere results of the economic reforms. "The extent to which continued strong economic growth will foster broad-band improvements in the lives of the Chinese population will largely depend on [public service sector] reforms, which are among the key challenges confronting China at this time."[20]

While the aforementioned problems in regards to minority groups were historical, these groups are still are confronting serious problems today. Typically, an urban-rural divide is discussed in reference to China. It is important to note that the Han majority tends to be the people living in urban areas, while the minority groups are living in the rural areas. The United Nations Development Programme sites lack of equal access to "primary education public health, basic social insurance and public employment services" as "one of the

central causes of the gaps in [Chinese] development."[21]

Income

A recent trend that has been occurring is a rapidly increasing income gap between the urban Han majority and the rural minorities. "The urban-rural income gap widened from 2.79 to 1 in 2000 to 3.33 to 1 in 2007."[22] This trend is indicated by the following figure:

Fig 1 Urban-rural income ratio in China, 1978-2007

Source: 2008 China Statistical Summary

The United Nations Development Programme reports that "it has been estimated that 30 to 40 percent of the full income gap has been attributed to the unequal distribution of public services expenditures."[23] Low-income households tend to be unable to "afford important services provided by the Government, so they benefit less than higher income

households, who can afford all public services provided by the Government."[24] Consequently, the income gap deepens even further.

Healthcare

Despite the fact that healthcare expenditures increased substantially in both urban and rural areas from 1990 to 2006, the urban-rural gap has continued to expand. It is important to note that medical costs tend to be universal through the country, even though the average income in rural areas is only one-third of that in urban areas. A study conducted with the United Nations in 2003 found that "about 60 percent of total governmental spending on health flowed to urban areas serving just 30 percent of the total population, while only 40 percent of spending reached rural areas."[25] The following charts indicate the disparity in medical treatment available between urban and rural Chinese citizens:


Figure 2 Number of rural and urban hospital beds and medical personnel per 1000 people

Source: Summary of China Health Statistics 2007

Table 1	Number of Medical Equipment in Urban and Rural Area in 2006			
	Total	**Less than 500,000 Yuan**	**Between 500,000 and 1 million Yuan**	**Above 1 million Yuan**
Total	1,821,750	1,715,858	65,433	40,459
Cities	1,482,649	1,393,167	53,844	35,638
Counties(rural)	339,101	322,691	11,589	4,821

Basic Social Security

Basic social security is one of the most fundamental public services and is blatantly maldistributed in China. Many aspects of basic social security are new to China and others are under reform. Old age, medical, unemployment, and work-related injury insurance have been first introduced and reformed in urban areas before ever reaching the rural areas. "For example, workers' old-age insurance has been set up in urban areas, but has not taken functional shape in rural areas. The minimum living allowance and various social aid systems started in cities in the 1990s, but they were extended to rural areas only in 2007."[26] These facts solidify the notion that those living in rural areas, who are typically minority groups, are at a societal disadvantage over the majority Han, living in urban areas.

EDUCATION: THE EXCEPTION

Despite the lack of funding for and improvement in many public services in rural areas, the Chinese government has made efforts to ameliorate education for minority groups. Significant educational improvements have been made in both rural and urban areas in China over the past thirty years. "The number of undergraduate and graduate students in China has been growing at approximately 30 per cent per year since 1999, and the number of graduate at all levels of higher education in China has approximately quadrupled in the last six years."[27] It is understandable that of the public services in China, priority would be given to education. Education could be considered the first stepping-stone to making improvements in other sectors, such as health. Improvements in health occur directly as the result of increased levels of education. For example, knowledge of diseases and their causes is the prime way of preventing the proliferation of diseases. Education tends to promote higher standards of living in a country by providing individuals with knowledge and skills that are necessary to function productively in society. "Poor education limits

capacities and pushes offspring into the vicious circle of low income leading to low investment in education, leading to the poor capacity to make a livelihood, and leading back to low income."[28]

A high value has been placed on education in China, which is by no means a new phenomenon; it has been in existence for hundreds of years. Today, reforms have been instituted in order to promote its expansions. Today, China "has the largest student population and the largest education system in the world."[29] Academia was able to flourish in China as the result of the government encouraging the privatization of education. Previously, "bureaucratic walls were erected around academia to contain possible nongovernmental influences."[30] After Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, however, the government encouraged "business enterprises, private institutions, and even foreign institutions to support academic programs in existing educational institutions or to sponsor new academic institutions."[31] The government, especially under Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) in the 1990s, strongly encouraged the rapid growth of academia. The following chart expresses the shift in funding for education in China:

Figure 3 — **Education funding in 2002 (%)**

33.6%

62.7%

3.7%

☐ Government ■ Social ■ Personal

Source: The urban investigation team of the National Bureau of Statistics: Education Fund Contributions in China, China's National Conditions and National Strength, 2005.

"After the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, the Chinese leadership embraced the notion that education is the essential tool for economic modernization and must meet the needs of China's modernizing economy and its future development."[32] Therefore, investment in education has been on the rise. "In 1976, funds from the central budget for education were only 7.5 billion Yuan or 2 percent of annual GDP; this figure increased 60-fold to 453.1 billion Yuan in 2005, comprising 2.5 percent of the country's vastly expanded GDP."[33] In order to become an important economic player in the globalized world, the Chinese government has regarded academic improvements as essential. "China has achieved nearly universal nine-year compulsory education in both rural and urban areas, remarkable feat."[34] Enrolment has increased at all education levels throughout China, as dropout rates are dropping. The following chart indicates the rapidly increasing adult literacy rate in China:

million primary and middle-school students in the western region and parts of the central region of China,"[36] which is largely populated by ethnic minority groups. A year later, in 2007, efforts were made to reduce the cost of education for children in rural areas, such as providing textbooks free of charge and subsidies to students at boarding schools. Another important advancement is that "the female illiteracy rate has dropped rapidly since the 1990s, and the gap in average length of schooling between men and women has decreased."[37] As Mao Zedong famously proclaimed, "Women hold up half the sky," emphasizing the importance of gender equality for a successful society.

Although education rates have increased significantly, the rural-urban gap is still apparent in the returns on education. This implies that there may be drastic differences in the quality of education between rural and urban areas. "In 2002, the expected increase in annual income for

Figure 4 — Adult literacy rate, 1996-2006 (%)

Source: 1997, 2000, 2006 and 2007 China Statistical Yearbook

Unlike the other basic services, education has permeated from urban areas in China to rural areas as well. "In 2006, 70 percent of the Government's new expenditures went [to rural areas]."[35] In the same year, free compulsory education also significantly expanded to reach "52

one additional year of education for a rural individual with seven years of education (the average) would have been 87 Yuan per year, whereas the expected increase for an urban individual with seven years of education would have been 460 Yuan."[38] It could be deduced from

these statistics that the quality of education in rural areas must be inferior to the quality of education in urban areas.

Looming Change

Large-scale changes brought about by civilians are frequently led by an educated vanguard. This occurs due to the fact that those who are educated realize their situation and understand how to go about changing it. It is interesting, therefore, that the Chinese government has concentrated on fixing the educational system for ethnic minority groups in rural areas before other basic services. These ethnic minority groups have been historically oppressed. Today they experience a disadvantage in terms of access to basic public services, which are readily available to the Han majority in urban areas, but not available or of lesser quality in rural areas.

The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen wide-scale changes in many nations. Strikes and protests have spread throughout the world, especially during the Arab Spring, to bring about significant change. Though China attempted to

Mao's Statue in Lijang

censor out information about these events, their effects have managed to infiltrate the so-called Great Firewall of China. Main causes of foreign influence on movements for change include the large amounts of foreign direct investment and joint ventures in China. "Many foreign companies, mostly from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, are based in Southern China,"[39] such as the Taiwanese firm Foxconn in Shenzhen, which is a supplier for Dell, Apple, and Nokia. The company's employees in Shenzhen decided to protest their six-day workweeks, thirteen-hour workdays, and unfair wages. Employees protested with a series of suicides, which forced the firm to improve working conditions and raise wages. Thousands of workers at other foreign-based firms in China, such as Honda and Toyota, have also initiated strikes in support of wage increases.

These strikes are small-scale examples of the desire for change among disgruntled rural workers. The "high price [many paid] in the form of arrest, disappearance, and beatings"[40] reflect their hope for change, despite the struggles they may face. Mao Zedong said, "Where there is oppression, there is resistance,"[41] which may have been a foreshadowing of a completion of the Chinese Revolution. As the rural Chinese people become more educated and more frustrated with their position in society, they are becoming more and more motivated to make a push for change.

Conclusion

It is clear that the ethnic minority groups in China have both a desire and a hope for societal change. The first two Chinese "revolutions" failed to successfully change and improve Chinese society, while focusing solely on the government and economy. As the oppressed rural groups are becoming more educated, while no other aspects of society are changing, they are being pushed to the brink of igniting a revolution. In order to prevent a revolution, the Chinese government needs to realize this problem. If the government made greater efforts to end the oppression of

minority groups and provide them with equal access to services such as fair income, higher quality medical care, and social security another revolution could be avoided. If these changes are not instituted in the near future, however, it is highly probable that China will see a completion of its revolution very soon.

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in
MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
Section

Middle East Review

The Military's Evolving Role in Jordanian Political Reform

By Dana El Kurd[*]

Introduction

Following the Arab Spring, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan seems to have faced less instability than its neighbors, much like monarchies across the region. Analysts agree that the regime has navigated the demands of its population in a manner that has *preserved* its own control. Despite this analysis, there remain important challenges the monarchy must address in the coming years.

