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A Multinational, Global Think-tank
For

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01/16
Netherlands
The government of the Netherlands collapsed after Geert Wilders, a right-wing populist whose Freedom Party had supported the coalition in parliament, withdrew from budget talks. Mark Rutte, the prime minister, will stay on in a caretaker role until early elections in September.

02/16
Ukraine
25.04.2012
Yulia Tymoshenko, the imprisoned opposition leader, went on hunger strike after alleging that she had been beaten and forcibly transferred from prison to a hospital. Officials denied that violence had been used. Separately, two opposition political parties said they would join forces in October’s election.

03/16
Britain
22.04.2012
The phone-hacking scandal surrounding News Corporation took a surprising twist. Testimony from James Murdoch to the Leveson Inquiry, which is investigating media ethics in Britain, suggested that the office of Jeremy Hunt, the government’s culture secretary, had improper links with employees of News Corp during its bid to win full control of BSkyB, a television network. Mr Hunt denied he had behaved improperly and defied calls for his resignation.

04/16
Afghanistan
Insurgents in Afghanistan carried out coordinated attacks on an unprecedented scale, targeting embassies and government buildings with guns and rocket-propelled grenades in Kabul’s heavily fortified diplomatic zone. Three provinces outside Kabul were also attacked at the same time. Meanwhile, photographs emerged of American troops apparently posing with the mutilated corpses of Afghan insurgents, the latest in a series of incidents to damage America’s image in the region.

05/16
USA
Rick Santorum withdrew from the race for the Republican Party’s presidential nomination. His announcement was unexpected, and came after he assured supporters that he would continue campaigning despite pressure from party bigwigs to pull out. Mr Santorum gave no one specific reason for his exit, though his three-year-old daughter, who has a rare bone disease, has been in and out of hospital.

06/16
Turkey
12.04.2012
Turkey protested to Syria after its forces opened fire on Syrian refugees who were crossing the border, killing at least two people. Around 24,000 Syrians have crossed into Turkey to escape the turmoil in their country. The regime continued its crackdown by shelling rebel areas. A ceasefire brokered by Kofi Annan, a former UN secretary-general, started on April 12th, though many observers doubt it will hold.
07/16
South Korea
10.04.2012

President Lee Myung-bak’s governing party kept its majority in South Korea’s parliamentary election. The liberal-left opposition had hoped to gain from a number of corruption scandals that have afflicted the government. On polling day North Korea reasserted its intention to launch a satellite, against UN restrictions.

08/16
Myanmar
07.04.2012

Myanmar’s National League for Democracy party won most of the seats it contested in by-elections that were held in 45 constituencies. Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the democracy movement, won a seat just outside Yangon. It was the first time the NLD had participated in an election since 1990, when the result was overturned by the army.

09/16
Falkland Islands
05.04.2012

In a speech on the 30th anniversary of the outbreak of the Falklands war, Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández, called the British presence on the islands (which Latin America calls the Malvinas) “absurd”, but announced no further measures against Britain or the islanders.

10/16
Mali
03.04.2012

Mali’s neighbours imposed a trade embargo in protest at a recent army coup. The coup’s leaders responded with promises to restore the country’s democratic constitution. Tuareg rebels meanwhile advanced from the north, seizing the city of Timbuktu.

11/16
China
31.03.2012

Rumours persisted about the sacking of Bo Xilai, until recently the Communist Party boss of the mega-city of Chongqing in China. It has emerged that Wang Lijun, his police chief, whose alleged attempt to defect at the American consulate in Chengdu sparked events leading to Mr Bo’s ousting, had previously sought a meeting with diplomats at the British consulate in Chongqing. Meanwhile, the British government requested that China reinvestigate the death of Neil Heywood, a British businessman and family friend of Mr Bo, in China last November.

12/16
Spain
30.03.2012

Spain’s ruling People’s Party failed to win control in elections in Andalusia, the country’s biggest region, surprising many. The result kicked off a tough week for the government, which faced a general strike as it prepared to deliver a harsh budget.
As expected, Vladimir Putin won Russia’s presidential election on March 4th. Officially Mr Putin got 64% of the vote, although there were widespread reports of foul play. Around 15,000 people took part in a heavily policed anti-Putin demonstration in Moscow a day after the election; some 260 were arrested, although most were released soon afterwards.

North Korea agreed to suspend both uranium-enrichment at its Yongbyon plant and further testing of weapons and long-range missiles, a breakthrough following talks in Beijing between American and North Korean negotiators that came two months after Kim Jong Un’s ascent to power. The Americans are providing at least 240,000 tonnes of food aid to the impoverished country in return. Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, said the agreement was a “first step in the right direction” towards curbing the North’s nuclear ambitions.

Euro-zone finance ministers at last agreed to a second bail-out for Greece worth some €130 billion ($170 billion). The money will be paid in tranches, dependent on Greek promises to make both deeper budget cuts and more economic reforms. The protesters in Athens and the markets reacted more quietly than expected, though an approaching Greek election may cause new upsets. Fitch, a ratings agency, downgraded Greece again, after the deal was announced.

Egyptian officials said 43 charity workers, including 19 Americans, would be put on trial for illegally receiving foreign funds. Critics condemned the move as an attempt by the ruling military council to clamp down on foreign support for pro-democracy groups. Cairo continued to be roiled by battles between police and protesters, following the deaths of 74 people in clashes at a football match in Port Said that the military council blamed on elements of the old regime.
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Abstracting/Indexing

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This argument is based on two specific works. The first is a review essay of Noam Chomsky’s monograph entitled *Hopes and Prospects* (2010, Chicago: Haymarket). Therein I began trying to explain a new Leviathan which is growing in this world – one that is meant to establish the hegemony of democracy in global governance (i.e. the much greater influence of citizenries in the running of the world). The realization that this body exists, or is coming into existence, was sparked by wondering how the demoi in this world could bring international rogues and bandits to heel. These rogues can include, for example, certain administrations or individuals from or working on behalf of the USA, Israel, Syria, Zimbabwe or Australia among many others. In short, it was an attempt to describe a paradigm that is fighting or starting to fight against the abuses of states, corporations, and criminal powers – many of which Chomsky impressively catalogued, described, and normatively argued against. The second work which completes the foundation of this piece is an interview with Noam Chomsky, recorded May 8, 2012, and appearing in the *Journal of Democratic Theory*’s 2nd volume, 2012. Therein, over approximately twenty precious minutes, Chomsky and I discussed the global Leviathan. He did not deny the existence of this sacred being – the Leviathan is rising. But, as Chomsky argued, she has clay feet. This Leviathan, bringing the hegemony of democracy well into global governance, is fragile. She is only recently born and still very much in development.

The aim of this article is to try to explain the origins of the global Leviathan. It will also try to analyse how she is rising and finally will offer certain points that must be remembered by the citizens of this world should this global Leviathan expect to come into maturity. That is a lot of ground to cover in a short piece which is why I will have to resist plunging into depths – that I shall try to reserve for the
research monograph on this very subject.

Through my own rationalisations, it has taken the age of communicative abundance (proliferation of information, media, and interpersonal communication exchanges for example) to produce the necessary conditions that would allow for a global Leviathan to be born. Given that there are already many Leviathans in different states of strength which exist at both the union-state and sub-state levels – at times composed of one or more demos – it is not a stretch of the imagination to understand the inevitability of these smaller Leviathans and their composing demos uniting to form a global giant. Like atoms, the demos of this globe and their own Leviathans come together to form a greater power. The technologisation of communication has, via the internet for example, permitted a demos to be aware of many other demos, states, corporations, and of course global issues which has driven a specific type of reflexive modernisation within that demos. Individual citizens are now concerned not only with local, local-regional, territorial-provincial-state (sub-national), and union-state politics, but also transnational-region (e.g. the European Union, African Union, and ASEAN), continental and intercontinental as well as global politics. That has created the late 20th century phenomenon of particularistic protests at or against global summits. These protests are very often comparable in wants, demands and behaviours wheresoever they have occurred internationally.

The above is naturally not confined to one specific demos, but is a growing observable reality across a large number of demos throughout this world – namely those that can communicate with or be communicated at by other transnational information creators, providers and analysers. This, I argue, is primarily how global political issues have come to be issues for the attention of most demos. Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear power, terrorism, the Israel/Palestine debacle, regulating financial markets and environmental concerns are a few examples. That commonality of political concern forms a type of platform that is influencing global governance. And it is that particular influence, namely how it gradually began to form, which can be directly translated into the metaphor of a fertilized embryo that matured and was born into the complicated world of democratically governing global politics.

As mentioned above, Chomsky, I think rightly, argued that this Leviathan has clay feet (i.e. she is fragile and thus weak – she has both observable and hidden
weaknesses). My view is that this Leviathan is a child. She is developing into the powerful woman, a champion, that I and hopefully many others want her to be. Given that this child is composed of the demoi of this world (she would not otherwise exist without us), she requires the constant attention and support of her makers. This is comparable to parenting. In essence, she must be raised. And as raising any child – this requires constant attention, care, affection, and unconditional love. This child, the youth of a powerful global Leviathan, is I argue something sacred. She has the potential to grow into a powerful champion of democracy and can ensure that the hegemony of this world’s demoi will be established in global governance.

The hegemony of citizens through democracy in global governance is essential as it not only increases the ethics of global politics but also brings the positives associated with normative democracies into action. There would be less scope for human fallibility, there would be greater scope for better decision-making, the participation of the world’s population in said decision-making would ensure stronger outcomes for public policies, and most importantly there would be far less scope for violence to be sanctioned.

And I see this process as already in action. The United Nations, the multifarious network of international non-governmental organizations, the increasingly toothy international criminal courts system and all of its brilliant associates (such as Interpol), and naturally the growing existence of a transnational civil society form both the body and movements of the global Leviathan. We see for example her weak presence in the decisions of how to handle the internal strife of Syria, we saw her confused over how intervention should have occurred in Libya, and we saw her weep over the violent fates of Yugoslavia, Rwanda and East Timor among others.

What is of paramount importance then is to try to empower this child so that she may reach a state of maturity. This is too where both my review essay of *Hopes and Prospects* and the interview with Noam Chomsky ended – what can be done to ensure not just the continued existence but more importantly the growth of this global Leviathan? Chomsky offered that it must take the constant pressure by those that can apply it on the citizenries of this world. Individuals must be willing to engage the governance of global politics. They must try to uncover and understand what the powers of this world are doing in order to keep them to account. There must be constant demands for transparency, anti-corruption, the greater inclusion and participation of the citizenry, a far more ethical transnational media, and of course support for and interest in social
science education. Without this fire in the belly of the citizen we invite the rapists of politics to continue violating our individual and collective sovereignty. We invite the shamans and sophists to keep us in the mists of their making so that they may have their way with us.

Individual citizens must use their frustration with the limitations of politics, with the idiocy of many decisions made in global governance, and with the lack of access to governance to demand for more cleverness. Politics, as I have argued elsewhere, must be pushed into evolution with cleverness, innovation, ethics, stress-tested functionality and intelligence being central to this drive.

As pressure of this nature is applied and increased, this will drive both the further empowerment of the world’s demoi and by effect the increased maturity of the global Leviathan. But without this pressure, without unrelenting calls for better politics (however that is defined), for more democracy, for clever and more ethical governance, we risk the possibility of losing this child or of keeping her in such a state of weakness as to render her easy to avoid or manage by international rogues and bandits (state, corporation, military, criminal or otherwise). All of this, which Chomsky powerfully concluded, rests on the will to democracy – a condition that is called for by many democratic theorists and social as well as political philosophers. To me, there is too much useless cynicism, avoidance, apathy and sadly ignorance: a vast majority of citizens have their heads buried in the ubiquitous sands of ineptitude and frustration. In short, citizens themselves are not meeting the expectations of normative democratic theory. We are all aware of the shortcomings in both government and governance – we all know the irritations that politics at whatever level can produce – but without a change of energy in this world’s demoi the atoms will not vibrate and our child will not move or grow.

To end, I reason that we need to place much greater value – if not humble pride – in being a political person. We should not avoid the topic of politics at the dinner table or among new people at a party; we should not scoff at the social sciences; we should not turn our backs on politics because our avenues of entry are so limited; we should make time in our day or week to try to participate and offer our ‘two-cents’ or fifty-cents about one or more decisions that are going to be made or that have been made at whatever level of politics; we must cry foul; we must demand for far better politics, government and governance than what is available to us today; we must evolve as citizens; and we must recognize the global Leviathan and nurture her so that she may wield such power as to protect us all from the villains and brigands and rapists of global politics. It is she, the global Leviathan as paradigm, that is quite possibly one of the most important mechanisms in human existence thus far. She is leading us, and will continue to do so but only with our constant support, into an advanced condition of democratic politics, human progress, and peace that has not yet been experienced in the history of the human animal.

Note:
* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political theorist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed his doctorate at the Queensland University of Technology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious Endeavour Award.
China’s willingness to invest in Africa has brought benefits to both that continent and the Chinese people. But if Chinese leaders do not quickly respond to the growing mass political consciousness in many African countries, all that has been achieved could crash around their ears.

Whether it is by democrats or dictators, China is accustomed to being welcomed with open arms throughout Africa. Recent regime changes, however, have revealed some layers of resentment which could thwart Beijing’s attempts to lay their hands on precious resources. The victory of the “rebels” in Libya, ill feelings in Namibia and the recognition of South Sudan’s independence could turn upside down long-standing relationships China has forged with Africa, mostly at the expense of Western competitors.

In September 2011 Zambia, a former British colony, changed its leadership, an event that has the potential to derail China’s ambitious investment drive. Michael Sata, alias “King Cobra,” was sworn in as Zambia’s president on September 23, 2011 after an overwhelming electoral victory over incumbent Rupiah Banda. The election result brought to an end the 20-year reign of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). The new president, who leads the Patriotic Front party, promised Zambia’s poor that he would divvy up the revenue from copper production more efficiently and equally.

The MMD’s long reign may have produced a – deceptive – sense of security within the Chinese government: it did not expect the MMD would lose the election. The end of the Cold War has brought African governments a certain
degree of stability. African rulers have since often been able to measure their tenures in decades rather than years. Where elections have been held the results have, by and large, favored incumbent leaders. However, if the “Arab Spring” has shown anything to the one-man-rule Middle East and African regimes of today, it is that nothing lasts forever.

The change of political leadership in Zambia, the largest copper producer in Africa, came as a really unpleasant wake up call for China, one of the world’s largest consumers of this precious metal. Sata’s electoral campaign played heavily on anti-Chinese sentiment, which, given that China is the largest investor in this low-developed country, looked to many observers a quite risky platform. But Sata had a good grasp of his audience and knew only too well how cunning the Chinese can be in seeking to achieve their objectives.

During the 2006 presidential election campaign Sata, who under British colonial rule was a railway worker and trade unionist, once referred to Taiwan as a sovereign state. Beijing then reportedly fumed about what it considered a transgression of diplomatic norms. It even threatened to withdraw from the country should he be elected. The Zambian media even hinted that Beijing may be secretly transferring funds to the MMD’d coffers. A little less confrontational in his September campaign, Sata nevertheless made good use of his anti-China diatribes, and this paid off handsomely in the final vote count.

China’s economic relations with Zambia are considerable in terms of the sums of money invested. The communist state has poured in approximately $2 billion in Zambia. Investment projects are mostly concentrated in the exploitation of copper, a metal China voraciously consumes to supply its ever-expanding
infrastructure programs, especially those involving electric cabling.

The MMD regime enthusiastically sought to court Chinese state-owned companies and facilitates their access to Zambia’s national wealth. Out of a total of six Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa, two are located in Zambia. In 2011 Lusaka, the country’s capital, became an African financial leader by offering Chinese people the possibility to deposit and withdraw funds denominated in Yuan, China’s national currency.

Banda and his predecessors made every effort to lure the Chinese. Ordinary Zambians, however, grew resentful of thousands of low-skilled Chinese entering the country and stealing their jobs. A growing number of Zambia’s markets, especially the chicken market in Lusaka, are now under the control of the Chinese.

In addition, in April last year, Zambian prosecutors refused to pursue proceedings against two Chinese foremen who had injured 13 miners by opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators at the Chinese Collum Coal Mine in 2010. This incident touched off a wave of anger throughout Zambia. The suspension of the investigation was expected by many, and only amplified the perception among Zambians that a privileged status has been given to Chinese firms.

Sata has pledged that under his government the relationship between Zambians and Chinese buyers and sellers, truck drivers and construction workers – constantly on the increase – will undergo profound changes. The first act of the 73-year old president was to arrange for a meeting with Chinese Ambassador Zhou Yuxiao. The meeting officially aimed at dispelling the storm clouds threatening China-Zambia relations. But Sata also made it clear to the Chinese Ambassador that his government would put an end to unrestricted Chinese immigration.

Reuters reported that the new Zambian president told the Chinese ambassador on December 1, 2011 that Zambia “welcome your [Chinese] investment, but as we welcome your investment, [it] should benefit Zambians and not the Chinese.” He added that “it’s in the law that all investors coming to Zambia should bring a limited number of expatriates whom they cannot find in Zambia ... My party has expressed concern at the unlimited number of people your investors are bringing to Zambia.”

Copper export to China was also suspended for a few days. Sata announced that from now on all copper exports will be cleared by Zambia’s central bank to safeguard the country against exporters’ miscalculation of volume and value. It is strange to many that, while government data indicate that copper accounts for 75% of Zambia’s export revenue, it makes up less than 10% of its tax revenue.

Since Sata’s election, Zambian labor unions have embarked on a series of strikes, demanding higher wages. In early October some 2,000 miners at NFC
Africa Mining, majority-owned by China Nonferrous Metals Mining Corporation, refused to work. A few days later 500 workers at the Sino Metals copper processing plant walked out. Labor unrest is unlikely to ebb in the near future as worker associations take advantage of the wind of change initiated by the new political leadership.

Investors have also eagerly awaited the approval by the Zambian Ministry of Finance of the takeover of Metorex, a South Africa-based copper and cobalt miner, by Jinchuan, a Chinese mining and refining group. The Zambian authorities’ approval for the sale was needed because Metorex holds a majority stake in Chibuluma copper mine. Authorization for the $1.1 billion deal was finally given at the end of November, to the relief of investors who had to wait for several months, not knowing whether the takeover would be allowed to proceed or not.

In Namibia, the government is quite active in distributing uranium exploitation licenses in the Namib Desert in the mountainous Erongo region, one of 13 regions of the country. Some 66 mining companies, mostly from Australia, Canada and China, dig immense holes, releasing radioactive dusts. In some places, radioactivity exceeds accepted norms. In April, the oldest firm operating in the country, Rössing Uranium, sold Namibia’s giant Husab uranium project, believed to hold the world’s fourth largest uranium-only deposit, to Taurus Mineral, a subsidiary of Chinese state-owned
Guandong Nuclear Corporation (CGNPC).

Many Namibians protest against China’s stranglehold on Namibia’s natural resources because Chinese corporations always try to dictate the terms of investment contracts. China’s investments now extend throughout the African continent, as European colonialism did before them. In Namibia, natural resources, uranium diamonds, fish, meat, copper and gas extraction and exploitation account for only 9% of GDP.

Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is now widely known among international security scholars and those living in Africa for his infamous activities in that continent. Since the early 1990s Kony, allegedly the spokesperson of God and a spirit medium, has led his army on a reign of terror in poverty-stricken Uganda and, more recently, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.

He and his group have now apparently settled in the Central African Republic. They survive by living off the land and by robbing and terrorizing villagers living deep in the jungle. They are mostly known for their practice of kidnapping children and forcing them to serve as “child soldiers.” International organizations’ estimates suggest that the LRA has murdered, abducted, mutilated and raped tens of thousands of men, women and children in Central Africa over the past 20 years. Kony has been indicted by the international criminal court for allegedly war crimes and he and his army continue to be on the run.

During that same period, China has pursued a policy in Sudan aimed at destabilizing its domestic politics and society as a whole. Nevertheless, being politically isolated from the international community, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has found in China his most important political, economic and military ally since he seized power in a military coup in 1989.

China officially maintains a non-interference policy toward African countries’ internal politics, but this approach was trampled on in Sudan. From the 1990s until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, it actively backed the National Islamic Front, led by Bashir, against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) rebels in the south. It modified this policy only when it became clear that the rebels would manage to gain their independence from the north, which was achieved on July 9, 2011. This more recent diplomatic overture by Beijing to South Sudan can be explained purely by practical considerations. After Angola, this new country is the second most important supplier of oil to China on the African continent.

Infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars were bankrolled by China during its years of supporting Bashir, along with additional financial assistance in the form of low to zero interest loans. Beijing usually later forgave them. But China’s economic engagement in Sudan is better illustrated by its activities in the energy sector.
China is the main outlet for Sudan’s oil: Sixty-seven percent of Sudan’s oil is exported to China, an amount which constitutes 10% of Beijing’s total oil imports. Since the 1990s the Chinese have developed and exploited Sudan’s oil fields, which are mostly located in Southern Sudan. They have also laid two pipelines to carry crude oil across Sudanese territory to Port Sudan in the north. This infrastructure was built while a civil war raged between Bashir and the SPLM/A. At the same time several Western oil companies were competing in the region. Soon, however, they all sold their shares, afraid of the constant violence and buckling under the allegation that they were “oil exploiters” profiteering from the war. In comparison, the state-run Chinese petroleum industry did not concern itself with such criticisms and pursued its own policy in Sudan.

Independent Southern Sudan now holds 75% of the proven oil reserves of the two Sudans combined. Thirsty for oil, Sudanese or other, China is now playing a flimsy diplomatic balancing act between South and North Sudan. At the moment dark clouds of war are gathering over the two countries and oil is one of the main root causes of this potential armed conflict. Seeking compensation for the loss of oil revenue, Sudan demands oil pipeline transit and port processing fees of $36 a barrel, while Southern Sudan is offering only $1 to $2 a barrel. The oil rich South is also ready to sell discounted oil to North Sudan. In January South Sudan, in protest, suspended all oil production, which provoked attacks from both sides along their oil rich border. Beijing actively seeks a resolution, not because it looks for peace and stability in the Sudans out of altruism but because the oil tap to Chinese ports must be quickly turned back on.

