Rukiye Patan | patanrukiye@gmail.com
She is currently a Research Fellow at CESRAN International. She is an MA student in the Department of International Relations at Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey.
Introduction
The beginning of 2021 started as the scene of a new Ukraine-Russia conflict in the Black Sea. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ceasefire between the two states continued to deteriorate steadily. In the spring of this year, Russia deployed large numbers of Russian troops to Donbas, on the Ukrainian border. Russia’s aggressive stance in the region and its hybrid war strategy against Ukraine continued to occupy an important place in NATO’s agenda. Indeed, Ukraine’s significant experience in deterring Russian aggression, both on the traditional battlefield and the hybrid battlefield extending to disinformation and cyberspace, has strengthened Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects.
While frequently expressing its commitment to the “open door” policy for countries seeking NATO membership, NATO has followed a stance of supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from the very beginning of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. In the joint statement issued by the heads of state at the NATO summit in Brussels in June 2021, it was mentioned that Russia’s aggressive actions pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Pointing out that Russia violated the values and trust in agreements supporting NATO-Russia relations, the document referred to the Ukraine-Russia conflict as follows: “Russia’s recent massive military build-up and destabilizing activities in and around Ukraine have further escalated tensions and undermined security. We call on Russia to reverse its military build-up and stop restricting navigation in parts of the Black Sea. We also call on Russia to stop impeding access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports. We commend Ukraine’s posture of restraint and diplomatic approach in this context. We seek to contribute to de-escalation. We are also stepping up our support to Ukraine” (NATO, 2021). NATO clearly opposes the illegitimate annexation of Crimea and Russian support for the separatists. Therefore, the official statement by NATO allies condemning Russia’s destabilizing activities in Eastern Ukraine strengthens the Russian perception that NATO will pursue policies aimed at increasing capacity and cooperation in the region.
Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership
Russia’s increase in its military capacity in the region has also increased the membership interaction between Ukraine and NATO. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky called on NATO member states to increase their military presence in the Black Sea, emphasizing that obtaining the NATO membership action plan, seen as a pathway to future membership is the most urgent issue (Sabbagh, 2021). Russia’s decision to withdraw its troops from Donbas and NATO’s declaration at the Brussels summit that it supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity raised questions about whether Ukraine’s membership would be realized. Although President Zelensky’s social media statement that NATO leaders confirmed Ukraine’s membership after US President Joe Biden’s refusal to give a yes or no answer to Ukraine’s membership at the Brussels summit strengthens these possibilities, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has made it clear that such an action is not imminent (Gould, 2021). Even though NATO has, in theory, expressed its response to the destabilization of Ukraine by Russia and the threat to its territorial integrity, in practice, Ukraine’s NATO membership appears to be a remote prospect. There are several reasons why Ukraine’s NATO membership is a remote prospect:
First, the real strength of the NATO alliance stems from the common interest and perception of the common threat. NATO, which has been rapidly adapting to the changing security environment in the Soviet and the post-Soviet period since its establishment, has expanded its sphere of influence with its “open-door” policy. Following its open-door policy, NATO followed a collaborative security strategy understanding based on improving relations with non-member states. In this sense, although collective defence was defined as one of the main strategic objectives at the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw Summits held after the annexation of Crimea, it seems difficult for NATO member states to follow a policy that will increase Russia’s aggression (Bağbaşlıoğlu, 2016: 653). If Ukraine becomes a NATO member, it will have the opportunity to benefit from the collective defence provided by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The members will consider an attack against one or more of them as an attack on all of them. Thus, as an ally, Ukraine will share its risks and responsibilities with the members due to its strategic partner status against possible Russian aggression (Kriendler, 2007: 7). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the former Soviet states -which are current NATO members like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania- would not want to take responsibility for Ukraine and provoke Russia. It should be taken into account that these Baltic states, which are geopolitically close to Russia and struggling with Russia’s disinformation and cyber attacks, may not want to implement Article 5.