In particular, the Jordanian military's role within the state and their reaction to these developments has often been neglected. Lack of analysis on the Jordanian Armed Forces comes despite its increasing importance as a member of the elite coalition. Most academic work on the subject of Jordan's military has merely assumed the institution's consent to any political development approved by the king. This ignores the tumultuous relationship the military has had with past monarchs and the recent strain between military officials and the ruling family.

In the Middle East and North Africa, the military institution has been identified as a key player in the setting and execution of government policy (Rubin, 2002). Armed forces have also played a pivotal role in deciding the outcomes of protest movements and revolutions in countries affected by the Arab Spring (Lutterbeck 2012, pg 44). As such, particularly in the case of Jordan – a monarchical regime dependent on a tribally-dominated military to maintain its rule – an analysis of the army is crucial to understanding political developments in the future. The military is the game-changer: an increasingly powerful actor recognizing its decision-making capabilities. Their tension with the monarchy will guide future reform in Jordan.

A Brief History

The Jordanian Armed Forces emerged from the Arab Legion, an institution that existed prior to the creation of the Jordanian state itself under British rule. The main function of the Arab Legion was to organize tribes and Bedouins against the Ottoman Empire. When the British created the Jordanian state for the Hashemite family, the Arab Legion was passed to the command of the King Abdullah I in 1949 (Herb, 1999).

Glubb Pasha, British Commander of the Arab Legion
(Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division)

It took a number of decades for the Jordanian ruling family to cultivate the "civic-myth" responsible for its legitimacy later on (Kamrava, 2000). For precisely this reason, the rule of King Abdullah I came to an abrupt end with his assassination in 1951. Coup attempts continued for his grandson, King Husain, particularly in 1957 and in 1970. Luckily for the king, common Bedouin soldiers sided with the monarch instead of with their commanding officers, and thus the ruling family survived.

The King's reaction to these coup attempts was to purge all officers suspected of harboring disloyalty to the monarchy (i.e. those officers with nationalistic impulses affected by military coups in the region). The king cracked down on civilian protests, banned media publications and political parties, and instated curfews and martial law. He also reconstituted his cabinet with assuredly loyalist members only, removing members of Palestinian origin (George 2005, pg. 31). From that point forward, the King pursued policies of patronage to the tribes and Bedouins termed "East Bankers" at the expense of Palestinian citizens. This was as a result of Palestinian politicization, contrasted with the loyalty of Bedouin/tribal elements during coup attempts. The King made it clear that the armed forces were to remain separate from politics, and personnel with any sort of political conviction were not to be tolerated (Kamrava 2000, pg. 90). Particularly, the events of Black September in 1970 – in which members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization attempted a coup against the king – were responsible for marginalizing Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship almost entirely. Despite some evidence to suggest that Jordanians of Palestinian origin constitute 2/3's of the entire Jordanian population today, King Hussain, King Abdullah II, and the top brass have pursued a consistent policy of limiting their role in the armed forces ("Jordan Personnel," 1989). The King has relied heavily on the Jordanian tribes for important military appointments, increasing their ties to the regime and aggrandizing the tribes at the expense of the Palestinians within the armed forces.

Despite initial conflict with military officers, King Hussain was able to refashion the army to support his family's rule and consolidate his personal power over the armed forces. It is safe to say that both the patronage offered by the monarchy and the "de-Palestinianization" of the armed forces has increased the military's loyalty to Hashemite rule since the tumultuous period pre-1970 (Tell 2004, pg 17).

The Jordanian Armed Forces Today

According to the constitution of Jordan, the King and his Council of Ministers are responsible for internal and external security. The chain of command between the Armed Forces and the state flows through this Council. Although the Parliament has oversight over the Council of Ministers in theory, this Council is appointed by the King and all final decision-making is under his authority (Tell, 2004).

The monarch, as commander in chief, has generally sought to complicate the chain of command between the Armed Forces and the state beyond this title. For instance, the Armed Forces Law of 2001 stipulates that the commander of each service branch should report to the Minister of Defense who also has "complete mandate" over the Armed Forces and their objectives. The office of Minister of Defense has been vacant for many decades however, with that position's responsibilities allocated to the Prime Minister instead. For reasons of workload supposedly, the Prime Minister has always delegated the responsibilities of Defense Minister to his Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff is nominated by the Prime Minister, but approved by the King, and accountable to him only (Tell, 2004). Consequently, the King's authority over all defense matters is wide-ranging.

Although the Constitution has allocated some means of control for the Parliament over the military, reality is quite different. The legislature does not have any security committee and thus suffers from a lack of civilian expertise or direct oversight. Reliance on foreign aid, particularly U.S. military aid, helps the Armed Forces remain autonomous from any constitutionally-mandated oversight (Tell, 2004).

Civilian control of the armed forces through the executive and legislative branches, particularly through the chain of command and Parliament, is for all intents and purposes nonexistent. This dynamic exists as a result of the King's involvement and his abundant avenues for intervention, all in the name of consolidating his own power and maintaining the control of the ruling family. But, this assumes the acquiescence of the armed forces wholly and in all circumstances. As recent events prove, this may not always be the case. Thus, in an attempt to maintain absolute control, the king may have empowered the military as a political actor.

The Armed Forces and the Arab Spring

Following the Arab Spring, the military has been used to quell protests focused on electoral reform, neoliberalist policies, and charges of corruption (Riedel, 2012). The gendarmerie in particular –

> **Civilian control of the armed forces through the executive and legislative branches, particularly through the chain of command and Parliament, is for all intents and purposes nonexistent.**

recently formed to act as part of the coercive apparatus under the jurisdiction of the Jordanian Armed Forces – was put to good use (Sayigh, 2011). This paramilitary force has been involved even in gatherings predominantly supported by "East Bankers" (Vogt, 2011). There is no reason to believe that the remaining service branches would not follow suit, no matter which group is involved in protest (Yom, 2013). The military is not only loyal to the monarch, but also has no shortage of experience in maintaining domestic stability, as its history proves.

Some questions remain, however, as to whether East Bankers (perceiving marginalization at the

expense of Jordanian Palestinians) will continue to deploy for the protection of the monarchy in this loyal fashion (Yom, 2013). Political grievances expressed both by military veterans and their East Bank tribes may indicate a gradual shift in the political landscape of Jordan (Goldberg, 2013) (Schenker, 2013). Most importantly, it may point to some unrest within the Armed Forces themselves.

(Muhammad Hamed, Reuters)

Political Reform

While outright mutiny may be out of the question for the professional and sufficiently loyal armed forces, some questions have been raised over whether the army will get involved in the debate on political reform, or continue to acquiesce to the King's pace. In May 2010, a petition was raised by the National Committee of Military Veterans calling for an end to corruption, a resolution to the "Palestinian" question within Jordan's borders, and changes to the constitution for the benefit of parliamentary power by limiting the monarch's role (David, 2010). This organization has significant political power, encompassing over 140,000 veterans including high-ranking generals from the most prominent tribes (Vogt, 2011). Analysts considered this political involvement by the military veterans, and their broad scope of both

political and economic demands, as a "culmination of a gradual process in recent years, whereby senior army veterans interfere in politics" (David, 2010).

This proved to many within the regime that the military was not a silent actor in the political arena. In fact, it was beginning to vocalize its demands, some of which flirted with attacking the monarchy itself. Their petition, for instance, emphasized the corruption around the queen and demanded an end to "elite treachery" (Vogt, 2011).

Specifically, the "Hirak" movement emerging out of royalist towns has been highly vocal both about maintaining the East Bank character of the state and other issues of reform (Schenker, 2013).

Members of these tribes represent military officials at all levels; thus there is no reason to believe that tribe members within the armed forces do not share the same grievances. Corruption within the state bureaucracies, and within the monarchy's inner circle specifically, has signaled to the military establishment that they are personally being harmed by these developments (Muasher, 2013). For instance, neoliberal reforms have worked to privatize and thus reduce public resources and expenditures, affecting public servants such as soldiers and officers to a great extent (Vogt, 2011). Despite the doling out of material benefits at any sign of unrest, it seems the military leadership recognizes the increasingly powerful role they play in determining the country's political future. This explains their re-emergence on the political stage, after many decades of seeming professionalization and subordination to the king.

Conclusion

Although the protest movement was quelled by state force, King Abdullah II continues his attempts ⟫⟫

to maintain the balance between opposition movements amongst East Bankers, the regime's economic beneficiaries, and the urban (Palestinian) protesters. Neglecting the military's grievances however, particularly in such a turbulent context, may prove detrimental to his long-term control, especially considering their representation of the "East Bank" elements of society. Their ever more vocal demands will define the pace and scope of future political reform. Without the loyalty of the military, the threat of the tribes to "follow Tunisia and Egypt" poses great risk to King Abdullah II, and to the future of his line (Vogt 2011, pg 67).