In exchange for oil Sudan received weapons and military hardware from China. The 1990s saw China supplying Bashir’s Sudan with tanks, helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, howitzers and fighter aircraft. Small arms and rifles were also provided to Sudan in its battle against the SPLM/A. In the 2000s China supplied two-thirds of all small arms and light weapons used by the Sudanese army. More tanks, rocket launchers, helicopters and combat aircraft also poured into Sudan. These arms imports occurred despite the 2004 United Nations embargo on weapons going to Darfur. This non compliance with the embargo helped Khartoum supply small arms to the Janjaweed militia (Sudanese Arab tribes currently in conflict with rebel groups in Darfur, western Sudan) and send Chinese-equipped Sudanese forces...
to Darfur. Chinese weaponry was also used by Bashir’s armed forces when they brutally cleansed the local population from areas chosen for oil exploitation by Chinese companies in the south. According to some estimates, today China supplies 90% of Sudan’s small arms purchases, and has for a decade assisted Sudan in building its own arms and ammunition factories.

More weapons, more forced displacement due to oil exploitation and disregard for international sanctions designed to bring an end to the genocide in Darfur – this is mostly the legacy of China in Sudan.

What happened in Zambia and Sudan should be interpreted by China as a warning sign. While Beijing’s policy of “non-interference” in sovereign states’ affairs has brought it important economic benefits over Western firms it competes with for the enormous volume of African natural resources, it is becoming increasingly noticeable that its conduct risks antagonizing workers in African countries where China is doing business, especially those ruled by autocrats. In the event of the collapse of some of these dictatorial regimes, China’s closeness with them could become a burden. After the downfall of Gaddafi in Libya and the formation of a new country in the name of South Sudan, China scrambled to salvage the oil concessions obtained from the previous, and deeply detested, regimes.

China has maintained close ties with the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. But if the ailing tyrant loses power, these relations may end abruptly. In February 2011 the state-owned China Development Bank announced that it was willing to invest the tidy sum of $10 billion in agriculture and mining in Zimbabwe. But Mugabe’s government is deeply unpopular and fears are growing among his sycophants over his health, as he is nearing the end. His reign will most likely end in chaos, and this should raise concerns in Beijing that it could become a scapegoat in the ensuing popular upheaval.

Regardless of pundits and policymakers’ legitimate criticisms of China, the latter’s activities in Africa have, overall, been positive. Chinese businesses are ready to provide much-needed capital when now cash-strapped Western personal investors, state-owned companies and multinationals prefer in many cases to stay away. They also don’t carry the weight of a colonizing past, which is still quite an issue in most African countries.

Nonetheless, China’s strategy involves a number of risks and has its share of dangers. Government-to-government negotiations over investment, ignoring the interests of the workers and citizens on the ground, could undermine China’s reputation in Africa – and elsewhere – in the long run. Its refusal, so far, to attentively listen to workers’ opinion and grievances, in a time of political awakening and growing awareness of economic strength in Africa, could significantly slow down its attempts to gain the major proportion of the riches of the African Continent.

Note:

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In December of 2010 a man in Tunisia self-immolated in protest and what has followed has literally been explosive, as the lessons learned on the use of social media has been at light speed. Since 2010 a number of connected and seemingly unconnected events have changed the tone and texture of activism. Social media and digital technology is, both neutral and strategic terrain. The following points present lessons learned to date from several seemingly unconnected events; The Arab Spring, SOPA/PIPA (Stop Online Piracy/Protect IP Addresses), and NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act).

Modern disobedience is rarely viewed as a political element, but as a side element of radicalism, terrorism, and banditry and civil disobedience, however, contemporary events compare with this history. For example, many local initiatives, grievances and grassroots leaders give the appearance of fragmented authority, and appear to stand in short duration; and The State, Law Enforcement, and the Military stigmatize and describe these loose outbreaks as mass impetuosity without direction or form. The Occupy Movement, Hackers Anonymous Hactivism and its supporters is one such example.

Ranajit Guha, in Selected Subaltern Studies and Elementary Aspects of Insurgency in Colonial India, describes this as ‘... multiple elements of conscious leadership, but no one of them predominates.’...‘the symbiosis of sarkar (someone of authority), sahukar (banker or money lender) and zamindar (collector of land revenue, tax collector?), is a political-economic fact directing insurgency against one or all? The peasant detected a mutuality of interest and power (the triumvirate: in the eyes of the population, political character equals economic exploitation; the state views the resulting acts as banditry and not as a form of social protest of the political character and economic exploitation’

Social Media Lessons Learned for Political Engagement

By Dr. Terry Tucker
Despite that some power concepts, groups or people have failed to rise above localism, sectarianism, or ethnicity, it does not take away from the essentially political character of the activity, but defines the quality of that politics by specifying limits. The State views each as local and separate instance, unless, like SOPA/PIPA, you gather 4 millions of petition signatures inside of 84 hours and countless emails to Representatives, in which case politicians that ignored this would do so at the risk of their political career.

Social Media and Digital technology defy those limits, and connect other limits, at Quantum speeds.

Thus, the consultative process in past activism and insurgency had previously taken weeks and months, now, the temporization and weighing of pros and cons has already been weighed and measured in the collective cloud of thought and idea, immediately transmitted via social media. For instance, the estimated number of active twitter users in the Middle East at the end of September 2011 was over 650,000. Globally, 1 Billion Tweets are estimated to be sent every four days. The estimated number of tweets is over 1 million a day, 854 tweets a minute or circa, 14 tweets a second.

Within this cloud is a network of individuals and communities that identify with a single and or multiple unifying factors, such as: grievances over corruption, religion, governance and unemployment. The result of massing this unifying effect was evident in the Arab Spring, Occupy and SOPA/PIPA. Conversely, from a US Domestic point of view, the unifying effect failed in its timing and synchronicity with House Bill HR 347, and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, as these two items effectively slipped past public scrutiny, despite very controversial elements that are contained within them.

We are all aware what Social Media has done in the Middle East. I think valid questions to ask are: Where is it going next? And can Social Media make the Electoral College in US Politics obsolete? My initial inclination is, perhaps.

The following is a list of lessons learned.

- Ideology in both a loose sense and very wider sense bubbles and hangs in the social/population collective cloud (see
item number 16). Social media is an effective tool to self radicalizes simultaneous multi-dimensional threats and groups.

- Social media makes emotive escalation rapid to the point that it overwhelms, yet it can also be very transient. Timing and synchronicity with public mood with the urgency of an item is key. This is key because, before we can predict what people are likely to do, we must first understand what they believe about a situation and the outcomes they desire. The trends in the blogosphere, tweets and counter-tweets already make this evident of what the mood and character is like in this collective cloud.

- Social media and digital technology have brought an escalation of global insecurity from multiple sources and locations. Social media and digital technology connect, engage and mobilize disenfranchised Diaspora that creates multiple simultaneous security challenges – local and international. It is for this reason that activism through social media is not viewed as activism or even civil-disobedience, but terrorism.

- Digital and social media make no distinction between journalism, citizens that report in real time, activism and entertainment. The anonymity allows for one to cross over all thresholds at once and at will. This makes Law Enforcement and Security Specialists crazy and causes politicians to view this as banditry, terrorism, and militancy; hence the perception by those that govern that stricter legislative and law enforcement measures must be enacted.

- Social media and blogs have gone beyond a competition for internet market share to circumventing government control through the use of a crowd-sourced narrative that is culturally in context with the wider idea and ideology, and are not restricted to a geographical area.

- Tweet, counter-tweets, and social media are the means in which influence operations are conducted.

- Digital technology and social media is the new political top cover. If you can influence the politics the economics will follow. This is a strange paradox in which government and military believe that only two ’imperatives exist for strategy: the economic imperative’ or the ’military imperative.’

- Social media is multi platform and a vortex.

- The amount of internet penetration in a country is no longer a valid gauge.

- Opinion shapers, influencers, celebrities, and folk stars come in various languages, cultures and locations. They can be simultaneously, spoiler, detractor and supporter.

- Social media is the new first method of pre-emptive strike...if.... it can be coordinated and executed in synch with credibility within a cultural narrative that resonates.

- Social media and digital technology is best suited to a 'Maoist' strategy in which the will of your opponent is quickly overcome through indirect means and psychological mass. The use of the “emotional narrative” goes from slow boiling to mass mobilization in moments, or from
“Viral to Spiral” in which things violently spiral out of control.

- Social media is truly a "population-centric strategy"; counterinsurgents or insurgents are not confined, locations for both are both local and global.
- Social media and digital Technology is a low cost, highly effective means of exploiting political, economic and social vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance against strategic Corporate or Government objectives. It is mass mobilization without borders.
- Speed, mass, and objective are key military principles; Social media accelerates these at a “Mach” and exponential “Social-Emotional-Narrative” speed; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, created the concept of “Netwar” when they articulated this process as “…swarming; a deliberately structured and coordinated way to strike from all directions”
- Revolutions, revolts and insurgents can be created in days, not months; especially when the conditions for the grievance and platform for dissent already exist. This easily bypasses the traditional early vulnerable stages of mobilization in past insurgencies (See first bullet reference collective social cloud)
- The conditions that ultimately weaken or divide a government / group already exist. Visualize an ‘iceberg’ in which 90% of those that feel disenfranchised bubble under the surface and what you actually see or hear might represent 10%. Social media and digital technology exploit those pre-existing conditions in an exponential manner. The population’s desire and will is better enabled and provides a more secure platform for the masses to resist without real fear of retaliation.
- Social media is both “favorable terrain’ and ‘neutral terrain’ in a law enforcement and military analytic sense. It is the same in a ‘market share’ sense. You can gain and lose your support by as much as what you do and say, and fail to do and say.
- The most profound revolutions to date were social media –population-centric resistance movements.
- Revolution may not be the aim, but in most cases to date it has been the outcome. Social media and the growing body of collective effort create a sense of inevitability of perceived outcome and regime change. The sense of narrative creates actions before consequences. Social media creates a sense of the “end of history” as the nuanced version of the narrative creates millions of identifiable personal stories, statements, or chronicles feed the proverbial beast. The ethics and universalism of the moment is greater than the parts.

Note:
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Regional Energy Projects for Georgia - Turkey - Russia relations

*by Dr. Zurab Garakanidze*

Turkish Natural Gas Hub and Energy Security: Theory and Practice

*by Faig Galib Abbasov*
The Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the processes for managing change in a non-violent way to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. Security is understood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. Therefore, the Journal’s scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance.

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Introduction

In July 2011, Turkey hosted an international conference to discuss navigation security issues in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. Ankara has announced its intention of working with foreign oil companies to create a fund for protecting the Turkish Straits against accidents. The cost of this plan may exceed US$30 billion, by some estimates. However, the Turkish government, pointing again to the massive spill in the Gulf of Mexico, says the proposed measures are well worth the price. Part of Turkey’s plan involves reorienting oil flows away from the straits and into an overland pipeline – specifically, the Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, which will be built by a Russian-Italian-Turkish consortium along the Samsun-Ceyhan route. But construction Samsun-Ceyhan and Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipelines are stopped and increased volumes of Kazakh oil through CPC need a new export route. That’s why we propose to revive Russian-Georgian-Turkish Novorossiysk - Supsa -Ceyhan Oil Pipeline project. This scheme, on the one hand, is designed to establish a crude transportation route to bypass the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. On the other hand, this project will help to open a deadlock in Georgian-Russian tense relations.

In his opening address at the conference, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz called for introducing emergency measures to protect the straits in light of swelling ship traffic. Over the last 15 years, he noted, some 115,000 tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products have been spilled in the Turkish Straits. He also noted that Istanbul, which is home to 15 million people, was located on the
Bosphorus. Any accident involving an oil tanker in the area would have grave environmental consequences for the city, he said. Despite this threat of environmental catastrophe, Turkey does not have the option of closing or tightly restricting shipping traffic through the straits. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates navigation in these waters, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles must remain open. Yildiz said at the conference that Ankara was committed to upholding its obligations. He also commented, though, that attitudes had changed because of the disaster that followed the collapse of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform at BP’s Macondo field in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010.

**Russian support for bypassing the straits**

Ankara has actively lobbied for the construction of a pipeline from Samsun to Ceyhan for years. It has achieved some success on this front with the recent signing of a deal with the Russian energy giant Rosneft, which will join Italy’s Eni and Turkey’s Calik Enerji to build the pipeline. Russia’s state oil pipeline operator Transneft will also be involved in the project. Its participation, and that of Rosneft, will ensure that the Samsun-Ceyhan link is filled and therefore profitable. Russia had long resisted the pipeline project, in part because of its own plans for the establishment of another bypass route through Greece and Bulgaria. In the face of Turkey’s plans to introduce new environmental protection measures for the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, though, it seems to have decided to embrace Samsun-Ceyhan. This logic is sound; if the pipe were built by other investors and the straits somehow shut down, Russia would have a very difficult time finding an alternative route for oil exports through the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Russia has not given up on the other bypass line, which would run from Burgas on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast to Alexandroupolis, a Greek port on the northern Aegean coast.

If both of these pipelines were built, they would be able to accept most of the oil that is now transited through the straits. However, Nikolai Tokarev, the president of Transneft, has said that the cost of pumping oil through the Burgas-Alexandroupolis
pipeline is likely to be nearly twice as high as the cost of tanker shipments through the Turkish Straits. He also estimated that the cost of using the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline would be nearly three times as high. Nevertheless, Eni, Transneft and Rosneft have agreed to co-operate with the Turkish government on this pipeline venture. Meanwhile, reports from the conference in Istanbul state that US companies have suggested upgrading the straits rather than establishing transportation routes. A Chevron representative, for example, said that his company was not considering any new routes for fuel oil shipments. (BP, for its part, has prepared a special document on methods of bypassing the straits, according to an employee of the company’s Turkish office.) Turkey, however, has resisted the US proposals. Turkish Environment Minister Veysel Eroglu has said: “Freedom of passage through the [straits] should be controlled in the interests of ecology and for the people of Turkey.” However, there is no way to redirect oil flows immediately. Moreover, Turkey will probably have a difficult time convincing foreign energy giants to fork out the many billions of dollars needed to cover the costs of setting up the proposed environmental programme and of constructing the pipeline to Ceyhan.

**Necessity for the CPC expansion**

At the same time Central Asian energy is strategic, enabling Russia to expand its economic gains in the energy market. Russia’s gas and oil fields are aging and production is slowing. Bringing additional reserves online will take both significant time and investment.¹

The threat to Russian energy dominance originates in the Caucasus. The Western energy corridor through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey offers the opportunity for the West to break Russia’s grip on Caspian and Central Asian energy. While the BTC and BTE already allow Caspian oil and gas to flow west along this corridor, it might be expanded by trans-Caspian pipelines to tap Central Asia’s large deposits. Though such a pipeline route would be a feat of both engineering and politics, it is a possibility that Russia appears to view as a serious threat.²
To secure its future as a global energy superpower, Russia needs to reassert itself in the former Soviet regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus and Georgia provides a strategic chokepoint. If Georgia could be brought in line, Moscow could use its political dominance to cut the NATO air corridor into Central Asia, the Western energy corridor, and reduce the negative consequences of Russia's declining economic importance for Georgia and the former soviet countries. The problem for Moscow is that Tbilisi is anything but pro-Russian.

This problem was highlighted by two developments in December 2010. On one hand, Moscow struck an agreement with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) on the expansion of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk oil export link. On the other hand, Russia and Turkey signed documents providing for Rosneft and Transneft to join with Eni and Turkey's state pipeline operator Botas on the Samsun-Ceyhan project. These events may be linked. The CPC expansion project will increase the volume of oil flowing into the Black Sea, not via the South Caucasian routes but through the Russian territory. It will boost the capacity of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk link from its current level of about 36.5 million tonnes per year (733,000 bpd) to 67 million tonnes per year (1.34 million bpd). Most of the additional volumes will come from the massive Tengiz field in western Kazakhstan, which is operated by a Chevron-led consortium. However, some may come from Kashagan, an even larger field in the Caspian Sea. The cost of the expansion project is expected to reach US$5.4 billion, a figure that some Russian observers have described as unreasonable. It is also important that to Russian government needs the CPC expansion to block the «big Kashagan oil’s» possible transportation to the South Caucasian routes. But in Astana have little bit different opinion. As underlined by professors V. Papava and M. Tokmazishvili, «...despite close relations with Russia, Kazakhstan is also very interested in the security of the transportation corridor passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia.»

**Burgas-Alexandroupolis failure**

Moscow resisted the plan for years but agreed to approve it after Transneft managers, along with First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, struck a deal with Chevron that provided for crude from the Tengiz field to be transported by tanker from Novorossiisk to Burgas for loading into the Burgas-Alexandroupolis link. Then in 2010, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov, who was appointed in July 2009, said he would rather not go ahead with the pipeline project. He said it posed an unacceptably high risk of pollution for the magnificent beaches of southern Bulgaria. This would endanger the tourist business, which is much more important for the country than the “pittance” of 36 million euros (US$49 million) per year in transit fees from the pipeline, he said. There is an obvious and simple alternative to Burgas-Alexandroupolis – namely, continued use of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. However, Ankara is seeking to limit oil shipments through these channels. Initially, Moscow openly...
objected to the Turkish position and accused Ankara of violating the Montreux Convention, which guarantees freedom of passage for civil transport through the Turkish Straits. These protests failed to move Turkish officials, who remained unwilling to accept the risk of increased tanker traffic. Signs of a rapprochement appeared in 2009, when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed an agreement that gave Russia’s state-run natural gas monopoly Gazprom the right to build a section of the South Stream pipeline in Turkey’s section of the Black Sea. In exchange for this, Putin agreed to Ankara’s insistence on using the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline for shipments of Russian oil. Sechin, who had long opposed the Turkish bypass route, publicly expressed his displeasure with the deal. However, Putin appears to have decided that it is more important to please Alexei Miller, the head of Gazprom. This is perhaps because South Stream is meant to serve the important strategic purposes of bypassing Ukrainian transit routes and of competing with EU’s Southern Gas Corridor, a pipeline projects designed to reduce European dependence on Russian gas.4

It appears that Russia has abandoned the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project in favour of the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline and Turkey’s programme for protecting the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. In so doing, it has also made a point about its relationship with one of its main post-Soviet partners – Bulgaria.

Thus, we think it would not be bad, that GeorgIan energy policy will be transformed as a rational policy. In this regard, and according to the Georgian government’s "10 Point strategic Plan" in the coming years the country should become as a regional energy and transport "hub". For that purpose we discuss two projects: 1) An alternative route for Kazakh oil in the South Caucasus: Novorossiysk - Supsa - Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, and 2) EU’s "Southern Gas Corridor" and the Russian - Armenian "North - South Gas Pipeline» Interkonnector.

Alternative route for Kazakh energy resources in the South Caucasus: the Novorossiysk - Supsa - Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

Forgotten proposals for an along Black Sea cost Novorossiysk-Supsa-Ceyhan pipeline deserve a second look, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline threatens an ecology of the turkey straits.

Along with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is vitally interested in diversifying its options for oil and gas deliveries to world markets and in reducing its dependence on transit routes through Russia. To some extent, it has succeeded; it has, for example, been exporting oil to China via
the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline since 2006. However, the growth of production at the Tengiz and Karachaganak deposits, along with the promise of future output from Kashagan, has created a powerful incentive for the creation of an additional export route through the Southern Caucasus.

Since the disintegration of the USSR, Kazakhstan has exported most of its oil via Russian territory, using two high-capacity pipelines. One of these is the Soviet-built Atyrau-Samara link. The other is the conduit from Tengiz to Novorossisk built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).

The CPC was meant to allow Kazakhstan to export more oil, especially production from the Tengiz field. Since the pipeline ends at the Black Sea coast, however, the oil must then be loaded onto tankers for transport through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean market. Many shippers favour continuing this arrangement recently.

The CPC provides export of the Kazakhstan and Russian oil. For 10 years of work it has shipped to consumers from the sea terminal near Novorossisk, Russia, almost 270 million tons of raw materials which have taken out more than 2500 tankers. In July 2011 realization of the project of expansion of capacity of petrowire system which will come to the end in September, 2012 has begun.

Project CPC is one of the most successful in energy sphere on the post-Soviet territory. Application of the advanced organizational and administrative technologies, the modern and reliable equipment, highly professional and responsible shots became its card. 10 years oil pipeline Tengiz - Novorossisk in the general length of 1511 kilometers functions without uniform failure. Currently ongoing project CPC reconstruction was developed taking into account prospect of increase in its initial throughput in 2,5 times - to 67 million tons of oil annually, with antifrictional additives - 76 million tons.

**Bosphorus bypass may help in conflict resolution**

Now works on a number of the CPC pipeline objects undergo with a schedule advancing for two months. In particular, on reconstructed pumping station Kropotkinsky it is executed about 20% of works. Modernization will end and starting of operations are planned for September, 2012. The expansion project is realized without a stop of swapping of oil.

Ankara, though, is wary, especially in light of the mentioned campaign to expand the CPC’s capacity. It would instead like to see Kazakhstan crude shipped across the Black Sea for loading into the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. Russia, meanwhile, has previously urged Kazakhstan to use the planned Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline.

All of these options pose certain problems. Turkey opposes the first on the grounds that it would put too much strain on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles
Straits, while Russia and Kazakhstan have yet to make concrete throughput commitments to the Samsun-Ceyhan project. Bulgaria, for its part, has effectively blocked the Burgas-Alexandroupolis scheme.

As such, Georgia, Russia and Turkey ought to team up for talks on another alternative – an oil pipeline connecting Novorossiysk, Supsa and Ceyhan, along the Russia and Georgia Black Sea costs. One virtually nobody remembers, which calls for moving Kazakhstani oil along the Georgian Black Sea coast, from southern Russia through Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia, and into Turkey. The idea gained some popularity in the 1990s but was later abandoned. It is worth reviving, though, now that work on the CPC expansion project has begun.

The alternative pipeline would also be cost-effective. Russian experts have calculated its costs at US$600 million, as compared with US$30 billion for the proposed Turkish Straits fund, US$2 billion for Samsun-Ceyhan or 1 billion euros (US$1.44 billion) for Burgas-Alexandroupolis.

Additionally, the pipeline would generate additional transit fees for both Moscow and Tbilisi. Russia could use these revenues to recoup its losses from the Azerbaijani pipelines, while Georgia could use its share to cover costs related to reunification with Abkhazia.
It is worth noting, though, that unless the problem of Abkhazia’s status vis-à-vis Georgia is resolved, the Novorossiisk-Supsa-Ceyhan project will not be able to gain any momentum.