Second, given Russia and Ukraine’s common geography and history, Ukraine’s NATO membership could result in a deep eastern and western divide, both in the region and on Ukraine’s internal borders. Currently, the western part of Ukraine supports pro-European policies, while the eastern part follows a pro – Russian policy. The political polarization and ethnic division of Ukraine, whose history, geography, and culture are intertwined with Russia, creates instability. Even if Ukraine finds a balance as to whether its direction should lie east or west, Ukraine will not act completely independently in domestic and foreign policy decisions. In this sense, the membership of a state intertwined with Russia will not be compatible with NATO’s collaborative security strategy (O’Hanlon, 2021). As a matter of fact, the presence of NATO warships has been decreasing in the Black Sea, despite NATO’s plans to increase its presence and ensure security in the Black Sea after the Ukraine-Russia conflicts since 2014. While NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg promised an increase in warships going to the Black Sea in 2017, no progress has been made four years later (Coffey and Kochis, 2021).
Third, Ukraine’s becoming a NATO member without carrying out its economic, military, and democratic reforms is seen as a remote prospect. According to the Freedom House Report (2021), which calculates citizens’ right to vote, freedom of expression and equality in law, Ukraine is a “partially free” country with a total score of 60 out of 100. In addition, Ukraine is in the hybrid regime category with 39 democracy scores, which includes ratings on independent media, civil society, national and local governance, and corruption (Freedom House, 2021). According to the 2020 Corruption Perception Index, Ukraine ranks 117th out of 180 countries with a score of 33 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2020). Ukraine is making slow progress in the fields of democracy and corruption in meeting the criteria required by NATO. Also, the inability of Ukraine to meet its defence needs in terms of military capacity necessitates military modernization and training. Ukraine must align its national security policy more closely with NATO’s global strategic policy to become a NATO member. Since 2016, NATO has been implementing a Comprehensive Aid Package (CAP) for Ukraine and has been taking steps to accelerate Ukraine-NATO cooperation by helping Ukraine achieve defence reform (Hvozd, 2019). The aim of implementing the Comprehensive Aid Package is to improve Ukraine’s defence capacity and ensure that the Ukrainian military army and NATO Allied forces work in harmony. Expanding training missions in Ukraine, providing support for the modernization of its military infrastructure, and holding joint military exercises can effectively transform Ukraine – NATO cooperation into membership. In this sense, Ukraine should prioritize its defence capacity and pursue reforms to strengthen its national security.
As a matter of fact, after the NATO summit in Brussels, Stoltenberg stated that “Ukraine is an aspirant country”, but this would not be possible without modernizing the defence-security centres, establishing civil-political control, and completing the fight against corruption reinforces the claim that Ukraine’s NATO membership is a remote prospect (Gould, 2021). Ensuring Ukraine’s membership could be a counterproductive strategic decision for NATO. Indeed, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov’s statement that Ukraine’s NATO membership would be a red line for Russia shows that if any membership decision is made, peace in the region will not be achieved for a long time (Balmforth, 2021). Apart from that, Ukraine still has a long way to go to meet the criteria for NATO membership. The fulfilment of economic, political, and democratic reforms is seen as an important step for functioning the Membership Action Plan. Ukraine should ensure its military modernization by furthering its military cooperation with NATO while laying the foundations for its democratic development.
Conclusion
Since the uprising of the Russian-backed separatists and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ceasefire in Ukraine-Russia relations has repeatedly broken down and tended to conflict. The ethnic and cultural division within the country, as well as the eastern and western separation, oblige Ukraine to consider the Russian factor while making its national decisions. In this sense, ensuring the NATO membership of a Ukraine, which is intertwined with Russian culture and history, can be a difficult strategic decision for both Ukraine and NATO to manage. The statement made by the NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, who bases Ukraine’s NATO membership on certain criteria, even after Russia has amassed its largest military troops in Donbas after a long time, confirms the above-mentioned reasons. The prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership seems remote.
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