NOTES:

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Middle East Review

The Ideological Future of the Middle East: Turkey Model

By Rahman DAG*

In the field of political science, the attitudes of any states are being understood through the political ideology which fits with these attitudes or politics. Almost all of them are described as an "ism" such as capitalism, socialism, liberalism or realism. They emerged in Europe and had been exported to the rest of the world. Due to the fact that western ideological penetration on social, political and economic structure of modern Middle Eastern countries new ideologies were seen and employed as a mean of legitimizing their political actions and rule, such as liberalism, constitutionalism or nationalism. From the beginning point of modern Middle East to present, several political ideologies have been prevailing in the region; initially nationalism and then nationalist socialism, and eventually Islamism with its soft or liberal version, respectively. Yet, the impact of Islam in the region on politics has been neglected until 1970`s when petty Islamic groups have begun to blossom in almost every Middle Eastern country. That constituted a tendency among academicians, politicians, and economists interested in politics and international relations to pay attention on the influence of Islam on politics. Contrary to common knowledge, the seeds of the most of contemporary ideologies ranging from radical nationalism, socialism, Islamism (Abu Rabi, 1996), constitutionalism to democracy and their adherents have already been experienced in the last century of the Empire. What prevents scholars to realize this ideological diversification is that all of supporters of these ideologies presented as solution to the sickness of the Empire had accommodated within the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, afterwards). Yet, only Ottomanism and then pan-Islamism during the Abdulhamid II era (Eraslan, 1992) and Turkish

nationalism in the CUP era after 1912 had become prominent political ideologies in the Empire. It is because of that they were imposed and substituted by official governments. The institution of Caliphate in Islam had been endured from the death of Prophet Muhammad until the edict was issued in March 1924, by which the institution was officially abolished by modern Turkish State government. The title of Caliph was actively used by Abdulhamid II who was former of Pan-Islamism strategy and also by the CUP government to keep the Empire together and to survive it from Western Power aggression. After the demise of the Empire, it is known that nationalist sentiments driven by military elites including intellectuals and Arab Kings or Amirs were considered to be the only way in which an independent state should adjust into in order to have their own sovereignty. That is why most of modern successor states of the Empire from Balkans to the Middle East and even to North Africa were structured based on nationalist ideologies by military rulers.

The history of the Middle Eastern States is full of trial and error methodology in terms of political ideology. The prevailing political ideologies respectively shifts from nationalism to socialism (relatively) or nationalist socialism and then eventually from socialism to Islamic sentiments from 20th century till present time (Arjomand, 1984). This Islamist oriented public opinion becomes a Middle Eastern common public opinion, at least among people. The striking point of transformation of political ideologies is that they all have been implemented by military rulers. There is almost no exception on this regard. Remarkable examples can be listed as Turkey where Atatürk and his close associates established the state and imposed a top-down secular nationalist ideology, Iraq where King Faisal formed the state and implemented nationalist discourse during mandate period, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and also Syria were all formed by military figures who collaborated with western powers and upraised against the Ottomans.

Although there was differentiation among their nationalistic intense, these military officers formed the state and tried to gain their independence from the protector western states by getting rid of mandate system (Owen, 2004). This period of political ideology started in late Ottoman Empire and endured till the Second World War, which is interesting this period did coincident with colonial years.

Abdulhamid II

The power which dethroned these rulers was also from high military rank officers, who had a tendency towards nationalist socialism during cold war. For instance, in Iraq General Qasim and in Egypt General Enver Sedat and in Syria Colonel Husni al-Za'im and then Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi did dissolute their kingdoms and established new governments composed of military rulers.[1] These political changes shifted political ideologies of the states from nationalism to socialism-centred nationalism which was backed by Soviet Unions

against western block. This political campaign lost its lean when Soviet Unions collapsed. As a result of experiencing these political ideologies, people of Middle East sought for alternative way of life against nationalism and socialism which could not find solution to their problems and bring the peace in their own society. Despite the fact that there was a remarkable shift from radical nationalism to socialism-centred nationalism from preceding period to the cold war period, in terms of rulers did not change anything as their origins were from military ranks.

In other words, in the following years after the demise of the Empire, with the forming of mandate system, Arab world was administratively divided rather than ruled by a single political unite which covers all Arabs. As a result of that, nationalist movements fought for their own state independence instead of Arab independence. In the colonial period, the nationalist sentiments together with socialism evolved and generated Pan-Arabism which simply means the political unification of all Arab states. For instance, the initiation by Egypt, Syria and Iraq to be united as a pioneering force to encompass a unique and one Arab State is a concrete evidence of pan-Arabist ideology (Halpern, 1963). The failure and disunion of this enterprise and the defeat of Egypt by Israel in 1967 war, due to that Palestine question, extinguished the flame of Arab nationalism. This was the turning point of the displacement of socialism-centred nationalist thoughts and along with losing its dominant position, the revival of Islamic movements meaning totally different way of lives and as an alternative political ideology entered into political arena and consolidated its position among society with the fostering role of Islamic revolution in Iran and Sudan.

Systematically speaking, nationalism in the Colonial period from the First to the Second World Wars, socialism-centred nationalism in the Cold War period from the Second World War to the

1980s or can be extended to the 1990s and finally firstly radical Islamism and then democracy/liberalism-centred Islamism from 1980s to present gained their prominence in the Middle Eastern states (Hunter, 1988; Choueiri, 2008). What these classifications have in common is that they all have been controlled or driven by military rulers or dictators.

As in the late Ottoman Empire in which Pan-Islamic policy was emerged and found its adherents in all over the Empire, since 1980`s when Islamic sentiments[2] resumed to be prevailing in public opinion in the Middle Eastern countries (Lenczowski, 1970), this demand problematically and apparently has not been taken into account by military ruling elites in Arab states or by civil

> IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD, THE NATIONALIST SENTIMENTS TOGETHER WITH SOCIALISM EVOLVED AND GENERATED PAN-ARABISM WHICH SIMPLY MEANS THE POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF ALL ARAB STATES.

governments under military tutelage as the case of Turkey in decision making process. The major target of Islamic political groups whether radical or soft is to get power to imply Islamic rules in their own states. The methods they use to reach their target are obviously different due to the fact that their interpretations of Islamic rule related with politics are distinctive from each other. Generally speaking, despite the existence of radical Islamist groups, most of the Islamic oppositional parties and groups tend to accept democratic regimes to gain power via legitimate elections. In this regard, together with the ongoing arguments about compatibility of political Islam and democracy within the Middle Eastern countries, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Ismail, 1994), Dava Party in Iraq, National Outlook Parties and JDP in Turkey can be seen as suitable examples. These are now

several political opposition groups of parties whose policies and discourses contain Islamism. Apart from Iran, revolutionary or radical Islamism has not reached their aim which is to obtain power (Abrahamian, 1989) and this has changed the direction of Islamist groups to demand more democratic regime to take part in political arena and eventually to get the power.

The turning point where this public demand exposed itself and forced significant changes in both political ideology and practice is the electoral victory of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in 1996 in Turkey and Arab springs in all over the Muslim states in the Middle East and North Africa. Since the inception of nation-based states formed and ruled by military rulers having whatever political

Furthermore, globalized world forced them to come across with liberalism, democracy and human rights together capitalism in economic terms (Henry and Springborg, 2010). Instead of accommodating these changes in a way of adjustment themselves into more transparent governing, they have insisted on their absolute power whether they are military rulers or civil rulers under military tutelage. On the other hand, despite several radical Islamic movements, there has been always one Islamist movement or group demanding for democracy, liberalism and human rights for their sakes against military regimes. That is the paramount strategy Islamic movements applied to gain much more public support in their own struggle against militaristic tyranny. At the

ideology influencing all state policies, these ruling powers have always been minority and culturally, socially and economically far away from majority of their populations. It is to say that higher class of these states have been alienated themselves from their own people as they thought that they were doing best for their people without taking people's demands into account while policy making in every aspects (Gilsenan, 2000). That is the main reason these ruling elites could manage the state and their absolute power have been gradually degenerated from the last three decades.

same time, failure of both pure nationalistic and socialist ideologies turned people face towards Islamic movements which have been always among society even if they are not so religious. It is explanatory why Islamist movements gained significant among of public support in local and general elections despite repression from the military regimes.

Based on the arguments mentioned above, the reason why Turkey can be a modelling country for the Middle Eastern countries which are facing a dramatic political changes through "Arab Spring" is

that direct military regimes in Turkey in single party era accomplished to present itself as a democratic state although Ataturk and his colleagues were all from military origins and also in every coup d'états, military ruling did not endure more than three years. In addition, in spite of heavy military tutelage protected by the 1980 constitution, Turkey incepted to be a part of global economy thanks to transformation from statist market economy to open market economy. Moreover, Turkey is the first Muslim states in which an islamist political party got the power even in a coalition in 1996 and realized that direct Islamic discourse is not something military tutelage could tolerate thanks to the 1997 "soft" coup d'état. This event forced Islamist political party to be more liberal, democrat and conservative in order to have themselves acceptable by Kemalist cadre in military and its extensions in media, bureaucracy, and economy. Because of that, Justice and Development Party (JDP) came out of Welfare Party and when it got the power in 2002 election it paid delicate attention to define itself as "Conservative Democrats" and repeatedly articulated that they have changed (Özbudun, 2006). All these tactical strategies are just for avoiding from military reactions and it seems that they have been successful to eliminate the hidden power of military over the whole politics.

Why I have approached to the modelling issue from this perspective is that the same struggle between military power and civil Islamist political movements should be experienced by the rest of the Middle Eastern countries. It is because of that getting power is not enough to claim that incumbent freely elected movements have actual power over state. Almost for a century, military-centred powers with any sort of ideologies have held the power in the most Middle Eastern Muslim countries and so military understanding of ruling has embedded into capillary vessels in state apparatus. Therefore, most of the Middle Eastern

states experiencing political change should follow the footprints of politics in Turkey to eliminate mentioned military typed administration and then join to global market economy with liberal, democratic (Insel, 2003) and human right-respected understanding but at the same time and most importantly meet religious demands of people, whether they are actually culturally oriented or directly Islamic.