**Possible Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia Interconnector project**

At present, the only place where Caspian and Russian gas transport network intersect is in Georgia. In that country, the North-South Trunk Pipeline⁹, which runs from Russia to Armenia via Georgia, crosses the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), which is currently pumping gas from the first stage of Shah Deniz (SD1) and which will direct gas into Nabucco or Transanatolian Gas Pipeline. The point of intersection is near the village of Jandara, near Gardabani. The North-South Trunk Pipeline begins in the southern Russian city of Mozdok in Russia and terminates at the Armenian-Georgian border. The 235-km conduit includes two pipes – one with a diameter of 1,200 mm and a second or spare tube with a diameter of 700 mm. Most of the gas transited through these pipes is now delivered to Armenia, as Georgia has been receiving SD1 gas since 2007. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pipeline operated far below capacity. While the design capacity of both pipes comes to 18 bcm per year, the network pumped only 1.7-1.9 bcm per year in 2007-2010. (Even in Soviet times, the maximum annual transit volume was 9.5 bcm per year.) If it were connected to SCP, this pipeline could be used to channel some of the gas that Russia might have exported via South Stream into the Nabucco or Transanatolian pipelines. Increasing gas transits would also be profitable for Georgia. The country already receives 10% of the gas pumped through the North-South Trunk Pipeline as a transit fee. In recent years, gas consumption in Georgia has averaged about 1.73 bcm per year, while Armenia has used about 1.93 bcm per year. This implies that the state-owned Georgia Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) receives approximately 190-193 million cubic metres per year of free gas, equivalent to about 11.0-11.2% of the country’s gas consumption, which it then monetises through sales to the local population. The volume of gas transited through Georgian territory is slated to rise in 2017, when SD2 begins production. At that time, the SCP link, which has only been pumping 4.7 bcm in 2011, will see its capacity increase dramatically to 20 bcm per year. An agreement signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the transit and volume...
of SD2 gas in June 2010 provides for the pipeline to operate at full capacity. Linking the SCP to the North-South Trunk Pipeline would improve the latter’s prospects while also giving Russia access to a new high-capacity export route and improving Nabucco’s or Transanatolian’s access to gas supplies. Making the connection would be easy and would not restrict supplies to Armenia, especially since that country is now able to receive gas from another supplier – namely, Iran. If this can be done, the competition between Southern Gas Corridor’s projects and South Stream would subside, and the two projects would instead complement each other. That is, rather than working against Southern Gas Corridor, Gazprom would be able to make use of the EU’s pipelines to gain a new export route to Europe. We fully agree to idea, according which «...harmonizing gas pipelines is even more important given that it is far from clear whether the Russian gas transport system will be sufficient to transport expanded volumes of Central Asian gas during the first part of the next decade».10

Moreover, connecting SCP with the North-South Trunk Pipeline would allow the creation of a wider network in which Iran could serve as a supplier, so far as western anti-Iranian sanctions are against the oil exports and doesn’t extend on the Iranian gas. Iranian gas pumped through the Tabriz-Meghri line to Armenia could then be pumped to Georgian village Jandara, near Gardabani, via the Armenian network and redirected into the SCP for loading into the Transanatolian or any Southern Gas Corridor’s gas line, just as gas from Russia could be pumped through the North-South line for transfer to the SCP. This would be cost-effective, as it would make use of existing pipes rather than require the construction of new lines.

Conclusion

Not only is energy a source of economic wealth, but also it translates into political power. Coercive energy diplomacy is not the only source of leverage that Russia has in the case of Georgia, however. Having assumed responsibility for mediating Georgia’s separatist conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has the ability to manipulate these internal disputes for political gain.11

Now Georgia has a chance to use its geographical location for country’s reunification. Development of the Central Asian energy projects and growing shipments of Kazakh oil via the Turkish Straits, gives Tbilisi chance to start dialogue with Russia on the topic to use Georgian territory, including occupied districts, in which it is possible to involve the West. For that purpose to revive the Novorossiisk-Supsa-Ceyhan oil pipeline project is necessary. Also, according to the Georgian government’s strategic plan, in the coming years country should become a regional energy and transportation HUB. For that, the EU “Southern Gas Corridor’s” projects, via the SCP as an interconnector, can be connected with the Russian - Armenian “North - South Gas Pipeline”, which will also become as a leverage to use Iranian and Armenian economic interests in future Georgia, Russia energy cooperation.

Notes:
* Dr. Zurab Garakanidze is an author in News Base E-magazine.

1. Boris Rumer, “The Search for Stability in Central Asia,” in *Central Asia: A


6. Z. Garakanidze. “Protecting the Turkish Straits”. NewsBase, week 28, p. 4; 21 July, 2010

7. E. Ismailov and V. Papava have underlined: “Practically from the very moment of the inception of the idea of transporting Caspian oil to the West and the construction of oil pipelines bypassing the territories of Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey appeared as one ‘team’...” (See: "A new concept for the Caucasus". Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies; Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2008, p. 293)


9. The North-South Trunk Pipeline begins in the southern Russian city of Mozdok and ends at the Armenian border after passing through Georgia. It is 235 km long and includes two parallel lines – one 1,200-mm pipe and a 700-mm backup pipe. The pipeline has never operated at its full design capacity of 18 billion cubic metres per year for both lines. Even during the Soviet period, transit volumes never topped 9.5 bcm per year. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, throughput dropped sharply. In 2007-2009, for example, it pumped only 1.7-1.9 bcm per year. Most of the gas pumped through the pipeline is transited to Armenia, since as of 2007 Georgia began sourcing most of its gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz offshore field. The state-controlled Georgia Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) is, however, entitled to take 10% of throughput as a transit fee. In recent years, Georgia has consumed about 1.73 bcm per year of gas, while Armenia has used about 1.93 bcm per year. These figures indicate that GOGC receives approximately 190-193 million cubic metres per year of free gas as so-called monetisation of the transit fee. These volumes, which the company sells to the local population, cover only about 11.0-11.2% of Georgian gas consumption.


“Advancing Diversity”

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On the eve of World War I (WWI), Winston Churchill, as the first lord of the Admiralty, converted the Royal Navy from coal to oil. As a result, a shift emerged in the imported fuel dependency, from Welsh Coal to Iranian oil. Then Churchill declared, “Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone”.¹ In modern parlance this attitude denotes diversification of energy supplies.

Theoretical analysis: Diversification Gospel

Diversification of energy supplies, both in terms of supply sources and transit routes is at the heart of consumers’ energy strategy, as it ensures security of supply, resilience against disruptions and has a downward pressure on the prices by facilitating competitiveness in energy markets. In this sense, multiplicity of energy supplies is the best recipe for a mid-term and even possibly long-term energy security for the consumer states.

From the producers’ perspective energy security holds to a similar principle, but at the opposite end of the spectrum. As the single biggest source of income for the most of the hydrocarbon producers, energy security entails continuous sales of their energy resources at the highest possible prices. Disruptions of energy exports will deprive the governments from substantial national income and destabilize the economy. In modern gas market diplomacy, on the other hand, the best commercial conditions to retain and increase the market share have become a new criterion for the energy security of the producer countries. This is especially important in Europe, where
the bulk of the imported natural gas is supplied based on long-term pay-or-take commercial contracts. Therefore, the revenues of the energy producers, especially, Europe’s non-European gas suppliers are highly dependent upon their ability to acquire as big as possible market share under favorable commercial conditions. In turn, the best market conditions and the continuous flow of energy exports can be assured via, *inter alia*, security of demand. Thus, security of demand constitutes the bedrock of energy security of hydrocarbon producing states.

Accordingly, the security of demand is contingent upon the producers’ ability to increase the number of their buyers and access various markets simultaneously. Branching out of energy exports safeguards producers from disruptions in a particular market, whether it is caused by technical difficulties or as a result of diminished demand.

Secondly, security of demand necessitates diversification of export routes, as over-dependence upon a single route/infrastructure and disruptions thereof will stymie their exports reaching the necessary markets. This, in turn, will have deleterious effect on their revenues, as well as a blow on their reputation as a reliable supplier. In this sense, from suppliers’ perspective happiness in energy security lies in multiple pipelines and multiple clients.

The third facet of energy security is the concept of affordability. However, affordability entails different assumptions for producer and consumer states. If from an importer’s perspective, affordability equals to continuous supply of energy resources at *lowest* possible prices, from
a producer perspective it means continuous demand at the highest possible price. Therefore, the diverging perceptions of energy security by consumers and producers lead to everyone expanding their energy relations and partners. Efforts by consumers, but also producers to diversify their energy supplies and markets, have given rise to what Luft and Korin call “a new breed of countries”, i.e. transit countries of energy relations and trade.

Although, the notion of transit countries is not new in international trade, their strategies to influence energy flow and governmental policies of end users and suppliers have gained a new momentum in at the turn of the 21st century. In this regard, with its strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Africa and Asia, the Republic of Turkey is blessed with all the necessary natural endowments to fine-tune its politics with its advantageous geographical position and utilize it as a strategic instrument of foreign policy.

**Turkish bargaining chip**

Currently, the European Union is increasingly importing a lion’s share of its gas consumption from outside, the bulk of which is accounted by Russian Federation. Although being a reliable partner much of the time during the “cold war”, since the break-up of the Soviet Union Russia has repeatedly failed to stick to its end of the bargain in supplying Europe with natural gas. Perennial disruptions in Russian gas supplies, coupled with increasing import dependency on non-EU suppliers in the backdrop of dwindling indigenous reserves, drove the security of energy supply to the top in the political agenda of EU institutions and paved the way for the slow but strongly incentivized attempts to build a common European energy policy.

The bedrock of the EU’s supply security policy is constituted upon diversification of energy sources and transit routes. Such a policy is intended to bring additional supplies to the EU and ensure the liquidity of its gas markets, which will also serve as a “suspension” against disruptions from traditional suppliers. On the other hand, multiplicity of supplies will foster competitiveness in European outlets and help to tackle pricing monopoly of the dominant supplier.

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In this respect, developing a new – Southern corridor is of geostrategic and commercial value for the EU, upon which Brussels has largely hedged its bets. The corridor is envisaged to link vast and largely untapped gas fields of the Middle East and Caspian basin with European energy markets. As things stand, Turkey will be the key transit country for the delivery of these resources to the EU through Southern Energy Corridor, although the country currently suffers from bottlenecks in energy infrastructure.

All the more so, despite having officially applied for the EU membership in 1987 and commenced accession negotiations in 2005 the overall process is heavily protracted with France and the Republic...
of Cyprus blocking several chapters of the EU acquis communautaire, *inter alia*, the energy chapter. Ironically, while keeping the energy chapter closed, the EU calls Turkey to sign up for the Energy Community, which is intended to serve as a “bridge-head for exporting EU energy market policy and practice further east, to Turkey and beyond”4; the call Turkey duly ignores. As Gareth Winrow best put it:

“[…] to the annoyance of EU bureaucrats and representatives of energy companies, officials in Ankara have questioned why they should accept the applicability of EU laws on Turkish territory when Turkey is not a member of the EU and the opening of the energy chapter remains blocked due to a political veto”5.

In this respect, it seems only reasonable for Turkey to aspire for becoming a natural gas hub at the entry point of the EU, with the possibility of buying and re-exporting of Caspian and Middle Eastern originated gas. Although lacking its domestic gas resources, such a position would render Turkey as an important “supplier” of the EU, consequently increasing Ankara’s political weight vis-a-vis Brussels and serve as a bargaining chip in its accession negotiations. Before proceeding with further investigation on the matter, however, it is necessary to clarify the definition of the term “gas hub”, as it became a buzzword in energy policy circles and expresses different attitudes.

Natural gas hub does not simply infer physical juncture of a number of outsourced gas pipelines in a particular geographical area and differs from transit function of a given country. Although, there is not any single comprehensive definition of the “gas hub”, the one offered by Vladimir Socor conveys the essential functions of the one.

“A hub country buys another country’s gas, stores it and re-sells it as its own gas to third countries at a higher price. A transit country, however, provides transit service through pipelines on its territory for an agreed (cost-based) fee, enabling the producer country to enter into direct commercial relations with the customers for its gas”6. Thus, as opposed to transit country, a gas hub plays a role of a middleman and becomes directly involved in the transactions between the sellers and the buyers in the third countries.

In this regard, natural gas hub aspiration of Turkey envisages certain benefits for the country. Such a
position would be commercially rewarding for the Turkish energy industry. Buying gas from the Caspian energy producers in cheap and re-selling it in lucrative European markets at a higher price would be of value added business for the Turkish state-controlled energy companies. Secondly, turning the country into a gas hub will increase the liquidity in the domestic gas market and ensure the availability of extra gas during the peak demand periods.

Furthermore, Egyptian, Iranian, as well as Iraqi gas should be taken on board in scrutinizing Turkish energy hub ambitions. Although being currently stalled by the Syrian political imbroglio, the Pan-Arab pipeline (PAP) originating in Egypt and the possibility of joining Iraqi gas fields to the latter in Syrian territory, increases the importance of Turkish energy corridor. On that account, unfavorable political attitude by the Turkish authorities towards the Assad regime is largely explained by the rationale of this energy geopolitics, which also sheds light on the Russian-Qatari showdown on the issue.

In such a intricate state of affairs, the sanctions on Iranian oil and gas industry play for the Turkish energy strategy. Being the only ally of the West to go on with its energy relations with conflict-ridden Iran, Turkey currently increases its pressure on Tehran for the imported gas prices. With international sanctions tightening around Iran’s Central Bank, Turkey affords leverage in further blackmailing the former and securing a cheaper deal.7

Thus, by scoring a “seriously discounted price” for Russian gas after giving a green light to South Stream pipeline8 and rumors on new pressures on purchased Azeri gas prices, coupled with intentions of building a nuclear power plant, Turkey seems to not only ease its energy bills, but also free some of its gas purchases for re-export to the European markets, hereby consolidating its energy-hub ambitions.

While serving as stepping stones towards eventual EU membership, such an energy strategy will also confer upon Turkey leverage for playing several suppliers against one another. In the picture unfolding, cheap gas contract bargained with Azerbaijani plays for Turkey’s hand in negotiating new gas contracts or re-negotiating the existing ones with Iran and Russia. The sequel of discount related pressures upon its main suppliers points out to Turkey’s mostly successful “energy juggling diplomacy”.

According to the recent media leaks, however, Turkey’s gas import pricing list reveals certain asymmetries with regard to the country's natural gas bills and energy relations with its major suppliers.

In the picture unfolding, cheap gas contract bargained with Azerbaijani plays for Turkey’s hand in negotiating new gas contracts or re-negotiating the existing ones with Iran and Russia. The sequel of discount related pressures upon its main suppliers points out to Turkey’s mostly successful “energy juggling diplomacy”.

According to the recent media leaks, however, Turkey’s gas import pricing list reveals certain asymmetries with regard to the country’s natural gas bills and energy relations with its major suppliers. The price for Azeri gas imports ($282 for 1000 bcm), way below the market prices, can largely be explained with the latter’s high dependence on Turkish transit corridor and currently major export market (not least by the friendly relations between the two countries). Insignificant disparities between the Russian ($418) and Iranian ($423) gas prices, however, is followed by disproportionate commercial pressure upon each of them.
While the current Russian gas prices are not mentioned among the government’s concerns, Iran is being sued to the international arbitration over the “unacceptable level of gas prices”.

Although, some analysts are mostly right in pointing out to the relative reliability of Russian supplies as a major reason behind this discriminated pressure against Iran, it must also be acknowledged that, the high dependence upon Russian gas supplies (58%) and relative inferiority of Turkey’s political weight vis-à-vis Russia have a part to play. On the first hand, in past Russia has served as a back-up supplier when Iran failed to meet its contractual commitments during the times of hiked domestic gas consumption related with the sensitive weather conditions. Hence, Ankara acknowledges the fact that its capacity to put pressure on Russia is limited, as it is Russia whom Turkey is likely to turn to when facing supply shortages from other suppliers, the fact of which official Moscow is aware. Secondly, unlike Iran the ex-superpower is not internationally isolated and still possess political muscles capable of applying a strong-arm (both soft and hard power) upon its neighbors, when needed.

Thirdly, Russia is the key for the stalled Syrian domestic political stand-off, which threatens Turkey’s interests in terms of military, energy (PAP) and demographic security. In this regard, the last point deserves special attention in the light of up-surged refugee inflow into the bordering regions with Syria following the Assad regime’s harsh crackdown upon military and civil opposition. Therefore, by taking it easy with Russia, Turkey intends to play a “carrot” diplomacy and soften the Kremlin’s support to Assad regime.

Last but not the least, increased Turkish pressure upon Iranian gas prices has also certain political rationale in the light of the latter’s support to official Damascus and escalating international pressure linked to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Turkey has already slashed Iranian oil imports by 20% (although not halting it, as opposed to the EU’s plans), thus saving its grace before the (mostly) unified international community. In addition to this, Turkey’s taking Iran to international arbitrage over the gas prices can be interpreted as the former’s attempt to secure exemption from the US sanctions against its banks dealing with Iran, as replacing Iranian gas supplies is not as easy as in the case of oil, largely due to the non-fungible nature of the fuel type. In this respect, if Turkey secures reduced gas prices through arbitration it will still serve to the US intentions by diminishing Iran’s returns from hydrocarbon exports and having a debilitating pressure upon its already fatigued economy.
In sum, Turkish natural gas hub ambition is of economic importance to the country, not least of political. Tactfully combining the two will double the country’s geo-economic preponderance in the region and increase its weight vis-a-vis the EU, of which Turkey long aspires to be a member. On the flipside, however, the prospect of realization of Turkish energy hub is not equally welcoming for the EU and Azerbaijan Republic, which is to serve as the initial feedstock for the Southern gas corridor.

Azerbaijan’s energy strategy: why to put all your eggs in one basket?

Currently, Azerbaijan is widely considered to be one of the potential natural gas suppliers to the European Union through the yet to be established Southern Energy Corridor. Official Baku’s aspirations to access the lucrative European markets, coupled with additional market appetite of its industrial partners, namely, Norwegian Statoil and British Petroleum (BP), makes the project feasible in terms of supply sourcing. The leadership of the country has, in principle, agreed to supply the EU with 10 bcm of natural gas from the second phase of the massive gas field Shah-Deniz via one of the several competing pipelines, namely TAP, Nabucco, ITGI and SEEP.

Although, reaching out to the European energy outlets is of strategic and commercial importance to Azerbaijani government, it is by far not the only goal. The EU must not expect to be the exclusive purchaser of Azeri gas, not least for commercial reasons. As a producing country Azerbaijan is interested in ensuring the security of demand and best possible pricing for its natural gas sales. Correspondingly, in a liberal market security of demand and best pricing for the traded commodity can be achieved through accessing variety of customers. Such a market condition will trigger competitiveness for the traded product and enable the seller to negotiate the best conditions for the deal among the several consumers (although not excluding political benefits of such a bargaining position vis-a-vis the EU). Additionally, direct access to the European markets will elevate Azerbaijan’s energy strategy to a new level, where the policies aimed at increasing and competing over the market share will dominate the geo-

turkey aspiration to emerge as a major natural gas hub for the Caspian and Middle Eastern gas exports is detriment to Azerbaijan’s strategy of diversification of its energy partners.

economical game strategy. In this regard, diversification of energy partners is of commercial interest for Azerbaijan. On the other hand, access to multiple customers will safeguard the country from the potential shocks caused by disruptions in one of the target markets, thus mitigating the overall burden to the country’s energy export oriented economy.

In this vein, Turkey’s aspiration to emerge as a major natural gas hub for the Caspian and Middle Eastern gas exports is detriment to Azerbaijan’s strategy of diversification of its energy partners. As a landlocked hydrocarbon producer, Azerbaijan is heavily dependent on Turkish transit route. That is why, Turkish “gas hub” ambition stirs up uneasiness in official Baku.
According to the natural gas contract with Azerbaijan Turkey have been privileged to buy Azeri gas way below European market prices for domestic consumption, as well as for export to Europe, namely to Greece. Although, official Baku was collecting rents from gas sales, selling an exhaustible national asset for pittance is neither strategically, nor commercially agreeable for Azerbaijan. Such an unfavorable commercial condition is the bottom-line of Azerbaijan’s incentive to directly engage with the European consumers and negotiate the pricing and volume of the supplied natural gas.

After a prolonged and onerous negotiations official Baku managed to secure a deal with Turkey on the transit of Azerbaijani gas to the European market in 2010. This averted the prospects of Turkey purchasing all of Azeri gas and re-selling it in Europe. Nonetheless, Turkey still retains a right to re-export 6 bcm of natural gas that will be purchased from Azerbaijan on the second phase of the development of Shah-Deniz gas field, which still gives a hope to Turkish aspirations of becoming a gas hub.

Despite being strategic partners in broad foreign policy affairs, which largely stems from the close ethno-linguistic ties, energy politics is the base line of disagreements between the two nations. Although having signed natural gas transit agreement with Azerbaijan, Turkey continues to exert political and economic pressure on the former over the export routes and trade partners. This was especially salient during the World Economic Forum in Davos forum in 2012, when Azerbaijan was expected to sign an liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply deal with Ukraine, but backtracked latter on unconvincing grounds of Ukrainian arms sales to Armenia, which currently holds 20% of Azerbaijani territory under occupation despite international condemnation.
Contrary to the initial perception, Turkish energy hub aspirations had twofold direct impact on the fate of the mentioned contract. Firstly, the LNG deal would loosen Azerbaijan’s dependence over the Turkish transit route and set a precedence of the possibility of the second alternative route from the Caspian basin towards Europe via “non-territorial” Black Sea waters. As Turkey is set to consolidate the East-West energy corridor along its territory, any projects bypassing it is likely to meet Ankara’s frowning. Such a geo-economic strategy on the part of Turkey can also explain the reasons behind its intentions to renegotiate the shares in TANAP, the pipeline intended to bring Azeri gas to the EU’s doorstep under official Baku’s operatorship. Although, Baku is an independent actor, in current geopolitical circumstances, it is obliged to bring Ankara’s position into its energy policy calculations. In this regard, if Turkey manages to keep midstream (transit) under its legal and economical control, it will be able to play hardball with Baku by sourcing gas from alternative suppliers, mainly from the Middle East and Russia. However, if Azerbaijan manages to control TANAP, then it will be up to official Baku to decide whose gas will flow through the pipeline: what volume and at which costs.

Secondly, although 2010 deal between Azerbaijan and Turkey theoretically enabled the former’s direct access with the European consumers, Turkey’s re-export right of 6 bcm of natural gas it is to acquire from SDII. If to factor in Turkey’s intentions to supply Ukraine with natural gas, although itself being an import country, it is not difficult to infer that Azerbaijan’s gas sold to Turkey can constitute a competitor to its own energy deals with the third countries.

Therefore, in case of Turkey’s becoming an energy hub for the Caspian gas exports and first-hand buyer of all Azerbaijani natural gas, the latter will lose its ability to negotiate the pricing for its gas sales among the prospective consumers, namely, the EU member and non-member states, as well as Middle Eastern energy importers.