To sum up, the Middle Eastern Muslim counties including Turkey have internalized military regimes as legitimate and needed ruling system. With this understanding, they have tried all available political ideologies to find solutions their problems. From my point of view, the core reason why these states could find solution to their

> IN SPITE OF HEAVY MILITARY TUTELAGE PROTECTED BY THE 1980 CONSTITUTION, TURKEY INCEPTED TO BE A PART OF GLOBAL ECONOMY THANKS TO TRANSFORMATION FROM STATIST MARKET ECONOMY TO OPEN MARKET ECONOMY.

problem is because they searched it in wrong place. The solution was not in changing political ideology but in changing military regimes and superseded it with civil, religiously sensitive and respective and also integrated with global changes in terms economy and values. To what extend it is religiously accepted is also discussible but this is out of the subject of this paper. However, as long as JDP's internal and external achievements have taken into consideration and perceived as successful, then the way that they should follow is firstly to get rid of military regimes and their remnants in state apparatus.

NOTES:

* Rahman Dağ is the Director of CESRAN International Turkey Focus programme.

1. As an ally of western block during the cold war, even in Turkey, 1960 coup d'état was expected to be a socialist nationalist one by several socialist movements which were thinking of that any a top-down socialist revolution could bring the justice among the society and it should be brought to people by military as it was the case in Soviet Unions.

2. I do not claim that after the collapse of the Empire, Islam has never been a par policy making in the Middle Eastern states. However, Islamic discourse and people sensitiveness towards their religion, Islam have been used for justification of their primary ideology and policies. That is why Islam has been one of the most significant determinants of the Middle Eastern countries, yet not prevailing one. The Middle East is a place where Islam came into existence and it has been perceived as a natural part of that region and of people living there. It has penetrated into the blood of that region. In the mid-20th century, a few political groups generated by people who have desire to be ruled by Islamic rules have already existed throughout modern Middle Eastern history but they did not have a strong voice to be heard by public and politicians. The attention for such political groups reached at high level with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the impact of Islam on politics was depicted with some description such as revival of Islam, political Islam, radical Islam or Islamic resurgence, etc. due to the proliferation of such political groups (Ayubi, 1991). After 1980`s and onwards, Islamism has transformed from revolutionary to conservatism or soft Islam. That led to the debate whether political Islam and democracy is compatible or not.

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Inequality in Latin America: an Update

Presentation

By Ramon I. Centeno, The University of Sheffield, UK

In this issue, we present a series by Latin American researchers based at the *Freie Universität Berlin*, Germany. All of them offer an update on the state of contemporary debates on inequality. Although this intellectual effort is focused on Latin America, the reader will find that several insights can be fairly generalized to the world. After all, how many egalitarian societies exist?

Introduction

By Claudia Maldonado, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

This set of articles aims to showing the diverse nuances around social inequality in Latin America. Challenging the borders of analysis of the causes and consequences of inequality across the region represents an effort for intellectuals, politicians and society. In this line of thought the following articles attempt to show some counter-intuitive perspectives on this problem.

Latin America Review

Elites and inequality in Latin America

By Jorge Atria

Inequality constitutes a broadly debated phenomenon in Latin America. Analysis conducted from spheres as diverse as education, health or housing –among others– frequently deduce that extreme disparities between social groups, affect both the access to and the quality of several goods and social services. As a result, large differences in opportunities and life experiences of citizens are outlined. Concurrently, the problems and weaknesses that distinguish societies affected by high levels of inequality are being identified with growing precision by recent international studies from various disciplines.[1]

When the consequences of inequality are explored, the task of detecting who are the disadvantaged seems to be more relevant than identifying who the benefitted are. Public debate, and particularly public policies, tend to assume – reasonably– that confronted against inequality, attention must be focused firstly on those worst situated in society. Inequality constitutes a relationship, however, not an individual condition. Such relationship entails that reference to a certain group of society –e.g. the disadvantaged– always involves implicit reference to another one –e.g. the benefitted. What happens, therefore, with those situated on the benefited end? Is it possible to talk about a group that benefits from inequality?

Certainly, answering these questions goes beyond the possibilities of this work. Through them, however, some reflections regarding the issue of elites and inequality in Latin America can be drawn. To do that, the rest of this paper is organized as follows: firstly, background on regional income disparities will be presented; secondly, some precisions regarding the concept of elite will be provided; finally, three aspects of

social and institutional organization will be analyzed briefly, in order to shed light both on the social position of elites in the region and their relationship with inequality.

INEQUALITY AS INCOME CONCENTRATION AND STABILITY OF POSITION

The indignation and weariness of millions of citizens around the world nurtured the social mobilizations of 2011. For the first time in years they reacted strongly against a system they considered unfair. One of the most catchy and publicized slogans in the United States read: "*We are the 99%*". It was used to protest against banks and the financial system, but most remarkably, against a minority that was considered to be threatening the American dream of meritocracy and the self made man. Not only the streets were used to deploy campaigns, but also social networks. One of the most appealing consisted of one dollar bills showing the income received by the 1% versus the 99%, the evolution of those figures in the last decades, or the salary gaps between workers and CEOs.

If this campaign had been carried out in Latin American countries, bills would have needed to inform additionally that, far from being new, these are problems with long roots in time. Latin America is the most unequal region of the world, at least since the Second World War, with the possible exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (De Ferranti et al., 2004). When income distribution between groups of the population is analyzed, a common feature becomes apparent: a high concentration of income in a small group of society. According to ECLAC's figures (2012), "*The simple average of the values for the 18 countries for which relatively recent information exists, indicates that the richest 10% of the population receive 32% of the total income, while the poorest 40% receive 15%*".[2] Even though the last decade showed positive figures in terms of inequality reduction for several Latin American countries (Cornia, 2012), they are insufficient to modify the

scenery previously described in a meaningful way. The consequences of the abovementioned cannot be fully understood without paying attention to social mobility. A recent research of the World Bank[3] show improvements in terms of upward economic mobility –movements from poverty to vulnerability conditions or from vulnerability to middle class– during the last 15 years. Intergenerational mobility, however, remains limited in Latin America. This conclusion is valid both considering the relationship between parents' education and their offspring schooling years, and to a lesser extent, when observing the effects of parents' background in the performance of students.[4]

In addition, the same report concludes that low intergenerational mobility is correlated with high levels of inequality, which it is very interesting to research about the social position of the elites. Of course, there are a vast variety of distinct cases and experiences among different countries within the region. One element appears to be constant though: according with the World Bank, mobility towards the upper classes –despite the positive trends of the last 15 years– remains quite scarce.

The latter is consistent with the Chilean case, which is a prominent example of positive figures in terms of upward social mobility in a similar period. Previous research has described social mobility in Chile as having "*significant hierarchical barriers, especially between the upper social stratum and the rest of the social structure,* [which] *combines with weak sectorial barriers between classes that do not differentiate significantly in terms of socioeconomic status*".[5] Given the existence of social mobility, therefore, Chile appears to offer a positive case within the Latin-American spectrum. Nevertheless, it remains a significant barrier that separates the elite from the rest of society, preventing social mobility from reaching the upper tiers. In this light, the optimism of the Chilean case dilutes, bringing the country closer to the reality of the other countries in the region.

Conceived in this way, the phenomenon of

inequality becomes more relevant. An unequal society can be thought of, with levels of mobility that ensure a dynamic social structure, capable of transforming and renewing itself according to accessible merits, capabilities, and opportunities. If, on the contrary, there are high levels of inequality which are stable in time, and additionally with low mobility –or at least a mobility that is limited to access upper positions–, the problem is different, particularly when attention is paid to the position of elites.

LATIN AMERICAN ELITES: SOME CONCEPTS AND ELEMENTS OF DISCUSSION

In general terms, being the recipient of a high income is not necessarily associated with being part of the elite. The conditions of income concentration and social mobility described in this work, however, are useful to understand that in Latin American society there is a well-delimitated upper group, stable and difficult to permeate or renew. Given those elements, it becomes easier to associate high income with an advantaged social position, characterized by features that go beyond the mere possession of material resources.

Sociology has dealt with the issue of elites since its origins. In dialogue with philosophy, economy and political science, sociological literature has discussed for instance the difference between the notions of dominant class, prominence and elite.[6] Within the concept of elite, sociology has proposed categories to distinguish those who hold different positions, and to understand the role and influence of each one in society.[7] In a contemporary approach, Joignant & Güell (2011) define elite as "*a group of notable men and women according to some aspect or foundation* [such as]: *economic or cultural capital, expert or specialized knowledge, select social networks, scarce know-how in connection with the practical functioning of some activity –for example politics–,*

exploitation of socially valued surnames in a specific moment and a specific society".[8]

Greer & Orleans (1964) highlight the intertwined system that elites are able to build through a particular set of social codes that includes norms and sanctions, a strong intergenerational nature, and diverse fields that fall under their influence: "*The interlocking-elite system is one in which the same class of persons produces leaders in the polity, the economy, the ecclesia, and the army. This class of persons…is typically hereditary, so family becomes the major transmission belt for the recruitment of the various elites. At the same time, control of the various command posts allows self-perpetuation of the class, while class-endogamy creates, from a set of elites in heterogeneous*

> IN DIALOGUE WITH PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE HAS DISCUSSED FOR INSTANCE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NOTIONS OF DOMINANT CLASS, PROMINENCE AND ELITE.

activity, a defensive social group with common norms and sanctions".[9]

When analyzing the debate on elites in Germany, Hartman (2008) mentions the discontent that those groups activate in the general population, and how they are usually associated with unjustified privileges, detachment from reality and the arrogance of power. One way of understanding such a negative connotation is by considering that, upon those elites, fall "*all kinds of responsibility and capacity attributions in connection with the transformations of the State or of societies, which turn them, at the same time and without contradiction, into source of popular aggression and source of popular identification and imitation.*[10]

What can be said about Latin American elites based on these precisions? Three elements that should be part of a more extensive and systematic

analysis on the topic are presented:

1. Elites command high levels of power in the private sector, which allows them to produce diversified and influential control networks. Ross Schneider (2009) refers to Latin American countries using an approach of "varieties of capitalism", and characterizes them as "Hierarchical Market Economies". He describes diversified family business groups as the dominant type of corporate organization that has been able to survive and prosper during the latest periods of liberalization and globalization. Despite being few, these groups control large shares of the economy, reaching up to one fifth or more of the GDP. Likewise, Schneider emphasizes that, because these economic groups are usually owned and managed by families, they tend to perpetuate through several generations. Certainly, this description is expressed with nuances and specificities in practice. It proves useful to portray in general, however, the enormous economic influence of small elite groups in the productive structures of Latin American countries.