The same might be true from the consumers’ perspective. Being a huge energy market, the EU is interested in the diversity of energy supplies and transit routes, which will ensure competitiveness and security of supply in its domestic energy market. Turkey’s becoming a non-EU energy hub for the Caspian, Middle Eastern and Egyptian energy exports is against to these objectives, as it will strongly affect the EU’s negotiating clout vis-a-vis Ankara’s monopoly over the imported natural gas. This will be true for the pricing of the imported energy carriers, as well as in terms of Turkey-EU accession negotiations.

In sum, Turkey’s natural gas hub aspiration has different repercussions for the energy strategies of the regional actors. Although it is in Ankara’s best interest to bring the strategy into fruition, successful realization of this grand design is detriment to the national interests of suppliers and consumers, which largely explains their unfavorable attitude to such a plan.

Notes:

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in
MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
Section

Israel’s Fear of Democracy in the Middle East
by Dr. Marwan Darweish

Clouds of War over Middle East?
Why an attack against Iran is impossible
by Panagiotis D. Andrikopoulos
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This month Egypt, known as the “mother of the Arab world” will, for the first time, hold a free and transparent Presidential election. This election will have a great impact both regionally and internationally not least upon its neighbour Israel.

In the last few decades Israel has wasted no opportunity to make its claim to be the sole democracy in the Middle East sharing the same values as the liberal democracies of the West. It has suited Israel’s interests to hold this “unique” image of a country surrounded by Arab dictatorships.

Most of Israel’s and the US' Arab allies in the Middle East are characterised by their corruption and undemocratic regimes such as Mubarak, Bin Ali, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf States. The people of these countries have experienced political and economic corruption, grinding poverty and frequent violations of their human rights. The first response to the Arab revolutions, by both the Israeli public and the politicians, was one of complete surprise and denial portraying it as unauthentic and short lived. As time went by, their propaganda focused upon the “danger to Israel” and the risk that the “Muslim Brothers” and other Muslim
“extremists” would gain power and become a source of threat to Israel and the world. The Israeli image of the Arabs is one of being “anti-Semitic” and “Islamist in nature”. Arabs are perceived as undemocratic, fundamentalist and accepting of oppression and hierarchical authority, so it does not fit with this belief that they will call for social justice, freedom and democracy. Israel wants to maintain its image as the only democracy in the Middle East - as the “shining star” in the Arab darkness. Essentially Israel does not associate itself culturally, politically or economically as part of the Middle East, but rather as part of the West.

It came as no surprise then when Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister was very clear and blunt about the Arab Spring describing it as an: ‘Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, undemocratic wave’ and claimed that the Arab countries were ‘moving not forwards but backwards’.

Israel’s main concern is the impact of the Arab revolutions on the relationship with their peace partners; Egypt and Jordan. There is a growing public demand from the Egyptians to return the Israeli ambassador to Israel and show clear support to the Palestinians. There are also demands to reopen the contract to export gas to Israel that contained the subsidised conditions signed by the Mubarak regime.

The Arab leaders lacked credibility and support amongst their people because they violated their basic human and political rights. This seriously undermined their moral legitimacy and political power to criticise Israel about its violation of human rights and
international law in the Palestinian occupied territories. How could such a regime make any credible demand from Israel for statehood for the Palestinians whilst being the main cause of political and social injustice to their own people?

Since 2007 Egypt has played a leading role in mediating between Hamas and Fatah. However, different factors have contributed to the failure of the reconciliation efforts. Any agreement was dependent upon Israel and US approval. Both had the leverage over Mubarak not to support any agreement that might strengthen Hamas and increase the influence of its allies. Under Mubarak, Egypt also aided Israel to reinforce a tight economic and diplomatic siege on the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip and to hermetically seal the Rafah crossing. An accountable parliament and president in Egypt will challenge this status quo; indeed we are already witnessing indications of this.

In fact, Israel has never supported democratic change in the Arab world or publicly condemned violations of human rights in the Arab countries. It also failed to encourage or support civil society organisations against such oppressive regimes.

The mass participation of the Arab Spring has challenged the West and the US attitudes and values. There is no longer any meaningful credibility in the claim that they can bring democracy to the Middle East through "regime change" and establish Western style liberal democracy and economy in the region.

For decades the Arab-Israeli relations have been characterised by Israel’s military superiority and the use of military power to maintain its control over the region. The civil resistance in the Middle East has questioned this Israeli doctrine of military force. Israel is now aware that military might will not be able to deal with a determined popular nonviolent movement in the occupied territories and its Arab neighbours. As the Israeli defence Minister Barak told Haaretz newspaper "the Palestinians' transition from terrorism and suicide bombings to deliberately unarmed mass demonstrations is a transition that will present us with difficult challenges".

On a domestic level the wind of change in the Middle East also inspired thousands of Israelis last summer. It is estimated that more than 300,000 demonstrators took to the streets of Tel Aviv to press their demands for social justice and to protest over the lack of housing, and the high cost of living that has hit mainly the poor but also the middle income bracket in Israel. The campaign started with a handful of tents erected in the centre of Tel Aviv to highlight the social and economic injustice in Israel and the movement rapidly mushroomed into many Arab and Jewish localities in Israel with wide public acclaim and enthusiastic support. This movement was exceptional for Israel and managed to bring under one umbrella political and social groups from the entire political spectrum. The change in dynamics caused by the Arab Spring could change the balance of power between Israel and the Arab countries for years to come.

**Note:**

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It is obvious that Iran seeks a bigger share in the distribution of power in a post Cold War Middle East, especially now that the U.S. retreats its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. Although such an ambition could be realized through soft power tools (see Turkey), Iran has chosen to stand up against the West, mainly through its nuclear program and the threat this poses to the region of the Middle East. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s anti-western and anti-Semitic discourse is trying to attract the Muslim community and put Iran high on hierarchy in the region, becoming automatically the “bad guy” of the Middle East, a scenario a la Iraq when Saddam also envisioned a bigger role for his country. However, in this case, the storyline will not be identical. Israel is the only country that really faces a direct threat, as Iran continues to defy the West and focus on its nuclear weapon building. Action needs to be taken in order to erase the danger. But why are things more difficult for Israel and the West right now? Why is military action against Iran out of the question at this very moment?

a) The ongoing Arab Spring, which started a year ago, although it had the positive outcome of throwing out of the “game” some lifetime dictators, left chaos and anarchy behind. These dictators had been supported by the West for many decades and suddenly the picture changed and the cards were
reshuffled. How can the US cope with the ongoing situation? Obama has to deal with it, so a focus on Iran will undoubtedly restrain the U.S. and many of its interests in the Middle East, something that Americans cannot afford. Let us not forget the new focus of the US foreign policy on South East Asia and the Pacific in an attempt to contain the rising Chinese power.

b) While these lines are being written, Syria is still in huge turmoil and a high number of people die every day by government’s fire. The international community’s attention is currently guided to this direction, along with the UN resolution efforts, which are undermined by the Russian and Chinese vetoes. Iran does not want Assad to fall and tries its best to keep the current situation as it is because by doing that Ahmadinejad gains time for his nuclear visions. The U.S. expected Russia and China to behave as they did with the Libyan case but this time they stood against the West and made the UN reach a stalemate. Therefore, as long as the Syrian issue is not resolved, Iran is free in its moves.

c) What is Europe’s stance on Iran at the moment? So far, Europeans, other than posing economic sanctions against Iran, could not do any other harm mainly due to the economic crisis that threatens the EU’s very existence and its currency, the euro. Thus, for the time being, the big European powers (Germany, France and the UK) cannot collaborate with the U.S. and take up any military action against Iran as such action would be catastrophic for the EU.

d) Another important reason that no military action can take place is the
domestic reality within the United States. The American public opinion cannot just give Obama the green light for another adventure in the Middle East after the fiascoes of Afghanistan and Iraq, where thousands of U.S. troops lost their lives while chasing Osama Bin Laden and trying, in vain, to discover weapons of massive destruction in Iraq. At the moment, the American President and its advisors are more concerned with the forthcoming presidential elections and another war, especially in the sensitive area of the Middle East, would undermine his image and maybe cost him his seat in the Oval Office.

e) The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, said around a month ago that Israel is preparing an attack against Iran in the next months. Without any doubt, Israel would like to attack Iran's nuclear facilities and prevent Iran from becoming a regional power. But, can this become a reality under the circumstances? It is certain that Israeli forces prepared many scenarios and plans for a possible war with Iran over the last years. As in the beginning of the 21st century and the case of Iraq, Israel does not want to be neighbors with a country that allegedly wants to eliminate it from the map. Therefore, a war against Iran would be ideal for Israel but on one condition: with the support from the West, especially, her transatlantic ally. But, as mentioned above, the U.S. cannot give this assurance to Israel given the current domestic, regional and international situation. The only solution, then, is only to force Iran diplomatically and economically, but not militarily and this is what frustrates the Israelis as time passes by against it.

The last months, we see many activities taking place in the Middle East. U.S. troops, fleets and bases started surrounding Iran in case the latter decides to close down one of the most strategic points of the globe, the Straits of Hormuz. If this is realized, it would have great negative consequences on the world economy. Israel is intensifying its military operations near the Iranian borders. The sanctions, imposed from both the U.S. and Europe, are trying to suffocate Iran. All these actions have one objective: to force Iran to attack first! Israel cannot and should not start a preventive war against Iran, because not only it is against International Law but also because the whole international community would condemn Israel, which is something that the latter cannot afford, especially now that the Palestinians are trying to force the world to accept their state. Such a move, thus, from Israel would be disastrous for its national interests.

Iran is being pushed to its limits and it is expected to somehow get involved in a military action that would give the right to the West to attack back by being loyal to International Law and by showing that Iran started the war.

How Iran will act is something that only Iranian decision makers know and what we can do is only speculate. What is for sure, however, is the fact that every moment that passes by without any action, gives the benefit to Iran because it is not the one that wants to change the status quo of the area. The future will show.

Note:

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Has the European Commission Acquired more Power due To the Euro Area Debt Crisis?

by Dr. Dilek Yigit
The European Commission has always been the object of debates and analyses as to what extent the European Union (EU) political structure is democratic, since the structure of the Commission and its relations with the European Parliament have been regarded by many scholars as the main reasons why the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit".

After the global financial crisis broke out, measures taken to cope with the implications of the euro area debt crisis and to prevent another potential crisis have renewed the debates on democracy at EU level, in particular on the European Commission’s role in the new European economic governance. Why has the European Commission been a part of debates on a “democratic deficit” in the EU? The answer to this question is complex and many-faceted. Because the first aspect of this question is related to how the European Union and its executive body Commission can be defined; Is the Commission a sui-generis body of sui generis organisation? or can the Commission be compared with a government in the member states as the EU is becoming more like a state? It can be argued that the EU is becoming more like a state due to the continuous European integration process; nonetheless there is not a clear-cut answer on which scholars agree to the question of how exactly the Commission can be defined or whether it should be a government in the conventional meaning of the term. For example, S. Hix points out that the Commission may be defined as sui generis through stating that “the Commission is neither a government nor a bureaucracy, and is appointed through what appears to be an obscure procedure rather than elected directly by the votes or indirectly after a parliamentary election.”

While F. Laursen underlines the similarities between the Commission and a national government by expressing “to a certain extent, the Commission can be compared with a government in the
member states. It takes political initiatives, it proposes legislation, it has a bureaucracy at its disposal, it gets involved in policy implementation.”

The second aspect of this question is related to the democratisation of the European Union. In this context, the question of how the president and members of the Commission should be appointed/elected for a more democratic Union has led to political and theoretical debates so far, and many scholars argue that the democratisation of the European Union through the gradual increase of power of the European Parliament over the European Commission has caused politicisation of the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon brought about further politicisation of the Commission by defining the role of the European Parliament in the nomination of the Commission President explicitly. Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that

“Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for the President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members...”
It can be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon provides the Commission with greater democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, after the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission is still an executive body that remains unfamiliar to both parliamentarism and presidentialism, which may arise more concerns especially in the light of Article 10 of the Treaty stipulating that the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.

Furthermore, measures taken for strengthening fiscal discipline and introducing stricter fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance in the EU due to the euro area debt crisis received serious criticism on the grounds that these measures give greater role to the European Commission in the surveillance of national economic and financial policies, that is the Commission acquires more powers although its democratic legitimacy and democratic accountability have been questioned.

The aim of this article is to try to address more centrally the question of whether the Commission is becoming more powerful due to the measures taken after the euro area debt crisis and if so, why it receives criticism from a democratic perspective. Let’s analyse each measure and what they mean to the Commission in brief.

The European Semester which was approved by the member states on September 2010 for stronger economic governance and coordination at EU level means ex ante coordination of member states budgetary and economic policies, and it starts each year when the Commission publishes the Annual Growth Survey. On the basis of the Annual Growth Survey, member states identify the main economic issues which the EU faces and give policy advices at the Spring Council. The salient aspect of the European Semester is that the European Council and the Council of Ministers provide policy advice before the member states’ draft budget for the following year are finalised. Although the Commission’s role under the European Semester has received criticism on the grounds that the Commission can give direction to national fiscal policies, the European Council, Council of the European Union and the European Parliament are also given active roles under the European Semester in order to provide legitimacy for this new mechanism.

The Six Pack which entered into force on 13 December 2011 aims to reinforce the preventive and the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. The most salient aspect of the Six Pack for the Commission is an introduction of reverse qualified majority voting, which means in the Commission's words “a recommendation or a proposal of the Commission is considered adopted in the Council unless a qualified majority of member States votes against it.” Similar to the Six Pack, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) which was signed by twenty-five member states on 2 March 2012 in order to strengthen fiscal discipline and introduce stricter surveillance within the euro area also introduces the reverse qualified majority voting. Article 7 of the
Treat stipulates that

“While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to supporting the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended.”

With regard to the TSCG, the Commission underlines that

“...at each stage of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), euro-area Member States will support the Commission’s proposals or recommendations in the Council if a euro-area Member State is in breach of the deficit criterion, unless a qualified majority of them against it. In practice this means that if a euro-area member State breaches the deficit criterion a kind of reverse qualified majority voting applies to all stages of the EDP, even if not foreseen in the Six Pack.”
The reverse qualified majority voting envisaged in the Six Pack and the TSCG raises questions in terms of democracy at the EU level, because it means that only qualified majority in the Council should be able to stop sanctions, so it creates an automatic sanction mechanism triggered by the Commission. The automatic sanction mechanism may be criticised for putting the member states in the hands of the Commission which is not accountable to the European electorate directly, and for the lack of involvement of neither the European Parliament nor the European Council.

The Two Pack on which discussions are ongoing between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament envisages a common budgetary timeline in which euro area Member States shall submit their draft budgetary plan for the following year to the Commission and the Eurogroup before 15 October and requires the Commission to analyse the draft budgetary plans based on the Stability and Growth Pact and the recommendations from the European Semester. If the Commission assesses that the draft budgetary plans are not in conformity with the Stability and Growth Pact, the Commission may ask for a revised draft budgetary plan. The Two Pack has not been adopted yet. When it enters into force it will likely be criticised for causing national budgetary policy decisions to be taken out of the hands of national parliaments and delivered to the European Commission, consequently for undermining democracy at both national and supranational level.

In sum, the measures taken for strengthening fiscal discipline and introducing stricter fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance in the EU in order to prevent a crisis similar to the euro area debt crisis have raised objections coming from a democratic perspective. That is why, the measures which are taken from an economic viewpoint and would lead to a more powerful European Commission in the European new economic governance should be paid more attention from the perspective of democracy to prevent criticisms that new economic measures may undermine European democracy.

Notes:
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Undersecretariat of Treasury.

1. S. Hix, What’s Wrong With The European Union & How To Fix It, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p.71
4. See the chart in The European Semester: Who does what and when?, http://ec.europa.eu
7. European Commission, Six-pack? Two-pack? ...
8. Ibid.
An Interview with Dr Mark Chou: Addressing Democide and its Implications for Politics

by Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon
Mark moved to the University of Melbourne in 2011, having spent the three years prior to that living in Brisbane where he completed his PhD in political and international relations theory at the University of Queensland. Currently a McKenzie Postdoctoral Fellow, Mark spends his time researching and writing on the topic of democratic failure, mainly from a theoretical perspective. Besides this, his research interests and publications also extend to topics on cultural politics (particularly, Greek tragedy and contemporary political theatre) and international relations theory (especially, post-structural and Chinese conceptions of world politics). His monograph, *Greek Tragedy and Contemporary Democracy*, is contracted to be published with Continuum Books.

**Jean-Paul Gagnon:** What is democide?

**Mark Chou:** Perhaps it’s making poor use of an example to cite Joseph Goebbels at the outset, but he once commented that: ‘This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed’. Though no doubt gloating about what National Socialism had managed to achieve under Weimar’s democratic system, what we have here – if we are to take Goebbels seriously – are words to the effect that democracy is a precarious thing. Democracy is the very thing, in other words, that can bring democracy to its knees.

This, essentially, captures the idea of ‘democide’. Writing in *The Life and Death of Democracy*, the political theorist John Keane recalled us precisely to this point: that democracies can ‘commit “democide”’. In contrast to its more common meaning – the murder of a person or people by their government – Keane defines democide in terms of a people who elect, by democratic means, to murder their democracy. This is how a democracy can commit an act of suicide. When incapable of redressing the political crises they have manufactured themselves, whether because of individual freedoms, bureaucratic morass or the sluggishness of democratic politics, the claim is that democracies can die by their own hand.

Specifically, we can say that democide occurs when a majority of citizens or their elected leaders legitimately use democratic means for the purposes of
undermining the democracy in question. What makes these occasions all the more remarkable, and for that matter harder to discern, is that until such time where the democracy is actually toppled or infringed, these popular threats can and sometimes do actually contribute to the fervour of democratic engagement. Mass dissent during public debates and at the ballot box can enliven democracies and give the sense that there is something more at stake. Particularly when dissent takes place without the resort to widespread violence and coercion – after all, no democracy can claim to be without such elements from time to time – no one can dispute that these are the moments that democracy was made to incite and then endure.

Of course, this idea goes against the conventional wisdom in much of the contemporary literature on democratisation, where democratic consolidation, not capitulation, is what’s emphasised. And that, for me, is one very good reason – and here I’ll quote Keane again – to take seriously the ‘vexing thought that democracy as we now know it in all its geographic and historical variations might not survive indefinitely, that it could slit its own throat or quietly take its own life in an act of “democide”’.

**JPG:** Could you offer a number of examples where democide has occurred?

**MC:** I could give a few, but it might actually be more helpful to just offer one in greater detail – and here it’s probably the best use of time to use an example that many are likely already to be familiar with, that is, the democide which took place in the Weimar Republic in Germany. Problematic or not, the Goebbels quote I just made reference to is more or less vindicated by the fact that the Nazis’ rise to power took place within and took advantage of the very Weimar democratic processes which it would go on to systematically dismantle and repudiate. Weimar democracy, in other words, played a not insignificant role in bringing about its own demise.

Though I’ll discuss the complexities of that demise in just a moment, we can say that this democide occurred in essence because the ‘same citizenry, which democracy had created’, became for Sheldon Wolin the very citizens that then ‘proceeded to vote into power and then support movements openly pledged to destroy democracy and constitutionalism’. Here, it’s important to recall that a large majority of the German people at the time had a distinctly anti-liberal, anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic bias. Coupled with a Constitution whose ‘[p]olitical authority emanated from the people’ it could therefore be argued that both the citizens and the Constitution of Weimar collaborated in bringing about that democracy’s demise.

Within this environment, more specifically, the Nazis quickly mobilized popular support, something they could achieve largely without needing to breach the Republic’s Constitution. Working mostly within the confines made available to them through Weimar’s democratic system – though the Nazis did of course blatantly violate democratic principles through the resort to violence and political intimidation – these anti-democrats employed democratic techniques that would eventually enable them to mobilize the majority ultimately for their own political ends. Indeed, following each election that was held, many of which were actually called by the Nazis themselves, their popularity slowly increased finally to the point where they secured – with the support of the German Nationalist Party – the majority of votes in 1933.
The route which saw the Nazis take power demonstrates just how democide is possible, how it can arise quite logically in a course of democratic politicking and how, in the heat of the moment, it can be seen to contribute to the vibrancy of that democracy. The openness that was generated from the democratic processes in the Weimar Republic barely prevented any one or faction from entering the political sphere to voice their concerns and advance their proposals. Fuelled by the sense of injustice and the dire economic situation experienced by many Germans during the interwar period, the Weimar democracy enabled almost any party with a grievance the opportunity to have a say and influence the nation’s policies. In the case of Weimar, that was enough to hand Hitler the democratic majority along with the mandate to systematically dismantle the democracy that had brought him to power.

**JPG:** How is democide a risk to democracies – and are certain democracies at greater risk than others?

**MC:** I think the best way to answer this question is in a round-about manner. The way I see it is that there is no effective mechanism in a democracy which can prevent that democracy from paving the way for its antithesis, that is, without being itself a risk to democracy. In other words, mechanisms which are purposely created to prevent citizens from going too far and destroying democracy often have the uncomely potential to pave the way for democide. Not only that, but I think the concept of democide extends not only to ‘weak’ or ‘failing’ democracies as is typically suggested in the literature. Rather, democide is also a phenomenon that democracies have to contend with when functioning paradoxically at their best. There is no distinct marker, no universal signs of ill health, to alert a democracy before it goes too far and invites into its midst forces capable of ripping it apart.
Also, as a point of necessity, the matters that I am talking about here are not the violent and militaristic rebellions, or coup d’états, that have from time to time ended democracy’s tenure. These, though frequently anti-democratic, do not fall under, but operate outside, the purview of democratic processes. Accordingly, what interests me is when anti-democratic individuals or parties manage, because of their political platform, to secure majority support via legitimately democratic means. These do fall under the purview of democratic processes. And that is why democide can be construed as a risk to democracy: because a democracy can be at a loss to block their success.

**JPG:** Have you any recommendations for practitioners to use in order to minimize the risk of democide in their polities?

**MC:** The conclusion that democracies can from time to time deal themselves a deadly blow is a disconcerting one. After all, it is no small thing to say that democracy is apt to falter, sometimes with a self-destructiveness that is without parallel in other forms of political governance. In this sense, the prospect of democide brings to the fore the possibility that all democracies are born with a congenital defect, which can never be completely incised from democracy or the process of democratisation. If this is the case, then the future of democracy becomes a great deal more uncertain.

For many, this would no doubt be an unwelcome conclusion. Indeed, if democracy will always remain in the words of John Safford ‘an open-ended process’, then neither its full potential nor the full gambit of its problems will ever be known before they actually manifest. Because of this, democracy therefore becomes for many a politically dangerous idea, one which is ‘subject to great triumphs’ but also to ‘horrendous mistakes’. That both are as equally likely to eventuate makes democracy’s future unknown and its practice a perilous affair. So the important question we need to ask, as you suggest, is how should we deal with this? How can we mitigate the likelihood of democide?

Though there’s no universally agreed upon approach to dealing with democide, I think by far the most common and logical response has been to emphasize the need to continually consolidate and strengthen democracy from any internal weaknesses. What is imperative, for those who share this view, is that efforts be made to progressively refine those democratic institutions and procedures which have in the past clapsed onto democracy’s lifeblood, without themselves becoming a risk to democracy. Though this is no easy charge, it has, I think for the most part, been something skilfully navigated by scholars of democratic consolidation. To their credit, the initiatives they have proposed and put into effect has in recent years decreased both the likelihood and actual number of democratic failures around the world.

But because, to some extent, even the best efforts and most well-conceived mechanisms constitute no absolute guarantee against democide, there have also been commentators who stress the importance of viewing democide not as a logical continuation of democracy, but instead as an inversion or cessation of democracy. By making a point of identifying when a democracy ceases to be democratic, even when that result has been brought about by democratic processes, these scholars believe we can rescue the idea if not the practice of democracy from the worst of itself.

To this end, for instance, it is certainly right that we hold democracy responsible for the rise of Nazism. But while doing so, someone like Claude Lefort insists that we have to at least acknowledge that the ascendancy of National Socialism implied the ‘ruin of democracy’ not its culmination. On this view, the tragedy which sees democracies self-destruct should not be lauded nor accepted as a natural corollary of democratic politics. To the contrary, it must be guarded against, lamented and quickly separated from the ‘normal’ operation of democracy. After all, what point is there in studying democide if there is nothing we can do to prevent it in future? And what use is there in espousing and participating in democratic processes if we cannot avoid the mistakes of our past?
Various Strings of Pearls: Recent Security Developments in the South China Sea and Beyond  
by Tilman Pradt

New Challenges, Old Recipes: Communist Propaganda for China’s Youth  
by Konstantinos Dionysiou Tsimonis

The Needs of Further Development for Pearl River Delta  
by Sunny Lam
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Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in a recently published article that this century will become 'America’s Pacific Century.' In her text she declared that a strategic shift was underway in America’s foreign policy, a shift away from former hotspots of geopolitical attention towards the region of Asia-Pacific. Further, this newly increased engagement of the United States in the region shall be understated through activities in security related issues, too. Clinton made it clear that despite the need to limit expenses in dire economic times, the importance of the Asia-Pacific region will justify the reallocation of resources away from former areas of engagement (e.g., Central Asia).

Secretary of State Clinton’s remarks were further emphasised by the performance of President Barack Obama at his late 2011 official journey to Asian summits. It was the first time that the US president attended at the East Asia Summit (EAS), a forum formerly existing of 16 East Asian nations which in 2011 accepted the USA and Russia as new members. At this Summit, President Obama seized the opportunity to express the US’ will to establish a new base for US Marines in Australia to secure the waterways. Additionally, he suggested that the various claimant states to disputed areas in the South China Sea should meet at a round table to discuss the disputes multilaterally and that the US would be happy to play a facilitating role in resolving the protracted disputes.

The reactions from Beijing were instantaneous and unsurprising in its manner. China has been an engaged proponent of excluding outside powers from Asian regional affairs, therefore it strongly supported the EAS as an inclusive Asian organisation. Furthermore, China has been a strict opponent of multilateral discussions in respect of territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). Both standpoints were well-known and it is interesting to analyse what Washington might have affected to undertake these actions when China’s displeasure was guaranteed.

By Tilman Pradt
Relevance

The SCS is known for its busy waterways. Especially the Strait of Malacca, through which nearly half the annual shipping tonnage passes, is notorious for the vast implications in case of any blockade, disruption or the like. These sea lanes connect the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean via the straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok. Most of European-Asian trade is shipped via this connection, and thus not only Asian states are interested in guaranteed free passage but also the world economy altogether. Bernhard D. Cole, professor at the National War College in Washington, D.C, classifies the importance of this sea-lane in the following way:

“The Strait of Malacca is the most important shipping lane in the world, more important than either the Suez or Panama Canals in terms of both geopolitical significance and because of the numbers of ship and amount of tonnage that pass through it.”

Piracy attacks during the past years have demonstrated how vulnerable these sea lanes are. In this view it is not surprising that many states are engaged in securing the sea lanes and founded various programmes to counter piracy and terrorism hazards (e.g., the Eye in the Sky programme, initiated in 2005 is an aerial surveillance programme in the Strait of Malacca, conducted jointly by Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand).

The sea lanes are especially important to China and Japan because they are the waterway connection to Africa and the Middle East, the origin of the majority of their oil imports. Any interruption of the supply of crude oil would have immense impact on the world's second and third biggest economies, respectively. China and Japan are therefore both very interested in securing the sea lanes through the SCS and the Indian Ocean, unfortunately, they are suspicious of each other to interrupt the oil supply in case of any future confrontation. This suspicion is based on still existing territorial disputes of sovereignty over islands (i.e., Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) and because of their generally ambivalent relations in history.

China is furthermore not sure about the behaviour of the US in an assumed future conflict in the Taiwan Strait, a blockade of Chinese oil supply could be the means of choice in such a situation.

These insecurities in combination with China’s reliance on a steady oil supply through the Strait of Malacca were acknowledged by policy-makers in Beijing for several years. In 2003, after a
statement of Chinese Premier Hu Jintao on the problematic of this vulnerability, the phrase of the “Malacca dilemma” was coined.4

Military developments

The United States established a group of military alliances in the region after the Second World War. The strategic alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia plus the military bases on Guam and the Philippines allowed the US to control the sea lanes in the SCS and to hedge China in times of the Cold War. After the shift in the perception of China from foe to partner against the Soviet Union during the 1970s, this motivation waned and at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the strategic importance of the whole region lost significance. The US closed its military base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and reduced its overall presence in the region.

Nonetheless the military partnerships and joint military exercises continued and were even expanded. Via the continuation of joint exercises the US Navy ensured its compatibility with allied navies in case of severe confrontations in the region. It is observable that the efforts to conduct joint military exercises with navies in the region increased during the years of the 1990s when the US removed parts of its forces from Southeast Asia.

In 1995, the US established the Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training (CARAT) programme, designed to enhance regional cooperation among navies and to prepare for joint real-world operations. Sponsored by the US Pacific Fleet and scheduled by the US Seventh Fleet, this bilateral military exercise programme is comprehensive in its manner and aims at increasing the professional skills of participating navies. Since 1996, the navies of Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines participated.

The trainings include amphibious raids, live-fire exercises, jungle survival training, military operations on urbanised terrain, and joint anti-submarine exercises.5

In 2010, Cambodia and Bangladesh joined the CARAT and enlarged the circle to eight participating armies in the Southeast Asian region.

Additionally, the US conducts maritime exercises with the six navies of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines, the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) and annually a six-week military exercise with Thai soldiers, designated Cobra Gold.6

The strategic alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia plus the military bases on Guam and the Philippines allowed the US to control the sea lanes in the SCS and to hedge China in times of the Cold War.

The standing US Seventh' Fleet in the Asia-Pacific including thirty-six attack submarines is the paramount naval strike force in the region with bases in Japan and Guam.7

The deployment of US Marines to the military base at Darwin, Australia, is remarkable insofar as this is the first move to strengthen the US military’s presence in the region after two decades.
of declining the military personnel in the region. One motivation behind this newly move is certainly to continued upgrading of the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the last two decades. The increased military might of Chinese forces, above all its naval forces, has caused worries among smaller states in the Southeast Asian region, especially in view of unresolved disputes with China over territorial sovereignty rights in the South China Sea.

China is modernising its military forces at an impressive pace. The official numbers of China’s defence budget are admittedly dubious but it is common sense among security analysts that China possesses the most powerful armed forces among Asian countries and that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is even on the global scale second only to the US Army. The focus of China’s military build-up efforts was on strengthening the naval and air forces. In this respect, especially arms purchases from Russia are of significance. During the 1990s, China began upgrading its armed forces with arms purchases from the former Soviet army. The focus was obviously not on the ground forces but on acquisitions for the airforce and navy.

China ordered Russian Su-27 fighter aircraft until in 1996, China arranged a licence agreement with Russia about the co-production of 200 modified Su-27s (Su-27SK) labelled as J-11 (or F-11) in China. For its naval forces, China purchased a total of four Russian Sovremenny class destroyers and Kilo class diesel-electric submarines. Additionally, China increasingly succeeded in developing indigenous weapon systems assumably thanks to Russian technical support. China’s Luhu class destroyers, Jiangkai class frigates, Song class submarines and especially the J-10 fighter aircraft are evidence for Chinese improved prowess in view of indigenously developing military equipment.

In the new millennium, China continued its way of upgrading its armed forces via the acquisition of weapon systems from Russia and increasingly developing indigenous technologies. The motivation behind these military programmes is first of all China’s ability to do so thanks to its prolonged economic boom. One should bear in mind that China is not at all overstretching its financial abilities to upgrade its military forces in an arms race with a malign neighbour or the like. China is on the one hand experiencing the least threatening security environment for the last century, on the other hand, it is in the most promising economic situation for the same given period. The combination of these two facts is qualified to raise certain worries among China’s neighbouring countries about China’s future intentions.
and especially about the driving force behind China's military upgrading programmes.

Officially, the PLA is focused on a potential Taiwan Strait theatre in case of Taiwan unilaterally declaring its sovereignty. For the purpose to deter Taiwanese policy-makers, the PLA has installed some 1,000 missiles aiming at Taiwan and furthermore enhanced its capabilities of amphibious landing forces.

The second maxim of the PLA in view of its external threat perception is increasingly the goal to secure the above mentioned oil supply sea lanes which are pivotal for the Chinese economy. To reach this goal, China took efforts to increase its power projection capabilities to enable in-time reaction to potential conflicts along these sea lanes. The means of choice has been the development of a blue water navy, capable to patrol the concerning waters and to upgrade its air force for quick reaction capabilities. For the first purpose, China ordered guided-missile destroyers and the above mentioned Kilo class submarines from Russia. The probably most controversial part of China's navy modernising programme is the development of China's indigenous aircraft carrier programme. As early as in the 1990s, China purchased a semi-completed aircraft carrier from the former Soviet satellite Ukraine. The labelled 'Varyag', a Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier, was at first designated to become a swimming casino resort towed in Macau but eventually was refurbished and completed. In June 2011 it completed its maiden voyage off the Chinese coast and thus demonstrated Beijing's great ambitions for its naval forces.\(^9\)

In respect of the air force, China purchased some 200 Su-30s from Russia and began in 2003 to produce indigenous fighter jets labelled J-10 assumably based on experiences made with the Russian Su-30s.

Additionally, China sought to partner with littoral states along the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean to ensure replenishment facilities far away from Chinese ports. Over the past years, China has thus initiated port modernisation or completely new established port facilities in Myanmar (Hianggyi, Akyab, Mergui), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Pakistan (Gwadar), and Sri Lanka (Hambantota). This row of ports has been phrased as 'China's string of pearls' and is entirely defensive in Beijing's point of view, but also causing feelings of a Chinese encirclement among certain nations in this region. For these states it is further unsettling to recognise that China's increased amphibious capabilities and power projection forces would also allow an engagement in, for example, a potential conflict over islands in the South China Sea.

Thus, while China is upgrading its armed forces to secure its energy supply, at the same time, it causes security concerns in the region with the very same weapon systems it considers as defensive.

**Security outcomes**

The above outlined engagement of the United States and China to secure the
important sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea have surely one positive outcome: these sea lanes are increasingly less vulnerable to non-traditional security threats, i.e. piracy and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the upgrading of military forces has the potential to trigger an arms race in the region. This would be the characteristic outcome of a security dilemma. The efforts undertaken by a party to enhance its (perceived) security environment leads to an increase of the threat perception of another party and thus motivates the latter to upgrade its forces, too. By this development, the former feels confirmed in its threat perception and encouraged to further invest in its military forces which leads to the expectable reaction of the other party and so on.

In this case, the Chinese efforts to secure its oil supply might concomitantly threaten the Japanese that they can no longer control their oil supply. China’s establishment of port partnerships in the Indian Ocean might be perceived by India as interference in India’s sphere of influence. The US’ engagement in the South China Sea is surely perceived by Beijing as an interference in China’s sphere of influence but at the same time welcomed by smaller Asian nations which fret too much dominance of China in the region. The result of this rising tenseness in the region is quantifiable in sober numbers. China started its military modernization and upgrading programmes in the early 1990s with arm purchases from Russia. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s southeastern neighbours have been heavily invested in arms purchases and thus becoming the world’s second biggest arms trade region, second only to the Middle East. Especially the armies of Malaysia and Vietnam have used their increased income from oil extraction to upgrade and modernise their armed forces. Both
countries acquired modern attack submarines (French Scorpene class by Malaysia and Russian Kilo class submarines by Vietnam) and fighter aircraft (Su-30s from Russia). And although the littoral states of the SCS have overlapping claims among themselves, it is evident that China's military modernising programme has spurred the weapon systems acquisitions in the Southeast Asian region.

The other big spender in terms of arms purchases and military modernisation has been India. The Foreign Policy magazine headed an article “The Stories You Missed in 2011” in which the number one of ten overlooked developments in 2011 is the increasing military spending of India. Accordingly, in 2011, India has been the world's largest weapons importer, “accounting for 9 percent of the world's international arms transfers -- most from Russia -- between 2006 and 2010.”

The article states that the focus of India's military modernisation and acquisition is on its naval forces, caused by an increased perception of a Chinese threat.

**Conclusion**

China has been modernising its military forces for several years, especially its naval forces and airforce have been upgraded substantially. This development was not unnoticed by security analysts in concerned nations, China's development of an indigenous aircraft carrier was only the latest event in a row of impressive breakthroughs in China's efforts to develop indigenous military technology. These developments have caused concerns, initially among China's southeastern neighbours which fear China using its newly military might to resolve open territorial conflicts in its favour. Therefore, the navies of concerned littoral states have been upgraded by weapon systems acquisitions. The other big Asian power, India, was also increasingly worried by China's military rise and ambitions to project power into the Indian Ocean. Thus, India also invested immensely in military technology and became the world's largest arms importer. Last but not least, the US as the remaining dominant naval force in the region (and in the world) has re-emphasised its engagement and declared to deploy additional forces to Australia. It is difficult to imagine a sudden decrease in these efforts of military upgrading and it is far more probably that we are attending an arms race in the Asian region which is only gaining speed and severity.

China is about to establish a series of port partnerships in littoral states along the sea lanes connecting Africa and the Middle East with Northeast Asia. The pearls in this 'String of Pearls' are harbours in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, and China's Sanya base on Hainan. These ports are not military in nature but qualified to raise worries in states like India which feels increasingly encircled.

The United States' 'String of Pearls' stretches from its (leased) naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, over port facilities in Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan, supplemented by

...although the littoral states of the SCS have overlapping claims among themselves, it is evident that China's military modernising programme has spurred the weapon systems acquisitions in the Southeast Asian region.
military bases at Guam and prospectively in Darwin, Australia. Additionally, the US Seventh Fleet is deployed to the Asian region, a standing force of permanently 70 ships, 300 aircraft and 40,000 sailors and marines. To think that the immense concentration of armed forces in the region, both Chinese and American, will only lead to the increased security of sea lanes is naïve at best.

The Asian region has shifted into the spotlight of geopolitics over the last years. The recent declarations of the US President and Secretary of State, respectively, about the increased importance of the Asia-Pacific region for US foreign policy were only the latest pointer to a longstanding development. The contemporary security threats to the sea lanes of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean do not justify the military efforts described in this article and the concerned nations know it. Aircraft carriers and attack submarines are not the appropriate means to patrol sea lanes and chase pirates. Rather, the perceived interference of outside powers will urge the regional actors to overreact and respond with further military buildup efforts, thus destabilising the security of the whole region.

The US' motivation to deploy marines to the base at Darwin was assumably to present the Chinese a stick beside the carrot. The offer of President Obama to facilitate multilateral discussions among the claimants to disputed islets in the South China Sea was all too easy declinable for the Chinese.

Beijing has stated for decades that is was unwilling to even discuss these territorial disputes multilaterally but would only bilaterally negotiate with the other claimants. During the time of passed possibilities, the claimants upgraded their military capabilities, erected military outposts on the disputed islets, and thus created precedents for later negotiations over sovereignty. This development increasingly entailed the risk of military confrontation and is a danger to the important sea lanes. By its move to deploy forces to the region, Washington demonstrates Beijing a possible outcome of prolonged irreconcilability in view of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. If China is not able to solve the problems in its region on its own, the message goes, the US are willing to secure the stability. Maybe this is motivation for China to put new efforts in finding a solution to the SCS disputes. An increased military presence of the US in the region might be frightening enough for Beijing to bite the bullet.

Notes:
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1. (Clinton, 2011)
2. (Grammaticas, 2011)
3. (Cole, 2008) p.20
4. (Storey, 2006)
8. (Pradt, 2011)
9. (BBC, 2011)
New Challenges, Old Recipes: Communist Propaganda for China’s Youth

By Konstantinos Dionysiou Tsimonis

Since the Communist Youth League (CYL) became a mass organization in its present form after the 1949 communist victory in China, it has been at the forefront of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) relation with China’s youth. The CYL’s main tasks have historically included political screening and preparation for Party membership, mobilization for developmental projects and campaigns, and propaganda. In regard to this last task, following the extensive decentralization of public communication in the PRC, the challenge for the League has been to rejuvenate its message and public profile in order to appeal to a youth audience that is increasingly confident in its own choice of sources of information. But economic reforms and marketisation do not only affect the expectations and attitudes of young people. They also affect the means available to the League as a specialized Party agency to carry out its “communication” with them. In turn, the efforts and failures of the League in this direction are indicative of the CCP’s limitations for positive intervention in public discourse, an aspect that has been overshadowed by its phobia of social media and the increasing sophistication of its censorship apparatus. What has been the League’s institutional response to the call for the renewal of one of its core political functions in the new economic environment and how have young people received it?

The classic propaganda methods

The most routine forms of propaganda at the grassroots level include the dissemination of information on party policies and campaigns distributed by local urban and rural League cadres through means that vary from posts on the announcement board, to bbs-email-sms messages and the distribution of leaflets in schools, work units, and even in fields during the harvest period. At higher levels, propaganda events are routinely carried out and replicated during political anniversaries and campaigns. According to the 2010 Beijing CYL committee diary,
propaganda and political activities occupy the majority (63%) of the organization's annual schedule. This proportion includes only those activities that have a direct political and propaganda purpose, excluding volunteer work and cultural events that are usually ornamented with party and nationalistic themes anyway, indirectly propagandizing the CCP’s political and moral beliefs, and familiarizing youth and the public with certain policies.

Propaganda activities mainly include ceremonies, parades and thematic events according to the PRC’s political calendar and current politics. Next to the celebrations of May 4th, June 1st (Children’s Day), October 1st etc, the League organises or participates in festivities throughout the country in conjunction with national events such as the successes of Yang Liwei, Zhang Zhigang and other Chinese astronauts, the Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo, the Guangzhou Asian Games as well as for the purpose of publicizing the initiation of nationwide policies. In addition, League committees at every level of the administration are involved in government-organised publicity events, such as opening ceremonies of trade exhibitions, TV shows with a “patriotic” theme and revolutionary kitsch that host popular singers and dancing troupes, sport competitions and other events that require the mobilization of volunteers. The League’s role in these events varies from administration to dispatching youths to take part as background performers, viewers or, even, security personnel.

In addition, the League continues to create role models by awarding “outstanding” CYL members, cadres and youths for their achievements in promoting economic development, national pride, and officially sanctioned social issues. The use of such role models does not assume the study campaign dimensions of Lei Feng in the 60s and Zhang Haidi in the 80s, but is applied more conventionally to demonstrate the League’s and party’s legitimate claim to represent the most advanced forces of society. However, the League’s own capacity for effective propaganda and public communication with young people is undermined by its organisational and discursive dependency to the Party and the pluralisation and marketisation that has accompanied the reforms.

Propaganda is by definition externally focused, and in this respect the traditional media affiliated with the League have had the role of familiarizing the public with the CYL’s activities. After the initiation of the reforms, however, the media begun operating on commercial terms, and their affiliation to the League, from which they obtained the sponsorship necessary for their license, has been practically limited to an obligation to cover League-related news. In the cases of the China Youth Daily (CYD) and the Beijing Youth Daily (BYD), both newspapers have their Chief Editor formally appointed by the
Central and Beijing CYL committees respectively, and they are expected to cover League events, devote pages on propaganda articles and publish leaflets and thematic magazines (as for example the Volunteer Magazine circulated by the BYD) that have minimal -if any- commercial value in terms of circulation. But their affiliation to the League has a much more limited political meaning than actually being a League mouthpiece (houshe) similar to what the Komsomolskaya Pravda was for the Komsomol in the USSR. The point made here in relation to the League’s affiliated media is that the CYL is organisationally indistinguishable from the CCP in the wider configuration of the Party-press relation in the PRC and it is not involved in the daily operation of those newspapers. There are no League cadres in their capacity as CYL functionaries censoring articles or writing editorials for a newspaper directed to League branches, members, or ordinary young people.

The kind and combination of control mechanisms that impose direct and indirect structural, political and commercial constrains on the free operation of the CYD and BYD, as well the opportunities created for greater autonomy by marketisation, are similar to other government newspapers. Zhao Yuezhi, analyzes in detail the challenges and opportunities faced by both CYD and BYD in the 1990s. The CYD, the “only outspoken central-level official paper in the country,” that maintains “a certain degree of autonomy from officials in the CYL” has managed to resist top-down control initiatives such as an appraisal system that links bonuses to endorsement of articles by officials, and even to openly criticize a former CYL secretary and a League appointed editor. The BYD tactfully used opportunities arising from marketisation, (namely advertising and the stock market), and its political capital with the Beijing municipal government to eventually become a commercial success. This success, however, came with the price of abandoning its aggressive reporting on social issues during the 1990s for the sake of appealing to the consumerist desires and elitist reflexes of the moneyed classes, effectively covering “the most valuable audience market niche”. What does all this mean for the newspaper’s relation with the League? Zhao, answering this question, quotes Zhang Yanping, the BYD’s editor, who when asked to describe the meaning of the inclusion of the word “youth” in the paper’s title replied that “[it] only speaks of our institutional origin.”