2. Elites exert a strong influence in the public sector, which facilitates the representation of their interests in the State, the restriction of institutional change, and their capacity to permeate the functioning of institutions. According to Ardanaz & Scartascini (2011), the persistence of relatively low personal income taxes in Latin America –despite democratic transitions in the 80' and the 90s and the levels of regional economic development– is in part explained by the institutional arrangements introduced by key political actors during democratic transitions. This would have occurred, particularly, due to a *legislative malapportionment* -described as a *"discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts"*[11] - that is thought to have attributed more

influence, in terms of political representation, to certain groups in spite of others in the construction of public policies.

Due to the fact that overrepresented electoral constituencies tend to align with conservative parties, the *legislative malapportionment* would be serving the economic interests of elite groups that wish to keep their fiscal contributions as low as possible. Ardanaz & Scartascini show that high levels of *legislative malapportionment* are related with low personal income tax percentages in 17 Latin American countries (and more than 50 in the world). Likewise, countries with higher levels of wealth and income inequality tend to systematically show higher levels of *legislative*

> ELITES EXERT A STRONG INFLUENCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, WHICH FACILITATES THE REPRESENTATION OF THEIR INTERESTS IN THE STATE, THE RESTRICTION OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THEIR CAPACITY TO PERMEATE THE FUNCTIONING OF INSTITUTIONS.

malapportionment.

3. The elite's extraordinary benefits in terms of quality of life and opportunities create large distances regarding the rest of society (Reygadas, 2008). This translates into codes of closeness and identity that facilitate social reproduction of privileges and reinforce the affiliation of its members. Space for discrimination, harm and stigmatization gets amplified in highly unequal societies, hindering social coexistence and respect between citizens. This is exemplified by the work of Nuñez & Gutierrez (2004) who depict discrimination based on socioeconomic background between equally qualified professionals in Chile. Another example is found in the controversy triggered by a Spanish magazine report on a powerful Colombian woman, in which a photograph showed her with two black employees in the background, as a scene that portrays clearly

different positions and status between races, social and economic conditions.[12] Those examples provide evidence about how inequalities operate in everyday life, affecting life expectations of thousands of citizens, but also tracing social boundaries, with several consequences in terms of cooperation and integration between citizens.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has sought to provide information regarding inequality in Latin America with an emphasis on the position of elites. Further analysis should direct attention to country specificity and particular conditions of development and inequality: analysing an entire and diverse region as if it constituted a single, stable and undifferentiated reality would be an evident mistake.

The risk of falling in essentialisms must also be avoided, considering that Latin American elites do not constitute a unique case, completely different and incomparable to the elites of other regions. Neither do they represent a uniform and unchangeable group. Latin American elites do experience internal tensions and ruptures, and have been subject to social changes throughout history. It is inadequate, therefore, to think of univocal, conspiratorial and premeditated action guidelines, as if elites were a hermetic group, capable of designing the social order with absolute liberty.

Having mentioned the latter caveats, it is possible to describe Latin American elites as a small portion of the population, characterized by a high concentration of income and the presence of entry barriers. In light of the reviewed empirical evidence, such groups often benefit from current and historic inequality conditions, in terms of enjoying an occasionally decisive influence in business, tax and legislative matters, among others. A more extensive reflection, however, should not directly relate Latin American elites with a desire to reproduce inequality. In many cases, privileged and powerful individuals share the diagnosis that reducing inequality levels is not only necessary, but also advantageous to their own interests. Not only the development strategy is at stake, but also the threat to social peace in each country. And, in any case, this has an impact in the own prospects of the elites.

NOTES:

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1. See for example Wilkinson & Picket (2010), Stiglitz (2012) o Rosanvallon (2012).
2. ECLAC (2012), P.20.
3. Ferreira, Francisco H. G., Julian Messina, Jamele Rigolini, Luis-Felipe López-Calva, Maria Ana Lugo, and Renos Vakis. 2013. Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle Class. Washington, DC: World Bank.
4. According to the referenced report, the effect of parents' background in the performance of students is measured by using scores in standardized tests of the Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA. See page 7 (Overview in Spanish).
5. Torche (2005), Pág. 19.
6. See for example Münkler (2006).
7. See, for example, the distinction between strategic elites and non-strategic elites (Keller, 1963), the idea of *"Power Elite"* in Wright Mills (1956), the notion of *Leistungseliten* and the critics it generates (Hartmann, 2008), among others.
8. Joignant & Güell (Eds.)(2011), P.12.
9. Greer, S. & Orleans, P. "Political Sociology", in Handbook of Modern Sociology, edited by Robert Feris, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, Pág. 833, quoted by Domhoff, W. (1967).
10. Joignant & Güell, Op. Cit., P.12.
11. Ardanaz & Scartascini (2011), P.4.
12. See "*Las mujeres más poderosas del valle del Cauca*", Hola Magazine, December 2011.

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Publication date: Spring issue — April
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Invisible inequality in Latin America

"The poor wants to remain poor, I think that that's the point."

By Mayarí Castillo Gallardo

Inequality in Latin America has several peculiarities. Inequality is a persistent character, which has its roots in the colonial time and finds continuity in the subsequent construction and consolidation of the national state. During this time, there have been cultural elements that reproduce inequalities, giving legitimacy to the interactions between unequal subjects. In that sense, we can say that one aspect of inequality in Latin America is the constant reproduction of persistent stereotypes about the Indian, the black, poor and female.

Inequality in Latin America is not only present in the scandalous digits: is a landscape in which we live daily and, for this reason, sometimes it becomes invisible. There are 500 years of history that structure the horror, indifference or compassion that causes us the situations around. Many of these situations become invisible for us: some are victims who deserve to be helped, others just numbers or just part of everyday Latin American landscape. Thus, the struggle against inequality in Latin America is also a struggle to be considered worthy of compassion, help or indignation.

Looking into the invisible inequality

As an example of this phenomenon, here I present some of the findings of my research on perceptions of social stratification in the Chilean case, particularly on the perceptions that middle class establish about the "poor" subject.[1] During this research we selected 35 people differentiated by occupation, income levels and trajectories of social mobility, which were tested with an interview. In this interview, they were inquired about what they considered distinctive about their social position and what they considered typical of

other actors in the social world: the elite and the "poor", as well as aspects of legitimation or tolerance to inequalities in Chilean society. The purpose was to observe what was behind the idea of poverty/wealth and how that impacted on the reproduction of inequality, framing the interactions of individuals in the everyday space. This question was urgent on one of the most unequal societies in the region, where the concentration of wealth in few hands has been relatively constant, with an increasing gap in recent decades.

The results of this research were marked by negative images of poverty. In all analysed middle class participants was verified the construction of negative images about poverty, linked to apathy, ignorance and lack of habits. The negativity of the images was aligned with the findings of poverty studies in Latin American, but it was shocking the fact that the subjects involved in an upward social mobility –i.e. coming from households of working-class origin or poor working class- were those who showed a more negative perception of these groups. Among these, there was a vision of the poor subject marked by three attributes, all negative: *no project and ambition, lack of education and carelessness body*.

These three elements informed the interactions of middle-class participants with whom they considered poor. Ultimately, this unveils the everyday discrimination that establishes serious obstacles to the possibilities of subjects to break the cycle of poverty. Furthermore, the participants accounted for poverty in terms of *individual responsibility*, thus reinforcing tolerance to social inequality. When being asked about their relatively privileged position over these subjects, the interviewed relied in notions of motivation or individual ambition to explain deprivation. For instance, one participant said: "The poor wants to remain poor, I think that that's the point. Because if you observe a poor, poor has the same things that a worker, because it has free health, has benefits for free, has money that gives the state,

so to them life is easy and they haven't got the ability to understand that the way is studying, so they let the children do what they want, because he is going to be provided all and everything will be easy for him" (Interview Case 3, Management / Supervisor, High income).

THE BODY OF THE POVERTY. MARKS AND DISCRIMINATION.

The dynamics of structured discrimination become particularly stark if we consider the corporal phenomenon. During the analysis process, it was possible to note that an important part of the negative narratives about poverty are condensed into a story about some "marks" in the corporal dimension: visible signals into the body which like landmarks in a map guided the subjects and placed the other in a particular position in the social space: this marks shows in a symbolic way who they are and where they come from. But in contrast to the signals of a map these do not have a fixed meaning and the subjects themselves often do not know they carry them: the corporality of an individual is full of these signals, which others understand and in front of which they structure their reactions. In the case of poverty, all middle class participants in the study developed a strong corporal description of 'the poor' defined by four elements: colour tan skin, dark straight hair, small size and overweight.