Classic censorship, job insecurity, weak legal protections for the freedom of speech, and the indirect promotion of self-censorship are top down dynamics confronted by journalists. Those that wish to expand autonomous reporting have to push the limits of the sphere of the party’s discursive domination by adopting strategies that also include the manipulation of the lofty ideals of the CCP’s own rhetoric and pronounced goals, a process that has been described as “bounded innovation”. The CYD for example, has established the “Legal System and Society” column, that urges...
viewers to report law violations or seek legal advice, while its online version has discussion forums and blogs by experts devoted to issues of legal protection. But, in a system that offers opportunities for personal career advancement and wealth while being clear about the severity of potential punishment and vague regarding the exact limits of journalistic autonomy, self-censorship is a choice frequently made by journalists. As an editor in BYD explained during an informal discussion regarding the impact of the CYL on a journalist’s career in the newspaper, it is not the CYL but the CCP that is in charge and one simply needs to avoid problems by not causing any (“bugei mafan jiu keyi le”).

The importance of the above remarks is to determine the expectations one can have when referring to “CYL newspapers.” In fact there is no such thing. Provincial or city League committees may have a weekly or monthly printed publication but these are small in circulation and are targeted internally to local League committees. Overall, the media affiliated with the League, such as the CYD and the BYD, operate under market principles and pressures in the political context set by the party-state, and with the actual or potential intervention of the central government and individual officials. The League’s affiliation serves as official patronage for media seeking sponsorship to operate, which is the reason why there are so many magazines and newspapers under the CYL’s umbrella, and for journalists who may gain access to officials and inside information. In return, League-related news and leaflets are routinely, yet not very frequently, published. Other than that, in the post-reform era the League does not possess autonomous communication machinery in the field of popular printed media.

Propaganda.cyl.cn

Although marketisation has in practice excluded the CYL from active involvement in the published press, the League has expanded its presence on the Internet in an attempt to open channels of communication with League members and youth in general. The fact that the CYL has chosen to have a separate identity on the Internet from that of its affiliated newspapers reasserts the previous argument that the CYL’s impact in its traditional media is limited. In the direction of establishing an online presence, the CYL has instructed committees at every level of the administration to establish websites (with separate domains or integrated into those of the local governments), while at the national level it has set up portals, such as youth.cn, that offer diversified content.

The CYL’s presence on the Internet exemplifies the “relevance” challenge of the League in two ways: first, the content of the local committees’ websites remains overtly political; second the portal youth.cn is a clumsy attempt to create a website with a more youthful
appearance that mirrors both the vagueness of the League’s understanding of “youth” as a social group and an inability to catch up with trends on the Internet. Regarding the first, a district-level committee member in Beijing who had also been involved in the effort to establish the CYL online presence at the local level, admitted that very few young people actually visit the website, which is overloaded with CYL announcements, propaganda banners and photos of study sessions, award ceremonies, activities and official visits. It can be assumed that the overtly “red” theme of League websites and the limited useful information available results in low levels of visits among users that are not interested in League-related news. The table below presents web traffic estimates from two online analytics software tools, showing that central, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong League committee websites\(^7\) fare very low both in Chinese website rankings (quantitative measurement) and average time spent on site and bounce\(^8\) rate (qualitative measurements).

Concerning the League’s central portal, in a country that has 485 million Internet users, 57% of which are under 30 years old\(^9\), the importance of the Internet for an organisation that aims at appealing to a youth audience is straightforward. Recognizing this, the CYL Central committee set up the portal youth.cn, replacing the previous cycnet.cn that was outdated in both form and content and had no interactive capacities. Cycnet was little more than a CYL news feed with articles on League activities, unsophisticated reports on youth issues, and general news. Compared to its predecessor, youth.cn, which has been running in its present form since 2010, demonstrates significant improvements. The website is less congested and with far fewer flashing communist symbols and waving flags. The content is more

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Est. Daily Visits: April – Oct. 2011(^{(1)})</th>
<th>Ranking in the PRC(^{(2)})</th>
<th>Average time on site(^{(2)})</th>
<th>Bounce %(^{(2)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>youth.cn</td>
<td>The CYL Youth portal</td>
<td>10.000-70.000</td>
<td>2.143</td>
<td>2:43 min</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gqt.org.cn</td>
<td>Communist Youth League</td>
<td>4.000 - 7.000</td>
<td>47.882</td>
<td>1:42 min</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bjyouth.gov.cn</td>
<td>Beijing Communist Youth League</td>
<td>1.500-4.000*</td>
<td>34.787 (China)</td>
<td>3:30 min</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shyouth.net</td>
<td>Guangdong Communist Youth League</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>114.335</td>
<td>3:36 min</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdcyl.org</td>
<td>Guangdong Communist Youth League</td>
<td>4.000-10.000**</td>
<td>58.707</td>
<td>1.57 min</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zgzyz.org.cn</td>
<td>China Volunteers portal</td>
<td>1000***</td>
<td>28.753</td>
<td>3:32 min</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ynet.com***</td>
<td>Beijing Youth Daily</td>
<td>700.000 – 1,000.000</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5:45 min</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The League’s presence online
Sources: (1) Double Click Ad planner by Google – Web traffic analytics Nov. 26, 2011; (2) Alexa.com – Web Information Company: research on Nov. 26, 2011
\(^{(*)}\)Ranking is calculated using a combination of average daily visitors and pageviews on the website from users from China over the past 3 months. Baidu is ranking number 1.
\(^{(\text{**})}\)Period Aug-Nov 2011
\(^{(***)}\)Available for March, April and October 2011 **available for Feb-Jun 2011 ***available for October 2010
\(^{****}\)Used here as a measure for comparison
diversified and better organised, with CYL and politics being assigned certain locations next to issues that range from society and finances to education, fashion and recreation, culture and online games. Apart from links to CYL affiliated organizations and projects, youth.cn also offers a blogging service (boke) and an online discussion forum (luntun).

Despite innovations in form and content, youth.cn exhibits many shortcomings that affect its popularity and consequently its capacity as a propaganda tool. Although its ranking is significantly higher than any other League affiliated website, youth.cn still fares in unsatisfactory levels as visit time is short and bounce rate very high. This shows that despite the fact that in Google and Baidu searches on youth issues youth.cn is relatively high on the results, its ability to maintain interest is low. In addition, the blogging service on offer has a small number of users while its highly categorised discussion forums in two years of operation have generated very modest participation. Moreover, despite being tempered to a “light red” outlook, the political content is still very much present, covering two out of the eight thematic categories and most of the advertising banners. Also, the articles repeat in an uncritical manner the official line on social and youth affairs, echoing official morality as only “sanctioned” subgroups of youth and rather politically correct issues are given voice. Similarly, reporting on social problems confronted by working class young people and children is presented only in relation to the League’s volunteer work, with no critical analysis of causes, no appraisal of government policies and no commenting function. The silence of youth.cn regarding the demolition of migrant children’s schools in Beijing in August 2011 is characteristic of the portals’ standing on controversial issues that spark criticism from Chinese media and netizens. In sum, despite its youthful cover the youth.cn approach to “youth affairs” is faithful to the CCP’s traditional conservative understanding of the term and does not contest the limits of official discourse.

Conclusion

The League’s failed attempts at communicating its message exemplifies the challenge of appealing to China’s young people in the context of marketisation and the pluralisation of public discourse. First, the impact of economic reforms has rationalized the operation of the CYL's printed media, thereby minimizing the League’s influence on their content. Second, the CYL's own online ventures are indicative of the organization’s adaptation efforts that tend to replicate institutional weaknesses rather than amending them. This comes at a cost, as the League’s limited ability to address public opinion on youth affairs and provide an online space for discussion is translated into reduced penetration of its target group of young netizens, thus showing that
not only political participation at the grassroots level, but also the League’s online presence is undermined by the same dependency on the language, aesthetics, conservative morality and political phobias of the current political structure of authority in China.

Notes:

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2. Ibid, p. 116-120
6. Interview with BYD Journalist, Beijing, September 2010
7. Sub-city level websites are not accessible by web traffic software due to their very low level of visits.
8. A “bounce” refers to a website visit during which only a single page is viewed and the user does not surf in the particular website looking for information etc. A high bounce rate (more than 35%) means that a website does not engage visitors to stay and use the website in search of information etc. However, results based on bounce rate should be contextualized according to the particular website and discussed along other traffic statistics. Cnn.com, for example has a high bounce rate of 48.9%, but it ranks 54 in the world. The high bounce rate is explained by the nature of the website that appears on web searches on current issues, that cause higher single-visits in the form of reading an article or viewing an online video and then exiting.
10. Youth.net has 700.000 registered users (unknown active), in comparison to 300 million of Sina weibo. The most popular topics in the public discussion forums are: “volunteers” exchange” (zhuyuanzhe jiaoliu) with 140.000 posts, “campus feelings” (xiaoyuan qinggan) with 76000 posts, and “study experience exchange” (xuexi jingyan jiaoliu) with 65000 posts.
The main objective of this article is to examine the needs for further development in Pearl River Delta and how the policies of the Hong Kong and other local governments can be adapted to enhance further developments between their two jurisdictions.

The Pearl River Delta plays a remarkable leading role and has an important strategic status in the overall effort of China to pursue economic and social development. The Pearl River Delta economic growth is intensifying the challenges of urban policy. Mass migration to the cities is leading to urban sprawl, the loss of arable land, and spiraling demand for energy and natural resources, as well as contributing to the challenge of providing social services. In term of competition against other inland cities, it will likely become even easier to convince labor-intensive manufacturers to move inland, as the rising costs currently affecting the Pearl River Delta region show no sign of slowing. It's time for policy makers to rethink their approach to these problems and to the direction that urbanization has taken so far. The economic interaction between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta region has become increasingly extensive since the onset of China's reform programme.

The absence of a regional identity causes one of the obstacles to greater interaction between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta region. Without such a sense, it is difficult to identify common
Pearl River Delta
interests, common goals or common challenges. A regional identity that includes both Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta region is vital to achieving the higher levels of interaction. One of the reasons for the success of the Pearl River Delta region has been the development of a strong division of various development at different levels. The variation of development has allowed different places to do what they do best and has contributed to the overall efficiency of the region. The governments within the region should understand that each part of the region has its own advantages and disadvantages, and that the region as a whole. The idea should be for each policy maker to develop what it can uniquely develop that contributes to local and regional prosperity. This type of development holds the opportunity of a region that is more than the sum of its parts, rather than one beset by too much imitation and duplication. In order to increase understanding within the region, exchanges, and cooperative projects of several types should be encouraged. Government to government exchanges, student exchanges, academic exchanges, social and cultural exchanges, and business exchanges could all serve to foster greater understanding within the region.

Regional transformation - In the medium term, the Pearl River Delta region is trying to move up in the value-added chain. Pearl River Delta has a reputation of being the world factory. However, this factory will move up its ladder due to the modernization progress. The Central Government launched over 500 projects with a total investment of RMB 1.2 trillion for Guangdong in the 12th Five-Year Plan. All these projects caused momentum movement toward industrial upgrading and the development of new industries. The Five-Year Plan also supports the development of a Shenzhen-Hong Kong Innovation Circle. Hong Kong further enhances its springboard position attracts overseas companies to set up research offices linking with local higher education institutions with the industrial parts are planned for Shenzhen, Qianhai, Zhuhai, Hengqin, Guangzhou, Nansha, and Hetao where provide relatively cheap labours. There will be a lot more innovation and technology injected into the manufacturing process, and the whole manufacturing sector will be upgraded. This tie in with the development of the regional economy. There will be more upstream manufacturing. There will also be a major transforming of the whole manufacturing sector within the region, with some of the more labour-intensive manufacturing cascading down into other parts of the region. There is room for co-operative project allocating suitable resources into different parts of the region due to the foreseeing regional variation. Following current trends, economic development will be dispersed with less-developed cities slowly catching up. Effective co-operative further development will be the dominant driver of healthy economic growth.

Migration - The latest development direction for the Pearl River Delta highlights the emergence of Guangzhou into a larger metropolitan area. This will not only help strengthen Guangzhou’s leading role in the region, but also boost the region’s capacity to become one of China’s key growth engines. One of the consequences of such development causes rapid migration. Rapid migration will contribute to GDP growth but also carries serious challenges. By my analysis, demand for energy in urban areas will more than double, and demand
for water will increase by at least 50 percent. Providing health care and education to new migrants will severely strain municipal finances. Urban sprawl, massive slums, pollution, and traffic gridlock are some of the problems cities around the world confront when infrastructure and municipal services fail to keep pace with the influx of people. From the city planning perspective, it will lead to strong residential and commercial space demand.

**Resources interaction** – As full implementation of reform and opening unfurled in the rest of the country, the advantages of the Pearl River Delta arising from various preferential policies have by and large been eroded. Coupled with this has been a whole series of difficult problems faced by the Pearl River Delta in its economic development, such as rising costs, land and energy shortages, environmental degradation, and labour shortages, etc. There have been signs of a slow down in the economic development of Pearl River Delta in the past four years, seen as an easing of the growth of manufacturing output, and rapid scaling back on foreign investment. The issue of future economic development of the Pearl River Delta has become a pressing concern for Hong Kong in formulating its development strategies.

**Housing related co-operation** - The Pearl River Delta region does provide an ample supply of land suitable for residential use at prices affordable to Hong Kong residents. An innovation approach is planning low-income houses for cross-boarder workers and low-income families due to the strong rising property market in Hong Kong and other developed cities around the region. The low-income housing will play a stronger role in securing housing for the population who earn low incomes and have housing difficulties. The idea will play an important role in housing security, and increase the capabilities of the employees to pay for their housing. The policy-based low-income housing system is designed to meet the basic housing needs of the low-income families with housing difficulties, and eligible new immigrants from rural areas.

**Regional co-operative network for environmental protection** – Environmental protection becomes one of the biggest concerns. Pollutions arising from the interconnected developments and human activities have inevitably posed increasing pressure on the environment. The Governments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Guangdong Province have teamed up to form the Hong Kong-Guangdong Joint Working Group on Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection to promote exchange and cooperation on the protection of environment in the Pearl River region. As part of the agreement that established the Regional Sustainable Environment Network, the two governments have worked individually various measures, including:

**Air** - Rigorous measures will be taken to reduce the total pollutant emission. The industrial distribution will be
scientifically planned, and it will be ensured that pollution will be spread along with industry transfer. Other emission control, including improving energy supply structure, installing fuel gas desulphurisation systems in thermal power plants, and stepping up control of emissions from industrial sources.

**Water** - Effective management and protection of the water environment in the Pearl River Estuary is no easy task due to its complicated natural settings and wide spatial coverage. The administration of water environment should be strengthened. Especially, the cooperation among Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao should be enhanced to jointly improve the integral water quality of the Pearl River Delta, reduce the overall water pollution, and advance the level of wastewater treatment.

**Welfare development** - Rapid social, economic and demographic changes in the region have put tremendous pressure on governments to reform their social welfare and social protection. We are seeing a growing acceptance and flexibility emerging among the political and civil institutions that allows for innovative, non-governmental programs to “step in” and begin to remedy some of the real social welfare. One particular area is the low-wage migrants workers in the rapidly developing Pearl River Delta. The Pearl River Delta (PRD) has experienced rapid industrialization and population growth in recent years. Much of this rapid growth is built on the backs of millions of rural migrant workers who leave their home communities to work in PRD factories. Although it is still difficult to predict the future of NGOs in China, both international pressures and the growing strength of indigenous NGOs continue to test the limits of activism and gather new momentum in playing a larger social role to alleviate the needs of marginalized and vulnerable migrant workers.

**Interconnections between People’s Life and Industrial Developments** - All industrial developments are driven by people's needs with a purpose of...
improving people’s life. So the Hong Kong and Guangdong authorities should be far-sighted and forward thinking in order to get a right understanding of people’s needs and preferences, anticipate future market changes, and lead industries to develop accordingly. As suggested by the author, the Pearl River Delta manufacturing industry should consider four major changes to its conventional export-oriented light industries: (1) Targeted development of pillar industries; (2) Development of high-tech industries; (3) Gradual improvement in industry supporting systems; and (4) Strengthening and upgrading professional townships. Pearl River Delta manufacturing industry will enter a new era of restructuring, consolidation, and upgrading. Many industrial activities are getting improved with a high degree of flexibility, high technology content and large added value. As the result, the general direction for the industrial development will be highly internationalised, totally open and highly competitive.

Services industries empowerment with further Economic Integration - Looking forward to the next thirty years, the region will pursue closer integration in services industries. That is to say, many economies will undergo another structural rationalisation process that centres on services industries. For example, Guangdong enjoys comparative advantages in industries with a large number of manufacturing clusters and stronger technological capability. Moreover, Guangdong’s efforts in fostering a host of tertiary industries with great potential, such as logistics, trade and commerce, exhibition and professional services, are also beginning to pay off. Nevertheless, after 30 years of rapid development, Guangdong clearly understands that in order to keep on innovating and creating higher values, it must develop advanced production-oriented services industries and build itself into a national centre of services industries catering for the national market.

Infrastructure – One of the most important regional planning decisions facing the Pearl River Delta is its inter-regional mobility. A metropolitan region can only maintain economic innovation and vitality when free movement reaches a desirable level. The region should elevate the level of coordinated construction of urban and rural infrastructures. The construction of rural infrastructure for modern logistics accelerating the expansion of urban trading companies into rural areas will be encouraged, and the system of urban-rural business chains will be improved. For most urbanized cities such as Hong Kong, its public infrastructural facilities are characterized by developed road transport networks, rapid development in rail transport, successful positioning as an aviation hub in the Asia-Pacific region, establishes cluster of world-class ports, and well-connected ports of entry and cross boundary infrastructural facilities. According to planning, an integrated transportation network with an emphasis on rail will be established in the Pearl River Delta. By 2030, rail transport in the...
major cities will be linked up seamlessly with intercity railways, and all large townships will be within one hour’s driving distance.

**Urbanization** - In the context of rapid urbanization, there is an eminent trend for cities to integrate and merge for further prosperity in the Pearl River Delta. Although the Pearl River Delta is rapidly urbanizing in terms of population structure and land use, productive and efficient megalopolises have not yet emerged because the flow of labour, goods, information and capital are still not completely free between the cities and towns within the urban system. One of the most serious current problems of urbanization in the region is mainly reflected by urban-rural relations. As the process of structural transformation growing out to the traditional rural economy, it creates simultaneously a large demand for rural labour. The current situation imbalanced development prohibits the rural-urban relations. The policy of segregating urban and rural areas in the region weakens the influence on rural urbanization. Under the current system, supply-demand contradictions in urban employment emerged. The root of the problem is the absence of market adjustment and the market is not being administered by a
central body lacking multi-city cooperation.

The urbanization has a strong spill-over effect. An increase in urbanization level means increasing purchasing power and generating a comparatively large consumption market for both domestic and imported goods that demand for higher-level retail services and logistics business. It has a strong direct impact on job creation.

In accordance with the general requirements for coordinated planning, industrial distribution, infrastructure construction, and public services of urban areas, the Pearl River Delta will vigorously push forward the construction of socialist new countryside, improve the functions of cities, and take the lead in forming a new pattern of coordinated urban and rural development. The Pearl River Delta should strengthen the coordinated planning of the urban and rural spaces for non-agricultural use, optimize the industrial structure of the rural areas, and integrate the industrial development of urban-rural areas. The Pearl River Delta should explore the new system for coordinating the planning, construction, and administration of urban and rural areas, and uplift the levels of urban and rural planning, construction, and administration.

**Suggested effective implementation framework** - Pearl River Delta leaders should restructure the region's governments into a regional administrative body which have the authority to govern effectively from a regional perspective. The Pearl River Delta regional cooperation should be included in the national strategy for regional coordinative development. The eastern, central and western region should act together with three main directions: 1) facilitate the mutual enhancement, 2) beneficial interaction, and 3) coordinative development. In fact, a regional government, if devised properly, would best serve the long-term physical and social development of the region. All local governments should enhance coordination and cooperation in speeding up the construction of inter-province passages, and form a comprehensive transportation network with the Pearl River Delta as the core and connecting the fringe areas. From the policy perspective, they should establish platforms for the regional cooperation on technology, human resources, and barrier-free tourism zones undertaking cooperation on science and technology, talent, intellectual property protection, and tourism. Regional development relies heavily on the relationship and interaction, cooperation or competition, between the governments, businesses and civil societies in Pearl River Delta. The challenge here would be to devise a regional structure that is responsive, effective, transparent, and accountable to the people. Finally, there are severe fluctuations for the further development. A conceptual framework is suggested as shown below:

**Conceptual implementation framework**

After 30 years of rapid development, Guangdong clearly understands that in order to keep on innovating and creating higher values, it must develop advanced production-oriented services industries and build itself into a national centre of services industries catering for the national market.
The Pearl River Delta region is entering a deep transformation and new economic growth drivers will be formed. The nature of the region’s growth will be dramatically different over the next 20 years. An appropriate co-operation policy framework is important influencing the pattern of further regional development. Current policy is not the only factor that will influence the potential outcome for the regional development. New policies should address both the national and local levels.

Various projects should go ahead including the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, Hong Kong-Shenzhen Airport Rail Link and the boundary control point at Liantang-Heung Yuen Wai. It helps to facilitate the flow of productive factors such as capital, technology, talent, information, and resources, and promote regional cooperation regarding industries.

Note:
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Today’s strategic environment provides boundless space for both the international and regional actors to understand, share and cooperate with each other in order to protect and secure their own national interest and maintain strategic stability within their own region. Every nation in the international affairs has its own strategic significance against another in terms of its strategic location for economic and military means. However, the geostrategic significance of one nation remains a threat to another nation’s own interest and stability within its region.

Similar is the case of Israel which is surrounded by its major neighbouring nations as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon which are constantly in the state of unrest due to various regional and inter-state conflicts in the Arab world. This situation also resembles similar for India with countries as Pakistan, Tibet, Nepal, Srilanka, which remain burning due to its inter-state, inter-religious, political unrest, ethnic conflicts, traditional and non-traditional security threats as reported on the world conflict database, and by and large remain serious concerns to India’s national interest.

In this context, the relationship between the two major players in the strategic calculus is of utmost concern considering the geostrategic significance of the two countries.

**Historical background**

Since, India’s independence post 1947, there was no formal relationship with Israel. India recognized the state of Israel in 1950, two years after its establishment in 1948. However, India’s pro-Arab attitude and its strong commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which created rift and division between these two countries. In 1992 a significant diplomatic change occurred, when India and Israel established full diplomatic relations which reached new heights.
under the successive Indian Governments headed by BJP (1998-2004).