These corporal elements were not only outlined by a negative connotation in terms of models of beauty, but this negativity was linked with an specific group: the indigenous peoples. The first three corporal attributes condensed what the subject called "a native genetic," referring to marks that carried the specific subject, but also inscribed him on a certain group in the framework of a long-term historical trajectory of subordination. These corporal attributes are thus better interpreted as perceptions constructed in and inherited from the colonial period, recreated and re-actualized daily in contemporary Chile.

In the last corporal attribute, overweight, revealed

a notion of a general carelessness as an indicator of an apathetic attitude that accounts for poverty. The image of the poor "fat" extracted from this research is opposed to the classic image of poverty as lack of food, where the compassion of the subjects is set in motion immediately. In the case of these images of the poverty, overweight is linked not only to the apathetic attitude of the poor in front of his/her physicality, but also to the attitude they have against their own chances of escaping poverty, levels of discipline and care. A particularly eloquent vision of the link after these ideas of corporality and the legitimization of certain positions of subordination was observed when this "carelessness" of the body is linked to elements linked to reproduction and female sexuality. A significant example of this can be seen in this participant: "Poor women have many children; they have no job, too much legal problems, children of several parents. It seems that these women are polygamous. That's because they don't make it, they can't get out of the poverty" (Interview Case 28, professional, median income). This "carelessness" would be the origin of the reproduction of poverty for the subject;

therefore such judgments must be addressed and counteracted.

TOWARDS MORE EGALITARIAN SOCIETIES

To summarise, the results of my PhD research might signal the need to study into depth the cultural, everyday dimension behind the process of reproduction of inequality in Latin America. It is key to intervene and modify these frameworks of meaning in order to make progress in recent discussions on equality that exists in the region. Thus it is necessary to seriously consider challenging socially solidified classifications, construction of groups and names as an integral part of efforts to build more egalitarian societies. That is just the beginning of the great challenge of Latin America (and the world?) today: the disarticulation of persistent inequalities and the building of truly inclusive societies.

NOTES:

1. This article is based on research work of the author to obtain the degree of Doctor of Sociology, Lateinamerika-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin. 2013.

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Latin America Review

Why the Right is hegemonic in Mexico?

By Julia Aibar[*]

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES depicted Mexico's July 2012 elections as a crucial test in which the country was at stake. Although this warning was heard in other presidential elections there is no doubt this time seemed to acquire a much more vivid and real meaning, both due to the current conjuncture (War on Drugs) and the consequences of an older process (Neoliberalism). Nonetheless that sense of emergency did not materialise as a rejection of past policies. Neither was raised for the harmed sectors a political agenda for them to express their discontent and/or demands.

Overall, the election of this year confirms that, in Mexico, 1) there appears no emergent alternative paradigm seriously challenging neoliberalism; 2) political elites remain distant from broader society; and, 3) the Left is not prepared to offer an alternative political order. Although these issues are closely related, they refer to different problems. However, there is a common question: why the main political actors are more interested in continuity rather than change?

THE CAMPAIGN: A MESSAGE FOR THE ELITES

Despite Mexico's poor economic performance since the 1980s and persistent high levels of poverty, inequality, and (a shocking) wealth concentration, what is striking is the superficial, tangential manner in which candidates had addressed the economy. They not only proposed to follow continuity along the neoliberal agenda, but to widen and deepen its main tenets (!). Furthermore, although the 'security' question should have played a more central role in elections, particularly when violence escalated in the last five years with over seventy thousand people dead, twenty thousand disappeared and thousands displaced, no candidate seriously questioned the government's existing policy.

In other words, neither the economy nor security took over the heart of the debate. The absence of such discussions was irreducibly clear, wherein the campaigns revolved around mutual accusations of corruption. Thus, the election never turned itself into a critical moment where the main societal problems could be raised.[1]

If this was a peculiar feature of the recent Mexican election, even more curious was the ways in which the conservative ruling party –the National Action Party (PAN)- addressed these topics in the final phase of the campaign. Despite being the main responsible for the current situation, that party and her candidate vindicated macroeconomic stability and accused both the Leftist candidate – from the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD)- of wanting to indebt the country and the right-of-centre Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate of setting obstacles in Congress to approve the "structural reforms", which refer to reforms on energy sector (basically opening the State oil monopoly to private investment), labour (aiming to decrease workforce costs), and tax system (launch a single, universal tax). With respect to security, the Right in government vindicated its repressive policy and irresponsibly accused any opposition's candidate (at the local and national level) ascending in the polls as "colluding with organised crime."

PRI's candidate, for its part, not only proposed continuing current economic policies, but also, as in response to PAN's criticism, committed to carry out the structural reforms: one of the unaccomplished dreams of the PAN administrations. For the government, the PRI and the New Alliance Party (PANAL), the majority of academic, intellectual, economic elites and the mass media, the cause of stagnation lies in the difficulty of executing these reforms. As in a sort of sinister *déjà vu* of the neoliberal creed that was the *sole discourse* two decades ago in South America, the aforementioned reforms are for Mexican elites the only way to attain growth: the supposed true spark which will activate the

economy. They seem not to be aware that this economic paradigm is actually found to be wrong everywhere else. In this sense, far from concluding that the hardships of a major part of the population are due to neoliberal economic policies applied since the 1980s, they claim that the poor economic performance is a consequence of the "insufficient deep" of those policies.

To an important extent, on security issues, the PRI did not go beyond reproducing the proposals and measures of the ruling party. Peña Nieto promised to continue "the attack on organised crime", though making clear that he would make some minor adjustments. Hence, the measures included in PRI's electoral platform are: strengthen international co-operation to stop smuggling; professionalise and increase police corps; create a national militarised police; and combat both addictions and the financial flux of illegal money.[2] Following the official line, PRI dissociated security policy from State's obligation to secure Human Rights. Despite talking about the "Rule of Law", security was not seen as a fundamental human right that is not allowed to suppress other human rights. This, above all, clearly implied that security policy will remain repressive.

The main parties seem to ignore widespread social demands, which on its own reveal the profound social isolation of the political elites and the weakness of society to make their demands being heard. Nonetheless both that estrangement and weakness do not explain why the parties (PAN, PRI and PANAL) that proposed continue and deepen the current model, obtained 68% of total turnout. In other words, the relation between the electoral performance, the effects of neoliberal policies, and the actions of the elites during the campaign, make us wonder how is it possible that despite its evident failure neoliberalism was not questioned? How was it possible that the advocates of that model achieved so much electoral support?

These questions were already asked, in practice, in the Mexican public arena. There appears to be two answers. For the Right, there are no real

alternatives to the current neoliberal model, which was categorically revealed both by their lacklustre attempts in questioning the economic and security policies as well as the refusal of the parties to listen to social demands. Thus, the Right attempted to establish the idea that there is not any the chance to question the dominant paradigm unless paying high political costs. For the Left, in contrast, PRI's electoral success is explained by extortion, vote-buying, manipulation of the big TV broadcasters, and the unequal available resources.

Although partial, both answers are regarded valid by significant portions of the population. However, they mask two fundamental facts: what hinders political alternatives from public's view is neither the effects of neoliberal policies nor the inexistence of different ideas; rather it is the establishment of status quo as a common sense which has seriously constrained the scope of political options; and, that the electoral outcome is largely due to both the weakness of the Left to challenge the ruling paradigm and to its outstanding inability to develop and launch alternative proposals.

Neoliberal common Sense

If the discourse of the elites "makes sense" in wide sectors, is because there are deeply rooted narratives that make it credible. In Mexico there is a common sense that has become increasingly solid through years, fed by both sectors within the PRI and its detractors from Left and right, which relates the Nation with a protectionist, corporatist, and authoritarian State. Nationalism for its part is connected with the Mexican Revolution and above everything to the regime built in the post-revolutionary process.

Mexican history is told as a lineal process, shaped by necessary subsequent moments. For history written by the PRI's State, this succession –positively valued, started with institutionalisation (Calles' Government);

continued with social reforms (Cárdenas' Government); and was consolidated after through economic development. The critical version nonetheless sees these moments as the culmination of an authoritarian project: institutionalisation is codified as an antidemocratic and corporatist State's expansion; social reforms as co-optation and disciplining of society; and development either as statist dirigisme (liberal rightist account) or as capitalist deepening (Leftist account). Neither of these interpretations acknowledges zigzags nor ruptures, neither manages to grasp the depth of measures introduced in the Cardenist period.

The convergence in their critique by both the orthodox Left and the neoliberal right largely

> NATIONALISM FOR ITS PART IS CONNECTED WITH THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION AND ABOVE EVERYTHING TO THE REGIME BUILT IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

explains the weight and effectiveness of common sense opposed to PRI's revolutionary nationalism. All this turned into a consensus in which politicians, academics, cultural and economic elites took part. The confluence of so many actors was greatly due to the gradual erosion of revolutionary nationalism as well as the emergence of two deep internal ruptures in it. The first one occurred in October the 2nd 1968, when a brutal repression on the students' movement exposed how the regime had grown apart from the people. The second came with the 1980s economic crisis that gave way to the rise of PRI's neoliberal sector that denied the principles over which that party was created.

Although part of the Left managed to recover and maintain the demands of democratisation, the right succeeded in holding more political weight and initiative. The latter seized the democratic demands reducing them to the procedural-liberal format and imposed free-market ideology.

Since then every discourse with national content was regarded archaic, as a melancholic expression of a lost community that, in the name of the people, denies the individual and the citizen; as an attempt to revive a 'paternalist' State that suffocated the vitality of economic agents. This chain of negative valuations is currently synthesized in the word 'populism.'

This neoliberal consensus although redefined still keeps its defining kernels. This partially explains why today it does not seem possible to think of inclusive and redistributive economic programs; in a State with more presence that does not only assume repressive functions.

This group of dominant ideas and practises, which contains but also by far exceeds an

THE POLARISATION IF ANY —MORE PROMINENT IN THE 2006 ELECTIONS, WHERE LÓPEZ OBRADOR WAS ALSO CANDIDATE- WAS PRODUCED BY THE OTHER POLITICAL EXPRESSIONS, CONFIDENT ENOUGH ABOUT THEIR OWN AGENDA AND INTERESTS.

economic program, is what I call neoliberal common sense. It is a worldview that conceives persons as self-interested rational individuals; the State as an alien entity to society whose purpose is to guarantee the functioning of free market; politics as something that exclusively takes place in liberal institutions and which must be in charge of aggregating interests; and democracy as procedures aimed at selecting ruling elites.

THE LEFT: WITHOUT AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER PROPOSAL

Neoliberal common-sense hegemony in part explains the actions followed by the Left led by López Obrador in the electoral process, whose campaign centred on denouncing what he called the "mafia in power." Regarding the economy he proposed a development plan based on generating resources with a cut on salaries and expenses of the highest paid sectors of bureaucracy. That was his central strategy to improve the economic

performance. On the other hand he clarified that he would not introduce new taxation schemes and, in order not to scare businessmen, he specifically expressed that he would not affect the incomes of the richest. In regards to the 'Structural Reforms' he said he would not apply them although did not clearly elaborated why.

In respect to violence his proposals were rather feeble, abstract, and not very precise. He limited himself to both raise some social measures to attack poverty and to vaguely propose some measures to improve police performance.

Although the coalition that endorsed López Obrador did not share a substantial part of the rhetoric of his opponents, the differences between his block and the others were not clearly set out. Fearful of being accused of 'radical' this candidate strived more on showing a good face than on setting up an alternative.

In this sense, despite many analysts underscore that one of the causes of the not-bigger turnout for the Left was the so -called harsh discourse of López Obrador, the truth is that his campaign was not categorical enough neither in opposing security policy nor in questioning the economic policies responsible of poverty. His message was so diffused that it did not generate a polarisation between his proposals and those of the other candidates. The polarisation if any —more prominent in the 2006 elections, where López Obrador was also candidate- was produced by the other political expressions, confident enough about their own agenda and interests.

Incredibly, the Left allowed the candidate of the violent ruling party (PAN) to raise the banners of 'peace'; did not prevent PRI's candidate —whose party remains responsible of the brutal backwardness of entire regions- from taking over the modernisation's discourse; and did not contested PANAL's candidate —whose party was created by the teacher's union leader accused of the problems in education- monopoly of the

proposals to improve education.

López Obrador cemented his image almost exclusively on the moral dimension, making this the core of his proposal -as a condemnation of the corruption of power elites, which strengthened him in his immediate environment, but drastically reduced his potential public. The demands linked to concrete sectorial interests, as has been said, were not addressed for the most part. The few of them taken into account were neither processed nor elaborated.

Despite all this limitations, Left's electoral performance was good, and in some cities and regions was even outstanding. This point out on the one hand, that even if neoliberal common-sense is still dominant, it starts to crack; and, on the other, that the Left can aim at becoming an important political force.

The imminence of the Structural Reforms pre-shapes two scenarios: either an historical political defeat or growing dissatisfaction and protests. In any case, the Left can play an important role, but whether it is prepared to do it she will have to ask to herself the following questions: will we be able to transcend the strategy of politics through compromises with lobby groups, in order to address the deepest social demands? Will we be able to –through assuming and politicising those demands- represent wide sectors of the population and thus create collective subjectivities? In other words, the Left and the López Obrador's one will have to answer whether she will be able to overcome the partial representation of a 'people' understood almost exclusively as the plebeian –furthermore as a culture of those 'below', so as to build another 'people' thought as a political subject that can express and synthethize social diversity through transversal rhetoric as opposed to the current reductive one.

Finally, with that hypothetical social force, will the Left be able to question the place reserved by the neoliberal dogma to the State in order to revalue it, equip it with technical capacities, making it guardian of social, civil, and political rights, and so broaden the limits of a democracy trapped by proceduralism and legalism?

The possibilities are open. However, the actions of the *really existing* Mexican Left do not seem to act upon them.

To summarise, the strength of neoliberalism in Mexico rests not correlative to its results obtained as a model, but is rather due to a widespread common sense brewed throughout thirty years, which has managed to virtually erase other alternatives from the political landscape. The social disconnection of the major political parties has for its part various components: an unsuccessful integration of civil society with political society, which reflects and reproduces deep economic inequalities, social asymmetries, and ethnic, racial and cultural fractures. On the other side of the coin, the weakness of Mexican civil society –in stark contrast to *societal* density, seals the development of a political community based on shared rights and obligations. Last but no least, the Left's inability to lead a political alternative tells and exhibits its lack of skill and will to politically elaborate –i.e. listen to, channel, organise and represent- the deepest social demands and to forge links with the groups that express them. How long will these features remain unchanged?

NOTES:

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1. The official results of the 2012 presidential election are: Enrique Peña Nieto, candidate for 'Committment for Mexico' (PRI and PVEM), 38.2%; Andrés Manuel López Obrador, candidate for 'Progressive Movement' (PRD, PT, MC), 31.6%; Josefina Vázquez Mota, candidate fot the PAN, 25.4%; and, Gabriel Quadri, candidate for PANAL, 2.30%.

2. To see PRI's platform, visit: http://www.ulsa.mx/votolasallista/docs/Plataforma_PRI.pdf

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Studying social inequality in Latin America requires a perspective that considers not only economic inequalities, but also those which have permanently affected the political sphere, and more specifically the consolidation of Latin American democracy. For a long time the tension between inequality and democracy has been disregarded. The questions addressed in this article imply a turn in our ways of understanding the meanings of high social equality. Higher levels of social equality cannot only be achieved by overcoming poverty through social or redistributive policies. To complement these policies, it is necessary to address the substantial ethical dimension of *the principle of equality* through a focus on social and political rights. The latter should be placed as the ultimate goal of any government that wishes to call itself democratic.

Approaches to inequality in Latin America

Research about social inequality in Latin America plays a key role in academic discussions, debates in international organizations and national governments´ programs. This is not only due to the fact that our region has been historically one of the most in unequal regions of the world.[1] Besides, despite years of implementing social policies to overcome this problem, it is still complicated to find improvement indicators of social equality in most of our countries.

In this context, international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) have done relevant research on social stratification, income, social inequality and economic growth. Since the late nineties these agencies have also provided many

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Social inequality as a strong obstacle for democracy

By Claudia Maldonado Graus[*]

recommendations for public policies against poverty and the prevention of an intergenerational transfer of social inequality.[2] Furthermore, they have been involved in the assessment of governmental policies on the aforementioned issues. In this context, a largely celebrated approach against inequality has focused on both *direct or indirect income transfers* aimed at the poorest strata of society.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest to understand social inequality from inside the governments and societies themselves paying special attention to the forms of conflict taken by social inequality in several countries. This is mainly a consequence of the massive mobilizations of society groups that have claimed equitable access to goods and social rights (increased levels of political representation, education, health, environment, etc.). These manifestations have exposed the incomplete democratic process in the region. In this new scenario, it is important to

reconsider the conflictive relation between inequality and democracy and the obstacles that it generates with regard to social inclusion and citizenship.

UNDP and ECLAC have called attention to the need to incorporate institutional changes at the state level which guarantee *equality of rights* to the different segments of society as well as their inclusion into the political system and capacity to influence decision-making processes. These are considered necessary conditions for higher levels of democratization and human development.[3] Moreover, the debate about inequality furthered by the theory of political transition has been of equal importance in the region. According to this discussion, the democratization of political regimes would reshape the relationship between democracy and equality –understood in terms of opportunity creation and an active inclusion of the subaltern groups.[4] This perspective has been highly criticized due to the inability of democracy let alone to produce the amount of public goods necessary to the consolidation of the democratic regimes[5] and thus to achieve an egalitarian distribution of the opportunities generated.

INEQUALITY ON THE NEW PUBLIC SPHERE

With the transitions to democracy in Latin America since 1980s, two main concerns emerged: 1) the institutional reconstruction after dictatorships and civil wars; and 2) the challenge to overcome the immense 'social debt', mainly extreme poverty.[6] In order to face this second problem many Latin American states initiated programs of social assistance. Such programs have changed during the 1990s with the attempt – at least on the paper - to make them tools to tackle not only poverty but also inequality.[7] These 'public policies', as they were known from then on, tried to address the demands for State welfare and social services. They played an important role in trying to regain political, economic and social rights for the whole population –now seen as a prime vector of democratic development. Governmental actors

and political elites thus turned to a political discourse centered on inclusion and social cohesion as a tool to obtain political legitimacy.[8] Although these public policies managed to significantly reduce poverty indicators in countries like Brazil, Mexico and Chile, among others, they did little to diminish the gap between the rich and the poor.[9]

Moreover, it is important to point to the negative effects of such policies, such as the production of relations of total dependence between the state and the most vulnerable groups who in turn are prevented from fully acting as participative subjects. As a result, social actors turn into mere *objects of politics* whose role as political subjects is inhibited.[10] In other words, clientelism has emerged with great influence in the election of political authorities, which grants political control to the elites. In a complex paradox, this situation has had the effect of turning such tools aimed at poverty alleviation into mechanisms that legitimize and reproduce social inequality.