The relationship with Israel is purely based on the cooperation in the field of defence and security matters. The strategic partnership with Israel presupposes a broad understanding of mutual security concern that is common to the interest for both nations. The end of Cold war created a breathing space for major rising powers around the globe to choose partners of common interest and concern for each other. So was the case of Israel which appeared to be more appealing to India's foreign policy. There were four major causes that lead to the building of the strategic partnership from both sides. Firstly, India's immediate concern in post soviet disintegration was to maintain its defence and technological needs updated. Whereas Israel ambition was to gain military superiority in the Arab world by gaining access in South Asian region. Secondly, it was also important for India to overcome the propaganda unleashed by Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Thirdly, in case of Israel which recognised India's immediate needs in near future are importing of sophisticated technological weapons and armaments. Lastly, Israel also realised India's concern to maintain peace in the Arab world. On these parameters it became imperative for India to choose Israel as its leading arms exporter for military supplies, having not forgotten Israel assistance to provide immediate help to India during war in 1962 and 1965 with China and Pakistan respectively. India helped Israel during the 1967 Middle Eastern conflict, by covertly sending military equipment to Israel. Diplomatic exchange between the two countries on diverse subjects related to gathering of intelligence input through secret channels, military to military exchange programme, cooperation in the field of science and technology as well as space and nuclear science where discussed and shared at top levels. However, most of the visits remain unclassified in local media reports due to India's political clashes.

Commonalities of interest

The major area of concern that remains compounded to both countries had become the milestone for building the relationship between the two in the area of defence and security cooperation. In
case of Israel, the major threat emanating out from its immediate neighbourhood Iran due to its nuclear programme and support for terrorist groups, where as India’s remains concerned with the Pakistan nuclear arsenal and terrorist activities based in Pakistan. Both countries are pursuing their common hegemonic agendas of ‘Greater Israel’ and ‘Akhand Bharat’, since their inception. Both countries have an oppressive attitude and hostility towards their neighbors and, both have forcibly occupied areas beyond their geographical borders. The strategic partnership remains more intact due to Israel consistent assistance to India and its concern to maintain peace and stability in South Asia, which can be reflected in the Afghanistan war, the kargil crisis of 1999, the attack on the Indian parliament, the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. In all these major turmoil Israel provided assistance at diplomatic, economic and more vital was the intelligence inputs to Indian government. It was provided bulk of proposal floating in the ministry of defence post 26/11 to upgrade its special forces the NSG and the defence forces with high-tech cutting edge technologically sophisticated weapons and equipments.

The major concern for both countries is its immediate neighbours Pakistan and Iran illegal nuclear arsenal and its proliferation in the hands of the terrorists. It was in this respect that the Indian national security advisor, Brajesh Mishra, outlined a proposal in a speech to the American Jewish Committee in Washington in May 2003 that India, Israel, and the United States should unite to combat the common threat of Islamic fundamentalism. He argued that democratic nations that face the menace of international terrorism should form a “viable alliance” and develop multilateral mechanisms to counter this menace.

**Cooperation in the field of defence and security**

Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao’s decision in January 1992 to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel was driven by the potential for security cooperation. Israel offered India both investment and technical cooperation in matters related to military aircraft, reverse engineering, and the upgrading of weapons systems. In 1996, India purchased a sophisticated Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation from Israel, which was installed at the Jamnagar air base. The same year, a $10 million deal was made to provide two Dvora MK-2 patrol boats for the Indian Navy. During the 1990s, the Israeli firm Elta also won a multi-million dollar contract to upgrade the avionics on India’s MiG-21 fighters. Growing defense relations were further solidified by Israel’s willingness to supply arms—including ordnance, laser-guided bombs, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—during the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. In addition, India began to obtain a large number of small arms and weapons systems from Israel, eventually including airborne early warning systems. New Delhi sent its first military attaché to Israel in 1997, indicating a growing military dimension in bilateral relations. The approximate total value of the weapons trade over the
The past decade is estimated at around $10 billion. With the delivery of the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), equipped on Russian-built Ilyushin II-76s, in May 2009 and March 2010, Israel has emerged as one of the largest arms exporters to India.[20] An agreement for these weapons systems was signed in March 2004 at an impressive cost of $1.1 billion. Aerospace Industries has signed a four-year, $1.1 billion deal with India for aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence systems, a major boost for the Jewish state’s high-tech defense sector in an increasingly export-driven global market. Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI) won a $1.1 billion deal with the Indian navy in 2009 to provide advanced Barak-8 tactical air-defense missile systems for its warships. The Phalcon-equipped AWACS has proved to be a great force-multiplier for the IAF, being able to provide real-time intelligence, and command and control needed to attain and maintain air superiority in selected airspace over the combat zone and to enable surveillance deep inside enemy territory.

India and Israel have agreed to launch a long-term joint programme worth USD 10 million annually to facilitate research and academic activities benefiting them in areas like renewable and sustainable energies, bio-medical sciences and cyber-security.

Cooperation in the field of Counter Terrorism

The common threat to both countries is the rise of Islamic Radicalism, the threat from criminals and terrorists linkages. India’s relationship with Israel on counter terrorism is based even before the major events that have taken place post 9/11 and 26/11. It is important to quote that, India is one of the 39 countries with whom Israel has signed “secret cooperative agreements” to prevent information leaks from joint security projects. Besides of India’s strong commitment for Arab cause, she established secret military and intelligence links with Israel as early as 1960.

India and Israel not only exchange crucial intelligence information on Islamist terrorist groups but Israel is also helping India to fight terrorism in Kashmir by providing important logistical
support such as specialized surveillance equipment, cooperation in intelligence gathering, joint exercises, and cooperation to stop money laundering and terror funding. The level of intelligence cooperation between India and Israel may be even more extensive than between India and the United States. The tactics used by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the guerrilla and urban warfare it wages against Palestinian terror in the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be fruitfully adopted by the Indian security forces in countering insurgency. These tactics have even been found useful by the U.S. forces in Iraq who had to learn IDF strategy of urban warfare to tackle growing insurgency. The Israel security forces have also trained the Indian counterpart defence forces on handling of IED, training elite forces commandos in handling terrorist attacks both post and pre-operations there by reducing civilian casualties, followed by which the Maharashtra government in 2009 had send its troops for training for hands-on experience.

**The Space Cooperation**

In January 2008, India successfully launched an Israeli spy satellite “TecSar” developed by IAI, forging a strategic partnership in the space sector. It was Israel’s first satellite to be launched by India. On 17 April 2009, India successfully launched an Israeli-built RISAT 2 or radar imaging spy-satellite. In March 2009, Israel overtook Russia as India’s number one defence partner, when both sides signed a US$ 1.4 billion deal for the acquisition of shore-based and sea borne anti-missile air defence system. During the Kargil War, it supplied India with UAVs for high altitude surveillance and laser-guided systems within 24 hours.

**The Constraint in the Relationship**

Every strategic partnership of India with major rising powers in the international system has US as a factor attached to its periphery. The case is also true where; US interests sometimes constrain Indo-Israeli defense cooperation with regard to weapons and technology transfer. In 2003, the US blocked negotiations between India and Israel on the sale of Israel’s Arrow anti-missile defense system. Israel sold the Green Pine missile-detector radar system, manufactured by Elta, but New Delhi’s request to obtain the full Arrow system was rejected due to United States opposition. Such actions not only strain the relationship between India and Israel at bilateral level but also impinge on Israel’s arms sale to India’s. However, with increase in India’s defence budget and its requirements to tackle the future asymmetric challenges, its dependency and cooperation with Israel will be of significant importance for research. However, US have now realised India’s concern to build up its military capability both at land and airborne due to which it has given clearance to Israel’s delivery of Phalcon reconnaissance aircraft to India, in marked contrast to Washington’s vigorous opposition to supplying them to China in 1998.

Another factor originating is India’s close and historical relationship with Iran. India’s close military and defence cooperation and its future energy security needs to meet its ever
increasing yearn for oil and petroleum, makes India dependent on Iran in the coming decades for economically and militarily. Israel views the Iranian threat very seriously while for India, Iran is a partner, and an ideological partner that takes a negative view of American hegemony.

Conclusion

The final question that looms is whether the partnership between India and Israel is truly 'strategic'? Most of the analyst examines the relationship between the two countries remains strategic only when the partnership goes beyond the bilateral relationship with common understanding and shared values to protect and secure their interest against the global challenges. India and Israel have bases of its cooperation merely in terms of security and defence cooperation. Both countries look forward to peace and stability within their own region as the Arab world for Israel and the South Asia for India. Both countries by now must have realised the geo-strategic importance of the region with major conflict and war that have taken place since its independence.

Israel in the coming decades will definitely be one of the top arms exporter in the world to India as well a major reliable partner due to its major advantages that comes from its sales of arms and weapons with transfer of technology. United States will continue to remain a key factor in India- Israel relationship, as US interest in South Asia, primarily to counter Chinese presence and bring stability and peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan, US will continue to maintain its presence both politically and militarily within the region. However, US must also remember that in order to confront the menace of Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia, as stated by the former National security advisor of India, Brajesh Mishra that ‘US and Israel must unite to fight against this crisis. It is also necessary for Indian diplomats to remain realistic in dealing with problems confronting between Israel and Iran and remain an active player diplomatically to maintain analogous relationship with both the nations. In terms of sharing of intelligence inputs on counter terrorism, it is not practically possible for India to follow Israel’s model of countering terrorism as it did in Lebanon and Gaza, but India can definitely become accustomed and learn its strategic and tactics to tackle the future threat coming by the use of radiological and biological weapons, for which Israeli forces are the best equipped and highly trained unites to combat such disasters. Lastly, close military to military exchange, intelligence exchange and sharing of crucial information to counter terrorists and criminal linkages will remain major areas of interest for both the countries. India readiness to develop its own indigenous weapons and arms industry as predicated by most of the analyst may become productive if Israeli defence industry comes with substantial collaborative projects to foster India’s growing defence industry needs in the 21st century.

Note:

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In 1990s, due to the lack of economic independence, Russia was not able to play an active role in international affairs. The country was highly dependent on donations from the United States and Europe. Oil production had dropped by 50% after the collapse of communism. As much as Russia was willing to repair the damages of the past, it lacked a strategic vision for future.

With Putin’s rise to power, Russia saw a dramatically different approach to its relations with the West. Putin, an ambitious man, strived to give Russia its one-time hegemonic position. Referring to Russia, “A voice to be heard and a presence to be reckoned with” are kind of statements reflecting Putin’s foreign policy rhetoric.

In his interview published on February 27, 2012, in RIA Novosti, Vladimir Putin stated:

“Our foreign policy objectives are strategic in nature and are not based on opportunistic considerations. They reflect Russia’s unique role on the world political map as well as its role in history and in the development of civilization.”

The new Foreign Policy Concept, approved by Medvedev in 2008, outlines the main points of Russian foreign policy priorities. In regards to the international economic and environmental cooperation, the Russian Federation:

♦ “seeks maximum benefit and minimizes risks in the process of further integration of Russia in the world economy taking into account the need to ensure economic, energy and food security of the country;

♦ created favorable political conditions for diversifying Russia’s presence in the world markets through expanding the export range and geography of foreign economic and investment links of Russia;
takes trade policy measures to protect interests of the Russian Federation in accordance with international rules and counteracts trade and political measures of foreign States encroaching upon the rights of the Russian Federation and Russian enterprises;

- provides state support to Russian enterprises and companies in getting access to new markets and in developing traditional markets, counteracts discrimination of national investors and exporters, especially in the markets of high-tech products and goods of high level of procession;

- assists in drawing foreign investments in science-intensive and other priority areas of the Russian economy;

- continues to build up and modernize the capacity of the fuel and energy industry to support its reputation of a responsible partner in the energy markets, while ensuring sustainable development of its economy and contributing to the maintenance of balanced world energy markets;

- strengthens strategic partnership with the leading producers of energy resources, develops active dialogue with consuming countries and transit countries on the basis of the principles of energy security enshrined in the final documents of the Saint Petersburg G8 Summit in 2006, assuming that measures being taken to guarantee reliability of energy supplies should be consistently supported by forthcoming activities aimed at ensuring stability of demand and secure transit;

- actively employs possibilities of regional economic and financial organizations to protect interests of the Russian Federation in the corresponding regions, paying special attention to the activities of organizations and institutions that contribute to strengthening of integration processes in the CIS space;

- in accordance with the norms of international law, uses all available economic leverage, resources and competitive advantages to protect its national interests.”

The same concept recognizes the primacy of national interests as the basis for all foreign policy decisions and states that Russia seeks to cooperate on an equal ground, as an equal partner, in accordance with the international law.

Russian foreign policy has been substantially economized. Russian
The economy became increasingly integrated into the world market. The backbone of this integration has been oil and gas exports that augmented budget revenues and helped the country regain its status of hegemony.

“Russian foreign policy has been consistent in pursuing its main realist interests: maximization of power and security as well as maximization of utilities—military and economic capabilities—vis-à-vis the West, but also with the help of the West. Russia is also aiming at maximizing prestige and at receiving Western recognition as a great power.”

As Russia was going through a period of self-definition after the end of the Cold War, leading political analysts and politicians were struggling to give clearer contours to foreign policy analysis. The debate inspired by the ideologies of the elite groups is one among the supporters of nationalism, Eurasianism, centrism and Atlanticism. Western analysts assess Putin’s foreign policy track as one balanced between Eurasianism and Atlanticism, which is centrism, while they view Medvedev as a clear Atlanticist.

According to Jeffrey Mankoff, adjunct fellow with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program,

“Under Medvedev, Moscow has elaborated a new framework governing relations with the West, one that continues to respect Russia’s self-proclaimed position as one pole in a multipolar world order but at the same time pursues a high degree of economic integration with Western states and institutions. The watchword for Medvedev’s approach is modernization, which in the Russian context means overcoming the country’s dependence on energy as the foundation of Russia’s economy and international influence.”

Although Russian government has in the past held fields of strategic importance, such as energy sector, under tight government control, the event that marked the official linkage of Kremlin’s foreign policy and energy was the 2005 purchase by the government of Gazprom’s control shares. Gazprom is the leading company in Russia and the largest natural gas extractor in the world. It is responsible for exploration, production, transmission, storage, processing and marketing of gas for local and international consumers. The Russian government owns 50.02% of the company. It is controlled by Kremlin appointees, which is why the line between the company and the Russian state is often blurry. A good example is the one of Dmitri Medvedev himself, who prior to being elected as President served as Gazprom’s chairman of the board. Exerting close control over company’s activities ensures that the latter’s commercial interests will also benefit the state’s foreign policy.

Gazprom is currently chaired by Alexei Miller, who served at the Saint Petersburg Mayor’s Office, Committee for External Relations in early ’90s, headed by Vladimir Putin during the...
same period of time. The company is growing fast, expanding both to the East and to the West simultaneously. About half of Gazprom’s revenues come from sales to the EU, which the former sees as an issue. For this reason, the Shtokman field that is currently being developed might supply Asian consumers, namely China and Japan, with Russian gas. The Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok natural gas pipeline, presently supplying local consumers, might also become part of an international export route transporting Russian gas to China, South Korea and Japan.

Over the years, Russian government has made sure the state has the ability to control energy companies, who would have to work in the interests of the government. The term currently applied to those companies is that of ‘natural monopoly entities’. The 1995 law of the Russian Federation No. 147-Fz, defines natural monopolies in the following way:

“natural monopoly shall mean the state of the commodity market in which demand is more effectively satisfied when due to technological peculiarities of production there is no competition (due to substantial reduction of the production cost per unit of commodity as a result of increasing output), and in which commodities manufactured by natural monopoly entities cannot be substituted with other commodities in the market, thus causing the demand in the given commodity market to be less responsive to changes in price compared to the demand for other types of commodities.”

The state has purchased controlling shares in many of them. Lukoil, Russia’s largest oil company and the second largest private company in the world in terms of reserves, would be an exception, since it is privately owned and presided by Vagit Alekperov, an Azerbaijani businessman, who served as deputy minister of Oil and Gas Industry in the early ’90s.

The case most reflective of how much influence Russian state exerts in the energy sphere is YUKOS affair. YUKOS was the major Russian oil company, controlled by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was convicted of fraud and sent to prison in 2003. It consisted of several enterprises, the largest of which, Yuganskneftegas, was
transferred to the state-controlled Rosneft, after YUKOS went bankrupt.

In a report published on November 7, 2003, in the Heritage Foundation, Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, stated:

“YUKOS has become Russia’s most successful oil company. Just a month ago, it merged with Sibneft to form the world’s fourth largest oil company. It introduced western accounting standards and management, pioneered shipping Russian oil to the US market, and launched a private consortium to build a pipeline from western Siberia to the arctic port of Murmansk. It has also bought hundreds of millions of dollars worth of US oil equipment. Over the years, YUKOS paid billions of dollars in taxes and gave hundreds of millions to charity. It was also the company most independent from the government.”

Rosneft, Russian largest oil producer, focuses on the exploration, production and marketing of oil and oil products. It belongs to the state by 75.16% and comprises twelve enterprises, which produce oil in Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, Timan-Pechora, Central Russia, the southern part of European Russia and in the Russian Far East. In 2010, Rosneft produced 847.41 th. Barrels of oil. Rosneft has recently gained access to the North American energy resources by signing a deal with Exxon Mobil creating a joint venture. This important step forward won Rosneft an opportunity to develop seven projects in North America, of which the former chose three to start with - in West Texas, the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and in Canada’s province of Alberta.

Gazprom Neft is another major oil company in Russia. It is involved both in upstream and downstream activities. The Gazprom Neft Group consists of seventy oil producing, refining and marketing companies in Russia, CIS and non-CIS countries. It was created as a result of the purchase by Gazprom of Sibneft in 2005. In 2006, the company was renamed Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft. In 2011, the latter’s income accounted for $5.347 billion, which is a 70.6% increase compared to the previous year. Mounting oil prices, increase in extraction and processing value, reportedly explain this growth in financials.

Rosneft, Russian largest oil producer, focuses on the exploration, production and marketing of oil and oil products. It belongs to the state by 75.16%...

Transneft, a company responsible for national oil pipelines, is also owned by the state. The company’s website lists two recently realized, six current and three future projects. Its total network length accounts for 50,000 km, making it the owner of the largest pipeline system in the world. Transneft comprises twenty two enterprises. In 2007, Russian parliament gave Gazprom and Transneft the right to establish armed units to patrol the pipelines. The companies reportedly needed military protection against possible attacks.

Today, Russia’s energy empire is actively expanding into foreign markets, by acquiring assets in the leading energy
firms of Europe. For instance, in 2011 Gazprom took possession of 50% stake in Belarus' national gas pipeline operator, Beltransgaz. Another example is Czech RSP Energy, electricity and natural gas company, in which Gazprom acquired 51% last year. The latter could reportedly become co-owner of a transportation company soon to be set up in Lithuania. According to Turkish media, Gazprom is also interested in entering Turkish electricity market. The company's buyout of German energy provider Envacom comes during the same period. Gazprom Neft has recently announced it might buy a stake in Hellenic Petroleum, which is looking for buyers of its 35.5% stake.

At this rate, Russia is unlikely to easily leave the European market and focus on other regions instead. As much as the state is willing to rid itself of the excessive dependence on Europe, the continent will remain crucial for Russian foreign energy policy in the mid to long-term. Some analysts argue that low gas prices in the United States might have an impact on Russia's relations with its European partners: Russia's commercial partners might demand a decrease in prices on commodities. However, according to Vitaliy Mihalchuk from “Investcafe” agency, there's no such immediate risk.

Notes:
* Laila Mahdiyeva holds an M.A degree in European and Mediterranean Studies, with concentration in European politics and policy from New York University.


3. President of Russia, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (July 12, 2008).

4. Elena Kropatcheva, “Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 3, Issue 1 (January


About the

CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis

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Our dear Mother Russia is sick and dying. Power remains as centralized as ever, and the public is still unable to rely on this centrality for security and health benefits. The inability of the Russian government to address the issues surrounding the health of its country has resulted in an unprecedented health crisis never seen before in a literate, urbanized society during peacetime. The explosion of the HIV/AIDS virus, tuberculosis, cardiovascular disease, the growing problem of alcoholism, and the decrease in the birth rate remain widely overlooked by Kremlin—an ignorance that is sure to have catastrophic affects on Russia’s near future. The combination of the high death rate and low birth rate, as well as the low life expectancy of the Russian people has resulted in a steep population decline, and the Russian populace has been labeled as the “disappearing population.”

Almost in direct contrast to the looming effects of the population crisis, the Russian government has defined very specific and ambitious goals for the country. In 2007, Moscow declared that it aims to achieve and maintain an average annual economic growth of 7% per year. This growth will potentially quadruple Russia’s GDP and place the nation as the fifth largest economy in the world by 2020. However, unless the Russian government begins to address the factors causing the population decline, Kremlin’s economic goals will not only become unachievable but will experience a setback, and the country’s role as a key player in the world will diminish.

One of the biggest causes of the decline in population is the shift in family dynamics away from marriage, and the corresponding decrease in child birth. Russia is experiencing a revolution in family values with a significant decrease in the number of couples choosing to get married.
married, and a significant increase in divorce. Since the 1990s, more women have opted for cohabitation before marriage, and often forgone marriage altogether.\(^3\)

In addition to the decline in marriage rates, there is a significant decline in women choosing to have children. The lack of financial security is forcing many Russian women to choose abortion instead of motherhood. Andrei Akopyan, the head doctor at a Moscow reproduction and family planning clinic, predicts that the number of abortions will increase by approximately 11\%, which he attributes to current economic woes. In fact, based on results from the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, VCIOM, only 5\% of women polled in November 2008 are planning to become pregnant in the next two years.\(^4\) The numbers become even more desperate when considering the rising number of unhealthy babies being born. Only 30\% of children born in Russia are healthy; 50\% of newborns lack either iodine or calcium, the leading causes of brittle bones and mental retardation;\(^5\) seven in every ten newborns suffer from some kind of disorder; and one in twelve babies is born underweight.\(^6\)

Those women who do choose to give birth face many risks, from losing a job to dying in childbirth. According to the World Health Organization, a Russian woman is six times more likely to die in childbirth than a German woman.\(^7\) Combined with the high chance of giving birth to an unhealthy child and the unstable finances of the majority of the population, it is no wonder the birth rate has decreased.