These developments are the consequence of a process of systematic privatization of social goods and services, which resulted from the introduction of structural adjustment policies. This includes the privatization of health care, education and social protection as processes that reflect the withdrawal of the state from the public sphere.[11]

What to do then?

The task to demount social inequality is not only an economic but also a political enterprise, which Latin America is urged to accomplish. This endeavor implies understanding the fact that social policies have mainly a palliative effect and are not directly linked to the expansion of social, political and economic rights – despite optimistic opinions in official documents. As long as there is no equality before the law, fairness between citizens and legitimate recognition of differences between the social groups, democracy will not be achieved. Our challenge is then to move from the discussion on reforms of basic services (such as

education, health care and social security) to a *political reform* that guarantees the equal possession of these rights by all citizens. Only under these conditions, Latin Americans will have a fully-fledged democracy.

Notes:

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1. Paramio, L (1994), Klisberg, B (2002), Cortés, F (2011)
2. UNDP (2010) and ECLAC (2010)
3. UNDP (2010) and ECLAC (2010)
4. Burchardt, H (2008)
5. Pzreworski, A. (1998)
6. In the nineties as well as in the eighties debate discussion was focused on the theme of poverty. Inequality start being relevant only around the year 2000. See Lanzarotti and Mora (2004)
7. Especially meaningful were the politics of conditioned transfer applied in many Latin-American countries which profited from the support of international organisms. Among others we can find: "Fome Zero" [zero hunger] from Brazil, "Chile Solidario" [solidarian Chile] in Chile and "Oportunidades" [opportunities] in Mexico.
8. Chile under the governments of "la Concertación" proves being an iconic example in this matter. See Moriconi, M (2009).
9. This can be exemplified with the case of Chile where indicators of inequality actually grew under the democracy. (European Commission, 2007)
10. Regarding the constitution of social groups as objects of public policy, Chatterjee, P (2008) presents relevant information in the analysis of the case of the suburbs of Calcuta in India.
11. The notion of a Minimal State was enlarged by the structural reforms of the Washigton Consensus, whose effects have had profound and long lasting impacts in the continent until today.

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Latin America Review

Urbanization and inequality in Latin America

By Dr Ramiro Segura[*]

A RECENT WORLD BANK report notes that Latin America is the only region where income inequality declined during the last decade. This significant and hopeful finding cannot hide, however, a complex situation: Latin America is the most urbanized and most unequal continent in the world. Against this backdrop, this article seeks to reflect on the links between urbanism and inequality in times of globalization, looking at the evolution of some major Latin American cities in the last two decades. I will underscore the need for regulation of land use as a policy aimed at reducing inequality.

On the one hand, in the last decade many countries in the region have implemented policies that succeeded in reducing income inequality. On the other, simultaneously, there continued the expansion of fragmented in the metropolitan areas that increases inequalities in access to the city and its services. In this context, I will point out that we must to think about the place of urban space and urban policy in the Latin American States' commitment to reducing inequality in the region.

This paper argues that the challenge for the political processes in the region towards a reduction of social inequalities is to intervene not only in income distribution, but in urban settings through regulations of land uses, equal distribution of goods and services, and equal opportunities of accessibility and mobility in the city.

Globalization and inequality in the Latin American city

Social theory has widely discussed the relationship between globalization and urban inequalities, specifically in the form of the *duality* of social

structure, which underscores the growing gap between high and low wages in metropolitan areas that become nodes on the global network structure. Either with the concept of "world city"[1] or "global city"[2], the theory predicts a strong link between global interconnections and urban and social inequalities.

These issues are particularly relevant in the case of Latin American cities, some of which enter (in secondary or tertiary positions) in the hierarchy of global cities. As a matter of fact, during the last decades of the twentieth century, in the context of the passage from the model of import substitution industrialization to neoliberalism inequality worsened in major Latin American cities.

A comparative research between the cities of Buenos Aires, Lima, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Santiago de Chile, and Rio de Janeiro[3] found that between 1980 and 2000 in the six cities the informal employment increased, as well as the inequality (except Lima) and poverty (with the exception of Santiago). The same increase could be noted in regards to crime incidence and feeling of insecurity.

Given this evidence, there remains a question: to what extent inequality in Latin American cities is the result of the processes described in the theories of the "global city" and "globalization"[4]? In this sense, Roberts[5] noted that while some urban changes can be predicted with global city models[6], more relevant to the rise of urban inequalities were the reduction in communication costs, the opening of economies to free trade, free movement of capital and reduction of state intervention in the economy, "even when they do not increase the functional specialization and interdependence" (2005: 111). In short, the effects of neoliberalism "implemented under the close direction and influence of global institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund" (Portes and Roberts, 2005: 21)[7] are closely linked to inequalities in contemporary Latin American cities.

METROPOLIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN CITY

In the 1970s, researchers described "the Latin American city" as the city whose main features were urban primacy, informality and social polarization of urban space.[8] This kind of city was the result of several interrelated processes: economic policy oriented towards the domestic market, massive internal migration, rapid urbanization concentrated in one or two cities, growth of an "informal" working class outside the modern sector of the economy, resulting from imbalance between industrialization and internal migration, and expansion of housing in slums and "illegal" settlements in the peripheries.

At present, although it is not easy to describe the transformation of large Latin American cities in recent decades and there is no consensus among the interpretations of such processes, there is a shared diagnosis: large Latin American cities were transformed significantly in recent decades. Globalization, privatization and neoliberal deregulation allowed investors, planners and citizens greater freedoms, and their impact can be seen in the urban structure.[9] In terms of Borsdorf[10] the focus of spatial structure of Latin American cities shifted from spatial polarization (characteristic of the industrial city) to spatial fragmentation. This is a new form of segregation of functions and socio-spatial elements, not on a wide scale like spatial polarization (rich-poor divides, residential areas vs industrial areas), but on a small scale. The geographic scale of segregation changed due to new urban developments such as the free-space distribution of industrial areas, the location of shopping centers throughout the city, oriented to highways and airports, and the presence of gated communities around the city limits.

While large scale can highlight a greater social mixing process than the traditional center-periphery pattern, micro level reinforces the segregation pattern[11], possible through walls and

fences, barriers separating islands of wealth and islands of poverty.[12]

Thus with the gradual blurring of the center-periphery configuration resulting from the expansion of new urban forms and urban highways, gated communities for middle and upper classes in the periphery, hypermarkets, malls and urban entertainment centers in all urban space, suburbanization of industrial production and the increasing isolation of lower-class neighborhoods consolidates a conurbation that can be characterized by broad, diffuse, discontinuous, polycentric and regional dimension.[13]

Therefore, residential segregation and urban fragmentation in recent decades[14] are articulated with a progressive segmentation of the labor market and the education system, which are key to the (re) production and deepening social inequality. Some of its effects are, the increase in the isolation as well as the restriction of the networks of the urban poor and also reduced opportunities in low-income residential areas.

INEQUALITY, SEGREGATION AND URBAN POLICY

The relationship between inequality and segregation are complex, one cannot assume an automatic correlation between inequality and segregation. In fact, at present, due to the conjunction between the persistence of neoliberal policies and unregulated urban land use and the efforts of the governments to implement policies of redistribution of wealth, we have a paradoxical scenario in Latin America. On the one hand, fragmented metropolitan structures with segregated social networks affect the reproduction of social inequalities. The consolidation of homogeneous spaces and segmented urban circuits reduces social mobility alternatives. On the other hand, public policies implemented in most Latin American countries in the last decade have reduced income inequality. In this sense, the aforementioned World Bank

report[15] notes that out of the 17 Latin American countries for which comparable data is available, 13 experienced a decline in inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient, which decreased from 0.530 average at the end of 1990 to 0.497 in 2010. According to the report this reduction in income inequality is due to two reasons: the fall in the earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers, and increased transfers of money from the state to the poor. Thus, while the recent urban transformations persists or even deepens segregation and urban fragmentation, the implementation of public policies have reduced income inequality (although the gap remains wide).

We must understand that the urban structure is not only a product of social processes, but also a key factor in their (re) production, expansion or

> THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND SEGREGATION ARE COMPLEX, ONE CANNOT ASSUME AN AUTOMATIC CORRELATION BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND SEGREGATION.

reduction of inequalities. If, as we said, inequality and segregation are not related mechanically or reflected, we cannot say that the urban structure is a natural and inevitable product of social processes. By contrast, a fragmented metropolitan area is the product of human action, mainly real estate and urban planning.[16] It becomes imperative, then, to regulate land use[17] and to design policies that will create more equitable distribution of goods and urban services.[18] The task is not easy at all, especially considering the place of investment and real estate speculation on the expansion of urban space (not caused by migratory pressure) and the reactivation of the economy and employment in Latin America societies. But smart public policy-regulating land use and investing in access to the city-is strongly needed to intervene in the continent's inequalities.

NOTES:

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6. As the growing functional interdependence and specialization in Latin American cities observable in the growth of producer services in large cities and in cities that specialize in manufacturing exports in Mexico and the Caribbean.

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