The crisis only worsens as the death rate (16.06 per one thousand) continues to outnumber the birth rate (11.03 per one thousand). One of the dominant and rising killers is the HIV/AIDS virus. According to 2007 estimates, approximately 940,000 Russian citizens, or 1.1\% of the population, are living with HIV/AIDS and the number is increasing exponentially.\(^8\) Most unfortunate, 80\% of the population that will die from the disease will be between 25 and 39 years of age—the prime age for family formation and labor production.\(^9\) In addition, Russia is facing a quickly increasing rise in tuberculosis cases, which nearly quadrupled in the 15-to-17-year-old age group.
between 1989 and 2002. The death rate from cardiovascular disease is four times, and the death rate from accidents, injuries, homicides, suicides, and other “external causes,” is five times higher than that of the European Union.

Majority of these health problems and deaths are linked to the biggest problem facing Russia today: alcoholism. Alcoholism or alcohol dependency is a significant factor in two-thirds of deaths for men under the age of 55, given the life expectancy for Russian men is about 61.5 years. Russian women fare slightly better with a life expectancy of 73.9 years. The Russian government is almost blissfully unaware of the health crisis afflicting its citizens; does not have accurate data on the number of people suffering from the major diseases; and is doing very little to curb this horrifying death trend.

Regardless of whether it is a genuine lack of knowledge or an unwillingness to deal with the problem, the Russian government immediately needs to begin addressing necessary measurement for the prevention of the declining population. Otherwise, it will face significant consequences reversing its economic progress and jeopardizing its current influence over the rest of the world. A major consequence of a declining population is the declining labor force. Since 1992, the Russian population has decreased by more than twelve million, and this trend is expected to get worse. If the quality of healthcare in Russia is not improved and the Russian populace does not become more aware of the diseases, the increasing death rate will leave a titanic vacancy in the workforce diminishing chances for recovery.

Such a significant health crisis affects the economy in three distinct ways. First, studies show that each person suffering from a chronic disease in a household reduces that household’s spending on non-health goods by 5% and decreases income by 4.8%. In Russia, where a large portion of the population is suffering from one chronic disease or another, these percentages signify a momentous loss to not only per capita output but also a decrease in consumer spending—both factors are detrimental to the health of an economy. Second, such a high death rate makes it unprofitable to invest in higher education and/or additional training for the workforce, both of which are essential to the continued growth of a healthy economy. Third, significant population decline could potentially affect international investors decision to invest. Deutsche Bank economist, Markus Jaeger, explained this best when he said, “Where will the investor chose to invest? In India or China, where the income per capita grows together with the population or in Russia, where the income per capita is growing, but the consumer market is shrinking.” Taking these three factors into account, it is not a surprise that Russia’s economy is estimated to lose $400 billion dollars in the next 20 years.

The economy will not be the only issue Kremlin will have to confront if it decides
to ignore the declining population. A second, equally important, consequence will be the depletion of able-bodied personnel to fill the ranks of Russia’s immense military resulting in a weakening of the defense system and political stability. The historically great Russian military will see a significant decrease in healthy, educated, and competent conscripts to fulfill the ambitious goals of Putin and his cabinet. In 2004, only 43% of those joining the navy finished high school and only 13% received higher education degrees. While the rest of the world is relying on more technologically advanced and intelligence focused security measures, Russian army will grow weaker as less and less of those enrolled are skillful enough to learn to operate the advanced computers, weapons, and other technologies necessary to protect the country in an ever advancing world.

To begin reversing the economic and security crisis looming at Kremlin’s door, the Russian government needs to focus its attention on the depopulation crisis ravaging the country. One of the major concerns needs to be the reformation of the health care system to provide Russian citizens with widespread, easily available, and welcoming public health services. Supplemented with a massive public awareness campaign providing information on HIV/AIDS, cardiovascular disease, tuberculosis, and alcoholism, these reforms could begin to reverse the trends of the diseased ridden nation and to grant hope to the people of a once proud country. In addition, the government should continue to provide incentives for couples to form family
units. Starting in 2006, Putin's government launched a successful campaign to increase the birthrate; doing everything from offering cash payments to new parents to putting up pro-family posters in public spaces. While there has been an increase in births, it is unlikely to continue if potential parents do not feel that they are able to support a family. To create sustainable economic growth, the Russian government needs to implement measures to create jobs and economic stability for the Russian people. Only by refocusing on the people—their health, well-being, and sense of stability—can Kremlin reverse the trend of the “disappearing population,” continue the growth of its economy, and remain an influential power in the world.

Notes:
* Alina A. Smyslova is a Master of International Affairs Candidate at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

3. Eberstadt, 53.
7. Eberstadt, 53.
11. Eberstadt, 56.
15. Eberstadt, 56.
17. Nidecker.
18. “A sickening state”, 86.
19. Ertelet.
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It was a historical day that Bacha Khan (1890 - 1988) was born in the strategic tall mountains of Pashtun land located on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bacha Khan is also known as, Abdul Ghafar Khan, Fakhr-e-Afghan, non-violent Muslim soldier of Islam and a man to match his mountains. When Bacha Khan was died, flags were lowered in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India because the people of these countries have respect for his services to earn freedom.

Khan is standing tall in the line of thefinniest leaders of the world such as Mahatma Gandhi, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Martin Luther King and Nelsen Mandela in many aspects. Bacha Khan’s exclusivity was eminent due to the fact that he was born and raised in the mountainous region of Pashtun land that was agrarian and encountered with family and tribal feuds. Bacha Khan was sanded to see such difficulties and hardships.

The 6'5"charismatic Khan stood up to overcome it through community mobilization, education, and social and economic reforms. He raised over 100,000 strong nonviolent army of men, women, and youth — the Khudai Khidmatgars, or servants of God — drawn from the multi-ethnic traditions of the subcontinent (currently India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and Afghanistan. These servants of God included the diverse cultures, ethnicities, nationalities and religions.
such as Muslims, as well as Hindus, Christians, Parsees, Sikhs, and Buddhists. They came together in the cause of peace, social justice, religious tolerance, freedom and human dignity for all.

Bacha Khan was beaten, jailed, and exiled by the British rulers of United India because they thought that his reforms may be converted into a freedom movement if he is allowed to reform his people. When his reforms were blocked, his servants of God movement joined hands with Indian National Congress to raise a voice for their victimization. And there they started struggle for the freedom of India from the British rulers.

Khan mentored his nonviolent army to internalize the nonviolence struggle and prepared them to peacefully protest against the British rule to get India free. The British Army beat the Khudai Khidmatgars and dragged them in the streets, removed their clothes and humiliated them in front of their mothers and sisters but they did not respond with violence. Bacha Khan writes in his autobiography *Zama Zhwand au Jaddo Jehad* (My Life and Struggle) that “violence promotes dislike and hatred. Anyone can do violence but only strong people can practice nonviolence because nonviolence needs courage.” This was the message that he gave to his people which still continues in form of the 2.3 million members of the Awami National Party Pakistan.

According to Senator Afrasiab Khattak, peace envoy, Government of Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, the nonviolence philosophy of Bacha Khan is based on the teachings of Buddhism and Islamic sagesness - the basic principles of Pashtuns and regional society which is fully aligned with universal humanism and bonding.

The west resisted the philosophy of nonviolence and struggle for freedom of Bacha Khan due to the cold war rivalry.
among the USSR, India the West. Thankfully this mind-set is slowly changing because violence can no more be confined to specific countries and regions. It is in this context that the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton quoted Bacha Khan in an Iftar (evening meal for breaking the daily fast during the Islamic month of Ramadan) dinner hosted by her “that we need to be inspired by our leaders to fight poverty, injustice and hate with, “the weapon of the Prophet—patience and righteousness.” Well, that, to me, sums up much of what we celebrate tonight as we breakfast.”

Over two million courageous followers of Bacha Khan are fighting the worst form of militant violence, social and political instability in Pakistan with the nonviolence weapon that Bacha Khan gave to them. Pashtuns are not only fighting this fight against militancy for their own survival but the broader regional and regional peace and stability.

What can be done?

- The civil society, academia and the international community need to study and analyse the struggle of Bacha Khan and create positive discourse through seminars and conferences to defeat extremism and bring peace in AfPak and the region.
- The people and governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India need to include the life of Bacha Khan in their national curricula to highlight positive role model to give hope for peace to the children and youth.
- The governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India need to find common bonds through the services of Bacha Khan and work towards free trade and shared market to bring economic prosperity for their future generations.
- Hollywood and Bollywood needs to make films on the life and struggle of Khan legacy to advance a greater, broader, and inspired understanding of what is currently perceived as Muslim, Pashtun, and Afghan. His heroic life offers a profound message of hope for these increasingly troubled times.

Notes:

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1. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Zama Zhwand au Jaddo Jehad( My Life and Struggle) (Kabul, 1983)
2. Afrasiyab Khattak ! Bacha Khan and Nonviolence, Kabul Seminar, Retrieved February 27, 2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3bXL3G2R1U
PARIS
“It is Paying the Price for Being a Global City”
by Fatih Eren
In this volume, Paris the capital city of France, which is also the fifth strongest economy of the world, has been examined in detail from a globalisation perspective.

Paris is located at the north of France. With its 12 million population, it is the biggest metropol of the country as well as it is one of the most populated metropolis in Europe. Paris is usually remembered as one of the most historic, culturally vital and physically beautiful global city by the world society. It has a significant role in making France as the most attractive country for tourists in the world. In 2009, in total 76.8 million tourists came to France and the fifteen million of these tourists visited Paris (Paris Convention and Visitors Bureau, 2010). The Paris region, which is also called as one of the world’s leading business, culture and tourism destination, accounts for almost a third of France’s gross domestic product (GDP).

France, which is one of the leading playmaker actors of the globalisation process, is naturally a member of the world’s first and strongest global organisations such as G20, NATO, WTO, OECD and UN. It is clear that France benefited very much from the globalisation process as two-sided thanks to its playmaker role. On one hand, France is the fourth country which attracts foreign direct investments in the world at the most. International companies were recently invested in Research & Development (R&D), energy and recycling sectors in the country in general. On the other hand, the number of French companies is at the highest among European-origin companies in the Top 500 Global Companies list (Fortune Magazine, 2011).
International French-origin companies (for example Renault, Peugeot, Danone, Carrefour, Axa, Groupama, BNP Paribas, GDF Suez and so on) mainly invested in strategic sectors such as automotive, retailing, insurance, food and cement in other countries.

France has an advantageous geographical position in Europe. In recent decades, using this advantage in a good way, it established a strong transportation and logistical infrastructure and network for itself in the European Union. In this way, it achieved to attract huge foreign capital. In 2010, 70% of all foreign investments in France were made by European countries especially by Germany and UK. France makes both
import and export trades mostly with Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, UK and USA. Therefore, it can be said that France is getting its economic power mainly from the European Union.

Due to changing world economic conditions, France’s share in the world trade decreased gradually in the last 10 years. 2008 global crisis became a turning point for the country. USA and Europe, which are the main trade partners of France, were affected badly from this crisis so the French economy entered in a harsh rocky road after this year. The number of investment projects with foreign capital decreased about 31% in 2010 when it was compared with the year 2008. This fall showed its direct impact quickly on the country’s unemployment rates. The unemployment rate rose to 9.8% in 2011 where it was 8% in 2007. The unemployment rate among young population was measured over 22% in the country (INSEE, 2011). The French government then took some measures to increase employment and to fire non-financial sector. The cost of these measures was very high so the government went into debt of a high percentage. The government planned an important and large project, which is called ‘the Great Paris Project’, for national economic recovery and development. It decided to borrow 35 billion euros for the realisation of this project. It then borrowed another 8 billion euros in May 2012 for other purposes. The public budget deficit went beyond 150 billion euros in 2012 where it was 60 billion euros in 2004 (France Economy Profile, 2012). The only way to get over this crisis was to attract more foreign direct investments into France according to the government. In this context, the government started a new practice, which is called ‘single window implementation’, to facilitate fiscal and administrative operations for foreign investors in the country. Incentives for FDIs were also increased.

**The impact of global concern for Paris: Analysis**

It has been found out that the globalisation process had four important impacts on Paris. Firstly, this process developed Paris into a global city; inflows and outflows increased in every respect. Secondly, a territorial fragmentation in socio-spatial terms emerged in the city. Thirdly, land and property prices and the cost of living increased dramatically. Finally, at the end of this process, social tension increased and social peace disappeared in Paris. These outcomes have been explained briefly below.

Paris has a strong global identity like London, New York and Shangai in the world, today. For many years, Paris is ranked in the first five cities in the global city index which is conducted annually by A.T. Kearney Global Management Consulting Firm and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. However, it has been argued that Paris has started to lose its strong global city image and its global attractiveness for foreign investments recently. In a new global city list which was conducted by KPMG, Paris was ranked seventh; it fell backwards to Berlin, Beijing and Mumbai. Again, in the global attractiveness index, Paris was ranked thirteenth. This decline can be explained with the rise of Asian countries such as China and India as well as the rise of some other developing countries such as Turkey, Brazil and South Korea as new political and economic global powers. Probably, the metropols of this kind of fast developing countries will be ranked at the highest levels in these lists in the next 10-20 years because the future of a global city is an issue which is directly associated with the political and economic global power of its home country. In other words, the decline of Paris in the indexes is an outcome of the deceleration of the development of the French national economy; its economic growth rate remained below the growth rates of other countries in recent years.

City of Paris has some bilateral agreements with some other cities such as Montreal, San Francisco, Chicago and Shangai. These agreements were signed to exchange best practices in innovation, transport and urban development fields and to set up joint businesses between these cities. In the development process of Paris into a global city, cooperation/partnerships with other strong cities played an important role.
Today, Paris became an important centre for trade fairs, seminars and professional conferences in the world. Again, it became an important destination for art and culture with its 130 theatres, 56 museums and 2 opera houses in the globalisation process. Sixteen institutions which have world-wide reputation exist in Paris. In short, the city provided significant contributions to the world in politics, entertainment, media, fashion, science and arts fields thanks to the globalisation process. However, this process also brought some problems to this city. Paris became a magnet for immigrants for many years in relation to France’s imperialist history. According to INSEE 2006 data, four millions
immigrants live in Paris, today. It means the 35% of the city’s total population consists of immigrants. In other words, Paris attracted many less skilled, less educated and poor people from other countries while attracting world’s elites and riches for a Bohemian life. The application of unsuccessful social policies which did not bring all communities together in peace in the city and did not bring social justice to Paris started to develop this city into an unliveable city in recent years. Paris was not ranked among the first 10 cities in the world’s most liveable cities list which was conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2011. Again, it was ranked thirty-first in the Mercer’s Quality of Living Index.

The social division between riches and poors also created a clear spatial division in the city. The northern and eastern regions of the city were mainly occupied by poor immigrants in years whilst the western and southern regions were occupied by rich elites. One of main reasons for the emergence of this sharp socio-spatial division was undoubtedly the removal of traditional manufacturing industries from the northern and eastern regions (deindustrialization) and the addition of high-value-added services and high-tech manufacturing industries in the western and southern regions in a planned way beginning from the 1970s.

This socio-spatial division between riches and poors caused a social explosion in 2005. Parisians who could not take enough share from the economic growth of the city, especially immigrant youngs, held destructive demonstrations for three months. Cars were burned down and public buildings and shops were looted in the riots. The globalisation process developed Paris into a global city but at the same time, it increased social tension significantly in this city.

As it has been experienced in all cities which were mostly developed with the help of foreign direct investments, life in Paris became more expensive but the purchasing power of local residents dropped significantly in the last 30 years. According to UBS’s 2011 survey, Paris was ranked
9th at the world’s most expensive cities index whilst it was ranked only 27th in the list of cities with the highest purchasing power for residents. Probably, this is the cost of being a global city.

Paris developed attracting foreign investments in its western and southern regions in economic terms. Some jobs were created thanks to these investments. However, foreign investments increased land and property prices dramatically in the urban and rural area. The main reason for this increase was that the property market players of Paris made generally speculative investments. They developed many residential and commercial buildings without finding final users for them. They considered that in the internationalized property market environment, they could easily find a global user or investor for their properties. Incoherences and ruptures between developers and final users developed Paris into the most expensive capital city of Europe in terms of the prices and rents of both residential and commercial units. The price/rent of one squaremeter of a flat or an office in Paris is over than London and Stockholm.

The French government and the governors of Paris are aware that the global attractiveness is decreasing and social problems are increasing gradually in the city. To find a permanent solution to these problems, two master plans were prepared for Paris recently. First was ‘the Paris Region Master Plan’ which was accepted and confirmed in September 2008. This plan basically aims to develop Paris into a more compact and more polycentric city region in the next 20 years. In addition, it aims to improve living conditions for residents, to develop 72,000 affordable new
housing units, to extend and strengthen transportation network and to decrease territorial fragmentation and inequalities in the Paris city region up to 2030. Second was ‘the Greater Paris Master Plan’ which was accepted and confirmed in June 2010. This plan targets initially to develop Paris into a city region, it then targets to increase the global attractiveness of this city region, to strengthen the global city identity and role of Paris, to make this city region a national economic growth motor and to increase life quality in this city region. In this context, it is planned to develop 8 territorial clusters of excellence and to establish strong transportation links between these economic development clusters and urban suburbs in the capital region in the next years. It should be kept in mind that all these investments will be made with loaned money and with the support of foreign capital.

Looking at these plans, it can be predicted that urban projects which aim to decrease social tension and to ensure economic vitality will gain speed in Paris. Large scale urban planning operations and iconic architectural projects have already been started in the city (For example the Plaine Saint Denis Renaissance and Paris North East Renewal Project the Paris Rive Gauche Redevelopment Project). The number of skyscrapers was low up to now because of height limitations in the city but many new skyscraper development projects have been started in La Defence to strengthen Paris’s global financial centre image in line with master plan decisions.

At this stage, the consistency of French government’s future Paris vision with Parisian’s future vision for their city should be interrogated and discussed. The government wants to protect and sustain Paris’s global city character opening its national economy, science and values to the world without seeking national borders and national discrimination. In contrast, the French society has entered in a more inward looking and more nationalist road in recent years. As seen in most of EU countries, nationalist, radical-right, dissociative tendencies and anti-global/anti-liberal expressions are on the rise in French society. Looking from this window, the answer of the below question stands as crucial for Paris: ‘What Paris really needs: more globalisation/liberalisation OR more localisation/nationalisation?’. Which one brings social justice to Paris? Which one solves the chronic problems of Paris? Which one receives a support from the Parisian community?

It is predicted that Paris’s property tax system will change soon because current tax system works for making wealthy regions more wealthy and for making poor regions poorer in the city. The Paris city governors do not want to live with this problem anymore. Again, it is predicted that urban operations to create residential mixity will speed up to decrease territorial fragmentation in the city. All empty or less dense urban areas will be reconsidered and probably these areas will undertake new mixed use functions in the near future in the context of attempts for making Paris a compact and a peaceful city region. Thanks to planned large transportation investments, which will be put into action with borrowed public money or with foreign capital, mobility from every corner to every where in the city will increase; but transportation costs will also rise significantly in the future.

In conclusion, Paris is a beautiful city with its man-made design and structures, wide three-line boulevards, street life, iconic buildings, individuality and eccentricity. It also has a strong global image, today. More importantly, Paris became a role model/good example for other world cities with its unique social policies and planning decisions in the last 100 years. Time will show us whether or not today’s proposed urban policies and planning decisions will make Paris again a good role model for other world cities and again a beautiful city in 2030.

Note:

* Fatih Eren is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Sheffield.
Khuda Kay Liye -
In the Name of God

by Amir Hamza Bangash
Khuda Kay Liye -
In the Name of God

By Amir Hamza Bangash

This film proves that most of the times things in Islamic Republic of Pakistan, will start with the name of Islam, but will end somewhere beyond it.

In the Name of God
Original Title: Khuda Kay Liye
Director: Shoaib Mansoor
Cast: Fawad Afzal Khan, Iman Ali and Austin Marie Sayre
Language: Urdu

The Pakistani Urdu Language Drama Film “Khuda Kay Liye (In the Name of God)”, literal translation “For God’s Sake”, is the story of misinterpretation of Islam and its backlash on the lives of people. The basic theme of this emotional 170 minutes long film revolves around the line that how much symbols of Islam are given preference over its essence. The movie encompasses the world’s politics and the use/misuse of religious card on the global and regional level to serve one’s own organized and latent interest. Besides accentuating the socio-cultural problems existing in the society, this film also reveals the symbolic power of influential magician clerics sitting in the mosques by promoting the extreme wishful version of Islam and complete observance of silence from the government’s camp to counter back despite knowing the gravity of prevailing situation. In a country, where no hygienic and unhygienic campaign can stay successful, unless approved and backed by the clerics, which raises from the Polio Vaccination to the existing terrorism in the name of Islam. This film proves that most of the times things in Islamic Republic of Pakistan, will start with the name of Islam, but will end somewhere beyond it.

It has successfully been placed as the Best Film in Roberto Rossellini Award and Fukuoka Audience Award. It is written, produced and directed by well-known Pakistani name ‘Shoaib Mansoor’. The music of the film is catered by the Javed Bashir, Shuja Haider, Ahmed Jahanzeb, Khawar Jawad and Lagan Band, which colors the hot issue in sugar coated way. The script, plot and footage
makes the film catchy and worth watching. Indeed it’s the blend of Oriental narratives and Western Paradigm.

The film kicks off with two brothers Mansoor (Shan) and Sarmad (Fawad Afzal Khan), who are emerging young singers in Lahore. Sarmad gets in touch with one of the radical religious clerics and gets galvanize with his wishful interpretation of Islam. He ceases all the musical activities, grows his beard and even starts dictating his mother to observe veil.

His younger paternal Uncle Hussain, who lives in England with his British girl friend to whom even he is not married, gets late shocks of resurrection as true Muslim and starts seriously thinking about the future of her daughter Mary (Iman Ali) to have Muslim kin, but she is already in relation with the British boy named ‘Dave’. Her father Hussain deceives her and takes her to the Waziristan (hub of local and foreign militants), a well-known tribal area in Pakistan and gets her forcefully married to his radical turned nephew Sarmad, who is also backed by the radical cleric for the noble cause.

Meanwhile, Mansoor also leaves for music school in Chicago and there he falls in love with Janie and ultimately gets marry, who quits smoking, alcohol etc everything for him. After 9/11, he becomes the victim of the FBI and racism for having Islamic background. Mary drops a letter for help in guise of writing for her father. She is finally taken back from the Waziristan by Sarmad’s parents but Mary brings her father and Sarmad to the court of the justice, where interesting arguments about the different version of Islam takes place.

This film has also put forward certain existing stereotypes prevailing among the male segment of the society of Pakistan, which ranges from their powerful status to go for any extreme to take a decision and impose it on the female. Film depicts the picture of the fragmented and confused society and families, who are totally unaware of their blessed acts, journey of life and destination.

Note:

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